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One of the most consistent features of the diverse artistic movements that have flourished 
throughout the twentieth century has been their willingness to experiment in diverse genres and 
across alternative art forms. Avant-gardes such as Expressionism, Dada, Surrealism, Futurism, 
Fluxus and Pop were composed not only of painters but also dramatists, musicians, actors, singers, 
dancers, sculptors, poets and architects. Their works represent a dramatic process of cross-
fertilization between the arts, resulting in an array of hybrid forms that defy conventional 
categorisation. This thesis investigates implications of this cross-disciplinary impulse and aims by 
doing so to open out a site in which to reassess both the manner in which the avant-gardes have 
been theorised and the impact their theorisation has had on contemporary aesthetics.  
 In the first part of this study, I revisit the work of the most influential theorists of the 
avant-garde in order to ask what the term “avant-garde” has come to signify.  I look at how 
different theories of the avant-garde and of modernism relate to one another as well as asking what 
effect these theories have had on attempts to evaluate the legacies of the avant-gardes. The work of 
Theodor Adorno provides a connective tissue throughout the thesis. In Chapter One, I use it to 
complicate Peter Bürger’s notion of the avant-garde as “anti-art” and to argue that the most 
pressing challenge that the avant-gardes announce is to think through the cross-disciplinarity that 
marks their work. In Chapter Two, I trace how painting has come to be considered as the 
paradigmatic modernist art form and how, as a result, the avant-garde has been read as a 
secondary, “literary” phenomenon to be grasped through its relation to painting. I argue that this 
constitutes a systematic devaluation of literature and has resulted in an “art historical” model of the 
avant-gardes which represses both their real radicality and implications of their work for these 
kinds of disciplinary structures. 
In the second part of this thesis, I explore works which examine and question the aesthetic 
hierarchies and notions of aesthetic autonomy that the theories of modernism and the avant-garde 
explored in the first part set up. In Chapter Three, I approach by way of two cross-disciplinary 
works which employ literature and visual art: Marcel Duchamp’s Green Box (1934) and Andy 
Warhol’s a; a novel (1968).  Works such as these, which slip through the gaps between literary 
and art history, have, I argue, important implications for literary and visual aesthetics but are often 
overlooked in disciplinary histories.   In my final chapter, I return to the theory of the avant-garde 
as it emerges in the work of Jean-Francois Lyotard. I examine how his work reconfigures 
Adorno’s aesthetics by performing the cross-disciplinary movement that it argues is characteristic 
of avant-garde art works. Tracing his “post-aesthetic” response to Duchamp and Warhol, I explore 
how Lyotard articulates a mode of practice that moves beyond the dichotomy of “art” and “anti-
art” and opens out a site in which the importance of the twentieth century avant-gardes is made 
visible.   
I conclude by briefly considering the implications of the avant-garde, as I have presented it 
in this thesis, for contemporary debates on the twenty-first century “digital avant-gardes” and 
recent writing on aesthetics. 
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“There is something like an explosion in the meaning of certain words,” remarked the 
artist Marcel Duchamp in a 1968 interview, “they have a value greater than their 
meaning in the dictionary” (Cabanne Dialogues 16). One word of which this is certainly 
true, and a word heavily associated with Duchamp himself, is “avant-garde”. The term 
has a long history that encompasses political, military and aesthetic discourses and has 
been used to describe cultural developments since at least the early nineteenth century.1 
Yet, in the course of the last few decades, since the year in which Duchamp made his 
remarks in fact, the expression “avant-garde” seems to have become increasingly 
freighted with meaning, associated with a specific set of twentieth-century artistic 
movements and intimately linked with the hopes and disappointments of late modernity. 
In this thesis, I examine this process, analysing how the avant-garde was theorised in the 
last decades of the twentieth century and exploring the debates that these theorisations 
have provoked. My primary aim is to interrogate how the theorisation of the avant-garde 
has impacted both upon our understanding of specific types of art work and upon 
aesthetics more broadly.  
The development of the term “avant-garde” and the debates over the its usage are 
to a great extent the result of Peter Bürger’s seminal Theory of the Avant-garde, which 
was published in 1974 but is nevertheless very much infused with the disappointment 
that followed the events of May 1968. Clearly delimiting the concept for the first time,2 
Bürger’s text used the term to describe the various radical artistic movements of early 
twentieth-century Europe. These “historical avant-gardes”, he argued, sought to restore a 
                                                 
1 It is well known that the term has military origins and that its application to artistic production dates back 
to at least 1825, when it was used by Henri Saint-Simon. However, as this thesis is an examination of how 
the term has been used in the late twentieth century and what it has come to mean since the 1970s, I will 
not rehearse the full history of the term here. For a comprehensive history of the word and its usage before 
the period I am discussing see Calinescu 95-148. For a discussion of how the term is used in different 
countries, something this thesis will touch on in Chapter Two, see Bäckström. 
2 This is not to credit Bürger with the first theory of the avant-garde. In fact his work is pre-dated by 
Rennato Poggioli’s Theory of the Avant-garde, published in Italian in 1962 and translated into English in 
1968. However, Poggioli’s work does not delimit a clear field for it does not define the avant-garde in any 
sense that would distinguish it from modern art more broadly. Bürger’s text, as the evidence of subsequent 
discussion shows, has been considerably more influential.  
 
2 
social function to art, to restructure society through a basis in art. It was, he concludes, a 
task at which they failed. Theory of the Avant-Garde has left a powerful legacy in the 
form of two central ideas, ideas which seem to have set the parameters for almost all 
subsequent discussion. The first of these is the description of avant-garde as “anti-art”, 
as operating through a practice of negation. It is this practice, according to Bürger, that 
distinguishes the avant-garde within the wider category of modern art. The second is the 
idea that authentically critical art has become impossible under the conditions of late 
twentieth-century capitalism, as the process of recuperation operates with increasing 
speed and ruthlessness: according to Bürger’s thesis, the avant-garde is “historical” or 
dead.  
Over time, however, Theory of the Avant-Garde has also come under scrutiny. 
Indeed, the book has been roundly criticised. Some have argued, quite rightly, that its 
scope is limited and its examples are few and very carefully chosen, which is to say that 
Theory of the Avant-garde is in effect a theory of Dada and Surrealism which fails to take 
account of any of the other movements that it purports to describe.3 Others have suggested 
that the central categories of aesthetic autonomy and life praxis remain inadequately 
theorised.4 Bürger’s blanket dismissal of the 1960s “neo” avant-garde has also been 
contested as both short-sighted and self-defeating, relying on a model of originality and 
repetition which by his own account the avant-garde set out to challenge.5 As a result, 
there has been a great deal of dispute over Bürger’s conclusions, generating what Paul 
Mann has recently described as an “interminable discourse of termination” (115).6 Theory 
                                                 
3 It is for this reason that Richard Murphy, for example, attempts to supplement Bürger’s thesis with work 
on German Expressionism in Theorizing the Avant-Garde: Modernism, Expressionism and the Problem of 
Postmodernity. Likewise, Boris Groys’ Total Art of Stalinism effectively challenges the applicability of 
Bürger’s conclusions in the context of the Russian avant-gardes.  
4 Murphy questions Bürger’s theorisation of autonomy (see Theorizing the Avant-Garde 31-33), a move 
which I will discuss in Chapter One of this thesis. Ben Highmore examines his theorisation of “life praxis” 
in his essay “Awkward Moments: Avant-gardism and the Dialectics of Everyday Life”.  
5 See in particular “The Primary Colours for the Second Time” by Benjamin Buchloh and “What’s Neo 
about the Neo-Avant-garde?” by Hal Foster. 
6 Contributions to this debate, which operate within the framework of Theory of the Avant-garde, have 
been made by Suzie Gablik, Octavio Paz, Hans Magnus Enzensberger, Benjamin Buchloh, Richard 
Murphy, Hal Foster, Dietrich Scheunemann and Andreas Huyssen. These contributions will be referenced 




of the Avant-Garde, in short, has been revealed as flawed and internally contradictory, its 
conclusions disputed and its assumptions exposed: Bürger’s theory of failure appears as a 
failed theory. As far as the avant-garde goes, Mann concludes “there is, precisely, nothing 
left to say” (3).7  
Yet despite these criticisms, Bürger’s definition of the avant-garde as “anti-art” has 
nevertheless been broadly accepted. This is despite the fact that it clearly reduces a 
complex and heterogeneous set of phenomena to a single conceptual idea, the gesture of 
negation. It is this state of affairs to which this thesis responds: the central argument and 
assumptions of Theory of the Avant-garde have been largely discredited, the debate over 
the death of the avant-garde has ground to a halt, yet the theoretical reduction of the avant-
garde to “anti-art” has barely been challenged.8 This is all the more surprising given the 
recent critical effort that has been expended on examining the related category 
“modernism”, the conceptualisation of which is intricately bound up with the idea of the 
“avant-garde”. Modernism, it is widely recognised, had been reduced and caricatured in 
discourse in order to provide a relief against which “postmodern” perspectives could be 
constructed. In the last decade or so, the category has undergone an extensive revaluation 
during which its complexities and richness have been restored.9 The term “avant-garde”, 
however, has not been revisited in this manner. The second aim of my research, then, is to 
argue against the reduction of the category “avant-garde” to mere “anti-art”. In this sense, 
this thesis should also be read as a defence. 
                                                 
7 Although, as the page number here indicates, Mann goes on to write a whole book on the subject, the 
arguments of which I will discuss further in Chapter One. 
8 One exception here is the recent work of Krzysztof Ziareck, who, as his two monographs The Historicity 
of Experience (1999) and The Force of Art (2004) show, is in the process of developing an understanding 
of the avant-garde work as an operation of transformative force or event. Ziareck’s writing touches upon 
some of the arguments that I will be setting out in Chapter Four and, I would suggest, represents the 
development of a trajectory opened out by Heidegger which can be held in comparison (and sometimes 
runs parallel) to the Adornian trajectory with which I am concerned. Another important contribution to 
this Heideggerian strand would be Andrew Benjamin’s Art, Mimesis and the Avant-garde (1991). 
Although I will not deal with this line of development directly, I will indicate points at which the two 
might be productively compared.  
9 This is evidenced by works such as Eysteinsson’s The Concept of Modernism and Peter Nicholls’ 
Modernisms. Indeed, as both these works show, the concept has been sufficiently broadened that there is 
now a question over whether the avant-gardes should be grasped as part of modernism: Eysteinsson 
discusses the question at length, see his Chapter Four, 143-178.  
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Several possible paths open out, of course, so before setting out the approach I 
have decided upon, it is perhaps worth explaining which of these paths I have chosen not 
to take. One response to the problems of theorising the avant-garde would be to simply 
reject outright the attempt to impose a narrow conceptual category on a wide and diverse 
historical phenomenon, and instead to divert energy to mapping out the field.10 Rather 
than concern myself with overarching theoretical frameworks, I might have turned to the 
excavation and reconstruction of the different aspects of the avant-gardes, bringing to light 
a forgotten movement, perhaps, or inviting “lost” artists to step out of the shadows. 
However, it seems to me that as well as adding layers to the sediments of “avant-garde” 
history an examination of this sedimentation, these accumulated layers, is also in order. It 
is for this reason that my primary focus is not so much the history of the works and 
movements of the avant-gardes but rather the history of the idea and theorisation of the 
“avant-garde”. This said, however, the way in which I attempt to recast this debate does 
involve the examination of works that, for reasons that I will come to shortly, have 
received very little critical attention indeed: I hope, therefore, that my research does 
contribute in a modest way to the enrichment of the field and material history of the avant-
gardes.  
Another course of action would have been to attempt to construct a “better” theory 
by which to consider the avant-gardes. Such work has been undertaken, indeed attempts to 
counter Bürger’s dismissal of late twentieth century art (i.e. attempts to counter the death 
sentence he bestows) have often constructed alternative models by which these works and 
their relation to the earlier works of the historical avant-gardes can be grasped. In this 
respect, the Lacanian models adopted by the critics associated with the journal October 
have been particularly important.11 These attempts all impact upon this thesis at points. I 
                                                 
10 That such work is well underway is evidenced by many recent studies, for example the archival work on 
the Central European avant-gardes (see Benson and cs) and also on the female avant-gardists who 
have been all but written out of the history of the avant-gardes despite having played central roles in the 
movements (see Hemus and Sawleson Gorse). 
11 See Krauss, “Notes on the Index” and Foster “What’s Neo about the Neo Avant-Garde?” Other critics 
have attempted to develop alternative theories of the avant-garde by suggesting that, rather than being 
driven by self-criticism, the avant-gardes were driven by the development of mass culture and technology. 
Andreas Huyssen, for example, while largely accepting Bürger’s parameters, has tried to widen them by 
suggesting that what marked the avant-garde as distinct from modernism is its engagement with mass 
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have decided against such a path, however, for I believe—and will argue—that any single 
attempt to “correctly” grasp the avant-garde effectively misses the point: the schismatic 
relationship between the works of the avant-gardes and attempts to theorize, I will suggest, 
is indicative of a more profound resistance to discourse manifest within avant-garde art.12 
For this reason, I would argue that constructing an alternative theory obscures rather than 
responds to the problem of Theory of the Avant-Garde.  
Rather than attempting to define or conceptualise the term “avant-garde”, then, I 
want to use it as a heuristic device by which to open out a certain nexus of ideas, patterns 
of thought, viewing and reading, to allow the explosion of meaning in the term to make 
itself felt. In this thesis, I want to ask how the avant-garde has been constructed in the 
theoretical discourse that has accumulated over the last decades and to what effect. My 
aim is not to conceptualise the avant-garde “properly”, nor to “correct” its history: rather, 
what I want to discover is what is at stake in the process of theorising the avant-garde and 
how this process has impacted on how we understand art and the relationships between the 
arts.  
Given that part of my project is to examine how these debates construct and frame 
particular artworks in certain ways, it seems only logical to focus on the work of those 
artists who have been central to this project. Two figures in particular stand out in this 
respect, namely Duchamp and his heir apparent Andy Warhol.13 In almost every account 
                                                                                                                                                
culture. This opens the door to a reconsideration of the “neo” avant-gardes as reacting to a different 
technological context, which in turn recasts their work as “authentic” responses to the position of art in 
society. In this regard see also Scheunemann “On Photography and Painting,” and David Hopkin’s 
introduction to Neo-Avant-garde (1-15). If I do not deal with these alternatives in this thesis it is because 
they are grounded in precisely the same larger, Marxist framework as Bürger’s work and therefore operate 
more to shift emphasis than to change the terms of the debate. 
12 It is for this reason that I take Ziareck’s attempt to think through avant-garde art as operating as event to 
be the most compelling contribution to recent debates. To reiterate, though, our projects are different: I am 
effectively examining the background out of which the necessity for his work (and of course his work 
itself) arises. Indeed, I hope that this thesis helps to illuminate what is at stake in Ziareck’s work.  
13 Duchamp is usually seen to have set the stage for the activities of art world throughout the 1950s and 
60s, and is positioned as patriarch, fathering a generation of (metaphorical) artistic ‘sons’: he is “the 
Daddy of Dada and the Grandpa of Pop”, as one critic wrote in 1967 (qtd. A. Jones Postmodernism xii) 
His work has thus played a crucial role in the art historical appraisal of neo-avant-garde artists such as, in 
the American context, William de Kooning, Jasper Johns, and Claes Oldenberg and in the European 
context Yves Klein, Gerhard Richter, and Marcel Broodthalers. Indeed, it is this patriarchal structure of 
Duchamp discourse that has attracted recent criticism: its implications are the main focus of Amelia Jones’ 
monograph Postmodernism and the En-Gendering of Marcel Duchamp. While Jones concentrates on re-
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under examination in this thesis, Duchamp’s readymade is positioned as the paradigmatic 
avant-garde gesture.14 Unsurprisingly, then, it is to the readymade that Warhol’s silk-
screened paintings of banal everyday imagery are often seen to respond: they are, for 
instance, the key example of the “neo” avant-garde in Bürger’s thesis.15 This was not an 
original pairing in Bürger’s work, however; from the outset, Warhol’s art was labelled as 
“Neo Dada,” or as, as one early reviewer put it, “Anti-Art with capital A’s” (Glueck 6).16 
Over subsequent decades, his paintings and films have often been contextualized in the 
framework of Duchamp’s work. Warhol’s embrace of the automatic, his fascination with 
technological reproduction and his rejection of the human and emotional—all of which 
can be understood as Duchampian traits—has made his work appear every bit as 
challenging as Dada did half a century earlier.17 Focusing on these artists’ work and how it 
has been positioned thus gives me immediate purchase on the various theoretical 
approaches in which their work figures, allowing direct and often illuminating 
comparisons between different critical positions. Importantly, by focusing on these key 
                                                                                                                                                
reading Duchamp’s work in order to destabilise the gendering of this heritage, it was this masculine 
gendering itself which was the subject of David Hopkin’s recent exhibition Dada’s Boys (Fruitmarket 
Gallery, Edinburgh 2007), which examined Duchamp’s influence on subsequent generations of male 
artists. My own interest is not in the role that Duchamp’s legacies play in the gendering of the avant-garde 
and art history, important though this is, but more in the role they have taken in structuring and reinforcing 
the way in which the concept avant-garde has been theorised.  
14 Such is Duchamp’s ubiquity in theories of the avant-garde, in fact, that it has itself become a subject of 
some debate. See Perloff “Dada without Duchamp/ Duchamp without Dada” and Amelia Jones 
Postmodernism and the En-gendering of Marcel Duchamp (passim). However, as David Cunningham’s 
2006 article “Making an Example of Duchamp: History, Theory, and the Question of the Avant-Garde” 
argues such a thing as an “example of the avant-garde” may well be a contradiction in terms. Following 
Adorno, Cunningham argues that the avant-garde must logically be marked by its non-identity and 
difference. This means that examples cannot be given, for once a work is “exemplary” of a shared trait it 
must logically be excluded from the avant-garde. Although our focuses are different, the ideas and 
questions that Cunningham outlines in this essay and others overlap with the questions that this thesis 
focuses upon: he seeks to grasp the temporality inscribed in the idea of avant-garde, while I am examining 
its theorisation and cross-disciplinarity. I am nevertheless very much indebted to his work for a deeper 
grasp of the problematic of the avant-garde. 
15 See Bürger, Theory 61. This is also the subject of Benjamin Buchloh’s “Andy Warhol’s One 
Dimensional Art”. Again, Amelia Jones discusses how this relation has been naturalized in art historical 
discourse (51-54). 
16 For more on the reception of Pop see Pratt, The Critical Response to Andy Warhol. For a scholarly 
analysis of this reception, see Harrison, Pop Art and the Origins of Post-Modernism.  
17 Warhol actually always claimed to know very little about Duchamp and denied any influence. Whether 
this is actually the case is very difficult to confirm. Certainly, those around Warhol knew about Dada, his 
friend and flatmate Philip Pearlstein, for example, wrote a thesis on Picabia while living with Warhol; see 
Buchloh, “Three Conversations” 37-45. 
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players, I am also attempting to show that even the most theorized or recuperated avant-
garde works might be seen to challenge the conceptual categories that are imposed upon 
them.  
In order to contextualise these constructions in the wider philosophical, political 
and aesthetic discussions that they address, it is necessary to situate the debates on the 
avant-garde as responding to a particular set of inter-related events and phenomena which 
mark the period: as I have already intimated, these include the crisis of Marxism that 
followed the events of May 1968, and the emergence of the idea of “postmodernism”.18 
Another, more precise event of special significance in this regard is the publication of 
Theodor Adorno’s late magnum opus Aesthetic Theory in 1970. Adorno’s work provides a 
connective tissue throughout the debates under discussion; recognising the engagement 
with Adorno’s aesthetics that these works articulate, I will argue, is a crucial step towards 
understanding what is at stake in the theorisations of the avant-garde.19  
In Chapter One of this thesis, therefore, I look at how the avant-garde is set up by 
Bürger in counter-distinction to Adorno’s aesthetics and spend some time examining this 
relationship. I argue that Bürger’s work relies upon a problematic simplification of 
Adorno’s notion of aesthetic autonomy and that, as a result, it fails to take account of the 
real complexity of the works which it depends upon. However, my reading of Adorno’s 
essay “Art and the Arts”, in which the German theorist notes that the attempt to reach 
beyond the sphere of “art” into society (and thus to give art a social function) is often 
accompanied by the attempt to mix media and explore relationships among the arts, allows 
me to recast the conclusions of Theory of the Avant-Garde and to locate in Bürger’s work 
the germ of an alternative angle by which to approach to the avant-garde: a consideration 
of the relationships between the different arts and how they impact on one another. I 
attempt to develop the importance of this line of approach throughout the thesis, tracing 
                                                 
18 For a considered account of the 1970s historical context and its fascination with the artistic movements 
of the early twentieth century see Huyssen “The Search for Tradition”.  
19 Adorno’s aesthetics, as I approach them in this thesis, are a broader project than just Aesthetic Theory 
and include the essays that were written during the period that Aesthetic Theory was being developed, 
many of which have been collected in Notes to Literature (1991). 
 
8 
how avant-garde works are seen, by all the theorists discussed, to be marked by an 
impulse towards cross-disciplinarity.  
In the Anglo-American context, Bürger’s work has been understood less as a 
response to Adorno than as in dialogue with the ideas of Clement Greenberg to whom I 
turn in the pivotal chapter of this thesis, Chapter Two, which draws out many of the ideas 
with which the second half of the thesis will be engaged. In this context, Bürger’s 
distinction between the “historical” and “neo” avant-gardes has been grasped as 
paralleling a distinction between modernism and postmodernism: Bürger’s “historical” 
avant-garde is presented as a phenomenon contemporary with but opposing Greenberg’s 
modernist avant-garde (for Greenberg the terms are interchangeable) and which prefigures 
the postmodernist works of the “neo” avant-garde. However, while their terminology is 
different, it is striking that Greenberg identifies the same distinct patterns and impulses 
outlined by Bürger and Adorno. Indeed, mapping Greenberg and Bürger’s thought onto 
one another indicates that while the terminology may shift, a pattern can be discerned in 
twentieth-century art, a pattern in which artworks are seen to either turn inwards to 
explore their own media (Bürger calls this self-criticism) or to reach outwards, to 
experiment with other art-forms and with non-art (system-immanent criticism). Building 
on the groundwork established by Chapter One, it is this latter impulse, art’s attempt to 
transgress the boundaries imposed upon it by its medium and to engage with other arts, 
that this chapter takes as its focus.  
For both Bürger and Greenberg, Duchamp and Warhol play key roles. Bürger, 
concentrating on the 1917 readymade Fountain, argues that while Duchamp’s work is 
authentically avant-garde, Warhol’s repetition of the same gesture is inauthentic. For 
Greenberg, both Duchamp and Warhol represent what he sneeringly terms “avant-
gardism”, a term that is meant to indicate the artists’ miscomprehension of the proper aims 
of art. The proper aim of each art, Greenberg argues, is to refine and distil its medium in 
an attempt to identify its unique properties and effects. In this light, Duchamp and Warhol 
stand accused of “medium-scrambling”, which Greenberg describes as mixing or 
confusing the properties and effects of different media. In other words, what Greenberg 
objects to is their cross-disciplinarity, which he derides as “literary”. I examine his use of 
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this term and the hierarchies that it sets up, and drawing out the way in which the 
comparison between literature and painting is made in terms of social engagement in 
Greenberg’s work, try to show how this helps to illuminate the “avant-garde” problem of 
art’s function in society.  
It is at this juncture that a specific inter-art relationship—the relationship between 
painting and literature—comes to appear especially significant.20  For Greenberg, it 
emerges, these art forms represent opposite poles: literature is associated with 
conceptuality (with what Adorno calls the rational and unifying pole of experience), with 
the idea of transparency or the clarity of a signal, while painting is associated with 
materiality (the diffuse and mimetic pole of aesthetic experience), opacity, or noise. This 
distinction and apparent antithesis between these two arts becomes a grounding element of 
Greenberg’s thought and, I attempt to show throughout Chapter Two, has had significant 
impact on subsequent debates. A central question, then, is what it means to call a work (in 
any medium, including language) “literary”. From this perspective, moreover, Duchamp 
and Warhol become particularly interesting for while both are known primarily for their 
visual art—paintings, photography, installations and films—they also share an active 
interest in literature. Both artists produced numerous books and textual works, exploring 
the conventions of literary writing as well as the conditions of literary production as a part 
of their broader cross-artistic projects. These experiments, however, have received very 
little critical attention, although these two artists are among the most exhaustively 
researched figures of the twentieth century. In an attempt to highlight the avant-garde 
impulse to cross-disciplinarity, therefore, in both Chapters One and Two I concentrate my 
readings of Duchamp and Warhol on the points at which their visual art work engages 
directly with literature or employs “literary” strategies.21 The disciplinarity against which 
                                                 
20 Of course, this particular inter-artistic comparison has a long history. It is thus illuminating to trace 
which of the arts is privileged at certain moments, for it gives us an insight into the aesthetic values of the 
time. For more on the relationship between literature and visual arts, see Steiner The Colours of Rhetoric. 
21 While the way in which the other arts (particularly music and theatre) appear in relation to these debates 
would be a fascinating thread to weave into discussion, I regret that it would necessitate a far larger 
project, one beyond the scope of a single thesis. I do, however, try to indicate points in this thesis at which 
such comparisons might be fruitful. 
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their work protests, I am attempting to show, has framed their work in a certain way:22 
approaching from a different angle, as I try to do, reveals new insights into their work and 
brings previously ignored aspects of the works to the fore.  
In the remainder of Chapter Two, I trace how this opposition between painting 
and literature becomes increasingly ingrained in discussion of modernism and 
postmodernism. It is in relation to this debate and this aesthetic hierarchy, I go on to 
suggest, that Thierry de Duve’s recent attempt to locate Duchamp’s readymades as a 
form of painting should be understood. Looking at his Pictorial Nominalism (1991) and 
Kant After Duchamp (1996), I argue that while the key point of de Duve’s work—the 
idea that the “literary” avant-garde and “painterly” modernism are intimately 
connected—is of crucial importance, his work is ultimately in danger of re-inscribing the 
hierarchy that Greenberg constructs, subsuming the work of the avant-gardes as a 
negative manifestation of painting, and thus reducing them to “anti-art” once again. De 
Duve’s reading of Fountain as a nominalist gesture, however, allows a fresh insight into 
the relationship between art and language, reconsidering the role of aesthetic judgement 
and naming in art-making.  
I conclude this chapter by examining Jay Bernstein’s recent response to de Duve, 
which appears in his volume Against Voluptuous Bodies: Late Modernism and the 
Meaning of Painting (2006). Bernstein’s work constitutes a defence of modernism, but 
one that over-simplifies the role of the avant-garde, positioning it once again as anti-art. 
In his Adornian narrative in which art is continually in threat of being overwhelmed by 
the forces of rationalisation, art’s only defence, Bernstein argues, in is the materiality of 
the medium. Painting, Bernstein thus argues, as the most self-consciously material of the 
arts, is the form which most rigorously defends the “lost authority of nature” (11), the 
preservation of which he presents as being at stake in modern art. Thus, although he 
                                                 
22 One thing that has been striking about post-1968 discussion of the avant-gardes is that it has taken place 
largely in an art-historical context. Although there has been a resurgence of interest in literary avant-
gardes recently, driven particularly by the work of Marjorie Perloff, “avant-garde” is still a term that is 
used considerably less often in literary studies than “modernism”. In this thesis, I aim to show that the 
questions that the avant-gardes and the theorizations of the avant-garde raise are important across different 
disciplines. Unlike Jake Kennedy, however, I do not want to construct a “literary” history of the avant-
gardes but rather to suggest that it is their cross-disciplinarity that is important about the avant-gardes. 
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distances himself from Greenberg’s arguments, Bernstein echoes Greenberg’s 
conclusions on painting, presenting Adorno’s thought as leading to a scenario in which 
the medium specificity of abstract painting is privileged and considered more rigorous 
than the “meretricious” (215) medium-scrambling of the avant-gardes. However, I 
suggest, although he does not necessarily recognise it as such, Bernstein’s work also 
presents a useful alternative framework for thinking about the task of avant-garde art, a 
framework in which the avant-garde is not reduced to a negative anti-art gesture, but can 
be thought of in positive terms as a gesture of “integral nominalism”. This “avant-garde” 
gesture has consequences for a considerably broader field than either de Duve or 
Bernstein acknowledge: how it impacts on the fields of literature and philosophy will be 
discussed in Chapters Three and Four. 
Bernstein’s dismissal of the avant-garde exemplifies one direction in which 
Adorno’s aesthetics can be taken. In the second half of the thesis, attempting to counter 
this judgement and to launch a defence of the avant-garde which counters its reduction 
to mere anti-art, I attempt to show that other directions have also been taken, directions 
which reveal the real potential of the cross-disciplinarity of the avant-gardes. In Chapter 
Three, therefore, I continue my project of drawing out the cross-disciplinary projects of 
Duchamp and Warhol, using their work to reconsider the relationship between literature 
and visual arts. Focusing on two works, Duchamp’s masterpiece, The Bride Stripped 
Bare by her Bachelors, Even (La Mariée Mise à Nu per ses Célibataires, Même 1915-
1944)23 and Warhol’s seldom discussed a; a novel (1968), the key aim here is show that 
these works are as much in dialogue with literature as they are with painting,24 and thus 
to locate literature as a site of equal importance vis-à-vis the stakes of modern art. I also 
                                                 
23Duchamp used a mixture of English and French titles for his works: sometimes there are commonly used 
translations, as with Given and The Bride Stripped Bare; sometimes the title works in both languages, as 
with Fountain; sometimes there is only an English title, for example ‘readymades,’ or only a French title, 
for example Tu’m. When there are two titles, I will cite the French title along with the dates at the first 
mention of the work and use the English titles within the text. All of the titles and dates of Duchamp’s 
work are taken from the catalogue complied by Schwarz.  
24 Studies of modern literature quite frequently make reference to writers adopting painterly strategies, yet 
in studies of modern painting the impact of literature is barely mentioned. Indeed, as I shall try to show in 
Chapter Two, one sometimes gets the impression that, rejecting the function of representation, art turned 




aim to show that in their work these artists recognise and engage with the gesture of 
integral nominalism itself. In developing this argument I follow the same logic as the 
Adornian arguments set out in Chapter One, thereby beginning to develop a counter-
reading to Bernstein’s. 
I develop this reading further in Chapter Four, by returning to the 1970s debate 
and to another theorisation of the avant-garde, in the form of the work of philosopher 
Jean-François Lyotard. Lyotard’s theoretical reformulation of the task and responsibility 
of avant-garde art has been somewhat overshadowed by his far more widely known 
work on the postmodern condition, and therefore has not yet been brought to bear on 
discussion of the legacies of the avant-garde. Yet, as any glance over his body of work 
shows, Lyotard is consistently and intimately engaged with the art of the historical 
avant-gardes. In Chapter Four, I trace this engagement looking at his early monograph 
on Duchamp and related experimental essays, which, I argue, also show evidence of a 
deep engagement with Warhol’s art. I then turn to his later direct reconfiguration of the 
term “avant-garde” in The Inhuman. In both periods, although in different ways, 
Lyotard’s work is centrally engaged with the question of the relationship between the 
arts and the implications of the avant-garde transgression of the conventions of media. 
Indeed in his 1970s work, I suggest, Lyotard’s is so intimately engaged with this 
question that he takes on the avant-gardist mantel and performs this mixing of effects 
and procedures in his writing, attempting to develop an avant-garde theory rather than a 
theory of the avant-garde.25 Although he later distances himself from such experiments, 
I argue that they remain of profound importance for his later work. What Lyotard uses 
avant-garde strategies to do, I suggest, is to alter the relationship between criticism and 
its objects: indeed it is this task of transforming critical relations that might be thought of 
as moving the avant-garde more broadly beyond the idea of negation.  
                                                 
25 The work of several of Lyotard’s contemporaries has been discussed in this way. For example, 
Calinescu discusses Deleuze and Foucault in these terms (130) while, as I try to show in Chapter Four, 
Derrida has been most often identified with the avant-garde legacy. The influence of the historical avant-
gardes on Lyotard’s work, although equally profound has not yet been fully sketched out. I attempt to 




The common thread throughout these two periods is Adorno: Lyotard’s work is 
at once a complex critique of the German philosopher and a development of his 
aesthetics and it is only through tracing the thread of this engagement, I suggest, that the 
full implications of Lyotard’s reworking of the avant-garde are revealed. Reading his 
work in this way, allows me to present Lyotard’s thought on the task and achievements 
of the avant-garde as an alternative reading of Adorno, a reading that can be contrasted 
with Bernstein’s pessimistic modernism and which, through its commitment to avant-
garde cross-disciplinarity, opens out the German philosopher’s thought in ways that 
have important ramifications for any contemporary account of modernist or avant-
gardist aesthetics.  
 Exploring the avant-garde from the angle of its resistance to disciplinary 
restraints, I hope to show, opens out not only a space in which to re-read art, literature 
and theory but also shifts relations that have come to appear fixed into different and 
surprisingly illuminating constellations. This relatively simple change of perspective 
shows, I hope, that we still have a great deal to learn from the twentieth century avant-























Chapter One  
 
 “Art” and the Erosion of the Arts 
 
 What the avant-garde does not tolerate about the bourgeoisie is its language. 
 – Roland Barthes 
 
“Russia needs a political revolution. America needs an artistic one” (Roché 151), 
declared The Blindman, a little magazine written and published in New York in April 
1917. The author of these words, Henri Pierre Roché, could hardly have imagined how 
prophetic his statement would later seem. Although he would certainly have known that 
New York’s first Exhibition of Independent Artists was soon to open, Roché could not 
have foreseen that this would later be remembered as one of the most significant events 
in twentieth-century art history.26 Nor would he have been able to predict what the 
catalyst of this artistic revolution would be. For while he may have been aware that his 
friend and Blindman co-editor Marcel Duchamp intended to submit a work to the 
exhibition, Roché would not have known that this “work” would take the form of the 
now notorious Fountain.27 (Fig. 1.1) 
A urinal, turned over and “signed,” Fountain is one of the most provocative of 
Duchamp’s works. Certainly it is the most famous of his readymades, a genre that was  
                                                 
26 Based on the Parisian Salon des Indépendants, the exhibition provided a space outside the gallery 
system in which aspiring artists of all levels of experience and talent could show their work. There was a 
hanging committee, responsible for organisation and administration, but no jury: everything submitted 
would quite simply be shown without exception and, to prevent the individual taste of the committee from 
impinging on the event, the works would be hung in alphabetical order. For more on the history of the 
exhibition see Thierry de Duve, “Given the Richard Mutt Case.” 
27 It is worth noting here that, at the time, the urinal did not in fact attract a great deal of attention and 
Duchamp’s involvement in what would come to be known as The Richard Mutt Case was concealed: it is 
retroactively since the 1960s that the significance of this event has really been constructed. This is to say 
that the “scandal” that surrounds Fountain is a product of art history. Indeed, whether the work was 
actually exhibited at all is open to question. Pierre Cabanne, for example, claims it was exhibited behind a 
screen (Duchamp & Co. 28-33) and “The Richard Mutt Case”, a text attributed to Duchamp, suggests it 
was never shown at all. For an interesting reading of Duchamp’s involvement in the events surrounding 
Fountain’s submission see de Duve “Given the Richard Mutt Case.” See also Camfield’s Marcel 





Fig. 1.1 Marcel Duchamp, Fountain (1917). 
Photograph by Alfred Stieglitz. 
 
defined in 1934 by André Breton as “manufactured objects promoted to the dignity of 
works of art through the choice of the artist” (“Lighthouse” 88). Breton’s definition 
pivots on the opposition between the unique artwork and the mass-produced object, 
between conventional ideas regarding artistic media and the radical proposition that the 
artist’s prerogative alone is what generates art. Fountain appears as a paradox: it 
represents an attack on the conventions of art via the deliberate introduction of non-art 
into an art context and, at the same moment, to operate as the confirmation of art’s 
ability to transcend the opposition, a celebration of artistic freedom. Quite deliberately 
indeterminate, the gesture hovers between iconoclasm and affirmation. 
  As a result, Fountain has played a central role in debates on the relationship 
between aesthetic experience and wider social experience throughout the twentieth 
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century. In Peter Bürger’s Theory of the Avant-garde (1974), for example, the urinal 
appears as a paradigmatic example of avant-garde anti-art.28 For Bürger the central 
problematic to which the avant-garde responds is the autonomy of art, the separation of 
art from what he terms “life praxis”: it is this autonomy that the avant-garde seeks to 
challenge through a sequence of strategic negations. The readymade serves as a key 
piece of evidence in Bürger’s argument, illustrating the negation of the categories of 
work and individual craftsmanship. This positioning comes at the cost of significant 
reduction, however, as situating Fountain as a gesture of negation is to ignore its 
constitutive ambiguity and complexity. Opening out the aspects of Fountain that are 
suppressed in Bürger’s approach, I hope to show in this chapter, enables a different set 
of concerns and questions to emerge which, in turn, reveal the limitations of the 
theoretical framework of Theory of the Avant-garde. My intention here, however, is not 
so much to critique Bürger’s thesis—the inconsistencies and contradictions of Theory of 
the Avant-garde have already received a good deal of attention—as to locate in his work 
the germ of an alternative framework, one that I think provides a better means by which 
to approach both Duchamp and the avant-garde more broadly.29 In order to develop this, 
I will go back to Bürger’s own key source, namely fellow Frankfurt-School theorist 
Theodor Adorno. Returning to Adorno, and in particular to the ideas set out in his 1967 
essay “Art and the Arts” establishes a crucial connection between the problem of 
aesthetic autonomy, anti-art and the media of the arts, thus allowing the question of art’s 
relation to non-art to be posed rather differently. Importantly, this generates a site in 
which the artwork can be approached without being reduced to the articulation of a 
single idea or intention: it thus provides a means to account for the full force of the 
ambiguity and instability of gestures such as Fountain.  
 
                                                 
28 Duchamp himself disliked the term anti-art and considered himself, if anything, an “an-artist:” “I am 
against the word ‘anti’,” he told Arturo Schwarz, “because it’s a bit like atheist, as compared to believer. 
And an atheist is just as much of a religious man as the believer is, and an anti-artist is just as much of an 
artist as the other artist” (Schwarz 1:33). See also Paz, Appearance Stripped Bare 22. Nevertheless 
Duchamp’s contribution to twentieth-century art history is very much framed by this idea. 
29 A good discussion of the problems with Bürger’s thesis can be found in the opening chapter of Richard 
Murphy’s Theorizing the Avant-garde 1-48. See also the references given in the introduction to this thesis 
(2n3, 4, 5).  
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1. Anti-Art and the Death of the Avant-Garde 
 
The primary aim of Bürger’s thesis is to create a unifying concept and historical 
grounding for the divergent artistic movements and practices which emerged in Europe 
in the first half of the twentieth century. Focusing primarily on Surrealism and Dada, 
Theory of the Avant-Garde stresses the utopian aims of such movements and seeks to 
make clear the political challenge they attempted to articulate. Bürger’s thesis is well 
known. However, as the most influential articulation of the concept avant-garde and 
thus as the point from which this thesis departs, it will be necessary to rehearse its key 
arguments. I will therefore sketch out the historical trajectory that Bürger sets up, before 
elaborating two important distinctions that develop in his work: firstly, between 
modernism and the practice of the avant-gardes and, secondly, between the historical 
avant-gardes and the neo-avant-gardes. At this juncture I will indicate how Warhol’s 
work has been positioned in the light of Bürger’s argument. I will then return to 
Bürger’s discussion of Fountain and try to demonstrate how this specific example in fact 
operates as a fault-line within his argument.30  
The central premise of Theory of the Avant-Garde is that the emergence of the 
avant-garde is a logical development in a historical trajectory which sees the “social 
subsystem” of art become increasingly differentiated and isolated within bourgeois 
culture. The avant-garde is the result of the historical unfolding of the autonomy of art: 
for Bürger this means art’s being marked out as a sphere independent of other social 
spheres and operating according to a different set of values. The notion of autonomy, he 
argues, by positing a realm that appears to stand outside of other social systems—
beyond history, economics and politics—encourages the idea that art is an a-historical 
category and thus suggests that autonomy is inherent to art, a necessary condition for 
art’s appearance. In fact, Bürger argues, this is an illusion, for the autonomy of art is 
entirely historical and contingent.  
                                                 
30 As I indicated within my introduction, Cunningham’s essay “Making an Example of Duchamp” also 
examines Bürger’s discussion of Fountain. However, while Cunningham approaches it from the angle of 
the general function of examples in theorising of the avant-garde, I am attempting to use the work to open 
out some of the questions suppressed by Bürger’s framework.   
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To substantiate this claim Bürger outlines a trajectory in which the function of art 
is transformed from a sacral role, through a courtly function to its position as effectively 
functionless in the late nineteenth century. While Bürger is mindful of the fact that these 
changes do not move at an even pace, his narrative describes an evolution in which art 
moves from a first phase of collective production by craftsmen and a ritualistic function 
within social systems which entail collective reception, into a second phase in which the 
individual artist becomes a significant figure while the function and reception of the art 
object remains social or collective, in that it is considered a representational object 
which can be understood by all.31 Objects such as altarpieces and religious icons might 
exemplify the first stage, while court portraiture may be taken as an example of the 
second, a mode which relies on the skill of a single painter to create an image that 
represents the wealth and status of the subject. The third and final stage of this process is 
represented by bourgeois art. In bourgeois society, here Bürger follows Adorno, 
experience is increasingly rationalised into discrete spheres, generating a fractured and 
alienated form of subjectivity. As a part of this process, art is separated from wider 
social systems: aesthetic judgements and ideas are grasped as qualitatively different 
from judgements of pure and practical reason and rational ideas. Art is understood as a 
means by which to restore the subject to himself: the pleasure given by the beautiful, 
described by Immanuel Kant as the free-play of the faculties of understanding and 
imagination, provides a consolation in the face of fragmented experience. In such a 
system, reception becomes a private affair; emphasis is on aesthetic judgement as 
subjective and as pertaining to individual taste. The artist is no longer a craftsman but a 
genius charged with the responsibility of generating an authentic experience in the 
bourgeois subject. The artist’s task, then, is not simply to produce an ornamental object 
but to express aesthetic Ideas through the work.32  
                                                 
31 See Bürger 47-49. 
32 The notion of art in bourgeois society, as Bürger presents it, is broadly Kantian. The legitimacy of 
Bürger’s reading of Kant is of course open to question: I have only glossed over these aspects of his 
argument very briefly for this legitimacy is not what interests me here. I flag up this connection here 
however because, at several points later in this thesis, I will be returning to how Kantian aesthetic theory 
has informed the debates on avant-garde art. For a general outline of Kant’s aesthetics see Scruton: for a 
discussion of the stakes of Kant’s thought see Bernstein, Fate 17-65. 
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For Bürger the increasing separation of art from society reaches its zenith in late 
nineteenth-century Aestheticism, with its famous motto of art for art’s sake. It is in this 
moment, Bürger argues, that art’s detachment from everyday life culminates: “the 
apartness from the praxis of life that had always constituted the institutional status of art 
in bourgeois society now becomes the content of works” (27). This shift effectively 
closes the category “art” off from wider social systems and causes it, in opposition to 
historical and particular “life praxis,” to appear a-historical and universal. Aestheticism 
celebrates this apparent freedom, formulating aesthetic autonomy as art’s ability to 
throw off the shackles of the everyday, to rise above the banality of the quotidian. Free 
from society, art is thus figured as a space in which higher values can be embodied and 
thus as a site which operates as a critique of degraded and mundane “life praxis.”  
It is at this moment, Bürger argues, that the avant-garde appears: it is a response 
to the historical unfolding of art’s autonomisation.33 What its emergence signals, Bürger 
claims, is the realisation that autonomy is not simply the freedom that aestheticism 
celebrates but also a form of hegemonic containment or silencing. For, in its detachment 
from society, any critical power that art might have is neutralized: art may protest all it 
likes, but as long as it remains art, it cannot really have an effect on “life praxis.” With 
the unfolding of aestheticism, Bürger thus argues, “social ineffectuality stands revealed 
as the essence of art in bourgeois society and thus provokes the self-criticism of art” 
(27). It is this self-criticism that is the task of the avant-garde which seeks to restore the 
social effectuality of art, to put it back at the service of society. Recognising and 
showing that art for art’s sake amounts to no less than the social and political impotence 
of art, the avant-gardes seek to reconnect art and “the praxis of life” (49); by doing so, 
however, they aim not to integrate art into life but instead to transform life from a basis 
in art. This is the revolutionary political task of the avant-garde as Bürger theorises it: a 
task driven by the utopian aim of reconciling art and society.  
                                                 
33 Given that aesthetic autonomy is initially established with Kant, as Bürger’s Kantian model of 
bourgeois art makes clear, the question arises of why it takes over a century for the avant-garde to emerge. 
Richard Murphy provides an answer by developing Bürger’s thesis to argue that the avant-garde is a 
response to an “unprecedented and momentous economic and technological revolution in society … [and] 
the crassness of aestheticism’s blank rejection of any need to react to it” (6-7). 
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However, the task that the artists of the avant-garde set themselves, in Bürger’s 
reading, is one that was always already doomed to failure. For, as Bürger goes on to 
argue, the aim to reconcile art and life is ultimately contradictory: “the (relative) 
freedom of art vis-à-vis the praxis of life is at the same time the condition that must be 
fulfilled if there is to be a critical cognition of reality” (50). In other words, giving up 
autonomy would mean giving up art’s power to challenge; dislocation is the price of 
critical distance. To collapse art into life or vice versa, then, is ultimately to destroy art. 
The avant-garde seeks to reconcile art and the people, to transform social conditions: it 
fails because, in the end, it cannot or will not abandon art. However, this is not to say 
that there is nothing to be learned from the avant-garde project; their success, Bürger 
argues, is in making recognizable what he terms the institution of art. By institution he 
means to indicate specifically the framework of the historical conditions of production 
and reception of art, as well as “the ideas about art that prevail at a given time and that 
determine the reception of works” (22). The avant-garde, by revealing the institutional 
status of art, reveals that art’s status as autonomous within society, its separation from 
the praxis of life, is fundamentally historical rather than anything essential to or inherent 
in art itself.  
 It is Bürger’s conceptualisation of the avant-garde as a force that interrogates the 
institution of art that enables his celebrated distinction between the avant-garde and a 
wider notion of modern art, a distinction which has since come to be understood 
articulating the difference between modernism and the avant-garde.34 Bürger identifies 
two impulses in modern art, both of which are considered to be self-reflexive responses 
to the historical trajectory outlined above. The first is defined—in terms borrowed from 
Marx—as a mode of “system-immanent criticism” (21). It works introspectively with a 
                                                 
34 Although his work has been widely interpreted as doing so, Bürger does not make his argument in order 
to draw a clear distinction between “modernism” and the avant-garde but rather to separate out the avant-
garde from other drives in modern art. That Bürger’s work has been interpreted as making this 
distinction—and Jochen Schulte-Sasse’s foreword to the English translation of Theory of the Avant-garde 
claims that this distinction is a key legacy of Theory of the Avant-garde (xiv-xv)—is highly significant: it 
reveals the extent to which Theory of the Avant-garde has been read as a response to Greenbergian 
modernism. It is for this reason perhaps that, in Anglo-American criticism, the book has been studied 
more regularly within the realm of art history rather than literary history. In Chapter Two, I will be 
outlining Greenberg’s formulation of the avant-garde, how it can be seen to dovetail with Bürger’s work 
and how it constructs a notion of modernism which devalues the “literary” avant-gardes. 
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strong conviction about what art is, accepting the distance between art and “life praxis.” 
A centripetal movement, it does not question aesthetic autonomy but instead, though a 
formalist reflection on art, interrogates the media of art rather than the institution. In 
contrast, the other impulse that Bürger identifies, and which he terms avant-garde, 
operates according to the logic of “self-criticism”: its movement is centrifugal, looking 
outwards towards society and interrogating art’s relation to non-art (21). Avant-garde art 
is not concerned with the forms of its media, but rather with the discourses and 
structures of the social sub-system (institution) of art itself. For Bürger, then, while the 
mode of system-immanent criticism reinforces the aesthetics of autonomous art and is 
the heir of aestheticism, the avant-garde turns on and attacks this system seeking to pose 
questions about what “art” is and how it functions in society. The former affirms the 
autonomy of art, while the latter reveals this autonomy as a historical contingency.35  
It is thus that Bürger’s work has come to be read as positioning modernism and 
the avant-garde as different modes of reaction to aesthetic autonomy:36 modernism re-
inscribing the separation between art and non-art, the avant-garde challenging the idea. 
Yet, as Richard Murphy has argued, the notion of autonomy itself is never fully clarified 
in Bürger’s thesis and remains ambiguous.37 Theory of the Avant-garde takes as given 
the validity of its opposition between art and non-art, as if what constitutes art and what 
constitutes “life praxis” were already agreed and their relationship (or lack of 
relationship) apparent.38 This failure to consider the complexity of the links between art 
and society generates, as I will argue in Chapter Two, an overly simplistic opposition 
                                                 
35 Bürger is careful to indicate that these tendencies are not unrelated—an important point which will be 
explored in the following chapter—but Theory of the Avant-garde remains focused on their differences.  
36 See for example Murphy’s “Introduction” to Theorizing the Avant-Garde in which he too claims the 
distinction between modernism and “avant-garde” is a key aspect of Bürger’s work.  
37 In order to clarify the ambiguity that the notion “autonomy” marks in Theory of the Avant-garde, 
Murphy (following Richard Wolin) suggests the category of “de-aestheticised autonomous art” (32). This 
move is meant to strip art of the inheritance of aesthetic theory and its framework of ideas such as beauty, 
harmony and truth. While I am sympathetic to the desire to find an approach to art that circumvents the 
frameworks of conventional aesthetics (and indeed attempt to do so through a discussion of “post-aesthetic 
philosophy” in Chapter Four), I think Murphy’s suggestion—rather than actually challenging the 
problematic simplification of autonomy in Theory of the Avant-garde—simply involves a re-labelling of 
Bürger’s modernism as “aestheticised autonomous art” and avant-garde as “de-aestheticised autonomous 
art.” I would argue that the real challenge here is to actually reconsider autonomy and how it relates to 
aesthetics: the final section of this chapter will turn to Adorno to attempt this reconsideration. 
38 See Highmore for a discussion of Bürger’s use of “life praxis”. 
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between modernism and avant-garde and in the later sections of this chapter I will use 
Adorno’s thought to begin to break these oppositions down. For the moment, however, I 
will proceed to outline Bürger’s second and more controversial distinction between the 
“historical” and “neo” avant-gardes. 
The avant-garde proceeds, Bürger argues, through the force of negation: it is as 
an example of this negative protest that Bürger positions Fountain. “Duchamp’s Ready-
Mades are not works of art but manifestations,” he writes. “Not from the form-content 
totality of the individual object Duchamp signs can one infer the meaning, but only from 
the contrast between mass-produced object on the one hand, and signature and art-
exhibit on the other” (52). Bürger’s understanding is a variation on Breton’s definition 
of the Readymade. Yet, while Breton had approached the gesture as affirmative, an 
elevation of the object confirming artistic freedom, Bürger reads it as a gesture of 
negation: because the urinal is mass-produced it signifies the negation of not only the 
aura of the unique artwork, but also the craftsmanship and skill conventionally 
associated with art. In other words, it negates the “work” of art, as well as the emphasis 
that bourgeois art places on the unique and the individual, in terms of production and 
reception. As a gesture of negation, Fountain is anti-art: it represents the moment of 
art’s fall from grace, revealing once and for all that in the bourgeois institution of art the 
signature of the artist “means more than the quality of the work” (52). In other words, 
the artwork is revealed as a form of commodity. This reading of the Duchampian 
readymade has not only been extremely powerful—mention of Fountain today is often 
shorthand for precisely this set of ideas—but has also provided a key by which the work 
of other artists has been interpreted.39 Foremost among those who inherit this mantel is 
of course Warhol. As I will attempt to show throughout this thesis, however, this 
interpretation of Duchamp and Warhol as “anti-artists” requires considerable 
complication. 
                                                 
39 This is not to say that Bürger was the first to approach the readymades from this direction. In fact such 
readings were well established by the time Theory of the Avant-Garde was written and underpinned the 
immediate critical response to much new “Duchampian” art of the 1960s, such as Pop. See Camfield 
(Fountain 88-116), Dezeuze, and Pratt.  
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It is not as an anti-artist that Bürger positions Warhol, however, but as a “neo” 
avant-gardist. Protesting against the separation of art and the everyday, and blind to the 
contradictory nature of their task, the “historical” avant-gardes seek to reinvest art with a 
critical function by reconnecting it with the praxis of life: what anti-art gestures such as 
Fountain make visible, however, is art’s complicity with the structures of power. This is 
an operation with significant implications for the future of art. For, once the avant-garde 
reveals art’s separation from the realm of the social and political and once it 
demonstrates (through the failed attempt to sublate the two spheres) that this separation 
is a pre-requisite of a critical art practice, later attempts to re-connect art and “life 
praxis” are at best “inauthentic” (53) and, at worst, the very means by which the 
historical avant-garde is recuperated. As Bürger, making reference to another of 
Duchamp’s readymades, explains: 
 
once the signed bottle drier has been accepted as an object that deserves a 
place in a museum, the provocation no longer provokes; it turns into its 
opposite. If an artist today signs a stove pipe and exhibits it, that artist 
certainly does not denounce the art market but adapts to it. (52)  
 
The historical period in which truly critical art was possible has come to an end: the 
authentic avant-garde is dead. In its wake, art cannot challenge but can only knowingly 
affirm bourgeois society: “the neo-avant-garde institutionalizes the avant-garde as art 
and thus negates any genuinely avant-gardiste intentions” (58). Just as the avant-gardes 
reveal the meaning of aestheticism in the wake of its full unfolding, then, so too does 
Bürger’s theorisation position itself as revealing the meaning of the avant-gardes in their 
full unfolding. Theory of the Avant-Garde marks the moment in which the avant-garde 
task (and its failure) can be revealed because it has become historical: the genuine 
“historical” avant-garde is dead, its death marked by the “neo” avant-garde. 
 It is no surprise that Warhol is Bürger’s key example of the “neo” avant-garde of 
the 1950s and ‘60s for this is, of course, precisely the game that Warhol played. 
Declaring himself to be in “the Business Art Business” (Warhol Philosophy 92), the Pop 
artist made no secret of his desire to adapt to the market. In his work, he emphasizes the 





Fig. 1.2 Andy Warhol, 32 Soup Cans (1961-62).  
Irving Blum, New York. 
 
silk-screen printing canvases on the “assembly line” at his studio the “Factory”40 but 
also through his choice of subject matter, most notoriously the series of Campbells’ soup 
cans, hung to resemble a super market shelf,41 which seem to knowingly perform 
precisely the kind of “inauthentic” repetition against which Bürger protests.42 (Fig. 1.2) 
Thus, in Theory of the Avant-Garde, it is Pop that marks the recuperation of Duchamp: 
the soup cans signify the power of the institution of art, the hegemonic containment of 
Duchamp’s radical gesture. For Bürger, therefore, Warhol’s work is the very opposite of 
anti-art:  
 
What Adorno calls “mimetic adaptation to the hardened and alienated” has 
probably been realized by Warhol: the painting of 100 Campbell soup cans 
                                                 
40 For a description of Warhol’s production methods see Caroline Jones, Machine in the Studio (189-267). 
41 The soup cans, which were actually hand-painted, were shown in a 1962 exhibition in the Ferus Gallery, 
Los Angeles. For an interesting discussion of this and other exhibitions by Warhol see Stuckey.  
42 There have always been those who disagree with this assessment: in 1962, in a review of the Marilyn 
paintings, Michael Fried announced that he was moved by the work and concluded that Warhol had a 
“feeling for what is truly human” (“New York Letter” 2). More recently, Thomas Crow has made a 
credible argument that the same paintings constitute a significant emotional response to Monroe’s death. 
See Crow “Saturday Disasters: Trace and Reference in Early Warhol.” However, I would argue that to 
attempt to neutralise the threatening disinterest of Warhol’s work by suggesting that it has a 
conventionally humanistic basis is to deny what makes it interesting.  
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contains resistance to the commodity society only for the person who wants 
to see it there …. The Neo-avant-garde, which stages for a second time the 
avant-gardiste break with tradition, becomes a manifestation that is void of 
sense and that permits the positing of any meaning whatever. (61)  
 
In other words, Warhol’s “yes art” (Bergin 34) is to all intents and purposes 
indistinguishable from commodity culture and thus entirely affirmative, a vessel for 
whatever values the market ascribes to it.43  
The “death” of the avant-garde has in fact come to define the parameters of its 
discussion, which is framed in terms of originality, authenticity and failure. These are 
the parameters that guide Octavio Paz when he writes that “the avant-garde is the great 
breach, and with it the ‘tradition against itself’ comes to an end” (Children 103). The 
same ideas lie behind the work of Hans Magnus Enzensberger who suggests that “the 
historic avant-garde perished by its Aporias” (264) and goes on to lament the cowardice 
of mere “experimentalism” which relinquishes art’s duty to articulate a political 
challenge. Art historian Susie Gablik draws from this pool of ideas when she writes of 
the bureaucratisation of the art world, arguing that the death of the avant-garde is a result 
of a bureaucratic late capitalist society whose machinery is pre-programmed to 
incorporate and thus neutralise any opposition. For Gablik, the neo-avant-garde artist, as 
a cog in the wheel of late capitalism, cannot resist the temptations of financial security 
and reward: “the vanguard concept has been traded in for a good marketing strategy” 
(65). Avant-garde status is forfeited when the artist buys into (and sells out to) the 
dominant ideology. Despite the differences and subtleties of each of these critics’ 
readings, they operate within the same framework: a framework in which the only 
                                                 
43 Again, Bürger is by no means alone in reading Warhol in this way. Pop art is often discussed as having 
drawn upon the Duchampian rejection of the craft of painting and the banal and transient images of 
advertising images, newspaper photographs and film stills are frequently considered as responses to the 
Readymade. Where Duchamp introduces non-art into an art context in order to question conventions and 
aesthetic values, Warhol appears to take such indifference a stage further, declaring all the trivial objects 
of everyday life as beautiful. Where Duchamp rejects sensual values in art, Warhol seems to reject them 
completely: famously declaring that he desired nothing more than to “be a machine” (qtd. in C. Jones 
Machine 189). Buchloh, in “Andy Warhol’s One Dimensional Art”, argues that Warhol progresses beyond 
Duchamp’s naivety to a fully-developed and fully cynical use of the readymade. Here Warhol is presented 
as knowingly reducing art to spectacle: however Buchloh, in contrast to Bürger, sees this as an “authentic” 
response to the artist’s historical moment.  
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authentic avant-garde art was that produced during the early decades of the twentieth 
century. The very act of recognising this avant-garde pre-supposes its recuperation and 
thus reads as an obituary.  
The circularly of these “death” theories is perhaps best captured by Paul Mann’s 
1991 monograph The Theory/Death of the Avant-garde. The central project of the book 
is to rethink the moment of the recuperation of the avant-garde work into discourse as a 
productive event. Mann builds upon the contradictions inherent in Bürger’s thesis to 
argue that it is the death of the avant-garde that is its most vital element: “The obituaries 
are not merely reports,” he writes “but performatives, sites on which death occurs; the 
diagnosis is the fatality, and, what is more, this is the diagnosis the patient has always 
sought” (40). For Mann, in other words, the avant-garde works within and is consciously 
aware of the recuperation process: its death is re-enacted every time it is declared to 
exist or have existed, for it is the act of describing the avant-garde in theoretical 
discourse that constitutes its recuperation. Conversely, it is by the very act of this 
recuperation/death that the avant-garde is theorised into existence. The moment of 
recuperation then becomes both the “end” and the “source” of the avant-garde.  
In this context, rather than reading Warhol’s work as a mere repetition of 
Duchamp’s gestures,44 Mann locates the pop artist as revealing the process of 
recuperation most explicitly. “What is most significant about Warhol,” Mann writes, 
 
is that he so thoroughly turned the means of recuperation—repetition, 
mechanization, stereotyping, the effacement of self by persona, 
theatricalization, flatness, commodification, publicity, a total embrace of 
the economy, openness to every interpretative ideology—into the very 
substance of his work, and without a single pretense that he was doing 
anything else. (138) 
  
Warhol “transparently represents” the culture in which he works, Mann argues. “A pure 
symptom: that is all he constitutes” (138). This is to say that, for Mann, Warhol’s work 
is not antithetical to “authentic” avant-garde art but, in fact, truly and more completely 
                                                 
44 For Mann’s reading of Duchamp see The Theory/Death of the Avant-Garde 100. 
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avant-garde. It reveals the “historical” avant-garde as a ruse, a semblance of opposition, 
which is in fact generated and contained by discourse.  
By rewriting recuperation as a generative process, Mann subverts the usual 
discussion of failure, selling out and cashing in. Instead, the death of the avant-garde is 
the on-going realisation of its goal: the creation and maintenance of a discourse about 
the values and practices of the institution that is art. The true aim of the avant-gardes is 
to work towards “a clearer and clearer reflection of recuperation” (131). Mann’s text, 
then, is the logical extreme of the argument that Burger articulated, unmasking the 
repetitiveness and circularity of “the same dialectical squabbles between radical and 
conservative” (139) and exposing “the avant-garde” as the mere “screen” on which these 
debates are replayed: it reveals Bürger’s text itself as a key agent of the recuperation of 
the avant-garde. 
The problem that the avant-garde marks, then, as Mann neatly surmises, is 
“essentially a critical one” for “to demonstrate the inherence of recuperation in the 
artwork is also to mark one’s own text as yet another agent of the discursive economy” 
(93). In this framework, he concludes, there are two options: the first and more difficult 
response is to invent another form of writing, an alternative critical practice. In such a 
mode, the aim would be  
 
to write without merely manufacturing another or even better theory for 
circulation, another history for exchange. To explore recuperation without 
being entirely caught up in it, or in the illusion that one is entirely free of it. 
[to invent] a writing that sees itself in the history it describes, that never 
pretends it is above the recuperative law, that drives recuperation all the way 
to the surface and turns it against itself. (93) 
 
This alternative critical practice, I will argue throughout this thesis, is precisely what is 
at stake in the works and discourses of the avant-garde. This is not however the option 
Mann himself takes.45 Instead The Theory/Death of the Avant-garde ends with a fall into 
silence: “And what if all this were true?” he writes,  
                                                 
45 Having revealed the contradiction of oppositional discourse, Mann seems content to revel in it, writing 




Suppose everyone knew it, assented to it, what difference would it make? 
None at all: nothing would come of it but more texts reflecting their 
emptiness. But we have traveled this path to arrive at this very point, where 
artists resign from discourse and discourse resigns itself to reproducing its 
death. A vanishing point. The last chapter of the death of the avant-garde is 
blank. (145) 
 
Positioning itself as marking the end of discourse’s claim to truth, Mann’s text 
announces the end of the narrative of the avant-garde. His work is a vision of the end of 
a critical distance between art and society: not as the utopian moment of reconciliation 
but as the moment in which recuperation triumphs. Mann’s text performs the process 
that it describes so efficiently that it presents itself as a complete closure, one that 
anticipates and pre-empts any response. 
 
2. “Art” and Media 
 
Bürger’s arguments have been much discussed and many commentators have disputed 
his pessimistic conclusions, and in particular his assessment of the art of the 1950s and 
60s.46 Others have argued that, based on Dada and Surrealism, his theory only describes 
a small section of avant-garde activity and thus fails to grasp even the “historical” avant-
gardes properly. Such criticisms are pertinent and do not need to be rehearsed again. My 
aim here is not to critique Bürger’s work, but rather to try to explore what this friction 
between the actual manifestations of the avant-garde art and attempts to categorise them 
signifies. I want to do this by locating in Theory of the Avant-garde the germ of an 
alternative idea, planted but not developed, in the form of Bürger’s claim that it is with 
the emergence of the avant-gardes that the “various techniques and procedures [of art] 
can be recognized as artistic means” (18). Exploring this claim and its implications, I 
will argue, opens out a space from which to reconsider the problematic of the avant-
gardes and the relationship between art and non-art.  
                                                 
46 As I mentioned in my introduction, the most significant attempt to break out of the “death theory” 
parameters took place in the pages of the journal October throughout the 1980s and ‘90s, and will be 
discussed in some detail in the Chapter Two. 
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Aestheticism, to reiterate Bürger’s framework, marks the moment in which the 
historical process of art’s separation from society fully unfolds: it is the moment in 
which art becomes autonomous, when the social subsystem “art” appears to cut itself off 
from broader social spheres. The avant-garde marks this moment by means of its protest 
thus delimiting the institution of art. When “art” is delimited as an institution rather than 
by means of a single work it becomes a general category. Likewise, the avant-garde 
generalises the category of artistic means or media. Rather than working within the 
subsystem “art” and choosing its means according to a dominant style, the avant-garde 
“liquidated the possibility of a period style when they raised to a principle the 
availability of the artistic means of past periods. Not until there is universal availability 
does the category of artistic means become a general one” (18). What Bürger is 
suggesting, then, is that the avant-garde marks the separation of the generalised category 
of “art” from the materials of the arts, from the generalised category of media. While 
previously there had been the arts—painting, sculpture, music etc.—the avant-garde 
reveals the contingency of the material form or media of the work, opening the 
possibility of any material or object (for example a urinal) to be subsumed under the 
general category “art”. This is to say that the progressive autonomisation of art results in 
the separation of the generalized category “art” from any necessary connection with the 
materials of the art work.47  
One consequence of phrasing the idea of autonomy in this way, as the 
delimitation of a conceptual category, is that it positions the material support of “art,” 
the medium, as non-art. The relation between art and non-art is thus shown to play out 
not just in terms of social conventions (e.g. what kind of objects are shown or not shown 
in a gallery), but in the material form of the work itself. In this light, while the 
                                                 
47 Boris Groys has pointed out that such a state of affairs has potentially dangerous consequences. In The 
Total Art of Stalinism, Groys argues that when artistic means are revealed as means, “reality itself 
[becomes] material for artistic construction.” Avant-garde artists, therefore: “naturally demand the same 
absolute right to dispose of this real material as in the use of materials to realize their artistic intent in a 
painting, sculpture or poem. Since the world is itself regarded as material, the demand underlying the 
modern conception of art for power over the materials implicitly contains the demand for power over the 
world” (21). Bürger’s avant-garde, in other words, as an attempt to transform life from a basis in art, can 
easily be taken as a drive towards totalitarianism: life will be transformed but only as the artist/dictator 
sees fit.  
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problematic of “system-immanent” art might be understood as an exploration of media 
in order to establish the grounds of the general category of “art”, the problematic of 
“self-critical” avant-garde art turns upon whether one can use specific materials or 
techniques to resist that category, asking the very question that Duchamp put to himself 
in a 1913 note: “Can one make works that are not works of ‘art’?” (Writings 74) It is 
against the recuperative power of the concept “art” that we might thus understand the 
avant-garde as protesting, against the power that declares every “work” to be “art” and 
thus disarms it and exempts it from social function. The avant-garde can thus be 
understood as employing the material means of artistic production—the medium—to 
operate against language, against the totalizing power of conceptual abstraction.  
Framed in this way, it is no surprise that the avant-garde works seem so resistant 
to Bürger’s attempt to categorise them under a single, univocal concept such as “anti-
art.” Yet it is this implicit claim about the separation of the category “art” from its 
materials that legitimates Bürger’s approach to the artworks of the avant-gardes.48 
Bürger considers an avant-garde work such as Fountain not as something to be 
considered in its “form-content totality” but rather as the manifestation of conceptual 
ideas. Indeed, in the preliminary remarks which precede the main text of Theory of the 
Avant-garde Bürger states that his use of examples should not be considered as 
“historical or sociological interpretations of individual works but as illustrations of a 
theory” (xlviii). In other words, he knowingly bends the material history of the avant-
gardes and their works to fit with his conceptual schema. He reacts to the avant-garde’s 
attempt to evade the categories of “bourgeois art” by imposing an alternative category 
upon them. It is not surprising, then, to discover incongruities between how Bürger 
positions Fountain and the historical facts of the case. As a fuller consideration of the 
work will form the final section of this chapter, I will give only one example of this 
                                                 
48 It is this idea that also motivates Joseph Kosuth’s conceptual art. “It is Marcel Duchamp whom we can 
credit with giving art [as opposed to the individual arts] its own identity” he writes in “Art after 
Philosophy” (18).  Kosuth’s interpretation of Duchamp and his notion of conceptual art has been has been 




incongruity at present, namely the importance that Bürger places on the fact that 
Duchamp signs the readymade.  
The emphasis on the Duchampian signature dominates Bürger’s discussion. As 
we have seen it is “from the contrast between mass-produced object on the one hand, 
and signature and art-exhibit on the other” that the readymade generates meaning. It is 
the procedure of signing, furthermore, that challenges the conventional role of the artist, 
for “when Duchamp signs mass-produced objects (a urinal, a bottle drier) and sends 
them to art exhibits,” Bürger writes “he negates the category of individual production” 
(51). Again, it is the signature that indicates the paradox of the readymade which both 
reveals and negates the categories of the bourgeois institution of art.  
 
When Duchamp puts his signature on mass-produced, randomly chosen 
objects and sends them to art exhibits, this provocation of art presupposes a 
concept of what art is: The fact that he signs the Ready-Mades contains a 
clear allusion to the category “work.” The signature that attests that the work 
is both individual and unique is here affixed to the mass-produced object. 
(56) 
 
Curiously, despite this emphasis on Duchamp’s strategy of signing objects, at no point 
does Bürger take into account what is obvious from a mere glance at Stieglitz’s famous 
photograph, reproduced alongside his argument. Bürger never mentions that the 
“signature” that appears on Fountain is not that of the artist Duchamp: in fact, it reads 
“R. Mutt.”49 Strikingly, then, while the textual element of the readymade is the most 
significant aspect of Bürger’s understanding of Fountain it is also the aspect least 
reflected upon. Like a Freudian slip, “Duchamp’s signature” is an indication of what 
Bürger desires to see in Fountain rather than what is actually there. In fact, what 
                                                 
49 In this sense Duchamp pre-empts the criticism levelled against him by the artists Gilles Aillard, 
Eduardo Arroyo and Antonio Recalcati who claim that “if one wants art to cease being an individual 
matter, it is better to work without signing than to sign without working.” (“Vivre et laisser mourir, ou las 
fin tragique de Marcel Duchamp” Statement for their Joint exhibition at the Galerie Creuze, Paris 1965. 
qtd. in Seigel 206) This accusation, made by young artists in the 1960s, is evidence of how powerful the 
reading of the readymade as a mass-produced object “signed by Duchamp” is, despite the fact that in 
reality the readymades very rarely fit that description. 
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Bürger’s work both relies upon and suppresses is the readymades’ involvement with 
language and writing.50  
Bürger ignores the materiality of the inscription on the readymade, subsuming its 
singularity and specificity under his theory: approaching it as the presentation of a 
unified theoretical concept (anti-art) rather than as an ambiguous object. Fountain is 
simplified and reduced in order that it be incorporated into an overarching theory, just as 
“works” are disarmed and made impotent by their incorporation into an autonomous 
realm of “art”. Theory of the Avant-garde performs the subsumption of the “work” into 
the conceptual category against which Duchamp (and the avant-garde more broadly) 
protests: in this light, what it reveals is the tension between the material field of artworks 
and the structuring concept “art”.  
That the availability of means as means makes problematic the relationship 
between individual works and the conceptual field of “art” is something that Bürger 
himself also recognizes. Indeed, it is his awareness of this issue that leads to the 
despondent conclusion which ends his monograph.  
 
The total availability of material and forms characteristic of the post-avant-
gardiste art of bourgeois society will have to be investigated both for its 
inherent possibilities and the difficulties it creates, and this concretely by 
the analysis of individual works. 
 Whether this condition of the availability of all traditions still permits an 
aesthetic theory at all, in the sense in which aesthetic theory existed from 
Kant to Adorno, is questionable, because a field must have a structure if it 
is to be the subject of scholarly or scientific understanding. Where the 
formal possibilities have become infinite, not only authentic creation but 
also its scholarly analysis become correspondingly difficult. (94) 
 
Bürger concludes, in other words, that the “total availability” of all forms signals a 
situation in which “anything goes:” he envisages a situation in which the label “art” can 
be applied to any object irrespective of any aesthetic values. The avant-garde’s opening 
out of the field in which “art” moves, its rejection of the limitations of conventional 
                                                 
50 Duchamp always insisted on the importance of the linguistic inscription of the readymade, indeed the 
notes and much of Duchamp’s practice indicate that it is the process of inscribing the object that creates 
the readymade (Writing 32).   
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media raises, in other words, raises the spectre of art’s demise. For when all means and 
materials are available, Bürger claims, the field of art is de-structured and there ceases to 
be a delimited field of study for aesthetic theory: the failure of the avant-garde thus 
evolves into the death of art more broadly.51  
Bürger thus ends on what (as he would later admit)52 is an overly pessimistic 
note, focussed on the difficulties created by the apparent divorce between the conceptual 
and material. Unlike Bürger, however, I do not think this de-structuring of the field of 
art need be seen in the either/or terms of rigid convention versus “total” availability of 
means: what interests me, is precisely the connection or tension between these poles. For 
it is in this tension, I think, that the “inherent possibilities” of this situation open out: 
these possibilities, in fact, are what this thesis is concerned to investigate. The revelation 
of the avant-gardes, their making visible means as means sets a specific challenge, 
which is to think through the implications of this “availability of material and forms,” to 
explore the difficult relationship between media and the concept “art.” If the avant-
gardes challenge conventional hierarchies of and distinctions between artistic media, 
then what is at stake in this challenge? In order to begin the process of sketching out an 
answer, I want to turn now to Adorno and in particular his 1967 essay “Art and the 
Arts.” Here, as I will try to show, Adorno in fact outlines and develops exactly the 
insight that I have located in Theory of the Avant-garde. In the following section, then, I 
want to set out firstly how Adorno’s thought develops the idea of the avant-garde’s use 
of means as means as an attack on the concept of “art”, secondly how this relates to his 
own understanding of art, and finally how this alters the framework by which we might 
grasp aesthetic autonomy. I will then briefly indicate how, for Adorno, this opens up a 




                                                 
51 See also in this respect Harold Rosenberg’s discussion of the “de-definition of art”. For Rosenberg, 
Warhol is a perfect example of “the post-art artist [who] carries the de-definition of art to the point where 
nothing is left of art except the fiction of the artist” (12).  
52 See “Postscript” in the second edition translation of Theory of the Avant-Garde 95-99. 
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3. Adorno: Art, Force and the Collective Undercurrent 
 
 “Art and the Arts” identifies and sets out to comprehend precisely this notion of the 
divorce between the idea of “art” and the materials of the arts. Adorno, although he does 
not use the term avant-garde or modernist in the essay, identifies a trend within 
contemporary art which he describes as “a process of erosion” (369). The boundaries 
between the arts have become fluid, he argues, as painting, sculpture, music, architecture 
and poetry borrow techniques and strategies from one another. Significantly, he dates 
this trend back to Dada and Surrealism and suggests that it is “almost always 
accompanied by the attempt by works of art to reach out toward an extra-aesthetic 
reality” (385). Adorno, in other words, is describing here the same impulse that Bürger 
terms avant-garde. His emphasis however is quite different: in this essay Adorno 
approaches the question of art’s autonomy through the problem of the relationship 
between different media (or means), drawing a connection between the exploration of 
the limits of the individual arts and the exploration of the limits of the conceptual 
category “art.” He thus locates the relationship between the specific art-object and the 
idea of “art” at the heart of the question of autonomy and so foregrounds precisely that 
moment, implicit in Bürger’s thesis, in which the identities of the individual arts are 
distinguished from the generalised concept “art.”  
Like Bürger, Adorno sees the avant-garde’s erosion of the arts as a reaction to 
the aestheticism of bourgeois society, specifically to its culmination in the idea of art for 
art’s sake: “whatever tears down the boundary markers” he writes “is motivated by 
historical forces that sprang into life inside the existing boundaries and then ended up 
overwhelming them” (370). The metaphors that pervade the essay are telling. 
Aestheticism is described as “culinary,” as something to be consumed and sensually 
enjoyed; it is a mode in which aspects that are conventionally considered beautiful or 
pleasing are repeated without variation, “an orgy of soulless repetitions” (371). In other 
words, bourgeois aestheticism is characterised by a glorification of sensual, bodily 
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pleasure: it is “retinal,” to borrow a Duchampian term.53 In contrast, the art that Adorno 
seeks to understand is described not as culinary but as cannibalistic, the arts “eat away at 
one another” (387) turning their back on the pleasures of the viewer and instead 
consuming themselves. While aestheticism revels in orgies of sensual pleasure, the 
incestuous cross-breeding between the “sister” arts is of a more threatening order: “the 
artistic genres” Adorno writes “appear to revel in a kind of promiscuity which violates 
some of the taboos of civilisation” (371). The metaphors of cannibalism and incest 
indicate both that art is confined, cut off from what Bürger calls “life praxis” and what 
Adorno calls “empirical reality,” and that this confinement is unhealthy or somehow 
dangerous. Like Theory of the Avant-Garde, then, Adorno’s essay describes the erosion 
of the arts as a self-destructive impulse, generated by the apparent severance of the 
connection between art and empirical reality. The avant-garde, Adorno suggests, takes a 
gleeful pleasure in this destruction of convention, aspiring to be unclassifiable in the 
terms of any pre-established artistic genre, to do violence to the structures which contain 
it, and to challenge the discrete, rationally organised genres by which “civilisation” 
organises (dominates) nature. It attacks bourgeois society not simply by breaking down 
the barrier between art and “life praxis” but also by breaking down the barriers between 
the arts. What this avant-garde impulse protests against, then, is not only the processes 
of rationalisation which demarcate “art” as a sphere separate from “life praxis,” but also 
the extension of these processes into that sphere itself in the form of a system of discrete 
“arts.” 
For Adorno, history can be viewed as the progressive domination of nature by 
the forces of rationalisation and capital. Art, he famously argues, is valuable because it 
bears witness to what is suppressed in this process. Yet, art—itself a result of this 
history—is also increasingly encroached upon by these forces of rationalisation, always 
in danger of being subsumed into rationality. It is this process that Adorno describes 
when he writes that with art for art’s sake “the culinary element, sensuous charm, has 
                                                 
53In Duchamp’s vocabulary, the idea of the “retinal” indicated everything he disliked about painting, 
namely its glorification of sensuality at the expense of ideas: he associated it with a kind of bestial 
pleasure which he sometimes described as an onanistic “shudder” (Cabanne Dialogues 43) and dismissed 
it as “completely non-conceptual” (Cabanne Dialogues 77).  
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split itself off and become an end in itself and the object of rational planning.” As a 
result, he writes, 
 
art rebels against every sort of dependency upon pre-existing materials that 
are reflected in the classification of art according to different art forms and 
that resist shaping by the autonomous artist. For the scattered materials 
correspond to the diffuse stimuli of the senses. (371)  
 
The classification of the separate arts indicates the rationalisation of art, just as their 
alignment with the separate senses represents the rationalisation of the human body.54 
The avant-garde transgression of the limits of the individual arts, its refusal of the 
classification of the arts, can thus be understood as a form of protest against the internal 
division and fragmentation of the bourgeois subject, against the domination of 
instrumental reason.55 Yet, paradoxically, what this refusal depends upon is precisely the 
processes of rationalisation that it refuses in the form of the generalisation of the concept 
“art”. In the face of their rationalisation into a system of arts, Adorno writes, “the 
individual arts aspire to their concrete generalization, to an idea of art as such” (373). 
Refusing the systems that aesthetic theory would impose upon art, individual works 
attempt to discover “art as such”, to isolate and locate not the specificities of the medium 
but rather what makes a work of any kind into a work of “art.” 
 In “Art and the Arts,” then, Adorno describes a field held in tension between two 
poles. While one is conceptual, a generalised idea of “art” as such, the other is material, 
the particular object or medium. Art, Adorno goes on to argue, emerges within this field: 
the work is a product of this tension and its success depends upon how well it is able to 
mediate the between the two poles. Art “gravitates toward dilettantism as long as it 
                                                 
54 This alignment between the individual arts and the senses can be traced back to eighteenth-century 
German Romanticism and notably to Gotthold Ephraim Lessing, whose work I shall be discussing in the 
next chapter. It culminates in Clement Greenberg’s modernist doctrine of “eyesight alone.” 
55 There have of course been numerous attempts to unify the arts under a single banner throughout history, 
generating concepts such as the “sister arts”, ut pictura poiesis, and the Wagnerian Gesamtkunstwerk. 
What is new to modern art, Adorno argues in “Art and the Arts”, is the refusal to accept such systems: the 
arts no longer maintain their individual identity under the broader banner but rather challenge one 
another’s identities, attack and consume one another in the irresolvable struggle to identify “art.”  
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remains satisfied with a generalized aesthetics,” he claims,56 but on the other hand, “an 
art from which the last trace of that ether—the simple fact that someone is an artist—had 
been expunged simply dries up into philistine handicraft” (376). What this means is that 
the  
 
substantial content [of art works] lies in the relation between the what and 
the how. They become art by virtue of this substantial content. But this 
needs the how, their particular language; if it went in search of something 
larger, beyond the particular form of art itself it would be destroyed. 
(377)  
 
Adorno’s description here of the substantial content of art can be compared to the 
Kantian notion of the aesthetic idea, which is defined in the Critique of Judgment as a 
“representation of the Imagination which occasions much thought, without, however, 
any definite thought, i.e. any concept, being capable of being adequate to it; it 
consequently cannot be completely compassed and made intelligible by language” (§49, 
117-118). In other words, the aesthetic idea is a sense or meaning (the what) which 
cannot be abstracted from our engagement with the work, which arises as a result of 
sensory, embodied experience (the how) and which evades any attempts to grasp it 
within language. The aesthetic idea is not reducible to the material in which it expressed; 
it exceeds the material of the art object in the same way that the meaning of language 
exceeds the graphic and phonic matter in which it is expressed. Neither is it reducible to 
an abstract idea, however, a generalised concept as such. It cannot be translated into the 
language of rationality, cannot be fully recuperated by discourse. It is by means of its 
embodying an aesthetic idea, then, that an object becomes art.  
It is at this juncture that a key difference between the understandings of art that 
underpin the thought of Adorno and of Bürger becomes apparent. For Bürger, as I tried 
to show, art is a social subsystem or institution, a set of practices, conventions and ideas 
which govern the reception of the work. In this sense, the what of the artwork (what 
                                                 
56 This is the accusation that is often levelled against Fountain and, given the kind of preferences which 
Adorno’s choice of examples indicates, I suspect that he would agree that Duchamp’s work is an example 
of this kind of dilettantism. The argument that I present in Chapter Two will, I hope, demonstrate that this 
is not the case.  
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makes it art) is extrinsic to the object. It can be abstracted from our engagement with the 
work and expressed within conceptual language as the description of practices and 
conventions. The how is simply the means or material of the work. The artwork, then, is 
a compound of meaning and material and is understood as the combination of these 
elements. For Adorno in contrast, while the how is the material of the artwork and the 
practice and conventions of art, the what of the artwork is not a conceptual idea but an 
aesthetic idea which is intrinsic to the work: for to reduce the artwork to a set of 
conceptual “meanings” is to translate it into another language, something “beyond the 
particular form of art itself,” and thus to deny the force of the particularity of the work.57 
This specific relation between the what and the how, Adorno argues, is what generates 
the artwork, which is born of the clash between idea and material.  
  
Art needs something heterogeneous in order to become art. In the absence 
of that, the process that every work of art is lacks a target and so just 
freewheels. The clash between the work of art and the world of objects 
becomes productive, and the work authentic, only where this clash is 
allowed to happen and to objectify itself by its friction with the thing it 
devours. (375) 
 
In other words, art is not an object nor is it an institution—a collection of practices, 
ideas, conventions or materials formed by an artist—but rather a movement or a process. 
Adorno refers to this in Aesthetic Theory as a “binding force” (425). It is a process 
which brings heterogeneous elements together into a dynamic and always changing 
relationship which constitutes the truth or authenticity of the work.  
This proposition is developed at length in Aesthetic Theory where Adorno writes 
that “however much they seem to be entities, artworks are the crystallizations of the 
process between spirit and its other” (436). Like a centre of gravity, which magnetically 
holds an entire field in tension, it is the force of art that creates this “internal 
                                                 
57 The indeterminacy and singularity of aesthetic ideas calls for a judgment the criteria of which are 
intrinsic to the specific work and not pre-determined. It is the freedom implied in this absence of pre-
determined criteria that has, for thinkers such as Adorno and Lyotard, made aesthetic experience appear as 
a site of possible resistance to the domination of nature by a rationalizing capitalism. I will develop this 
point further in Chapter Four. 
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crystallisation” (443) in which the work and its truth content are formed.58 Art then 
describes a force which holds thought and its other in tension, a drive which brings the 
incommensurable together without resolving their difference. Art is an aporia out of 
which the work is generated; the mediation of fact and concept, mind and thing. The task 
of aesthetics, Adorno argues, is to think this mediation: “this alone, and not the 
phenomenologist’s purportedly originary intuition, leads to art’s concrete concept” 
(446). Art is what we might therefore term a “complex concept” because it is structured 
not as a unity but as a constellation: it is, in Adorno’s terms, “non-identical” with itself. 
In “Art and the Arts” he explains this as follows: 
 
No work of art, not even the most subjective, can be completely identical 
with the subject that constitutes it and its substantial content. Every work 
possesses materials that are distinct from the subject, procedures that are 
derived from the materials of art, as well as from human subjectivity. Its 
truth content is not exhausted by subjectivity but owes its existence to the 
process of objectification. That process does indeed require the subject as 
an executor, but points beyond it to that objective Other. This introduces 
an element of irreducible, qualitative plurality. It is incompatible with 
every principle of unity, even that of genres of art, by virtue of what they 
express. (375) 
 
Art, for Adorno, is generated by the friction between art and its other, maintained by 
holding that difference in tension. Art as the dynamic crystallisation of spirit and 
substance, necessarily non-self-identical, necessarily heterogeneous is reducible neither 
to a univocal concept “art” nor to the material of the individual arts. Thus, Adorno 
concludes, “the constellation of art and the arts dwells within art itself” (383), which is 
to say that the plurality of the arts and the conflict between their different material 
conventions and the aesthetic ideas they articulate is necessary for art. To unify the 
category of “art”, to define it as a concept, is to submit it to complete rationalisation: the 
unification of the arts signals the end of art. It is against this rationalisation, delimitation 
and unification of the category “art” that the erosion of the arts, the avant-garde’s 
                                                 
58 In this sense Adorno sees art as a kind of event, an idea that has been applied to thinking about the 
avant-garde by Lyotard among others (see also Ziareck, Force). The overlap between Lyotard and 
Adorno’s thought will be the subject of my fourth chapter.  
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debauched transgression of the limits of the individual arts, protests: “it is as if the 
artistic genres, by denying their own firm boundaries, were gnawing away at the concept 
of art itself” (385).  
To try to grasp “art” as a unified concept, to reduce it to a set of ideas, practices 
or systems, as Bürger does, is, as Adorno writes, to be “blind to the invisible contained 
in the visible” (“Art” 379). It is, moreover, to fail to grasp that “what is essential to art is 
that which in it is not the case, that which is incommensurable with the empirical 
measure of all things” (Aesthetic 426). As these words suggest, and as I now want to 
argue, this dynamic phrasing of art’s essential heterogeneity—Adorno’s complex 
concept of art—presents a quite different relationship between art and non-art to that 
assumed in Theory of the Avant-Garde and reveals a notion of aesthetic autonomy at 
once more complex and more precise than Bürger’s.  
In the 1957 essay “On Lyric Poetry and Society,” Adorno explores the 
relationship between art and non-art by means of what he terms “the collective 
undercurrent”.59 Like all art, lyric poetry is generated by means of its attempt to 
individuate itself from the wider structures of empirical reality: art, as we have seen 
Adorno argue, is generated through a process of objectification. The basis of the work is 
not the individual poet, Adorno argues, but rather a common ground of non-art from 
which it must take form and separate itself in order to be a work of art. It is this 
precondition of art, this common ground of empirical reality, which forms the collective 
undercurrent in the work: in other words, society is not what the lyric leaves behind, but 
rather what it takes shape out of. In the lyric, Adorno writes, “language itself acquires a 
voice” (43). The heterogeneous composition of art, as Adorno thinks it, contains non-art 
                                                 
59 Having outlined this concept in the first half of the essay, Adorno then goes on to demonstrate its 
presence in two specific lyric works, one by Eduard Mörike and the other by Stefan George. For a 
discussion of these readings see Ulrich Plass’s chapter “As If: Stephan George” 89-114. The volume in 
which this essay appears, Notes to Literature was considered by Adorno to be an intrinsic part of the 
larger project of Aesthetic Theory (See Plass 362). This suggests that grasping art by examining the 
relationship between the arts was one of Adorno’s aims in the 1960s, an idea further strengthened by his 
use of the preposition “to” rather than “on” in this title which suggests a connection—or a promiscuous 
relation—between the different arts of music and literature. For more on Adorno’s cross-disciplinary 
interests see Cunningham and Mapp’s introduction to Adorno and Literature. It is for this reason that we 
might consider him not an aesthete as Bürger suggests, but as a post-aesthetic philosopher. Chapter Four 
will discuss this difference in detail.  
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in the form of the collective undercurrent within it. Moreover, Adorno considers this 
collective undercurrent not only as the matter that constitutes the lyric itself but also the 
gauge of its power: “participation in this undercurrent” he writes “is an essential part of 
the substantiality of the individual lyric” (“Lyric” 45). Non-art, then, is the ground and 
substance of the artwork:60 the “essential social relation of art,” Adorno argues in 
Aesthetic Theory, is not “the immanence of art in society” (as Bürger would have it) but 
rather, “the immanence of society in the artwork.” (304). 
For Adorno, art is not the a-historical separate autonomous sphere that 
aestheticism claims it to be. Rather, art is essentially social and historical yet, because of 
its heterogeneous composition, at no point reducible to history or ideology. Art develops 
in relation to empirical reality, it achieves a level of autonomy by clashing with it, by 
objectifying itself, but this autonomy is always precarious and always under threat of 
disintegration. For, with non-art at its heart, art is always in danger of collapsing back 
into empirical reality: “admixed with art’s own concept” as Adorno puts it in Aesthetic 
Theory “is the ferment of its own abolition” (5). Adorno’s artwork is not, as Bürger 
understands it, “isolated” and “monad-like” (11). It is rather engaged in an ongoing and 
irresolvable struggle with the empirical reality, to which it is essentially bound but from 
which it tries to differentiate itself and which, by so doing, it rejects. This is the process 
which generates art: should this process halt, should the relationship between the work 
                                                 
60 Adorno’s model of the collective undercurrent and art as a process of objectification bears comparison 
to the way that art is described by Martin Heidegger in “The Origin of the Work of Art” (1950). Indeed, in 
“Art and the Arts” Adorno appears aware of the proximity of his model to Heidegger’s, taking pains to 
explain why he substitutes empirical reality (as the ground and substance of the work) where Heidegger 
positions art (in Heidegger’s essay art is the ground and substance of the work). While Heidegger is 
credited with emphasizing “the linguistic nature of all art” (381) Adorno argues that in making “art” the 
basis of the artwork, Heidegger shifts the question from one of genesis within time, to one of ontology: 
rather than grasp art as a historical process, in Heidegger’s thought “art” becomes an essence, captured in 
the individual artwork. Heidegger “rescues the unifying element of art, that which makes it art, but at the 
price of a situation in which theory reverently falls silent when confronted with the question of what it is” 
(381). Thus in Heidegger’s thought the aesthetic aspect of art “shrinks to what Heidegger once said of 
Being, namely that it is ultimately nothing more than itself” (382). “Art” becomes something which 
cannot be explained or understood. In contrast, Adorno’s alternative of the collective undercurrent as the 
basis and substantial content of art is an attempt to counter what he considers a politically dubious 
mystification of “art” with a historical model, to establish a profound connection between art and society 
yet at the same time to preserve art’s critical distance and prevent its reduction to empirical reality. For 
more on this relationship see Nikolopoulou, whose work picks up this methodology, re-positioning the 
collective undercurrent in line with both Heidegger’s work and Kant’s sensus communis. 
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and empirical reality become reified, then the work no longer operates as art. It is upon 
this intimate but difficult connection between art and non-art, in fact, as I will now try to 
show, that the critical capacity or political potential which Adorno assigns to art 
depends.  
The 1962 essay “Commitment” is one of Adorno’s most explicit formulations of 
his understanding of the relationship between art and politics. At several points, it 
prefigures the arguments of “Art and the Arts” and, in fact, in this earlier essay Adorno 
also locates the question of art’s political engagement quite specifically within the realm 
of the relationship between the different arts by comparing the visual arts to literature.61 
He begins by outlining what he calls the precarious position of contemporary art, a 
precariousness resulting from the increasing dissipation of the tension between two 
previously antithetical poles: these are the same poles described as generating the field 
of art in “Art and the Arts,” one rational and unifying, associated with the conceptual, 
the other diffuse and mimetic, associated with the aesthetic and material. It is the nature 
of these antithetical forces, he argues in “Commitment,” to operate as a drive towards 
totality: in a trajectory that we have seen in Bürger’s theory, aestheticism moves to sever 
art’s relationship to rationality and empirical reality, making it politically impotent, 
while committed art in its move to sublate art into life, thereby threatens to reduce art to 
a mere conceptual message. The precariousness of art’s position is caused by the 
progressive strengthening of the rational and unifying pole—here we have again 
Adorno’s familiar narrative of the domination of all spheres of experience by the forces 
of homogenisation and rationalisation—and weakening of the diffuse and mimetic pole, 
which is increasingly overpowered. In other words, as Adorno sees it, the tension by 
which art is generated is gradually being dissolved. 
While Adorno associates the diffuse and mimetic pole of this structure with art 
for art’s sake, the opposite pole is not exemplified here by the avant-gardes but rather by 
                                                 
61 The later argument about the importance of the erosion of the arts is clearly developing in Adorno’s 
thought at this time, for the rather abrupt comment that the painter “Paul Klee too has a place in any 
debate about committed and autonomous art; for his work, écriture par excellence, had its roots in 




Jean-Paul Sartre’s concept of “engaged” literature.62 Sartre, Adorno writes, accords 
literature a privileged place over visual art in terms of political commitment because, as 
Sartre puts it, “the writer deals with meanings” (qtd. in “Commitment” 178). Sartre sees 
the apparent transparency of language as the key power of literature: the medium is the 
servant of the idea. Literature is thus better suited to social engagement than the visual 
arts, his work suggests, because it is a transparent medium which can signal a clear 
political message. In other words, Adorno argues, Sartre reduces literature to the pole of 
the rational and unifying. As I shall argue in the following chapter, Sartre is by no means 
alone in assuming that literature, because its material is language, is more transparent 
and more amenable to social engagement or political use than the other arts. This is, in 
fact, a central aspect of numerous accounts of artistic modernism. Adorno counters 
Sartre by explicitly arguing for the importance of form in literature, thereby refusing the 
distinction between literature and visual art that Sartre’s argument sets up.  
 
If no word which enters a literary work ever wholly frees itself from its 
meaning in ordinary speech, so no literary work, not even the traditional 
novel, leaves these meanings unaltered, as they were outside it. Even an 
ordinary “was,” in a report of something that was not, acquires a new 
formal quality from the fact that it was not so. The same process occurs in 
the higher levels of meaning of a work, all the way up to what once used 
to be called its “Idea.” The special picture that Sartre accords literature 
must also be suspect to anyone who does not unconditionally subsume 
diverse aesthetic genres under a superior universal concept. The 
rudiments of external meanings are the irreducibly non-artistic elements 
in art. Its formal principle lies not in them, but in the dialectic of both 
moments – which accomplishes the transformation of meanings within it. 
(178) 
 
                                                 
62 Bürger would distinguish the avant-garde from this kind of thematic “engagement” with society as, 
were it to be reduced to such a level, the “historical avant-gardes” could not be distinguished from any 
other forms of “engaged” art. Yet if the avant-garde’s social function is, as Bürger suggests, to provide “a 
free space in which reality and social practice may be theorized and reconceptualized,” as Murphy points 
out, then “the avant-garde would appear to be merely sharing a critical function common to many different 
forms and movements throughout the history of art” (27). This ambiguity about what constitutes avant-




In other words, Adorno argues that in literature, as in any art, the sense of the work 
depends upon its material embodiment and the new constellations which this 
embodiment generates. Thus, while for Sartre commitment is found in the meanings or 
content of language, Adorno is suggesting that it is found in the “formal principle” of 
art. This claim depends upon a particular notion of form, however, one in which the 
form of art is not opposed to content or meaning. This notion distinguishes Adorno’s 
theoretical framework from the oppositional structure (in which literature is led by 
content, visual art by form) which underwrites Sartre’s argument. The formal principle 
according to Adorno is the process in which meanings and materials collide and 
transform one another in the context of particular works, the crystallisation of art and 
non-art within the work. Literature is not reducible to conceptual “meanings,” then, just 
as the visual arts are not reducible to mere material.63 
Sartre, according to Adorno, ignores the tension between the poles, attempts to 
reduce literature and visual art to oppositions.64 He ignores the fact that language 
operates not just as sign but also, in the terms Adorno sets out in The Dialectic of 
Enlightenment, as image. For, like art, language also moves between two comparable 
poles: “[as] a system of signs, language is required to resign itself to calculation in order 
to know nature, and must discard the claim to be like her. As image, it is required to 
resign itself to mirror-imagery in order to be nature entire, and must discard the claim to 
know her” (Dialectic 17–18). For Adorno, then, literature, like any art, is internally 
heterogeneous and cannot be unified. Literature partakes in both the mimetic and the 
discursive: it brings them together in a clash that transforms both. Again, then, it is this 
formal principle, the binding force of art rather than any extractable meaning that 
constitutes literature’s power.  
                                                 
63 It is Adorno’s notion of form as dynamic (socio-historical and aesthetic) which separates him from 
Greenberg, whose formalism, as I shall try to show in the next chapter, is considerably narrower and more 
limited.  
64 One of the effects of this move, we may note, is to create a hierarchy in which literature (in Sartre’s 
view) is the privileged art: the next chapter will be concerned to show how such hierarchical squabbles 
have also marked theorisation of the avant-garde. Dismissing such notions in “Art and the Arts”, Adorno 
draws the arts together not to suggest a hierarchy but to use them to reflect on one another.  
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 Against Sartre, therefore, Adorno argues that “it is not the office of art to 
spotlight alternatives, but to resist by its form alone the course of the world. … In fact, 
as soon as committed works of art do instigate decisions at their own level, the decisions 
themselves become interchangeable” (“Commitment” 180). The form of art, understood 
as the clash of internal heterogeneity and thus the movement of transformation, is a 
resistance to the reified structures of thought in which “alternatives” are necessarily 
framed. The decisions or “messages” of individual artworks are interchangeable, Adorno 
claims, because they can do nothing to change the structural framework of the society in 
which they take place. Art for art’s sake reduces art to a medium for the private 
reflection of the bourgeois individual; but committed art becomes the mouthpiece of 
opinion. Both, in other words, reinforce the structures of bourgeois society rather than 
challenging them, Adorno argues. Sartre reduces literature to the declaration of a 
subject: “interwoven in the veil of personalization is the idea that human beings are in 
control and decide, not anonymous machinery” (182). Any personal opinion, any 
political statement or programme, as Adorno sees it, is contained within this machinery: 
one decision is interchangeable with another and thus none are truly transformative.65 
It is a movement beyond the individual and the subjective that Adorno seeks to 
make in an attempt to challenge the power of these two poles, and in order to reveal 
what he sees as the totalising power of the social system, a power that, for Adorno, only 
art can resist.66 It is for this reason that art must be understood neither as representing a 
conceptual idea nor as the opposite of the social sphere: the former would be to reduce 
art to the frameworks of rationality; the latter would be to fail to grasp the connection 
with empirical reality that gives art its power and importance. On the contrary, art 
participates in what neither commitment nor bourgeois aestheticism is able to take full 
account of, an “inherently collective objectivity” (181). This collective objectivity—
                                                 
65 At this point the pessimism that marks Adorno’s work begins becomes obvious: in Chapter Four I will 
argue that it is precisely this pessimism that Lyotard rejects in Adorno’s thought and that it is as a result of 
this rejection that he attempts to rethink the task of the avant-garde. 
66 It will be useful to the discussion in Chapter Four, if we take the time now to note that Adorno is 
critiquing subjectivity here (to some degree at least) because, in that later chapter, I will be examining 




which results from the double fact of the distance that art must achieve from empirical 
reality in order to become art and the necessity that art take shape out of empirical 
reality, must have a material basis, and is therefore irreducible to subjectivity—is the 
truth of the work generated in the process of its objectification. In other words the art 
work’s force comes from the way it differs from itself, the way in which it refuses 
reduction to concept or object, to rational unification or diffuse material. This force, 
because it cannot be expressed otherwise than in the work itself, is necessarily 
enigmatic, ungraspable, and this, Adorno finally claims, is what the debate on 
commitment fails to grasp: it cannot account for “what the shock of the unintelligible 
can communicate” (180). It is in its evasion of intelligibility, in other words, in its 
resistance to what Adorno terms “the lying positivism of meaning” (191) that art takes 
on an ethical and political role. Indeed in modernity, Adorno asserts, the work of art 
takes on the burden of “wordlessly asserting what is barred to politics” (194). The 
wordlessness of what art asserts, its aesthetic idea which cannot be translated into the 
language of rational conceptuality, is of course precisely the invisible in the visible that 
Bürger fails to see: his reduction of art to ideology is not only deaf to the language of art 
but in fact, in its attempt to strip away the veil of aesthetics and reveal the “real” social 
conditions of art, helps to silence it.  
For Adorno, art is born of society, constituted by it, and at the same time 
operates to remove itself from empirical reality, to make itself an alternative to that 
reality and thus to refuse society. “Art’s own nature,” he writes, “not the impotence of 
our thoughts about it, forbids us to define it; its innermost principle, that of utopia, rebels 
against the domination of nature that its definition implies” (“Art” 386). It is this 
enigmatic character that Adorno sees as vital to art’s power. “The nonmeaningful 
realities that find their way into the domain of art in the course of erosion” he writes in 
“Art and the Arts”, “are potentially salvaged as meaningful by art, at the same moment 
as they fly in the face of the traditional meaning of art” (385). In other words, by 
reminding us that there is a potential for meaning in what rationality has deemed 
meaningless, art bears witness to an alternative to rationality. Thus, as he writes in 
“Commitment,” “as eminently constructed and produced objects, works of art, including 
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literary ones, point to a practice from which they abstain: the creation of a just [and 
meaningful] life” (194). It is this potential for transformation in the moment in which art 
and non-art, the rational and the aesthetic, meet that gives art a political role: for “in the 
semblance of what is other,” as Adorno writes in Aesthetic Theory, “its possibility also 
unfolds” (23). 
The possibilities opened out by Adorno’s own theory will be the subject of the 
following chapters which will look at the impact of Adorno’s work on more recent 
discussions of aesthetics and the avant-gardes. What remains to be done here, however, 
is to show how Adorno’s insistence on the importance of the productive conflict 
between the arts and on the enigmatic character of the artwork can be usefully employed 
to open out Duchamp’s readymades beyond the still highly influential “anti-art” reading. 
My concern in what follows is not so much to provide a decisive reading of Fountain, as 
to reveals aspects of the work which the anti-art reading suppresses and, by doing so, to 
locate the readymade in relation to Adorno’s thought. I aim to draw out the interest in 
poetic language which I think motivates the readymade and thereby to sketch out (with a 
broad brush) the outlines of ideas that I will develop in subsequent chapters.  
 
4. Fountain and Lits et Ratures  
 
In Theory of the Avant-Garde, Fountain signals a set of questions about authorship and 
institution critique. Bürger’s interpretation of the piece relies on the contrast between the 
authenticity of art and the mass-produced object, and Duchamp’s “signature” plays the 
primary role in establishing the work’s meaning. Yet, as I have already noted, this is one 
of the fault-lines in Bürger’s position, for Fountain is not signed by Duchamp. The idea 
that the “signature” functions as a guarantee of authenticity is made problematic by the 
fact that it belongs to a fictive persona, “R. Mutt.” Bürger ignores the particularity of 
this inscription and fails to take account of the more complex interaction of text and 
object that the readymade announces and performs. It is this relationship between the 
linguistic inscription and the object that I want to consider here, for approached from 
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this angle, I will suggest, what the readymade reveals is an interest in both poetic 
language and in the recuperative operations of discourse.  
In recent discussions of Duchamp’s readymades the relation between the object 
and inscription has in fact been an insistent line of enquiry.67 Rosalind Krauss, for 
example, argues that Duchamp’s work articulates a “trauma of signification” (“Notes” 
206) 68 in which the sign is revealed as emptied of meaning.69 For Krauss, Duchamp’s 
work plays with and can be understood in relation to the type of sign that Prague School 
linguist Roman Jakobson terms the “shifter.” The shifter is a word such as “this” or 
“that,” “I” or “you,” the meaning of which is generated through the context in which it is 
spoken and received. In a conversation, for example, “I” and “you” will shift according 
to the person speaking, who will sometimes be “I,” sometimes “you.” Crucially, the 
speakers will be able to recognize themselves as either “I” or “you,” because of the 
context of the articulation. The shifter, therefore, is “‘filled with signification’ only 
because it is ‘empty’” (“Notes” 197). This, Krauss argues, is precisely the position of the 
readymade. “It is a sign which is inherently ‘empty,’ its signification a function of only 
this one instance, guaranteed by the existential presence of just this object” (“Notes” 
206). In other words, Duchamp, by placing a urinal where an artwork “should” be, 
reveals the emptiness of the sign “art” and how it must be guaranteed by an object, and 
conversely Fountain reveals the dependence of the object’s significance on its labelling 
as “art”. For Krauss, then, language and object operate to fill one another in: like 
photographs and their captions in newspapers, she argues, they supplement one another 
to create meaning and at the same time, because of their interdependence, reveal the 
absence of meaning conventionally assumed to inhere in the sign.  
                                                 
67 The linguistic aspects of the readymades have been explored by many critics outside of the avant-garde 
and anti-art debates. The connection was established by the poet David Antin in his experimental essay 
“Duchamp and Language” (1974). It has recently been cemented as an area of interest by Marjorie Perloff, 
as a theme she treats in many essays (see in particular “The Conceptual Poetics of Marcel Duchamp”), and 
David Joselit (Infinite Regress).  
68This idea has had important consequences for the theorisations of the avant-garde, which will be 
discussed in the next chapter. 




In her monograph Postmodernism and the En-gendering of Marcel Duchamp 
(1994), Amelia Jones has developed this idea of the readymade as shifter in relation to a 
discussion of the signature. What shifters indicate, Jones argues, is the manner in which 
the speaking subject is always already split in two and alienated in language, a splitting 
which she sees both Duchamp’s use of pseudonyms—a practice which he referred to as 
his “little game between ‘I’ and ‘me’” (Kuh 83)—and the readymades as articulating. 
 
It is the activation of shifters by Duchamp’s textualized objects, the 
displacement of the active–passive, making–viewing parts of the self, that 
exposes the multiplicity within the signifying system – the changes in 
signification that occur according to enunciation. Duchamp’s texts and 
objects undermine the notion of a clearly defined split by acting out the 
mutual dependence of the shifters, even their permeability to one another – 
the reliance of the “I” on the “me,” the masculine on the feminine, the 
internal on the external, the maker’s identity on the interpretation of the 
spectator and the spectator’s identity on what she or he perceives to be that 
of the maker. (133-134)  
 
For Jones, shifters operate not as empty signs, in other words, but rather as unstable 
signs, exposing not so much the evacuation of meaning from the sign as the multiplicity 
of potential meanings within language. The readymades, as textualized objects, 
deliberately operate to prevent the fixing of meaning and to destabilise identities. 
“Duchamp’s productions undermine interpersonal opposition [you and I] by activating 
intrapersonal difference,” Jones writes, “playing out the split within the subject by taking 
on both shifters at once, compelling the spectator to do the same” (133). In other words, 
the readymades work to attack precisely that coherent, “rational” subject position—a 
stable, homogenous and unified identity—that Adorno, as he argues against Sartre’s 
notion of literature, conceives art as protesting against.  
Like Krauss, then, Jones perceives Duchamp as working through a kind of 
trauma of signification. Both understand his work as challenging the notion that meaning 
can be lodged within the sign: however, where Krauss sees an emptying out of the sign, 
its being divested of meaning, Jones—more perceptively I think—sees an instability 
caused by excessive signification, by a doubling of identities and multiple meanings. In 
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a passage that allows us to take account of the fact that “R. Mutt” is not the Duchampian 
signature, she writes that the readymade’s 
 
written label is … splintered from continuity with the object. It refuses to 
serve as the traditional, descriptive “anchor” directing the vehicle towards 
its “proper” referent. The metaphysical belief that meaning can lodge 
within the sign (as intended by an original subject still present through her 
or his enunciative “I”) is continually shaken as text and object conflict. 
(138)  
 
With Fountain, in other words, text and object do not supplement one another in order to 
stabilize meaning, but rather frustrate such a resolution. Such an account resonates with 
Claude Lévi-Strauss’ description of Duchamp’s work as a kind of “semantic fission,” the 
disconnection of signifier and signified serving not to annihilate meaning but rather “to 
create an unexpected fusion between another signifier and another signified” 
(Charbonnier 79). The readymade can thus be understood as a text/object construction, 
or to use Duchamp’s own description of the object, “a kind of rendezvous” (Writings 32) 
between numerous meanings and materials.  
In fact, given this description, it is perhaps not the shifter that is the most fitting 
linguistic model for Duchamp’s work but the pun.70 As a double structure in which the 
manifold senses of the word or phrase interfere and destabilise one another, the pun 
fascinated Duchamp throughout his career. From the double entendre captions which 
accompanied the newspaper cartoons that he drew in the 1910s, through a period of 
overt experimentation with the form in the 1920s—exemplified, for example, by the 
punning pseudonyms of the 1923 Wanted Poster (Fig 1.3)—to the publication in 1939 of 
a book of puns under the alias of Rrose Sélavy (Eros, C’est la Vie),71 and on to later 
works such as the visually punning collage Genre Allegory (Allégorie de Genre 1943)  
                                                 
70 For a richly allusive discussion of Duchamp’s many puns see George Bauer’s “Duchamp’s Ubiquitous 
Puns.” For further discussion of Duchamp’s puns in relation to his readymades see Carol James, “An 
Original Revolutionary.” 
71 Rrose Selvay is Duchamp’s most famous alter-ego, “born” around 1920. Rrose, as well as authoring the 
book of puns, signed/created a number of works and inspired many others. She was captured in a famous 
1921 photograph by Man Ray and appears on the readymade perfume bottle “Belle Haleine: Eau de 
Voilette” (1921). Perhaps the best discussion of the Marcel/Rrose relationship appears in Amelia Jones’s 






Fig. 1.3 Marcel Duchamp, Wanted: $2,000 Reward (1923). 







Fig. 1.4 Marcel Duchamp, Genre Allegory (1943). 
Musée National d’Art Moderne, Centre National d’Art et de Culture Georges Pompidou, Paris. 
 
(Fig 1.4), Duchamp’s work constantly revels in compound meanings, multiple identities, 
internal heterogeneity and the potential for humour that these generate.  
In his 1905 study Jokes and their Relation to the Unconscious, Sigmund Freud 
discusses puns as linguistic condensation, the compression of multiple meanings into a 
single word. Such jokes, Freud reminds us, depend on a process of setting up a meaning 
that appears expected or “normal” within dominant structures of thought or behaviour 
and then allowing another unexpected or “abnormal” alternative to present itself.72 Puns 
necessarily emerge though the frameworks of “normal” language and can only operate 
within a social context. They are relative to the dominant structures of meaning, 
therefore, yet subversive within these structures, revealing, as Derek Attridge writes, 
“the process upon which all language rests, the process whereby context constrains but 
                                                 
72 See Freud 16-22. As Andrew Stott points outs drag identities such as Rrose Selavy operate according to 
precisely the same structure—a man appears as a woman but is clearly male—which is, Stott argues, why 
drag is often humorous and why transvestitism, in contrast, isn’t. See Chapter Three of Stott, Comedy. 
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does not wholly constrain the possibilities of meaning” (Peculiar 192). In other words, 
the pun emerges from the social sphere of communicative language and relies upon that 
framework for its meaning yet also operates against that sphere, revealing other 
possibilities of meaning repressed within these structures as the second meaning flashes 
out from within the material of language. Crucially, the ambiguity in the pun is not 
resolved but remains held in conflict: it cannot be collapsed into one meaning or another 
but, like the joke, relies upon what Henri Bergson in his own study of humour describes 
as “the double fact of coincidence and interference” (124). 
The title “Fountain” appended to the urinal also performs precisely these 
doublings and sets into play multiple associations. A drinking fountain, an ornamental 
water feature, a generative source from which plenty springs forth: each of these 
meanings finds its counter in the object of the urinal, an entirely practical object, a 
repository for waste fluids rather a source and certainly not something from which to 
drink. Marjorie Perloff, in a pertinent reading of the object, its title and inscription, sees 
in this coupling of conflicting ideas a kind of sexual joke or double entendre: 
 
The fountain is a standard Romantic image of natural energy and beauty, 
a symbol of sexual potency. But here, the urinal’s original male function 
gives way to a rounded female form with a hole at its bottom — perhaps 
a true fountain after all. Or is this female form the receptacle for the male 
artist’s “fountain”? … Even the signature “R. Mutt,” a variation on J. L. 
Mott, the Philadelphia Iron Works where Duchamp purchased the urinal, 
becomes the occasion for extensive punning: Duchamp himself cited the 
“Mutt and Jeff” comic strip, but the name also recalls such German words 
as Mutti (“Mama”), Mut (“courage,” “nerve”), Armut (“poverty”), or even 
art mutt (“art” in French + mongrel dog in American slang = mongrel 
art). Such sexual punning and double entendre is found everywhere in 
Duchamp’s world of objects. (“Of Objects” 140) 
 
Like the title in other words, the “signature” inscribed on the urinal functions as a verbal 
pun to double the conflict of meanings in the object/title. Duchamp’s interest in 
language is not in its function as a communicative tool, it seems, his inscription is not 
intended to identify the object as a work, not to claim ownership, nor to guarantee 
(however ironically) authenticity. Rather the inscription is a tool to open out and 
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multiply the potential meanings affixed to the object: as the artist wrote, “instead of 
describing the object like a title it was meant to carry the mind of the spectator towards 
other regions more verbal” (Writings 141). 
As a sexual joke, moreover, Fountain might be considered to prefigure The Bride 
Stripped Bare as part of Duchamp’s broader concern with eroticism as “a way to try to 
bring out in the daylight things that are constantly hidden … because of social rules” 
(Cabanne Dialogues 88). For, if we accept Freud’s account, obscene jokes or smut 
operate in the same manner as the “exposure” (or stripping) of the person (or bride) at 
whom it is directed.  
 
By the utterance of the obscene words [or presentation of the obscene 
object] it compels the person who is assailed to imagine the part of the 
body or the procedure in question and shows her that the assailant is 
himself imagining it. It cannot be doubted that the desire to see what is 
sexual exposed is the original motive of smut. (Freud 98)  
 
What is particularly interesting about the sexual joke, then, is that it reminds us that 
while joking depends upon a shared and understood social context and the unresolved 
subversion of the dominant structures of meaning within that context, it can also operate 
to reveal divides or conflicts within this social framework. The sexual joke targets 
someone and operates upon their discomfort as the social context in which the joke 
emerges is divided into those who take pleasure in the jest and those who are the butt of 
the joke. This is of course precisely the operation of Fountain and precisely what makes 
it disturbing: for the viewer cannot be sure whether she/he is the one being exposed or 
whether they should take pleasure in the joke. Are we to laugh along at the bourgeois 
pretensions of the art world or does the fact that we are in the position of viewer in that 
same system mean that we, ultimately, are the target of Duchamp’s humour? Fountain, 
as Jones indicated, forces us onto an unstable and uncomfortable ground. 
Importantly in the context of this thesis, the idea of the pun also connects the 
readymades to Duchamp’s interest in literature.73 The sense of the pun arises out of the 
                                                 
73 Judovitz’s Unpacking Duchamp has perhaps the most considered discussion of Duchamp’s work in 
relation to poetic language currently available.  
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clash of incompatible meanings brought together in the material of the word, the image 
or sound of the written or spoken word. It operates, through the exploitation of polysemy 
and of formal similarities between signifiers, to reveal the possibility of multiple 
meanings within the system of language, refusing to reduce language to its utilitarian 
communicative usage. It is the pun’s refusal to behave, to communicate properly—what 
Attridge refers to as its “insubordination” (Peculiar 192)—that links the form to 
literature, for, as he writes, 
 
the independence of meaning from its material representation required by 
the linguistic system is challenged by every use in poetry of sound or 
appearance to make connections or to establish contrasts—every effect of 
rhyme, rhythm, visual patterning, alliteration or assonance. (Peculiar 
192-193) 
 
The pun, in other words, uses the material of language to interfere with its meaning and 
to highlight the capacity of language to evade conceptual rationality, to be aesthetic. 
Thus, as Dalia Judovitz remarks, “the radicality of readymades, as both objects and 
critical gestures, lies in the fact that they embody the effort to rethink visual 
representation through the mediation of a poetic interpretation of language” (77). In 
other words, the readymades perform the erosion of the arts which Adorno identifies as 
central to avant-garde works, cross-pollinating the visual arts with the techniques and 
strategies of literary language.  
In fact, as the subsequent chapters of this thesis will attempt to show, Duchamp 
had a keen interest in poetry and poetic language—which he described in one interview 
as “words distorted by their sense” (Cabanne Dialogues 90)74—often exploring the 
effects that could be generated by the material form of writing. A case in point here is 
Written Wrotten (Morceaux Mosis 1919)75 (Fig. 1.5), a text which presents extremely  
                                                 
74 This sequence of extensive interviews, in which Duchamp talks about his interest in literature in some 
depth, was first published in France in 1967 under the title L’Ingénieur du Temps Perdu, a far better title 
in that it captures not only the sense of literary influences but also the idea that in these late interviews the 
artist reworks his career, engineering his impact in much the same way as he had with the Green Box and 
the Boîtes-en-Valise. 






Fig. 1.5 Marcel Duchamp Written Wrotten (1919) 
One of Four Pages from the Boîtes-En Valise, Collection Arturo Schwarz, Milan. 
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neat writing on musical paper that looks like a school exercise book, from which a 
whole host of “unacceptable” meanings burst forth: the obviously “practiced” 
constraints of handwriting reign in references to incest, “intimate hygiene” and casual 
sexual liaisons. The work thus allows what Sarat Maharaj terms the “calligraphic” and 
“cacographic” modes of writing to interfere with one another. Maharaj describes the 
calligraphic as a perfected and controlled writing “of luminous clarity” and the 
cacographic as a writing of “fecal opacity … clumsy and cack-handed precisely because 
it is a transcript of bodily drives and pulsions” (84). The exaggerated correctness of the 
writing in Written Wrotten, Marharaj suggests, “a stilted right-hand slope, copybook 
fashion,” demonstrates the calligraphic aspect of writing while the puns demonstrate the 
cacographic, “quietly [playing] havoc with the copperplate form, composition, and 
layout, unbuttoning their stiff properness” (84). Like the arts which erode one another’s 
boundaries, the multiple meanings set in motion by the puns seem to violate the confines 
of the “proper” writing and proper behaviour: the promiscuous coupling of meanings 
breaks the same taboos as the incestuous coupling of the arts.76  
Another pertinent example in this regard is the phrase Lits et Ratures which 
appears in Written Wrotten.77 On first reading, this pun clearly mobilises the word 
“literature” with its attendant associations. However, read as three words, lits et ratures 
or “beds and erasures,” it generates a whole set of further associations – sleep, sex, 
death, disappearance, errors, frustrations. The two nouns impact on one another, as we 
are asked to imagine a logic in which this connection between “beds” and “erasures” 
makes sense. This second reading arises from within and interferes with the word 
“literature.” The pun invites us to ascribe it a context that connects these words, to find 
an overarching framework in which their relation makes sense.78 Yet, the frameworks of 
communicative language use and rational thought cannot account for this pun: it refuses 
to conform to established patterns of meaning. The ambiguity of the pun seems to hint at 
                                                 
76 For a discussion of the pun as connected to sexual perversion see Tanner, Adultery in the Novel 53, and 
Attridge, Peculiar Language 201. 
77 This pun was created for the cover of issue 7 of Andre Breton’s magazine Litterature in 1922. 
78 Schwarz, for example, describes it as an attack on literature; see 1:31. To me, however, the connection 
between sex and death seems to be the dissolution of the self, and, in this respect, I think the connection 
with literature can be read more easily as a rather conventional nod to aesthetic disinterest.  
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an alternative order the rules of which remain elusive: it has, we might thus conclude, 
something of the enigmatic promise that Adorno identifies in the artwork.  
Duchamp’s play with poetic language did not only manifest itself in the form of 
readymades. Indeed, in this light, “Apropos of ‘Readymades’,” a talk that the artist 
delivered at New York’s Museum of Modern Art in 1961, appears significant.79 In the 
speech Duchamp pays special attention to the linguistic aspect of the readymades and 
imagines a whole sequence of categories—the “RECTIFIED READYMADE;” the 
“IMITIATED RECTIFIED READYMADE:” the “RECIPROCAL READYMADE”, a 
purely imagined category in which one could “USE A REMBRANDT AS AN 
IRONING BOARD” (142). The fact that the majority of these categories begin with the 
letter R is not coincidental, the alliterative resonances of word play were something that 
Duchamp often capitalised upon: the double R-R of these categories also evokes the 
double R-R of Rrose’s name indicating her punning presence in the material of the text. 
As if to highlight the wordplay within the text, Duchamp switches the alliterative mode 
at the end, finishing with a punch line: since the tubes of paint used by the artist are 
manufactured and ready made products, he claims, all the paintings in the world are 
“READYMADES AIDED” (142). From the repeated R that has structured the 
discussion, Duchamp switches to the unexpected repetition of the final syllable. Playing 
with the concept of the readymade, highlighting the alliterative and material aspects of 
language and loading a single term with such an excess of meanings that it begins to 
reflect the instability of signification: in this text, the concept “readymade” becomes a 
substitute for the concept “art” and recuperates all manufactured objects under its 
banner. Duchamp infuses this “non-artistic” text with the kind of word play that more 
usually characterises literary language: he refuses to keep the genres separate, again 
plays the calligraphy of discourse against the cacography of rhythm and assonance as the 
rolling R’s of Rrose (Eros) and the stuttering repetition of “readymade-aided,” interrupts 
the “proper” discourse of the artist’s address. The bodily and material interferes with the 
conventional in this address, just as the lewd urinal interferes with the conventions of 
                                                 
79 This text was printed (entirely in uppercase) in Art and Artists (1.4, London, July 1966). It is reproduced 
in Duchamp’s Writings, from which my references are taken. 
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art. Does this artist’s statement give us an insight into the “truth” of his works, or does it 
constitute a work of art in its own right it, like a readymade which is, in turn, Duchamp 
tells us, “like a speech delivered on no matter what occasion but at such and such an 
hour” (Writings 32). 
If we can approach “Apropos of ‘Readymades’” as indicating Duchamp’s desire 
to infuse discourse with poetic language, to break down the borders between art and the 
commentary on it, then we might also approach his other texts in this manner. Indeed, 
from this angle, the events of 1917 begin to take on a slightly different cast. Recalling 
that the urinal itself was lost during the process of submission, and may never have been 
exhibited at all, we might note that Fountain actually entered art history by way of 
discourse: the lost “work” was recorded in a photograph that was published alongside a 
text, “The Richard Mutt Case”, which although unattributed at the time was later 
reported to have been authored by Duchamp himself.80 The text was published in the 
second edition of The Blind Man, the little magazine that Duchamp and Roché edited, 
and is often approached, like the photograph, as a document of fact, evidence of the 
author’s real intentions: “whether Mr. Mutt with his own hands made the fountain or not 
has no importance”, reads the text, “he CHOSE it. … [He] created a new thought for that 
object” (153). Yet, given Duchamp’s willingness to blur the boundaries between art and 
non-art, we can also understand it as another layer of the work, a means of controlling 
the reception of Fountain, which, as an event reactivated through a later textual 
intervention, is thus seen to operate with the kind of delays and recursive temporalities 
that mark Duchamp’s catalogue more broadly.81 The readymade, as it turns out, is like 
any good joke a “matter of timing” (Writings 32). 
                                                 
80 Although I am following the usual practice of attributing the “Richard Mutt Case” to Duchamp, in fact 
there is some confusion about who wrote this. As William Camfield writes, “Beatrice Wood claims she 
wrote this editorial in I Shock Myself, 31. In response to questions posed by Serge Stauffer … Duchamp 
said ‘The Richard Mutt Case’ was by the eidtors [sic] of The Blind Man. Duchamp identified Louise 
Varèse as the author in his interview for the Arts Council of Great Britain, June 19, 1966, 27. Alice 
Goldfarb Marquis thinks Arensberg was probably the principle author” (“Duchamp’s Fountain” 174). 
Certainly, The Blind Man was produced, as I noted at the outset of this chapter, by group that included 
Duchamp and, in conversation with Pierre Cabanne, Duchamp goes as far as to suggest that the entire 
point of publishing the journal was “above all a matter of justifying the ‘Fountain-Urinal’”(Dialogues 56). 
81 Given Stieglitz’s involvement as photographer, moreover, this process of documentation can be read as 
a conscious game with the reception and discourses surrounding art for, as Arlene Olsen’s Art Critics and 
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Such a practice of subsequent intervention can be seen to mark Duchamp’s 
career from beginning to end, in fact: the artist played with texts and objects in a 
strategic attempt to prevent his work from becoming fixed in any particular conceptual 
category. “If you interrupt your work, I mean after you have done it,” the artist declared 
“then it becomes, it stays a thing in itself” (Writings 134).82 This is a process that I will 
examine more closely in Chapter Three. For the moment, however, it suffices to say that 
Duchamp’s catalogue may be viewed as elaborating a practice of strategic interruption 
in which single works appear not as univocal gestures, but rather as constellations of 
conflicting ideas set in motion in an attempt to forestall the recuperative process.83  
If this process began early with Fountain, Duchamp continued the process of 
returning to this particular work throughout his career. A late example is the cover that 
Duchamp designed for Arturo Schwarz’s 1964 book Marcel Duchamp: Readymades, 
etc. (1913-1964). (Fig 1.6) The cover is a negative image, a white sketch of the upside-
down urinal on a black background. Above the image there are two lines of text: “Un 
Robinet Original Revolutionnaire /‘Renvoi Miroirique’?” (An Original Revolutionary 
                                                                                                                                                
the Avant-Garde shows, the photographer and gallery owner was an expert manipulator of the media as a 
source of free publicity (16-17). Duchamp may have been attempting to turn Stieglitz’s own work and 
tactics against him for, if Thierry de Duve is correct, the entire Richard Mutt case was Duchamp’s attempt 
to write himself into a history that was dominated by the artists represented by Stieglitz’s gallery. In this 
sense, manipulating the conservative Stieglitz—who thought Duchamp a “charlatan”—into taking the 
picture seems part of the joke (see “Given the Richard Mutt Case”). For more on the relationship between 
the Duchamp and Stieglitz circles see Balken’s Debating American Modernism. 
82 The Bride Stripped Bare in particular was “interrupted” several times, left to “breed” dust for many 
months at one point and at another, famously, it was broken in transit: Duchamp declared himself 
delighted with the result. In fact, Duchamp’s last project Given: 1° the Waterfall and 2° the Illuminating 
Gas (Etant Donnés: 1° La Chute d’Eau 2° Le Gaz d’Eclairage, 1946-1966) can also be considered as a 
return to the Glass.  The title of the later work is taken from the notes for the former, which appear in The 
Green Box and refer to important elements of the Glass and, presenting the stripped bride, Given renders 
the abstraction of the earlier Large Glass all too literal. See Schwarz 2:145 and Cabanne, Dialogues 18. 
For Duchamp’s attitude to habit and repetition, see Cabanne, Dialogues 48.  
83 This refusal to allow one interpretation to dominate his work is a crucial aspect of Duchamp’s wider 
project. The artist’s catalogue is a sequence of complex returns to earlier ideas; figures are re-worked, 
tropes reappear, entire works are incorporated into others. For more on this aspect of his work, see 
Buskirk’s “Thoroughly Modern Marcel” and Carol James, who argues that the concept of the readymade 
is consistently worked over and interrupted throughout Duchamp’s career. “As time passed,” James 
concludes “all of Duchamp’s previous work became ‘readymade,’ first, in its simple anteriority, and 
second, in its availability for reuse as artistic material, that is, in a state of having been already changed 
into art” (“Original” 281). The resistance to this kind of reading and the desire to fix the definition of 
readymade are evident in what appears, on the printed page, as a rather hostile response to James’ 





Fig. 1.6 Marcel Duchamp, Dust jacket for “Marcel Duchamp: Ready-mades, etc. (1913-
1964),” by Arturo Schwarz (1964) Published by Galleria Schwarz Milan. 
 
Faucet/‘Mirrorical Return’?) and, below the sketch, “Un robinet qui s’arrete de couler 
quand on ne l’ecoute pas” (A faucet that stops running when no one is listening to it).84 
The object thus visually suggests a process of reflection on the “snapshot effect” 
(Writings 32) of the readymade, inverting the revolutionary original (that is not an 
original) into a conceptual riddle that suggests that the work directs itself to the ear 
rather the eye,85 and only functions when attention is paid to it. The cover was designed 
for a text about his work: the readymade is thus opening an art historical commentary, 
the kind of text that Duchamp described as “a faucet of words …which instead of 
explaining subconscious thoughts, in reality creates the thought by and after the word” 
(qtd. in Tomkins 394). In other words, Fountain is a faucet that opens a flow of 
                                                 
84 This work is catalogued by Schwarz 2: 834. For a more lengthy discussion of it see Judovitz 132-133. 
85 As the discussion in the next chapter will show, this suggests that Fountain is literary or musical in the 
terms of Romantic aesthetic theories of the arts.  
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discourse which retroactively forms it: discourse which Duchamp himself, as we have 
seen, engages with and shapes. The term “mirrorical return” can be read as indicating 
this process of interruption and reflection on the works and their interpretation, a 
questioning of whether the work appears as original and revolutionary only in 
retrospective as a result of discursive construction.86 Refracted through this later book 
cover, then, Fountain appears as a game with discourse, suggesting that texts such as 
“Apropos of ‘Readymades’” and “The Richard Mutt Case” are not explanations of 
Duchamp’s work so much as additional media by which to condense progressively more 
and more meaning into the objects and increasingly destabilizing any single 
interpretation in the process.87 The idea of an independent, self-standing work is 
challenged and thus the mutual dependency of work and label, art and discourse is 
revealed.  
The force of Fountain, to conclude, is in the ongoing play of meanings that the 
work generates: it is for this reason—and not because it is anti-art—that Fountain is still 
provocative today.88 Duchamp’s readymade explores the relations between the arts and 
between art and non-art on numerous levels. Destabilising dominant structures of 
meaning and experience, it critiques a univocal interpretation of the work and exposes 
the constraints of convention, revealing the instability of linguistic meaning and the 
contingency of labels and definitions. Indeed, Duchamp’s work questions the truth value 
that is assumed to inhere in “non-aesthetic” or “rational” discourses just as it questions 
“art”. In this sense the task of the Duchampian art-pun, and its mirrorical return in 
Fountain, is the very same task which Adorno assigns to art: to resist the drive of 
                                                 
86 As I shall try to show in Chapter Three, this term links the urinal to the bachelor section of the Glass 
and the frustrated attempts at communication which the bachelors make. 
87 Duchamp appears to have been very relaxed about interpretation of his work, remarking on several 
occasions that all interpretations were valid: if a viewer could see something in the work, then it must be 
there (see Cabanne, Dialogues 42, 70). In this he is true to the comments made in his 1957 speech “The 
Creative Act” in which he asserted that is the spectator and ultimately posterity that decides what enters 
the art history books (see “The Creative Act” reprinted in Writings 138-140). 
88 Fountain has inspired not only positive reactions in the form of artistic homages by for example artists 
as well known as Claes Oldenberg and Sherry Levine but also negative reactions in the form of attacks. 
Most recently, in the Pompidou Centre, Paris in January 2006, performance artist Pierre Pinocelli attacked 
the urinal with a hammer. Like the Chinese artists who urinated on Fountain in 2000, Pinocelli’s declared 
that his “attack” was performance art and that Duchamp himself would have approved. On artist’s 
responses to Duchamp’s work see Cabanne, Duchamp & Co. 162-203. On the Pinocelli attack, see Riding.  
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rationalisation and unification. The readymade enacts the erosion of the arts and their 
concomitant reaching out towards an extra aesthetic reality, introducing a concept of 
poetic language into the realm of the visual arts and, in a text such as “Apropos of 

































                                                 
89 This is the title that Duchamp and Cabanne use when discussing the puns (usually referred to as Wrotten 
Written) written by Rrose (Dialogues 82). However it is also a variation on text that appears on Rrose’s 





Modernisms and Media: Painting, Literature and Language 
 
1. The Studio and the Library 
 
Despite its prominent position in art historical accounts of his career, it was not Fountain 
that established Duchamp’s name in the United States. In fact, ironically perhaps given 
his subsequent rejection of the craft, his reputation as iconoclast was secured by means 
of a painting – the scandalous Nude Descending a Staircase No. 2 (Nu Descendant Un 
Escalier No. 2) which was completed in Paris in early 1912.90 (Fig 2.1) The painting 
owes much to the social and artistic contexts of Duchamp’s life in Paris; the brown-
yellow colour palette of the Nude, its decomposition of form and fragmentation of 
planes all point to the influence of Cubism. Moving among the painters of Puteaux, a 
group that included the theorists of Cubism Albert Gleizes and Jean Metzinger, 
Duchamp was immersed in an intensely intellectual milieu. The exchanges were not 
limited to debate about painterly techniques and theories but also ranged over 
contemporary developments in mathematics and physics, notably the possibility of a 
fourth dimension and the implications of non-Euclidean geometry.91 Through these 
discussions, Duchamp claimed in a 1946 interview, the artists attempted to generate new 
ideas, to break free from the “conventional way of speaking—from our café and studio 
platitudes” (Writings 126).  
 Despite initial appearances, however, the Nude is far from a straightforward 
adoption of Cubism. It is most immediately differentiated by its depiction of movement, 
the portrayal of subsequent rather than simultaneous perspectives. Such an interest in the  
                                                 
90 This painting, unlike Fountain, actually did cause a public outcry in the New York. See Schwarz (1:18-
22) for a discussion of the work and its reception. 
91 In terms of Duchamp’s interest in science, fruitful research has been conducted by Linda D. Henderson 





Fig. 2.1 Marcel Duchamp, Nude Descending a Staircase, No. 2 (1912). 
The Louise and Walter Arensberg Collection, Philadelphia Museum of Art. 
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dynamics of movement is of course associated more readily with the Italian Futurists.92 
Indeed, it may have been this obvious proximity to the ideas of a rival movement that 
prompted the decision reached by the Cubist hanging committee at the Salon des 
Indépendants in 1912: in spite of the Salon’s governing principle of “no jury, no 
prizes”,93 the Nude was turned away. While this refusal clearly foreshadows the events 
of 1917, the tone is quite different. Duchamp’s Nude was not submitted as a joke and its 
dismissal was unexpected. The hanging committee was composed not only of the 
Puteaux Cubists but also of Duchamp’s two older brothers, a fact that can only have 
heightened the impact of the rejection. Certainly the event had a profound effect on 
Duchamp, providing the impetus for his decision to stop painting. Speaking some years 
later he recalled that “as a reaction against such behaviour coming from artists whom I 
had believed to be free, I got a job. I became a librarian” (Cabanne Dialogues 17). Never 
again would Duchamp seek validation from the art-world, instead he would attempt to 
become financially independent by other means, thereby gaining the liberty to pursue his 
projects without any attendant anxiety regarding their success or failure. 
  In actual fact, as Duchamp would later explain, the primary reason that the Nude 
was rejected was not its engagement with Futurism or with movement but rather its 
engagement with literature and language. Firstly, the title was considered 
inappropriate:94 to the hanging committee the practical movement that it described 
represented a mockery of one of painting’s most idealised subjects. For centuries the 
female nude had reclined, bathed, been idealised, depicted as goddess or nymph: her 
body was considered one of the highest examples of natural beauty. She was, then, an 
object to be looked at and revered not a subject to be engaged in mundane actions. 
                                                 
92 Not only did Duchamp vehemently deny such assertions, calling the Futurists mere “urban 
Impressionists” (Cabanne Dialogues 35), but there is in fact little evidence in the painting of the 
preoccupation with dynamism and speed which characterises Futurist works. The movement of the Nude 
is slow and deliberate; her descent is as symbolic as it is literal. The relationship between Duchamp’s 
work and other contemporary artistic movements has been well documented in critical literature. For 
cubism see in particular de Duve Pictorial Nominalism, Chapter Two of Henderson The Fourth 
Dimension and Non-Euclidean Geometry in Modern Art, and Steefel.  
93 This Parisian salon was clearly the model upon which the New York Independents was based, for more 
information see Chapter One, 14n1.  
94 Duchamp recalled: “On the day before the opening Gleizes asked my brothers to go and ask me to at 
least change the title …They thought it was too much of literary title” (Schwarz 1:18). 
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Duchamp breaks these codes, envisaging a figure that descends the stairs “like a show 
girl at the Folies Bergère!” (Tomkins 80) The action thus carries a sexual charge that 
appears to introduce a “base” concern into the realm of the high arts.95 Of course, it was 
not only the action of the nude that made the painting subversive; the androgyny and 
mechanical form of the figure played a part too. It is debateable, though, whether these 
would have been so shocking had conventional expectations not been set in motion by 
the title, which Duchamp painted directly onto the canvas. 
Not only was the title problematic, however, but the painting itself was deemed 
too “literary.” The accusation can hardly have come as a surprise to Duchamp, given 
that the painting was in fact a direct response to literature. Nude Descending a Staircase 
is a reworking of an earlier sketch, illustrating poet Jules Laforgue’s work, Once More 
to This Star (1911) in which the same mechanical figure is portrayed ascending rather 
than descending the stairs. During the same period, the artist produced two more 
illustrative sketches for Laforgue’s work; Mediocrity (1911) and Eternal Siesta (1911) 
which would later reappear in the Boîtes-en-Valise (1935-1941).96 Similarly, To Have 
the Apprentice in the Sun (1914)97 was also illustrative, although this image was 
suggested by the lines of Alfred Jarry rather than Laforgue: the work appears in the 1914 
Box and then again in the Green Box before finally reappearing in the Boîtes-en-Valise. 
The painting that Duchamp had completed immediately prior to beginning the Nude was 
also inspired by poetry; Sad Young Man on a Train (Jeune Homme Triste dans un Train 
1911-12) began with the working title, taken from Laforgue, Pauvre Jeune Homme M. 
The subsequent change in title by no means represents a rejection of the literariness of 
the poetic title but rather, quite the opposite, was done because of the strong appeal 
                                                 
95 The preoccupation with the nude remains central throughout Duchamp’s career. Duchamp, as Dalia 
Judovitz reminds us, treats the subject “as a symptom of the problems embodied in pictorial representation 
in general” (8). In this light, Jake Kennedy seems right to understand Given as “a declaration about the 
nude’s destiny” (51).  
96 The Boîtes-en-Valise are suitcases created by Duchamp which contain miniatures and reproductions of 
his works. They clearly play into Duchamp’s concern with re-presenting earlier works and managing the 
connections drawn between his works, as well as their interpretations. For more on the Boîtes-En-Valise 
see Schwarz 2:762-765, and Bonke. Duchamp created numerous boxes throughout his career, the first of 
which was the 1914 Box. The Green Box, which was the second, will be discussed in detail in Chapter 
Three of this thesis. 
97 The French titles of these illustrative sketches are, respectively, Encore à Cet Astre, Médiocrité, Sieste 
Éternalle, and Avoir L’Apprenti Dans le Soleil. 
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which the assonance between triste and train held for the artist.98 The interest in poetic 
language suggested by the later inscriptions of works such as Fountain, then, is made 
explicitly evident in the works of this earlier period. Likewise, the Nude’s inclusion of 
the title into the work prefigures later works that actively include writing and suggests 
that the title is to be considered less a label than a part of the painting: here the words 
themselves, like the notes reproduced for the boxes and the inscriptions on the 
readymades, are an element of the work.  
Laforgue was by no means Duchamp’s only literary source. “My ideal library,” 
he later commented “would have contained all Roussel’s writings—Brisset, perhaps 
Lautréamont and Mallarmé. Mallarmé was a great figure” (Writings 126). I will explore 
the impact of some of these writers on Duchamp’s work in the next chapter. Here, 
however, I simply want to note that such remarks suggest that the decision to move from 
the studio to the library may not have been quite as arbitrary as it might at first have 
seemed. In fact, Duchamp’s own description of his development in these years, as 
relayed in numerous interviews, is dominated by references to writers.99 “I felt that as a 
painter it was much better to be influenced by a writer than by another painter,” he 
claimed, for “this is the direction in which art should turn: to an intellectual expression, 
rather than to an animal expression. I am sick of the expression ‘bête comme un 
peintre’–stupid as a painter” (Writings 126). The relationship between the arts, and in 
particular between literature and painting, it begins to appear, is of central importance to 
Duchamp’s thought and work. 
The complex and dynamic relationship between literature and the visual arts in 
fact also lies at the very heart of Duchamp’s reception in the Anglo-American academy. 
Indeed, in this context, it has been a primary site upon which the importance of his work 
has been contested and upon which the notion of the avant-garde has been theorized. In 
the first sections of this chapter, therefore, I want to spend some time examining how the 
                                                 
98 See Cabanne, Dialogues 29. 
99 These comments are from a 1946 interview with James Johnson Sweeny, titled “The Great Trouble with 
Art in this Country” and published in The Bulletin of the Museums of Modern Art, Vol. XIII. No.4-5 
(1946), reprinted in Duchamp, Writings 123-126. Similar sentiments about the importance of literature can 




relationship between the arts has been conceptualised in discussion of the avant-garde. A 
key figure in this respect is the art critic Clement Greenberg whose influential formalist 
aesthetics have had a huge impact on how Duchamp’s work has been received. Like 
Bürger, Greenberg draws a direct connection between Duchamp’s work and that of 
Warhol, which is to say that his arguments have also had significant impact on how what 
Bürger calls the “neo” avant-garde has been interpreted. In fact, Warhol’s work proves 
pivotal here for, as I will try to show, it self-consciously reveals the inadequacies of 
Greenberg’s theoretical framework. Having sketched out Greenberg’s position, then, 
how it develops out of his response to literary ideas yet becomes fundamentally anti-
literary, I will briefly discuss the role Warhol has played in more recent attempts to 
theorize the relationship between the “historical” and “neo” avant-gardes. While these 
attempts challenge both Bürger’s conclusions and Greenbergian formalism, I will argue 
that they do little to destabilise the opposition between the visual arts and literature that 
Greenberg’s work sets up. 
In the second half of this chapter, I will look at two more recent interventions by 
philosophers Thierry de Duve and Jay Bernstein, both of whom reconsider the apparent 
opposition between modernism and the avant-garde. Both, I will try to show, argue for 
different versions of artistic modernism, yet like Greenberg, both situate the medium of 
painting as the paradigmatic modernist art form. It is a conclusion which suppresses the 
particular problems raised by literature and one that Duchamp and Warhol, I think, 
actively resist. In Bernstein’s case, I will argue, this conclusion is reached as a direct 
result of his reading of Adorno’s account of socio-historical development. His work thus 
represents one direction in which the Frankfurt-School theorist’s arguments can be 
developed: it is not the only direction Adorno’s thought can be taken, however, as I will 
try to show in subsequent chapters. This is one reason that I end this chapter with 
Bernstein. The other reason is that, despite his own conclusions on the avant-garde and 
painting, I think Bernstein’s Adornian account of the stakes of art opens out another, 
more interesting way of thinking about the task of avant-garde art. I will therefore try to 





2. “Literature”, Painting and Poetry: Greenberg’s Avant-Garde 
 
The accusation of “literariness” levelled against Duchamp’s Nude is in fact less to do 
with its direct connection to poetry than with the aesthetic principles most famously 
formulated by the German aesthetician Gotthold Ephraim Lessing. First published in 
1766, Lessing’s Laocoon: or, The Limits of Poetry and Painting100 attempted to identify 
and delimit the properties peculiar to each art.101 While maintaining that the arts share a 
common objective, inducing aesthetic pleasure, Lessing set out to refute the established 
Horatian maxim ut pictura poesis which suggests that, despite their different media, the 
arts of painting and literature share the same principles and modes.102 Lessing countered 
this idea through an exploration of the relationship between perception and the arts, 
attempting, as Jonathan Rée explains, “to derive norms of artistic value from the specific 
nature of different sensory fields” (58). He decreed that each art must strive to recognize 
and develop those effects and properties which are essential to it and must leave aside 
those which are not. The visual arts, he thus claimed, address themselves to the eyes and 
are characterised by a concern with space and with bodies which co-exist in space; 
painters and sculptors should choose a single pregnant moment rather than concerning 
themselves with the passage of time. The literary arts, in contrast, address themselves to 
the ear and are concerned with time and actions which unfold consecutively.103 While 
the arts can and do involve themselves with one another, the  
                                                 
100 In the German, Lessing’s title has an umlaut: it reads Laokoön. The translation that I am using however 
does not use the umlaut, nor does Wellbery’s monograph on the text, nor does Greenberg’s essay. For this 
reason I have elected not to use the umlaut in this thesis. 
101 That Lessing was neither the first nor the only thinker to adopt these ideas regarding the relationship 
between the arts is something that he himself acknowledged in the preface to Laocoon (see xiii-xix). For 
more on the relative position of Lessing to other aestheticians see Wellbery, whose illuminating study 
traces Lessing’s ideas back to the philosophy of Christian Wolff and places it in dialogue with the 
aesthetics of Baumgarten, Meier & Mendelssohn in order to demonstrate the extent to which Laocoon 
crystallises a whole complex of ideas, current in eighteenth-century Germany, about the relationship 
between signs and language.  
102 For more on the history, ancient context and subsequent importance of ut pictura poesis, see 
Markiewicz.  
103 Obviously Lessing’s distinction between the arts of space and the arts of time is problematic on 
numerous levels (see Mitchell, “Space and Time: G. E. Lessing” 96). Several other contemporary scholars 




mutual relation which exists between poetry and painting may be likened to 
the rational policy of two neighbouring and friendly states, which, while 
they forbid all unreasonable liberties in the heart of their dominions on the 
part of each other, yet tacitly permit on their extreme boundaries a sort of 
mutual indulgence, to compensate on both sides for the little 
encroachments which occasional circumstances may suddenly oblige the 
one to make on the territory of the other. (Lessing 178-197) 
 
This characterisation of the arts as neighbouring but distinct spheres has had a 
substantial impact on subsequent thought: in fact, as Rée points out, the idea of an 
aesthetic theory of the arts can be traced directly back to Lessing. As I shall try to show 
shortly, Lessing’s account of the difference between literary and visual art underwrites 
several of the claims upon which prominent theorisations of modernism such as 
Greenberg’s depend. Certainly it seems to have grounded the Cubists’ rejection of 
Duchamp’s Nude in 1912, for the work depicts an event in time as well as space, 
narrating a sequence of moments rather than depicting a single, pregnant moment: 
clearly, like Sad Young Man it transgresses the limits that Lessing sets for the medium, 
adopting the concerns proper to literature as well as those of painting.  
For Lessing, discovering the divergent properties of the individual arts was not a 
means to arguing for their equality. Indeed, in the system of the arts outlined in 
Laocoon, one art is held as intrinsically superior to all others, namely poetry. Lessing’s 
argument revolves around his crucial distinction between natural and arbitrary signs. 
Natural signs are signs which bear an intrinsic connection to the object that they 
represent, for example signifiers which look like or sound like that which they are meant 
to indicate. Natural signs, Lessing argues, are the material of the visual arts. Arbitrary 
signs, on the other hand, are those that bear no relation to what they represent, neither 
mimicking the appearance of, nor being produced by, the objects or ideas that they 
signify. Language is largely a system of arbitrary signs, and thus arbitrary signs are the 
primary material of poetry. One way of grasping this distinction is to understand it as 
                                                                                                                                                
representation of pain; see in particular Gustafson and Richter. The gendering of the arts, interestingly, 
raises the connection between transgender ambiguity and mixed media: this connection has been raised by 
Dalia Judovitz and Amelia Jones but is yet to be explored in depth. 
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prefiguring the difference that Kant describes between aesthetic ideas and rational ideas. 
For, in the terms of Lessing’s argument, natural signs are understood intuitively, and 
arbitrary signs are grasped conceptually. An immediate consequence of this is that the 
visual arts immediately appear to be more essentially art-like than literature which, 
forced to use arbitrary signs, seems to be placed in a peculiarly difficult position. For, if 
the arbitrary signs of language appeal to conceptual rather than sensory experience, 
literature must find a way of supplementing this rational aspect of language in order to 
become aesthetic.  
While it seems initially, as a result, that in Lessing’s system of the arts literature 
might be at a disadvantage, in fact, as Lessing sees it, just the opposite is the case; the 
arbitrariness of its signs is not poetry’s weakness but rather its strength. As David 
Wellbery explains, in Lessing’s thinking, language 
 
negates the brute, sensuous presence of things: the con-fused interlocking 
of qualities in perceived reality is dissolved into series of discrete content 
units from which selections can be freely made providing optimal 
intelligibility and purity of representation …[and] the arbitrary relation 
between individual sign and meaning allows for unlimited semantic scope. 
Whereas the plastic arts can represent only what is visible and must 
conform to our ordinary perceptual expectations, poetry can represent 
‘bloße Wesen der Einbildung’ (‘mere beings of the imagination,’…) and 
can project worlds with various ontological levels. Language is the vehicle 
through which the contents of our experience are elevated to the status of 
freely deployable, ideal entities. (189-190)  
 
The power of poetry, then, as Lessing sees it results from the freedoms inherent in the 
use of the arbitrary sign, its semantic scope and the access it allows to extra-perceptual 
ideas. Yet, this alone cannot account for poetry because all language, poetic or not, 
shares these possibilities. What is unique about poetry, Lessing thus argues, what 
differentiates it from other modes of language usage, is its power to make its arbitrary 
signs function as natural signs. It is this ability upon which its conversion into an art 
form, its appeal to intuitive rather than conceptual cognition, is dependant.  
The transformation that poetry effects on arbitrary signs, its means of making 
them function as natural signs, is achieved through the use of tropes and metaphor and 
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the poet’s ability to mimic the temporality of his subject: “Poetry not only employs 
individual words,” Lessing writes,  
 
but rather these individual words in a certain sequence. Thus, even if the 
words are not natural signs, their sequence can still possess the forcefulness 
of a natural sign. Namely in cases when all the words follow upon one 
another exactly like the things they express. (qtd. in Wellbery 198)104 
  
Here we have the idea in which the thesis of Laocoon is grounded: poetry should restrict 
itself to actions unfolding in time because it is in the consecutive, temporal aspect that 
words approach the condition of natural signs and can produce aesthetic rather than 
rational ideas. It is this ability to capitalise on the freedoms of the arbitrary sign, while 
taking advantage of its capacity to appear as natural, that prompts Lessing to remark that 
“the dominion of the Poet extends over a wider sphere than that of the Painter … he can 
command beauties which painting can never attain” (93). Thus, Lessing’s aesthetic 
theory and his famous distinction between the divergent concerns of the arts can be seen 
not only to position literature as the highest art form but also, in fact, to be motivated by 
a specific theory of language.  
It is with the literary bias of Lessing’s thesis in mind that we might now 
approach Clement Greenberg’s formulation of what constitutes avant-garde art. In two 
early doctrinal essays, “Avant-garde and Kitsch” (1939) and “Towards a Newer 
Laocoon” (1940), Greenberg lays out the basic definitions that would both underpin his 
thinking throughout the next decades and form the foundations of his readings of 
Duchamp and Warhol.105 The theoretical framework of these twin essays has had a 
                                                 
104 This quotation is a translation by Wellbery of a fragmentary note made by Lessing as part of his plan 
for an intended but never completed expansion of Laocoon.  
105 My claim that these basic definitions form the underpinning of Greenberg’s thought should be qualified 
with the observation that his own position as regards these underpinnings shifted considerably across his 
career. There are, most commentators agree, three major periods in Greenberg’s work: the early essays are 
marked by their author’s Marxist position and speak very much to their historical moment. Indeed, in 
order to be properly understood, Greenberg’s insistence on the autonomy of art must be set against the 
back-drop of German National Socialism and Stalinism in Russia. In the second period, the post-war 
years, Greenberg’s politics moved increasingly to the right, this too is reflected in his writing which—
broadly speaking—concentrates largely on individual artists and works rather than socio-political 
contexts. The essays that characterise the third and last period of Greenberg’s career are marked by an 
active re-engagement with Kant and thus constitute a re-thinking of many of his earlier positions. I 
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crucial influence on how modernism and the avant-gardes have been theorised in the 
Anglo-American context; together they constitute a sustained argument for the priority 
of the visual arts over literature. Greenberg, however, fails to address adequately the 
problem of the relationship between art and language, instead simply glossing over it by 
means of an ambiguous use of the term “literature.” It is his failure to recognise and 
respond to this problem, I shall try to show, that leads to the development in his work of 
a rigid theoretical framework which, ultimately, prevents Greenberg from being able to 
take account of the development of art in the later twentieth century. 
Like Theory of the Avant-Garde, Greenberg’s “Avant-garde and Kitsch” (1939) 
argues that the key factor in the historical development of the artistic avant-garde is art’s 
apparent autonomy. Greenberg too sees the progressive autonomisation of art and 
rationalisation of society as resulting in two contradictory impulses which manifest 
themselves as, on one hand, an inwardly-focussed, self-referential art and, on the other, a 
desire to transgress the limits of art and to reach out to an external reality. However, 
while Bürger, as we have seen, labels the latter “avant-garde”, it is the former “system-
immanent” movement that Greenberg understands by this term. Indeed, in Greenberg’s 
early writings the avant-garde is modernist; he uses the terms interchangeably to 
describe the impulse of art to consolidate rather than challenge its autonomy.106 This is 
to say that he does not understand the artistic avant-gardes as breaking with aestheticism 
but rather as developing from it. Autonomy, then, is not what Greenberg’s avant-garde 
seeks to renounce but rather what it celebrates: “once the avant-garde had succeeded in 
‘detaching’ itself from society,” he writes “it proceeded to turn around and repudiate 
revolutionary as well as bourgeois politics” (7). Greenberg’s avant-garde does not seek 
                                                                                                                                                
concentrate on the first period only because it is here that Greenberg lays out explicitly the framework for 
his conception of modernism and, despite his later shifts of position, it is this early framework that 
remains his most powerful legacy. For more on Greenberg’s oeuvre and its impact on art history see 
Caroline A. Jones’ Eyesight Alone, and for a theoretical response to Greenberg’s later engagement with 
Kant see de Duve’s Clement Greenberg between the Lines and Crowther “Greenberg’s Kant and the 
Problem of Modernist Painting.” 
106 This is explicitly stated in Greenberg’s famous 1960 essay “Modernist Painting”: “The essence of 
Modernism lies, as I see it, in the use of the characteristic methods of a discipline to criticize the discipline 
itself – not in order to subvert it, but to entrench it more firmly in its area of competence” (774). Thus 




to reconnect art and life, but to disengage itself from society; it does not declare a 
political position but, quite the opposite, rejects revolutionary aims, does not oppose the 
bourgeoisie but remains knowingly connected to it by “an umbilical cord of gold” (11).  
Art which “misunderstands” this role and attempts to transgress the limits 
imposed by autonomy, Greenberg argues, is quite simply bad art.107 In “Towards a 
Newer Laocoon” this particular movement beyond the confines of autonomy is linked, 
as it was in Adorno’s thought, to the erosion of the arts: “confused” art, Greenberg 
suggests, mistakenly concerns itself with effects that are not proper to it, derived from 
other media. “Artistic dishonesty,” he writes, is “the attempt to escape from the 
problems of the medium of one art by taking refuge in the effects of another” (26). In 
other words, like Adorno, Greenberg thinks the opposition that Bürger sets up in terms 
of the distinction between art and life, as equally bound up with the distinctions between 
the individual arts. 
In “Avant-garde and Kitsch,” both avant-garde visual art and avant-garde 
literature are described as born of the desire to create 
 
something valid solely on its own terms, in the way nature itself is valid, in 
the way a landscape—not its picture—is aesthetically valid; something 
given, increate, independent of meanings, similars or originals. Content is 
to be dissolved so completely into form that the work of art or literature 
cannot be reduced in whole or in part to anything not itself. (8)  
 
Both are thus defined in formalist terms as a process of increasing medium 
specialization: painting must concern itself with painting, writing with writing. The arts 
will no longer attempt to communicate a conceptual message that can be abstracted from 
the work: they will not seek to represent, but rather will attempt to eliminate anything 
extrinsic to the art-work and thus to present “art” as such. As a self-referential 
                                                 
107 To minimize risk of confusion, it is perhaps worth spelling out explicitly this shift in terminology: like 
both Adorno and Bürger, Greenberg differentiates between two impulses or trends in modern art, one 
inwards-focussed and self-critical and the other system-critical and outwards-focussed. Bürger terms the 
latter avant-garde. Greenberg, in contrast, uses the terms modernism and avant-garde to describe the 
former, and “bad art” (or, as I shall explain shortly, “avant-gardism”) to describe the latter. Adorno’s 
preference is for the term modernism and, although his choice of example often suggests otherwise, I 
would argue on the basis of “Art and the Arts” that he recognises both trends within that category. 
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movement, then, the avant-garde is concerned with exploration of its own media, 
techniques and processes, striving to be “independent of meanings,” independent of 
“originals.” Clarifying this in “Towards a Newer Laocoon,” Greenberg argues that what 
the avant-garde work must avoid is “subject matter as distinguished from content: in the 
sense that every work of art must have content, but that subject matter is something the 
artist does or does not have in mind when he is actually at work” (28). What this 
definition of “subject matter” implies is that the avant-garde artist must avoid expression 
of intentions or meanings that can be articulated independently of the work. Emphasis is 
shifted, Greenberg explains, from the “meaning” of the work to “the physical, the 
sensorial” (32). 
The role taken by Greenberg’s avant-garde, then, is not to question the identity of 
art and the individual arts but to perpetually reinscribe it. Developing Lessing’s 
argument, Greenberg suggests that the most advanced art seeks to distil itself within its 
medium; the avant-garde forms a progressive drive towards aesthetic “purity,” its aim is 
to isolate the essential elements of each art form. Rather than challenging traditional 
aesthetic conventions, therefore, the avant-garde is the force that preserves them and 
entrenches them more deeply in their fields and in their separation. Like Lessing, in 
other words, Greenberg lays emphasis on the differences between the arts. It is from 
Lessing, moreover, that Greenberg takes his understanding of literature as an art 
essentially concerned with time: “the question of form in literature” he writes in a 1950 
review of T.S. Eliot’s work, “boils down to that of a right succession of parts” (“Eliot” 
243). When it comes to painting, however, Greenberg’s thesis begins to diverge from 
that set out in Laocoon. This is principally because he is not concerned with the kind of 
representational painting which Lessing describes, for, as the previous quotation from 
“Avant-garde and Kitsch” demonstrates, in Greenberg’s framework, what art must at all 
costs avoid is extrinsic meaning, being indicative of something else. Art must be “valid 
solely on its own terms” and not judged upon its capacity for and skill in representation. 
Thus a crucial difference emerges in Greenberg’s reworking of Lessing’s distinction 
between painting and poetry: although he borrows the structure of Lessing’s aesthetic 
theory, he rejects his theory of semiotics. Indeed, at no point does “Towards a Newer 
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Laocoon” acknowledge Lessing’s distinction between “natural” and “arbitrary” signs. 
Instead, it advocates an art that avoids the character of the sign completely; art ceases to 
signify and instead is experienced as a material presence.108 As a result, as I shall try to 
show shortly, Greenberg struggles to find a way to account for literature in his theory of 
the arts: ultimately, in his work, “literature” becomes something that “art” must reject. 
Firstly, however, I want to return to the argument of the first essay and consider kitsch, 
the term which Greenberg opposes to avant-garde.  
The defensive tactics of self-preservation and consolidation that the avant-garde 
demonstrates are necessary because, Greenberg suggests, art operates in the face of a 
threat, namely the specific danger posed by kitsch. While avant-garde is defined as a 
formalist concern with the properties of the medium, kitsch is identified as the art of the 
masses: “popular, commercial art and literature, with their chromeotypes, magazine 
covers, illustrations, ads, slick and pulp fiction, comics, Tin Pan Alley music, tap 
dancing, Hollywood movies, etc., etc.” (11) Formulaic and synthetic, presenting not a 
challenge but a pre-constituted and easily communicable message, kitsch can be 
passively consumed: “identifications are self-evident immediately and without any effort 
on the part of the spectator” (16). In other words, while avant-garde art is concerned 
with form, kitsch is concerned with subject matter: the pre-constituted meaning is what 
counts here. Kitsch is about signification and transparency.  
The ease with which its pre-formulated message can be consumed sets kitsch 
closely in league with not only capitalism and “the culture industry” but also with 
totalitarianism in general. With reference to propagandistic Soviet Realism, Greenberg 
declares that “[flattering] the masses by bringing all culture down to their level” is the 
means by which such dictatorships preserve their power and ensure that they “stay close 
to the ‘soul’ of the people” (20). The viewer of such kitsch, he writes, “recognizes and 
                                                 
108 It is on this point that Greenberg might be compared to another of Duchamp’s most influential 
commentators in the Anglo-American Academy, Arthur Danto who, in complete contrast to Greenberg, 
sees art as operating primarily through its semantic character. If I do not deal with Danto in the main body 
of his thesis, it is because I think his notion of an “art-world” can be understood as roughly equivalent to 
Bürger’s “institution” of art. The moves taken by de Duve and Bernstein appear to me, in this sense, much 
more interesting. Moreover, many of the questions that Danto’s account of art raises are also raised in the 
context of my discussion of de Duve. For more on Danto in relation to Duchamp and aesthetics see Robert 
J. Yanal. See also Bernstein on Danto in Against Voluptuous Bodies 223-252. 
 
78 
sees things in the way in which he recognizes and sees things outside of pictures—there 
is no discontinuity between art and life, no need to accept a convention” (16). In other 
words, while the viewer of Soviet Realism apparently does not need to reflect upon the 
artwork in order to understand it, the viewer of avant-garde art must derive its values “at 
a second remove, as the result of reflection upon the immediate impression left by 
plastic values” (16). While kitsch subdues the masses, keeps them in place with a 
constant supply of “new” images—a drip feed of pre-digested information—avant-garde 
art is that which ruptures their experience, generating a critical distance which provokes 
them into reflection on the conditions of their existence.  
Such ruptures are crucial for Greenberg, for he sees art’s power as residing in its 
function as a space outside, detached, operating to different rules and with different 
values from society. While avant-garde art maintains a distinction “between those values 
only to be found in art and the values which can be found elsewhere,” (15) kitsch 
perilously collapses these distinctions. Thus the key danger of kitsch—a mode that 
operates according to the values of life, not art—is that it threatens to destroy this 
alternative space, to collapse art and life into one.109 This is an important point as it 
grounds Greenberg’s belief that the values of art and those of life are necessarily 
different: art, Greenberg suggests, must reject the political values of “life praxis” 
because the aestheticisation of politics would be too high a price to pay.110 The 
materiality of avant-garde art, its sheer opacity is what prevents it from being reduced to 
the conceptual, reified meanings of kitsch. What is at stake in art’s autonomy and the 
                                                 
109 It is important here to remember the historical context of Greenberg’s comments. For it is right at this 
point, the point at which Greenberg positions the aesthetic as a means to preserve difference in society in 
the face of what he perceives as a very real totalitarian threat, that his thought appears to tip over into the 
essentialism which his detractors focus upon, an essentialism that is driven by the desire to erase alterity 
within the individual arts. In this sense, Thierry de Duve’s argument in “Silences in the Doctrine” 
(Clement Greenberg between the Lines 39-86) is particularly important (although also slightly problematic 
because forced): De Duve, to put it very bluntly indeed, suggests that for Greenberg the other is in fact 
represented by the medium itself and thus that his commitment has always been to acknowledging the 
importance of alterity and difference.  
110 Greenberg thus voices the same fears expressed more famously by Walter Benjamin in the concluding 
paragraphs of “The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction.” Debates on the relationship 
between modernism and post-modernism have tended to position Benjamin and Greenberg at opposite 
poles: Greenberg representing the elitism of high modernism and the rejection of mass culture, Benjamin 
as representing the post-modernist democratic possibilities of mass culture. As Caroline Jones argues this 
positioning obscures the common grounding of many of their ideas. See C. Jones Eyesight 350-386. 
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avant-garde’s rejection of society, for Greenberg, is the preservation in art of values 
higher than those which motivate everyday life and politics: the avant-garde operates to 
prevent art being reduced to propaganda.111  
These stakes also motivate Greenberg’s call for a newer Laocoon, for the second 
essay is an attempt to reinforce the framework set up by “Avant-garde and Kitsch” by 
providing it with a grounding in aesthetic theory and the history of the arts. “Towards a 
Newer Laocoon” is also Greenberg’s most sustained attempt to work through the 
problem of the relationship between language and art. It begins by reinforcing and 
building upon Lessing’s position as regards the essential differences between the arts. 
Echoing the description in Laocoon of the arts as neighbouring states, Greenberg 
suggests that at certain times the relationship between the arts is one of conflict. One art 
form can become dominant and 
 
when it happens that a single art is given the dominant role, it becomes the 
prototype of all art: the others try to shed their proper characters and imitate 
its effects. The dominant art in turn tries to absorb the functions of the 
others. A confusion of the arts results, by which the subservient ones are 
perverted and distorted; they are forced to deny their own nature in an 
effort to attain the effects of the dominant art. (24) 
 
A dominant art exerts control over its neighbours, subjects them to its laws and avails 
itself of their resources. Such a position Greenberg argues had been achieved by 
literature by the middle of the seventeenth century; this, he explains, is why Lessing saw 
the arts “exclusively in terms of literature” (25). Under these conditions, as subservient, 
the pictorial arts were relegated to effectively imitating literature, to denying their own 
identity or medium. When literature is dominant, Greenberg writes, “all emphasis is 
taken away from the medium and transferred to subject matter” (25). This is a dual 
claim: firstly, it suggests that literature is essentially characterised by subject matter, and 
secondly it opposes the past, the period of literature’s dominance, to the present 
movement of the avant-garde which places emphasis directly on the medium. Building 
                                                 
111 This dovetails neatly with Adorno’s argument that when works of art present positions, art is reduced 
to the mouthpiece of opinion and loses its power to challenge social structures (see Chapter One 44).  
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upon his thesis that the avant-garde seeks to seal art off in its autonomy, Greenberg goes 
on to state that as 
 
the first and most important item upon its agenda, the avant-garde saw the 
necessity of an escape from ideas, which were infecting the arts with the 
ideological struggles of society. Ideas came to mean subject matter in 
general. ... This meant a new and greater emphasis upon form …[and] was 
the signal for a revolt against the dominance of literature, which was 
subject matter at its most oppressive. (28)  
 
While in “Avant-garde and Kitsch,” the word “literature” indicated an art form, here it 
takes on the character of subject matter. Thus the signification of “literature” begins to 
shift in Greenberg’s thought; for if the primary characteristic of literature is subject-
matter, then “literature” comes to signify that which the avant-garde must slough off.  
 When literature became the dominant art, Greenberg claims, the medium was 
suppressed in all the arts. With the avant-garde the emphasis is shifted from subject 
matter towards sensuous physical experience, towards the medium. A revolt is staged 
against the dominance of literature by the other arts, and the key weapon in this battle is 
the materiality of the artwork: just as the opacity of the avant-garde artwork is opposed 
to the transparency of kitsch, so the materiality of the media of the other arts is opposed 
to “literature” for, as Greenberg puts it just a few pages later “‘literature’s’ corrupting 
influence is only felt when the senses are neglected” (32). In Greenberg’s thinking, then, 
“literariness” refers not to an aesthetic form of language use but to what he sees as 
language’s ability to communicate a meaning, without the “noise” of the medium 
interfering. It is a subtle shift, but an important one for while in these early essays the 
terms are still mobile, Greenberg’s distinction between “literary” and “advanced” art 
would become increasingly entrenched in modernist aesthetics. 
 The major problem that this historical account leaves Greenberg with is the 
difficulty of explaining poetic language and how it escapes “literature.” In “Avant-garde 
and Kitsch” he acknowledges this, flagging up the apparent disadvantage of the medium 
of language: “poetry must deal with words” he writes “and words must communicate” 
(9). Nevertheless, he goes on to say, avant-garde writing adopts a similar tactic to the 
visual arts in that it involves “the reduction of experience to expression for the sake of 
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expression, the expression mattering more than what is being expressed” (10). Whether 
this ambiguous conclusion entails a conception of poetry as an act, or poetry as a 
material object is unclear: indeed with this formulation Greenberg simply glosses over 
the problem which Lessing’s semiotics sought to explain, the problem of how language, 
weighed down with its accumulation of meanings, can take on an aesthetic dimension. 
Tackling this problem once more in “Towards a Newer Laocoon,” Greenberg 
reveals a second important influence on his aesthetics by turning to the poet who had so 
impressed Duchamp, Stéphane Mallarmé. In fact, strangely enough given his subsequent 
positioning of “literature,” Greenberg’s notion of the arts as seeking “purity” is rooted in 
his reading of Mallarmé’s poetics.112 For Mallarmé, Greenberg claims, “the poem is to 
aim at the general consciousness of the reader, not simply his intelligence … to deliver 
poetry from the subject and to give full play to its true affective power it is necessary to 
free words from logic” (33). This sense of literary autonomy as an achievement, won by 
casting off subject matter and the obligations of representation, clearly parallels 
Greenberg’s discussion of painting: like painting, then, poetry, as an art, must avoid 
“meaning”. For Greenberg, following Lessing, the arts are to be considered as formally 
                                                 
112 See C. Jones, Eyesight Alone 63-64. As Greenberg himself puts it, it was “literary criticism, and my 
experience with literature, that decided me to be such a quote ‘formalist’ endquote” (qtd. in Jones 63). 
Another literary influence was Bertolt Brecht, whose famous Verfremdungseffekt may be thought of as 
impacting on Greenberg’s conceptualisation of the task of the avant-garde. However, Brecht’s work 
constitutes a serious challenge to the values that are espoused in “Avant-garde and Kitsch”: Brecht’s work 
is materialist, it attempts to provoke a rational rather than an aesthetic judgement. While it redefines and 
explores its medium, it does not do so through the processes of distillation and purification that 
Greenberg’s avant-garde engages in: instead, as Greenberg acknowledges, Brecht refutes traditional 
aesthetics by “grafting his poetry upon conventions that lay outside the usual orbit of ‘book’ literature” 
(256) Brecht’s art turns towards politics as his essay “Shouldn’t We Abolish Aesthetics?” shows, and 
away from aesthetics.  Greenberg responds to his work, however, by forcing it into the kind of categories 
which it attempts to reject: Brecht’s “advances” Greenberg claims are enabled by his aesthetic intuition. 
“In Brecht’s case, it is poetry that fires both prose and verse; his instincts and habits as a poet enforce the 
shape, measure, and incisiveness which belong to almost everything he writes” (265). In other words, 
while Brecht tries to break with aesthetics, tries to reject intuitive judgement in favour of reason and 
intellectual engagement, Greenberg argues that his success is due to his aesthetic sensibility, his poetic 
intuition. In an ironically circular move Greenberg imposes on Brecht precisely the kind of romantic 
aesthetic notions that he sought to escape, making Brecht into a genius (for Kant, to create work as a 
genius is not to actively and consciously plan and create works, but rather to allow “nature” to guide the 
creation of the work: genius “gives the rule just as nature does. Hence the author of a product for which he 
is indebted to his genius does not himself know how he has come by his Ideas” (§46, 113)). Greenberg 
ignores the social basis of Brecht’s work. As I tried to show in Chapter One, it is the strength of Adorno’s 
aesthetic theory, that, in its radical historicity, it grasps both the aesthetic and the social at the same 
moment. It is the weakness of Greenberg’s thought that he is unable to do so. 
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different while their aim—the production of purely aesthetic pleasure—is the same. The 
poet may thus hint at the infinite possibilities of significance, Greenberg suggests, but 
should never express concrete ideas which can be extracted from the poem.113 In a 
formulation that modifies the comments on poetry in “Avant-garde and Kitsch”, he 
claims that the poet writes “not so much to express, as to create a thing which will 
operate upon the reader’s consciousness to produce the emotion of poetry. The content 
of the poem is what it does to the reader, not what it communicates” (33-34). For 
Greenberg, then, Mallarmé’s notion of the drive towards “pure” poetry is understood as 
a movement towards a kind of sensual, aesthetic form. Poetry shakes off the conceptual 
and the communicative, words are freed from logic: it becomes sound, affect, rhythm 
and emotion.114  
Such a reading seems to echo with a famous phrase from Mallarmé’s “theoretical 
poem” Crisis in Poetry (1886) in which the poet describes “pure” poetry as the act of 
“transposing a fact of nature into its almost complete and vibratory disappearance 
through the play of the word,” a transposition that results, he claims, in the “pure notion” 
(75).115 In this context, the “pure notion” appears as a process of dematerialisation, the 
poem reduced into pure sense entirely independent of reference to any object. Thus, 
rather than slough off meaning in favour of sensual, aesthetic pleasure, Mallarmé’s 
notion of purity seems to transcend this opposition. This sense of overcoming the 
opposition, however, is what Greenberg fails to see (or perhaps chooses to ignore). 
Indeed, reading Mallarmé through Lessing, Greenberg imposes on his work the kind of 
oppositional structure against which, as I shall argue in the following chapter,116 
Mallarmé’s thought might be seen to operate: literature becomes “pure” subject matter, 
“pure” conceptuality.  
                                                 
113 Thus in his review of T.S. Eliot’s Selected Works Greenberg writes that the “correct insight of all true 
lovers of art […is] to take delight precisely in that which art suspends beyond the reach of discourse or 
explicitness” (“Eliot” 241). 
114 “Pure” poetry can of course be read in relation to music more easily than to painting: it is in this inter-
art relationship that Mallarmé, like many of his peers, was more interested.  
115 In the original: “transposer un fait de nature en sa Presque disparition vibratoire selon le jeu de la 
parole, cependant ; si ce n’est pour qu’en émane, sans la gêne d’un proche ou concret rappel, la notion 
pure” (Oeuvres 213). 
116 As I shall attempt to show in the next chapter, it is the idea of transcending the opposition between the 
material and the conceptual that Duchamp takes from Mallarmé. 
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Greenberg’s early essays create a framework in which literature and painting are 
positioned as governed by different modes and properties but, ultimately, judged by the 
same criteria. Like the visual arts, literature, or poetry, as Greenberg sees it, must strive 
to escape the reified meanings of language. Unlike the visual arts however, it is also 
invested in those meanings. Always a sign, language cannot turn its back on meaning 
and subject matter. It shares the avant-garde struggle with degraded “reality” but unlike 
the visual arts it cannot resist by means of its own materiality: from the outset it is 
contaminated with meaning, its very material—that which Greenberg claims it must 
emphasise—compromises it. It is under these circumstances that, for Greenberg, 
painting moves into a position of dominance, becoming the paradigmatic modernist (or 
avant-garde) art form. Painting as “the chief victim of literature [has] brought the 
problem into sharpest focus” (“Laocoon” 28), Greenberg claims, and because its 
medium is easier to isolate, can more easily address itself to “eyesight alone” 
(Greenberg “Sculpture” 59).117 It has been able to progress the furthest in identifying 
and consolidating the characteristics of its medium, and in so doing has attained “a more 
radical purity” (“Laocoon” 34). If we translate this back into the terms of “Avant-Garde 
and Kitsch,” painting with its more radical purity and its ability to highlight its own 
medium free from the problems of subject matter, is, by its nature, more resistant to the 
recuperative powers of conceptual thought. In contrast, poetry, as nothing more than 
affect, has no such material stronghold. Painting is superior because matter is resistance: 





                                                 
117 Greenberg’s comments on sculpture are extremely interesting in fact: he argues that in sculpture the 
“prohibition against one art’s entering the domain of another is suspended, thanks to the unique 
concreteness and literalness of sculpture’s medium” (59). In other words, because of its sheer material 
presence, sculpture is exempt from the rules that govern the other arts. 
118 In this sense Greenberg shares Sartre’s assumption (criticised by Adorno in “Commitment”) that 
literature is characterised by transparency. While Sartre sees this as literature’s strength, Greenberg of 
course sees it as its fundamental flaw.  
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3. Avant-gardism and Medium Scrambling 
 
By setting up an opposition between the conceptual and the intuitive, rational ideas and 
aesthetic ideas, Greenberg, I have tried to show, suppresses both the literary roots of his 
own argument and the problem of “poetics,” the question of how language becomes an 
art. This framework, set out in his two early essays, is one that Greenberg would return 
to again and again throughout his career. Increasingly, he came to view abstract painting 
as the most advanced art form, writing in 1955 that “painting is the most alive of the 
avant-garde arts at the present moment” (208). In 1959, he clarified this, distinguishing 
abstract painting as more properly aesthetic by contrasting it to representational painting 
which he linked, once again, to literature: “representational painting is like literature, 
[in] that it tends to involve us in the interested as well as the disinterested by presenting 
us with the images of things that are inconceivable outside time and action” (78). 
Representational painting involves its viewer in the “interested,” for it is contaminated 
with non-art, events that take place in time.119 In contrast abstract painting appears as the 
manifestation of something a-temporal, valid in its own right and disconnected from 
immediate social concerns. Abstract painting, in what Greenberg considers to be 
exemplary avant-garde fashion, rejects empirical reality and thus enables a more 
profoundly “disinterested” response from the viewer, a more purely aesthetic reaction.  
The Kantian terminology of this description foreshadows Greenberg’s famous 
1960 essay “Modernist Painting,” which is perhaps his most precise statement of what 
                                                 
119 Although this is clearly Kantian terminology, Greenberg’s description suggests the rather un-Kantian 
idea that the artist can manipulate “interest” or aesthetic value through the choice of subject-matter (or 
through the choice to exclude it). In this, Greenberg seems to be attempting to make Kant’s stipulation that 
aesthetic judgements take place without pre-determined criteria, into a fixed criterion by which to judge 
artworks. For Kant it is the pleasure of aesthetic experience which is disinterested (relating only to the 
experience of immanent presence of the work/object) and upon which the aesthetic judgement is made. 
However, attempting to draw out values from that experience and thus construct an extrinsic framework in 
which to understand and objectively judge art, as Greenberg does, ultimately makes his own responses 
interested (as his judgements are constantly related to a set of criteria which are pre-formulated) As Paul 
Crowther argues, this “unargued reduction of aesthetic value to artistic quality” (“Greenberg’s Kant” 320) 
is a highly problematic aspect of Greenberg’s work. For more on Greenberg’s reading of Kant see 
Crowther. On disinterest in Kant see Zangwill.  
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he considers the task of modernist or avant-garde art.120 In the opening paragraphs, 
Greenberg declares that he identifies Modernism 
 
with the intensification, almost exacerbation, of [the] self-critical tendency 
that began with the philosopher Kant. Because he was the first to criticize 
the means itself of criticism, I conceive of Kant as the first real Modernist. 
… Kant used logic to establish the limits of logic, and while he withdrew 
much from its old jurisdiction, logic was left in all the more secure 
possession of what remained to it. (774)  
 
In other words, Kant marks the distinction between logic and aesthetics. His work is thus 
the site which opens out the possibility of modern autonomous art.121 For Greenberg, as 
I have tried to show, art must not only accept but entrench this division by means of 
identifying its own “unique and proper area of competence” (775). In a description 
which recalls the argument of “Towards a Newer Laocoon,” Greenberg writes that for 
each art this competence 
  
coincided with all that was unique to the nature of its medium. The task of 
self-criticism became to eliminate from the effects of each art any and 
every effect that might conceivably be borrowed from or by the medium of 
any other art. Thereby each art would be rendered “pure”, and in its 
“purity” find the guarantee of its standards of quality as well as of its 
independence. ‘Purity’ meant self-definition, and the enterprise of self-
criticism in the arts became one of self-definition with a vengeance. (775) 
 
The drive of “self-definition with a vengeance” is the drive of modernism, of what 
Greenberg earlier termed avant-garde art. Yet, it is important to recall once again the 
other impulse of twentieth-century art, the impulse which moves against definition, 
which gnaws away at the concept “art” and attacks the rational division of experience 
                                                 
120 Greenberg slowly gave up the term avant-garde in favour of modernism. “It is with ‘Modernist 
Painting,’” as de Duve explains, “that Greenberg began consistently to employ the term ‘modernism’ for 
the same thing he previously designated by the term ‘avant-garde.’ With one crucial difference […]: 
where avant-garde is a general term that doesn’t distinguish between the arts, there is only modernism in 
painting or in sculpture (or in music, in poetry, etc.), but not in art in general” (“Silences in the Doctrine” 
80). The reason that Greenberg gives up the term avant-garde, it thus appears, is because it is too heavily 
associated (in his own mind at least) with interdisciplinary activity. 
121 The idea that it is the separation of aesthetics from rational logic that opens out the possibility of 
modern art is shared by Adorno. However, while Adorno recognises in art’s “self-criticism” its 
rationalisation, Greenberg does not seem to. 
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into separate spheres, just as it attacks the rationalising division of “art” into “the arts”: I 
want to return at this juncture, therefore, to Duchamp, in order to see how his work 
challenges the aesthetic theories which ground Greenberg’s thought.  
Duchamp rejected the “retinal” aspect of brute materiality, instead attempting to 
put art “at the service of the mind” (Writings 125).122 A key step in this regard was his 
attempt to escape the prejudices of taste, which, he claimed, not only “gives a sensuous 
feeling …[but also] presupposes a domineering onlooker who dictates what he likes and 
dislikes, and translates it into beautiful and ugly” (Tomkins 368-369). Taking a 
primarily sensuous pleasure in the work, Duchamp thus suggests, does not necessarily 
immunise a viewer from “interest.” Nowhere is this expressed more visibly than in his 
1911 painting Dulcinea, a work which mobilizes literature in order to, as the artist put it, 
“‘detheorize’ Cubism in order to give it a freer interpretation” (Dialogues 28) and which 
openly mocks the idea of aesthetic “disinterest.” (Fig 2.2) Like the Nude, Dulcinea 
shows a figure—this time clearly a woman—repeated on the canvas five times in a 
sequential fashion, suggesting a movement in which she walks into and proceeds 
through the pictorial space of the canvas. Just as the Nude does, this painting depicts the 
unfolding temporality that both Lessing and Greenberg see as proper to literature. In the 
first three positions, the figure’s clothing is evident: she appears to have an overcoat on 
initially which, somewhere between the third and fourth positions, disappears to reveal 
the form of a naked torso with the suggestion of a bustle or large skirt. In the fourth and 
fifth position her breasts and legs are exposed (with typical Duchampian humour, her hat 
remains in place throughout). Here the stripping, which would later be explored in more 
theoretical fashion in The Bride Stripped Bare (1915–1923), operates on a simpler, 
voyeuristic level. As Lawrence Steefel has pointed out, in his early and still seminal 
monograph on Duchamp, the figure is surrounded by a “welter of nude limbs, torsos and 
                                                 
122 Duchamp, although he used this formulation and frequently disparaged purely sensuous art, claimed to 
dislike the word “intellect” which he claimed was “too dry a word, too inexpressive” (Writings 137). In 
French, he uses “esprit” referring not only to intellect but also, as Tomkins writes, “spirit, soul, vital 
principle, understanding, wit, fancy, humour, temper and character, all of which figured in Duchamp’s 
thinking. When he said that painting could not be understood by the intellect, he was using the word in its 
specific and limited sense: the intellect alone” (369). Thus when Duchamp talks about art and the intellect, 




Fig. 2.2 Marcel Duchamp, Dulcinea (1911).  




breasts” (87) which can be made out in the fragmented planes and brush strokes which 
constitute the background of the painting. In what appears to be a tongue-in-cheek 
comment upon analytic Cubism, a practice of painterly abstraction which famously tore 
the subject of the painting into a mass of interjecting angles and planes, the stripped 
female body is exposed to our view and dismembered in what seems like an aggressive 
act, the figure ravaged by the viewers gaze.123  
As with the Nude, moreover, the title of this painting is of no small consequence. 
It provides another instance of literary influence and locates the painting into another 
narrative for Dulcinea is, after all, a character in Cervantes’ Don Quixote. Like the 
central character of the novel, Don Quixote himself, Dulcinea del Toboso is a fantasy 
dreamed up by the “real” figure of Alonso Quijano, who imagines himself as the knight 
and the peasant Sancho Panza as his squire. Dulcinea is a part of this imaginary 
scenario: an identity projected upon the peasant Aldonza Lorenzo, she is an idealized 
princess in whose name Quixote undertakes his quest. As befits a chivalrous nobleman, 
Quixote describes her in the language of courtly poetry: 
 
she is my queen and lady, and her beauty supernatural, for in it one finds 
the reality of all the impossible and chimerical aspects which poets attribute 
to their ladies; her tresses are gold, her forehead Elysian fields, her 
eyebrows the arches of heaven, her eyes suns, her cheeks roses, her lips 
coral, her teeth pearls, her neck alabaster, her bosom marble, her hands 
ivory, her skin white as snow, and the parts that modesty hides from human 
eyes are such, or so I believe and understand, that the most discerning 
consideration can only praise them but not compare them. (1:13 91)  
 
Such over the top ekphrastic description serves to remind the reader of the meta-fictional 
operations of Cervantes’ work, a novel profoundly concerned with rhetoric and writing 
whose hero is inspired by chivalric romances. Quixote’s literary language also serves to 
highlight the contrast between his vision and the more mundane figure of Aldonza 
Lorenzo, who, Panza tells us, is in fact loud, coarse and even “something of a trollop” 
                                                 
123 In this it also prefigures—although with a lesser degree of violence—Duchamp’s last major work 
Given. As Kennedy observes, power and violence are key themes in Duchamp’s work which are as yet 
barely explored in the critical literature (see Kennedy 51). Jean-Michel Rabaté has recently developed a 
related argument, suggesting that Duchamp is “as Sadean as he is Mallarméan” (Given 75).  
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(1:25 200). As he does elsewhere in the novel, here Cervantes employs to comic effect 
the mismatch between the generalised ideal which Quixote imagines and the specific 
reality this ideal is projected upon. Dulcinea can thus be taken to represent the 
complexity of the relationship between reality and imagination, between how things are 
and how we perceive them to be, between objects and the meanings that we invest in 
them.  
In a key moment in the novel, the complex nexus of reality and imagination that 
Dulcinea represents is aligned with the processes at work in artistic creation. Rebutting 
Panza’s attempts to convince him that Aldonza/Dulcinea is in fact a peasant rather than a 
princess, Quixote admits that he is conscious of the gap between the reality of his 
situation and his imaginary world. Yet, he declares,  
 
because of my love for Dulcinea del Toboso, she [Aldonza Lorenzo] is 
worth as much as the highest princess on earth. … I imagine that 
everything I say is true, no more and no less, and I depict her in my 
imagination as I wish her to be in beauty and distinction, and Helen cannot 
approach her, Lucretia cannot match her, nor can any of the famous women 
of past ages, Greek, barbarian or Latin. (1:25 201) 
 
In this unique moment, the only point in the novel in which the apparent mad-man 
reveals awareness of his “real” position, it is strikingly as an artist that Quixote positions 
himself. It is not as someone subject to crippling delusions that he appears, but rather as 
someone caught up in the processes of artistic creation, who actively and knowingly 
creates pictures, depicts his subject in his mind in poetic terms. Quixote actively 
attempts to create an image which will function to motivate and explain his own 
narrative: muse and artwork, Dulcinea is an inspirational vision imposed upon the reality 
represented by Aldonza Lorenzo which—as far as Quixote is concerned at least—
transforms the peasant into the princess. 
Just as Quixote bases his fantasy upon a “real” woman, Duchamp’s Dulcinea too 
was inspired by a real person: “‘Dulcinea’ is a woman I met on the Avenue de Neuilly,” 
recalled the artist “whom I saw from time to time going to lunch, but to whom I never 
spoke…I didn’t even know her name” (Cabanne Dialogues 33). Like Cervantes’ 
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princess, Duchamp’s figure bears little relation to the real woman who inspires the 
image. While Cervantes’ hero is motivated by the noble sentiments of chivalry, 
however, Duchamp’s projection is explicitly sexualised. Indeed, the rude assault of 
Dulcinea may be taken as an assault on the idealised, aestheticised vision of art 
presented by Quixote. This is not an innocent attempt to idealise or romanticise the 
subject: instead what we are presented with is the knowing product of an entirely self-
conscious desire. That the title refers to the painting rather than the figure, moreover, 
suggests that Duchamp is marking the canvas itself out as a site of projection; just as 
Don Quixote can be read as fiction about fictions, then, so too can Duchamp’s Dulcinea 
be read as a painting about painting. The painting is identified as an object that bears an 
unstable relation to the interpretations attached to it: mocking the idea of “disinterest” by 
suggesting that the basis of the gaze lies in desire, it implies that what the viewer 
projects upon the material body of the work bears no necessary relation to the reality of 
the paint and canvas.  
Duchamp’s painting can thus be read as suggesting that social context and the 
immediate desires and interests of the viewer inevitably impact on how a work is 
received. Dulcinea mocks not only the “higher” aesthetic values of Cervantes’ romantic 
knight and the pretensions of the Cubists but, also, the tenets of aesthetic theory which 
Greenberg would later locate as central to the claims of abstraction. In this work, 
through allowing literature to trouble painting, Duchamp opens out some of the same 
issues that he would later explore with Fountain, raising not only the question of 
interpretative “interest” but also the question of how language and naming operate to 
create “art.”  
It is, of course, on account of such tactics that Greenberg dismisses Duchamp. 
His response is set out most explicitly in the 1971 essay “Counter Avant-Garde” where 
Duchamp is accused of “medium scrambling” and “avant-gardism,” that is striking an 
avant-garde pose while misunderstanding the aims of art as well as the expectations of 
the historical moment.124 Duchamp’s iconoclastic gestures, Greenberg complains, are 
                                                 
124 Despite revising his position on various aspects of art and philosophy throughout his career, the 
distinction between avant-garde and kitsch, as “Counter Avant-Garde” makes clear, remained an 
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attempts to unsettle expectations rather than live up to them. The “unique historical 
interest” of Duchamp, he writes, is that in this fug of miscomprehension he decided “to 
wreak his frustration on artistic expectations in general. As well as by scrambling 
literary and cultural with visual contexts he tried to disconcert expectation by dodging 
back and forth between pictorial and sculptural ones” (131-132). It is quite precisely the 
erosion of the arts, in other words, strategies that interrogate the relationships and 
overlaps between the arts rather than keeping them within a set of rigid boundaries that 
are declared to be emphatically pronounced and problematic within Duchamp’s work.  
The inability to take account of work that breaches boundaries and crosses media 
is, of course, one of the reasons that Greenberg’s thought fell out of fashion as the 
twentieth century progressed. Increasingly such cross media experimentation was seen 
to articulate an alternative practice which countered the dominance of aesthetic 
modernism (an idea which Bürger’s text clearly helped to ground) and it gradually 
became clear that mass culture in all its “literariness” was both here to stay and in need 
of more thorough consideration. In this context Greenberg’s formalism, and indeed 
formalist aesthetics more generally, began to appear as elitist, conservative and largely 
irrelevant to a contemporary situation in which the “cultural dominant” was no longer 
modernist but post-modern.125 As Greenberg’s star waned, Duchamp’s shone more 
brightly: his art was seen to herald this new age, a precursor for the developments that 
were now gaining momentum.126 It is upon this stage that Warhol made his appearance.  
 
                                                                                                                                                
important touchstone in Greenberg’s work and one to which he would return to frequently. Indeed, 
“Avant-Garde and Kitsch” reappeared in 1961, as the opening essay to the collection Art and Culture, 
with no revisions. Greenberg did stop using the word “purity” in the 1960s, however, clearly aware of the 
politically dubious inferences it carried. Later he tried to excuse his earlier vocabulary by claiming that he 
had always used the word in scare quotes: “I don’t believe there is such a thing as purity in art, or pure art. 
That was a useful illusion for the avant-garde, for many years, but I don’t believe there is such a thing. 
Now, when I wrote ‘Towards a Newer Laocoon,’ it was too new to put the quotes around the words ‘pure’ 
and ‘purity’” (Clement Greenberg Between the Lines 146). 
125 For a discussion of the relationship between art history and aesthetics, including considerations as to 
why aesthetics came for a period to be regarded as out of date, see Elkins, Art History Versus Aesthetics.  
126 See for example the influential anthology Art after Modernism: Rethinking Representation in which 
both Craig Owens and Douglas Crimp stage a Duchampian postmodernism as the antithesis of 
Greenbergian modernism. For more on this oppositional framework between Greenbergian modernism 
and Duchampian postmodernism see A. Jones, Postmodernism 55-62.  
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4. Dada to Pop and Back Again: Avant-garde and Trauma 
 
It was from those most influenced by Greenberg’s modernist aesthetics that some of the 
most powerful critiques of his work emerged. Yet, and this is what I now want to argue, 
these critiques did little to challenge his problematic hierarchy of the arts. For example, 
two of Greenberg’s most influential heirs, Michael Fried and Rosalind Krauss, have 
simultaneously distanced themselves from Greenberg’s thought and built upon his 
distinction between painting and literature. Within this context, I hope to show, 
Warhol’s work proves particularly interesting. Having outlined these responses to 
Greenberg, I will return briefly to the question of the theorisation of the avant-garde. For 
it is from Krauss’ work that an important line of enquiry begins to develop in that 
regard. This discussion necessarily moves away from the direct inter-art comparison, 
which I will examine again in Chapter Three, but it enables the question of the 
relationship between art and language to be recast as the question of the relationship 
between art and discourse. This move returns us to the question of the apparent priority 
of painting, which the final sections of this chapter examine.  
In “How Modernism Works” (1982), Fried argues against what he perceives as 
Greenberg’s essentialism, his belief that each art has a unique nature proper to it alone, 
the values of which are distinct from the values of non-art.127 In an attempt to distinguish 
his own position, Fried declares that, while he concedes that the task of art is self-
criticism and that this task takes place within the confines of the individual art forms, he 
 
expressly denies the existence of a distinct realm of the pictorial—of a 
body of suprahistorical, non-context-specific, in that sense “formalist,” 
concerns that define the proper aims and limits of the art of painting—
maintaining on the contrary that modernist painting, in its constantly 
renewed effort to discover what it must be, is forever driven “outside” 
                                                 
127 This article is a response to an article by T.J. Clark on “Clement Greenberg’s Theory of Art” published 
in the same issue of Critical Inquiry. Together the two articles form one of the most important and 
influential debates on Greenberg’s legacy which revolves around the key accusation that Greenberg’s 
aesthetics are essentialist. More recently, in “Silences in the Doctrine” (which is a response to the 
Clarke/Fried debate), de Duve has argued that, despite all his talk of purity and the distillation of the arts, 
accusations of essentialism sit uncomfortably with Greenberg’s resolute historicism, evident throughout 
“Avant-Garde and Kitsch” (see Clement Greenberg between the Lines 39-86). 
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itself, compelled to place in jeopardy its very identity by engaging with 
what it is not. (226)  
 
Art, for Fried, is not governed by distinct and higher values; it is, as it was for Adorno, 
constituted through its relation to empirical reality. Painting does not progressively 
reveal its essential features through a process of reduction but reveals the conventions 
which appear necessary for painting at any particular historical moment. This is to say 
that the material properties and conventions of a medium are in fact arbitrary, contingent 
upon historical circumstances, rather than necessary. This model, Fried thus claims, 
“leaves wide open (in principle though not in actuality) the question of what … those 
conventions will turn out to be” (227). Yet, at the same time, Fried remains true to the 
distinction drawn in his influential 1967 essay “Art and Objecthood” between avant-
garde art which seeks “an ideal of self-sufficiency” and “presentness”, or, as Fried puts 
it, an “instant revelation”, and avant-gardist work which “is essentially theatrical, 
depending for its effects of ‘presence’ on the staging, the conspicuous manipulation, of 
its relation to an audience” (“Modernism” 229).128 Significantly, what distinguishes 
Fried’s “theatrical” art most clearly from avant-garde art is that it attempts to move 
beyond the specific object and into the realm of ideas, or as he puts it in the early essay, 
“seeks to declare and occupy a position—one which can be formulated in words” (“Art 
and Objecthood” 838). In other words, theatrical art employs non-aesthetic, conceptual 
ideas (ideas which can be formulated in words, subject matter) which compromise the 
integrity of the work. Fried reiterates, then, the idea that language is alien to art, which is 
characterized by its material opacity. Quality, Fried thus maintains can only be found in 
the individual arts, in our encounter with the materiality of the art object: “what lies 
between the arts” he claims “is theatre” (“Modernism” 228).  
 It is easy to locate Warhol’s work in this framework, of course, for his brand of 
Pop is almost excessively theatrical. The artist was highly aware of how his art impacted 
on viewers and, like Duchamp, strategically manipulated its reception. Having learned 
his techniques in the advertising industry, perhaps the most self-consciously calculating 
                                                 
128 Fried seems to be suggesting here, as Greenberg does, that the work can provoke interest or disinterest 
by its subject-matter, or lack thereof (see 84n30). 
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mode of image-making, Warhol chose much of his imagery from that field.129 His work 
stages his own absorption in commodity culture and mass media. It invites viewers to 
share the artist’s apparently passive consumption, to allow themselves to be 
manipulated, and to revel in the ease of being fed “pre-digested” information which is 
often directly transposed from the familiar contexts of newspapers and films.130 Such 
strategies have been hailed as democratic and liberating by those who see Pop as critical 
of art world elitism: Trevor Fairbrother, for example, describes Warhol’s achievement as 
his move to “banish the mysteries of artistic creation from his ‘Factory’, where making a 
painting had roughly the same number of steps as a cake mix, and selling one involved 
‘Small, medium, or large? And how many?’” (95-96). Such an equation of art and 
consumerism has led others, among whose number we of course find Greenberg and 
Bürger, to renounce Warhol’s work as an affirmative celebration of meaningless kitsch.  
It was not only the iconic images of mass consumerism that fascinated Warhol 
but also the specific manner in which the mass media plays upon its readers/viewers, 
encouraging them to identify with certain figures and to develop a voyeuristic emotional 
investment in certain events. The “Death and Disaster” series, created in the 1960s, 
famously features images of “stars” such as Marilyn Monroe and Jackie Kennedy whose 
personal tragedies have become public spectacle, alongside images of riots, car crashes 
and suicides. One of the most potent works of the series is undoubtedly the series of 
electric chair paintings. An image such as that used for the 1963 painting Blue Electric 
Chair (Fig. 2.3) is highly “literary” or “theatrical” in that its force appears to depend 
entirely on subject matter; the significance of the events that take place in this room, the 
cultural meanings attached to this object. The photograph was chosen by Warhol in the 
midst of debates about the death penalty, produced in the same year that the state of New 
                                                 
129 Interestingly, while he was working in commercial illustration, Warhol’s work was characterised by a 
recognisable personal style and elaborate sketches: the precise opposite is true of his later art. Indeed, it 
seems that while he worked as a freelance illustrator Warhol played up his “artistry” and while he worked 
as an artist he played up his commercialism. For a detailed discussion of the relationship between the two 
phases of Warhol’s career see Buchloh, “One.” 
130 Such an invitation is pushed to breaking point in Warhol’s films, which have become almost as well-
known as his paintings: works like Empire (1964), a practically unwatchable 8 hour film comprising of a 
single fixed shot of the Empire State Building. This invitation can, and has been, read as a quasi-Brechtian 
gesture that serves to defamiliarize “normal” late twentieth-century cultural experience and thus to reveal 






Fig. 2.3 Andy Warhol Blue Electric Chair (1963) 
Gian Enzo Sperone, New York 
 
York outlawed the use of the chair.131 The image itself was re-produced from a 
newspaper article about the execution of “communist spies” Ethel and Julius Rosenberg, 
referencing a painful episode in recent American history. Thus the universality and 
timelessness of the subject of death collides with a sequence of current issues, specific to 
the historical and cultural context.  
The photograph is striking in its composition; the vertical and horizontal lines of 
the image are echoed in those of the chair itself and produce a grid-like effect. Almost an 
abstract work, the painting nevertheless raises the issue of the participation of society in 
the death of the condemned: as judge and jury during the trial, as spectators during the 
execution itself. Through its sparseness and clean lines, the image is barely emotive: it 
suggests detachment. Yet the emptiness of the chair appears as a void at the centre of the 
picture, a space of absence into which the viewer is invited to project themselves. In this 
sense, the painting functions as a memento mori: the chair is empty because death awaits  
                                                 





Fig. 2.4 Andy Warhol Orange Disaster (Electric Chair) (1963) 
The Solomon R. Guggenheim Museum, New York. 
 
us. Destabilising the viewer’s position, the work encourages an oscillation between 
looking on and projecting in. Like the sign on the wall (which reads “Silence”) the 
picture rebuffs the viewer but, at the same time interpolates him/her directly. It demands 
a “disinterested” response and disallows it.  
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Yet, while Warhol’s art is certainly “literary” what makes works such as the 
chair series particularly interesting is that they also draw upon the strategies of the 
painterly abstraction which critics such as Greenberg and Fried consider to be the 
marker of “advanced” art. Indeed, it is highly significantly that, although he 
experimented with many media, Warhol never abandoned painting: for the vast majority 
of his career, he located his challenge to aesthetic modernism from inside the medium of 
painting. Foremost among the formal devices that Warhol adopted, as Blue Electric 
Chair and Orange Disaster (1963) (Fig. 2.4) demonstrate, are the grid and the 
monochrome. In her 1979 essay “Grids,” Krauss maintains that the grid is the 
paradigmatic modernist structure because of its “hostility to literature, to narrative, to 
discourse” (9). As a structure that maps the conventions of painting (the rectilinear shape 
of the canvas) back on to painting itself, the grid walls “the visual arts into a realm of 
exclusive visuality and [defends] them against the intrusions of speech” (9). Likewise, 
the monochrome, or “blank” as the artist called it, as the reduction of painting to the 
single cell of the grid and to the bare fact of paint on canvas, performs the same process 
of negating empirical reality.132 Yet in Warhol’s work these devices perform slightly 
differently. As Fairbrother puts it, in a discussion of Blue Electric Chair, they allow the 
artist “to articulate the antagonism of life and death, the idea of death as the nothingness 
of a blank afterimage, and the perception of that bare figment of color as escape from a 
society that commits electrocution” (104). In other words, Warhol plays with the 
“literary” connotations of his image and how those interact with the formal devices of 
modernist painting: Warhol parodies the refusal of meaning embodied by the grids of 
abstract painting, by presenting images excessively imbued with connotation and 
emotional investment;133 the “blank” finds its paradoxical equivalent in a word, the word 
                                                 
132 As always, Warhol himself eschewed such theoretical explanations, claiming that the blank “just makes 
them bigger and mainly makes them cost more” (qtd. in Buchloh “One” 19). 
133 Warhol was certainly aware of the formalist interpretation of the grid structure, claiming that he chose 
the structure precisely of its capacity to silence narrative: “I don’t want it to be essentially the same – I 
want it to be exactly the same. Because the more you look at the same exact thing, the more the meaning 
goes away, and the better and emptier you feel” (POPism 50). Rather than opposing modernist abstract 
painting, then, Warhol mimics it just as he mimics the products of the “culture industry.”  
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“silence.” The artist thus builds a narrative around the devices of the monochrome and 
grid, imbuing them with the “meanings” they apparently protest against.  
Krauss, as her work on the grid shows, is another example of a critic who leaves 
Greenberg’s literary/visual distinction in place while distancing herself from his 
aesthetic theory more broadly.134 In “A View of Modernism” (1972), an essay which 
pre-dates the formalist argument of “Grids”, she rejects Greenberg’s position on the 
basis of its essentialism and its insistence on a set of unchanging conventions. In 
opposition, she adopts a “post-modernist” stance to argue that the repression of narrative 
as it is figured in the rhetoric of modernism masks the fact that such modernism itself 
depends on the ceaseless invocation of a larger narrative “the entire history of painting 
since Manet” (979). This larger historical grand narrative, Krauss complains, perceives 
itself as an objective history when it is in fact a single “interested” perspective and one 
which operates to repress alternative histories and different perspectives. In the light of 
this realisation, the task that Krauss’ work prompts is the articulation of these alternative 
art historical narratives: it is this project that underlies much of the work published in 
October, the journal which Krauss founded in 1976. It is at this juncture, furthermore, 
that Bürger’s thesis, as a revaluation of the work that Greenberg dismissed, started to 
make an impact on the modernist/post-modernist discussion as the October writers 
began to examine his alternative art historical narrative.  
It has not been Krauss, however, but rather her fellow October theorists 
Benjamin Buchloh and Hal Foster who have engaged most deeply with Theory of the 
Avant-garde, both attempting to work through the contradictions of Bürger’s work in 
order to counter-act his negative assessment of the “neo” avant-garde art of the post-war 
period. Yet Buchloh and Foster did take their cue from Krauss, developing the idea of 
                                                 
134 On the level of her approach to individual works, Krauss does not challenge Greenberg’s formalism in 
any great depth. It is on the broader level of art history that she argues. That she does not challenge the 
literary/visual distinction is particularly surprising, however, given Krauss’ willingness to open her critical 
practice to the ideas and consequences of post-structuralism. While some of her work seems quite radical 
in comparison to Greenberg (for example her writing on Duchamp which, as we saw in the last chapter, 
uses structuralist linguistics to engage with the work) at other times, such as in “Grids”, she echoes him 
very closely. That this push and pull has remained a constant in Krauss’ work over the last 30 years or so 
is demonstrated by her recent comments in Voyage on the North Sea in which she disparages “inter-
media” work as affirming the structures of global capitalism, see 120n67. 
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the “trauma of signification” (“Notes” 206) that, as we saw in Chapter One, Krauss 
locates in Duchamp’s work, into a model by which to grasp the relationship between 
avant-garde art and history. It is in Foster’s 1994 article “What’s Neo about the Neo-
Avant-Garde?” that this model is most fully worked out.135 The author eschews the 
Marxist approach of considering the avant-gardes in the framework of resistance and 
affirmation, pointing out that this framework depends upon the very notion of 
authenticity that the avant-garde movements themselves so frequently challenge. The 
task, he argues, is to develop a model which takes account of the relationship between 
works of different periods without positing a moment of originality and subsequent 
repetition. In other words, Foster tries to establish a temporal model that counters the 
historical narratives set up by Bürger and Greenberg.  
In an argument which draws upon post-structuralist literary theory, Foster 
proceeds by invoking the difference between “authors” and “originators of discourse” 
outlined in Michel Foucault’s essay “What is an Author?” This distinction rests upon the 
idea that an “author” takes a position within discourse, while an “originator of 
discourse” enables numerous positions. The former makes a statement, while the latter 
generates a discursive framework in which different statements can be made and 
alternative positions produced. The examples that Foucault gives are Marx and Freud. 
The aim of the reader returning to the texts of such thinkers, as Foster writes, is not only 
to  
 
                                                 
135 In this article Foster draws not only upon the work of Krauss but also of Buchloh. Although there are 
differences among these theorists, there are also shared assumptions between their enormously influential 
writings, the most important of which is their attempt to rethink the avant-garde in a manner that does not 
privilege originality. See Krauss “The Originality of the Avant-garde” and Buchloh “The Primary Colors 
for the Second Time: A Paradigm Repetition of the Neo-Avant-Garde.” I have chosen not to deal with 
Buchloh in the main body of this thesis as his work is in fact heavily invested in the same structures as 
Bürger’s. Locating his own work in relation to Habermas, Buchloh argues that the work of the neo-avant-
garde is “spectacular” art and a “semblance of radicality” (See “Introduction”, Neo-Avantgarde): that it 
acknowledges itself as such, is what makes it avant-garde according to Buchloh. This hardly alters 
Bürger’s reading at all and, therefore, Buchloh’s conclusion is every bit as pessimistic as that of Theory of 
the Avant-garde: “the very same strategies that had developed within modernism's project of 
enlightenment,” he writes, “now serve the transformation of the bourgeois public sphere into the public 
sphere of the corporate state, with its appropriate forms of distribution (total commodification) and 
cultural experience (the spectacle)” (Neo-Avantgarde 52). For more on Buchloh see Jones, Postmodernism 
60 and, on the October group more broadly, 56-59. 
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restore the radical integrity of the discourse but to challenge its status in the 
present, the received ideas that deform its structure and restrict its efficacy 
… to clarify the contingent strategy of the readings, which is to reconnect 
with a lost practice in order to disconnect from a present way of working 
felt to be outmoded, misguided, or otherwise oppressive. (7) 
 
In other words, the ideas of the “originator of discourse” are open to radical reinvention, 
reinterpretation and recontextualisation.  
Foster goes on to propose that the post-war repetitions of “the readymades of 
Duchampian Dada” (8) should be considered as this type of radical return. This is not to 
say that these works constitute a “return to origin” but rather to make the point that 
“origins” are retroactively constructed. This recursive action brings with it a specific 
temporality: “rather than break with the fundamental practices and discourses of 
modernity, the signal practices and discourses of postmodernity advance in a 
nachträglich relation to them” (31).136 In other words, the activities of the neo-avant-
garde are the return of the repressed within the historical avant-garde, a return that 
generates the historical avant-garde. This is to say that 
 
the neo-avant-garde acts on the historical avant-garde as much as it is acted 
on by it; that it is less neo than nachträglich; that the avant-garde project in 
general develops in deferred action. Once repressed in part, the avant-garde 
did return, and it continues to return, but always from the future: such is its 
paradoxical temporality. (31) 
 
It is impossible for the full significance of something to be understood in the historical 
moment in which it occurs, Foster is suggesting: yet the work circumscribes a set of 
possible responses, possible ideas. This is to say that the later manifestations of an 
avant-garde gesture like the readymade are not necessarily simple copies, but rather 
might be conceived of as making radical returns to Duchamp’s work in order to bring 
out what is repressed within it. They thus, in turn, generate and inscribe “the 
Duchampian Readymade” into art history. The avant-garde work, Foster writes “is never 
historically effective or fully significant in its initial moments. It cannot be because it is 
                                                 
136 As several of the quotations in the remaining sections of this chapter are characterised by the kind of 
emphasis that Foster uses here, I will take this opportunity to state that unless otherwise indicated all 
quotations in this thesis reproduce the emphasis of the original texts. 
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traumatic: a hole in the symbolic order of its time that is not prepared for it, that cannot 
receive it, at least not immediately, at least not without structural change” (30). In other 
words, in a move that recalls Duchamp’s fascination with “mirrorical returns,” the 
avant-garde work receives its meaning retroactively through the way that future artists 
engage with it.137 Foster, borrowing his words from an essay on writing by Jacques 
Derrida, thus concludes that it is “‘the very idea of a first time which becomes 
enigmatic’ … ‘It is thus the delay which is in the beginning.’ So it is for the avant-garde 
as well” (31-32).138 
The initial failure of signification, and the retroactive construction that this 
failure entails, allows Foster to question the precise effect of historical avant-garde 
production. He claims, contra Bürger, that it was not the institution of art that was 
attacked by the avant-garde but rather “the conventions of the traditional mediums” (20). 
While institution and convention are intrinsic to one another, he argues, they cannot 
simply be reduced to one another and, by differentiating between the two, the emphasis 
of the stages of avant-garde production become clearer: “the first focuses on the 
conventional, the second concentrates on the institutional” (19). This distinction allows 
the possibility that the relationship between the neo and historical avant-gardes is not 
merely one by which the former institutionalizes the latter, but one in which the 
historical avant-garde attack on convention is for the first time comprehended by the 
neo-avant-garde which develops this critique beyond the bounds of art towards its 
institutions. If this is to come close to suggesting that the neo-avant-garde is a project of 
closure, in which the aims of the avant-garde are fully articulated and finally grasped, it 
is also to suggest that the neo-avant-garde in turn will be the subject of later 
reconfiguration or analysis. The project Foster stresses is to “‘comprehend,’ not 
‘complete’: the project of the avant-garde is no more concluded in its neo moment than 
it is enacted in its historical moment. In art, too, creative analysis is interminable.”(16) 
                                                 
137 In fact, it is Duchamp (of course) that is the (not so repressed) retroactively constructed “origin” of 
Foster’s own model in this essay: “The language of suspended delays, the trope of missed encounters, the 
concern with infra-mince causalities, the obsession with repetition, resistance, and reception, is 
everywhere in his work, which is, like trauma, like the avant-garde, definitively unfinished but always 
already inscribed” (31). 
138 Foster is quoting from “Freud and the Scene of Writing” (1966). 
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The avant-garde, accordingly, is not condemned to the death that the Marxist framework 
envisages: it can continue indefinitely, releasing the repressed within the art that 
precedes it, rewriting its origins.  
I will return to Foster’s argument in Chapter Four for, in a number of respects, it 
touches upon the ideas inscribed in Lyotard’s work. Here I simply want to note two 
things. The first is that, as Foster shows, the central problem of the avant-garde is a 
problem of temporality: the failure that Bürger describes depends upon a particular 
conceptual framework, a sense of history as linear, as constituting moments of 
originality and subsequent repetitions. This linearity, moreover, is an idea that the term 
avant-garde—inscribing the notion of before and after—itself appears to rely upon: there 
can be no “avant-garde” without a narrative of progress of some description. Foster’s 
psychoanalytic model is an attempt to produce an alternative vision of the temporal 
dynamics of the avant-garde, in which the “neo” avant-gardes re-write the work of their 
predecessors, a vision in which attempts to respect the avant-gardes’ challenge to 
conventional aesthetic categories such as originality. Yet, and this is my second point, in 
positioning the avant-garde as a mode of working through a trauma of signification 
Foster seems at risk of simply inverting the problem of the original versus the copy. 
While the historical avant-garde is no longer conceived of as an origin “whose aesthetic 
transformations are fully significant and historically effective in the first instance” 
(“What’s Neo?” 11), in his analysis it appears to becomes a negative or repressed origin. 
The avant-garde, as a result, is in danger of appearing as little more than a compulsive 
return to the scene of a “trauma” that can never be grasped. Progress, if it can be called 
that, is a process of comprehension of the past rather than the development of 
possibilities in the present. Most problematically, in conceiving of the avant-garde as a 
working through of problems generated by earlier artworks, Foster might be seen to 
reduce avant-garde art to an engagement with art history alone rather than with the 
contemporary context into which it emerges, thereby erasing the question of art’s 
relationship to society which is so central to the idea of the avant-garde.139 Foster’s 
                                                 
139 As Foster’s subsequent work makes clear, what he considers to be repressed—and what he considers as 
returning in late twentieth-century art—is the Lacanian Real. Nowhere is this more forcefully argued, in 
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narrative is, I would therefore argue, almost as problematic as those that it seeks to 
counter.140 Leaving these issues aside for the moment, however, I want to return now to 
the question of the relationship between painting and language.  
 
5. Painting, Theory and Pictorial Nominalism 
 
In a 1987 essay entitled “Ut Pictura Theoria: Abstract Painting and Language” W.J.T. 
Mitchell echoes Krauss’ denunciation of modernism, arguing that “the true face of the 
‘will to silence’ in abstract art is not the ‘grid’ of its compositional forms, but the 
imposition of a social mandate: you, who are not qualified to speak about this painting, 
keep your mouths shut” (226). Modern art, Mitchell argues, has come to be an 
increasingly specialist and elitist pursuit, a discipline in which contradictions are 
repressed in order to maintain the appearance of art as autonomous and removed from 
the concerns of everyday life. In order to grasp art, Mitchell argues, it is no longer 
sufficient to simply view it, but rather one must speak the language of aesthetics.141 
 
[The] wall erected against language and literature by the grid of abstraction 
only kept out a certain kind of verbal contamination, but it absolutely 
depended, at the same time, on the collaboration of painting with another 
kind of discourse, what we may call for lack of a better term, the discourse 
of theory. (220)  
                                                                                                                                                
fact, than in his 1996 essay “Death in America” which argues that Warhol’s work develops out of “an 
experience of shock or trauma, an encounter where one misses the real, where one is too early or too late 
[…] but where one is somehow marked by this very missed encounter.” (36) Thus Warhol’s repetitions of 
single images are read as a working through of this missed encounter, a bearing witness to the “traumatic 
real” that representation papers over. Foster claims that “the repetitions not only reproduce traumatic 
effects” he claims “they produce them as well”, that they are both “a warding away of traumatic 
significance and an opening out to it, a defending against traumatic affect and a producing of it” (42).  
140 Foster’s “trauma theory” has received numerous critiques: see Seltzer, and for critiques of trauma 
theory more broadly see Kansteiner and Ball. While this reading sits comfortably with the Death and 
Disaster sequence, it is harder to see how it would explain works such as the more knowingly funny Pop 
paintings like, for example, Cow Wallpaper or the Do It Yourself series (1962), of which there are many. 
That said, Foster is by no means the only critic to ignore Warhol’s humour in favour of a focus on his 
more disturbing work. For more on Foster’s trauma theory in relation to late twentieth-century art see his 
The Return of the Real. 
141 Of course Mitchell is not the first to say this, as he acknowledges citing Harold Rosenberg’s The De-
Definition of Art (1972), as well as Tom Wolfe’s The Painted Word (1976). He does not cite however the 
rather surprising fact that Michael Fried, against whom Mitchell positions himself, also pre-empts him. 




In other words, abstract painting does not address itself to eyesight alone; it addresses 
itself to aesthetic theory. As painting becomes increasingly self-conscious and abstract, 
Mitchell suggests, it does not lose its relation to language altogether but rather comes to 
rely upon a comparatively esoteric language.142 For Mitchell, theory is a “curious hybrid 
of mainly prose discourse compounded from aesthetics and other branches of philosophy 
… characterized, generally, by a refusal of disciplinary identity … [it is] a synthetic 
discourse that ranges over several specialized idioms” (220-221). An abstract form of 
language, theory is to be distinguished from the singular, figurative use of language in 
literature as well as from the common, reified language of convention. What ut pictura 
theoria seems to announce, then, is that as figurative art is matched by literature, abstract 
art is matched by abstract language.  
This seductively straightforward formulation—which Mitchell does not explore 
in any depth—in fact announces an extremely complex relationship. For, clearly, 
abstract paintings do not represent theories in the way that traditional figurative painting 
represents “literary” meanings. Rather Mitchell’s formulation articulates a paradoxical 
situation: it suggests that the analytic discourse of abstract painting—one of 
specialisation—is somehow matched with the synthetic discourse of theory—one of 
conceptual generalisation. In other words, he connects the problem of abstract painting 
to precisely the problem which lies, as I argued in Chapter One, at the heart of Bürger’s 
avant-garde: the paradoxical relationship between the specific work or form and the 
generic concept. Rather than acknowledge the difficulty of this relationship, however, 
Mitchell’s brilliantly simple phrase glosses over it.  
In his monograph Kant after Duchamp (1996) Thierry de Duve not only 
examines this paradoxical bond, positioning it as the central problem of modern art in 
fact, but also locates it as the key concern of Duchamp’s work and Fountain in 
particular. His project is an attempt to refocus Greenberg’s famous arguments in order to 
                                                 
142 This can be read as a variation on the argument of Paul Mann, which was discussed in Chapter One of 
this thesis (see 26-28). 
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counter the critic’s negative assessment of Duchamp’s work.143 In a passage that clearly 
echoes both Greenberg’s “Modernist Painting” and his privileging of painting over 
literature, de Duve states that it is a fact of modernity that all the arts have sought to 
discover their own specificity. 
 
Modern literature and poetry have sought to isolate and define “the 
literary” and “the poetic”; modern music has gone after pure “musicality”; 
modern theatre, even, has come to think of itself as the enactment of sheer 
“theatricality.” But it was in painting that this self-referential (better called 
reflexive) striving for purity became both the exclusive object of aesthetic 
theory and the all-encompassing subject matter of practice. In other words, 
it was in painting and nowhere else (not even in sculpture, which merely 
took it over from painting), that the idea of abstract art came into being.  
… Since then, we have spoken of abstract art, in the singular, as though 
abstraction as an aesthetic principle had uncovered an essence that was not 
peculiar to painting but was present in all the arts. Better still, we seem to 
imply that the various arts, in the plural, are reducible to a single essence 
called art in general, art at large, as though this essence were not specific 
but generic. (151-152) 
  
In this way, de Duve connects the two impulses of modern art that both Bürger and 
Greenberg oppose in order to argue that the search for the unique identity of each 
specific medium ended with their opening out into a field of abstraction that was 
removed from the object completely. The drive towards specificity opens out into 
generality, as painterly abstraction aims to locate the meaning of the generalised term 
“art.” Here, we are returned to the moment described by Adorno in “Art and the Arts”. 
De Duve echoes the German theorist’s argument when he thus goes on to claim that the 
“profound paradox at the root of the impulse towards abstraction” is that “in the depth of 
the matter lies a language” (183). Yet while this revelation seems to echo Mitchell’s 
formulation, de Duve in fact is suggesting something quite different: what he sees at the 
root of modernism is not language as theory, but rather language in the form of the 
name.  
                                                 
143 As I have indicated previously, part of de Duve’s project is to counter the perception that Greenberg is 
essentialist and thus to an extent to rehabilitate his thought (92n38).  
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In this respect, Kant after Duchamp reworks the thesis of de Duve’s 1984 
monograph on Duchamp, Pictorial Nominalism.144 The title phrase, which according to 
de Duve describes the key strategy of Duchamp’s practice, is taken directly from the 
artist’s notes and interpreted by de Duve as describing art-making conceived as an act of 
naming or baptism. In the forward to the earlier book, John Rajchman provides a 
succinct definition: 
 
Nominalism is the doctrine that only individual or disparate things exist 
and that our classifications of them are only contingent and changeable 
inventions. Pictorial nominalism is the view that the “ideas” that allow us at 
a time and place to classify things pictorial are open to problematizing 
events and are not fixed by an essential nature. (xxii)145 
 
Pictorial nominalism suggests, then, firstly that we judge one thing to be art not because 
of something inherent in the object but rather through measuring the object against a set 
of criteria or ideas that are extrinsic to the work; secondly, it suggests that such criteria 
are not fixed—not essential—but rather a matter of convention; and finally, it suggests 
that such conventions are open to destabilisation and change. The values of art, in other 
words, are not distinct from those of other spheres, as Greenberg believed, and are in 
fact open to renegotiation.  
The particular significance of the readymade for de Duve is that it reveals 
nominalism to be at the very heart of modernist art practice. In other words, it reverses 
the gesture of abstract painting, which positions “art” as a quality that arises from 
specific works. The readymade turns this around by beginning with “art” and 
submerging it in an object, in the case of the readymade “the generic seems to precede 
the specific” (Kant 153). While painting sought to be “painting and nothing but 
painting,” the readymade in contrast appears as purism of a different kind: “‘art’ and 
                                                 
144 De Duve’s first book is concerned with the impact of Duchamp’s mysterious trip to Munich, which too 
place between June 18th and October 10th 1912. The Munich period is often conceived of as pivotal, as the 
point at which his “unsuccessful” career as painter was laid to rest and from which Duchamp emerged as 
fully fledged (an-) artist. The most significant product of his time in Munich is Duchamp’s painting Bride 
(1912), upon which the first chapters of de Duve’s study are focused. See also de Duve’s “Resonance of 
Duchamp’s Visit to Munich”, Kuenzli and Naumann 41-63. 
145 In this sense, pictorial nominalism operates in the way that Bürger claims Duchamp’s work operates, to 
reveal the “institution” of art as historical and contingent rather than necessary. 
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nothing but ‘art’” (Kant 153). In short, de Duve is describing the same situation outlined 
by Adorno in “Art and the Arts,” drawing a distinction between specific works and 
media which become art, and a generalised aesthetics which is submerged into non-art 
objects. He does not consider the latter as dilettantism, however, but as revealing the 
disconnection between the idea of “art” and individual media/art forms. 
There are two important consequences to de Duve’s argument. Firstly, as I have 
indicated, it connects the definitions of avant-garde outlined by Bürger and by 
Greenberg, which are revealed not as oppositional but as dialectically related, different 
moments of the same movement.146 Like abstraction, therefore, the readymade gesture is 
the direct result of painting’s “demise as craft and its instant rebirth as an idea” (Kant 
149). To reiterate for both clarity and emphasis, Greenbergian modernism and the 
radical avant-garde of Bürger’s theory are impulses driven by the same dynamic, a 
dynamic that springs from the tension between the individual arts and the idea of “art.” 
Secondly, and crucially, de Duve’s argument privileges painting, locating Fountain as a 
response to developments in that medium: the readymade is made possible by painting’s 
turn to abstraction. Abstract painting becomes a pure medium and “art” is generalised 
from its basis in the specific medium, as a result the readymade appears as the 
articulation of this generalised art which can make use of any/all means available to it as 
means. Without grasping its relation to abstract painting, its being “not painting”, de 
Duve thus argues, what is at stake in the readymade cannot be understood.  
By mistaking the specificity of the medium for the central question of modern 
art, de Duve argues, formalists such as Greenberg have been blinded to the importance 
of Duchamp’s gesture. Greenberg’s thought was based on a conviction that the values of 
art and life were distinct, thus his approach to art was bound to the idea of identifying 
those values, necessarily to be found only in the individual arts. Greenberg’s formalist 
doctrine, as a result, fails to take account of both “modernist” and “avant-garde” 
                                                 
146 As I indicated in Chapter One, Theory of the Avant-garde also acknowledges the relation between these 
moments, although it is not explained. Bürger, we are led to assume, sees this dialectical relationship as 
unfolding within historical time, the turn inwards of aestheticism preceding the turn outwards of the avant-
garde. De Duve also maps this dialectic as a historical development. I prefer however to follow Adorno’s 
position in which the dialectic is internal to the work, meaning both moments, the generic and the specific, 
are held within the work itself at the same time rather than superseding one another temporally.  
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impulses, which de Duve refers to as the “specific” and the “general” modes of art. De 
Duve, attempting to address this imbalance, argues that the conventions of art are open 
to renegotiation, that they are infiltrated by different values at different historical 
moments. Thus he claims that the question of the medium of art is of secondary 
importance, what is really at stake in modernism is the name “art.”147 This is precisely 
what the readymades articulate and thus, de Duve claims, “Duchamp is a modernist in a 
generalized sense that Greenberg was not able to recognise; he is not an avant-gardiste 
but avant-garde” (“Silences” 86).  
Yet, and as I hope my discussion in the previous chapter made clear, such a 
separation between “art” and individual arts/artworks places art in a precarious position. 
For, initially at least, de Duve’s thesis seems to suggest that “art” is something that 
exists independently of the artwork: the division between the specific material and the 
general concept, in other words, threatens to collapse into the idea that the term “art” can 
be applied to anything and thus that the properties of the object in itself are of no 
importance. He seems to go too far towards the generic, to open himself to the charge of 
glorifying the “dilettantism” which Adorno associates with a generalized aesthetics. The 
doctrine of pictorial nominalism, in other words, comes dangerously close to dissolving 
into the idea that art is only a conceptual category. 
De Duve is of course careful to guard against such an interpretation. It is to 
prevent this reading that he insists on the idea of art as a proper name. “One should 
guard carefully against any confusion,” he writes “between the idea of art as a proper 
name and the concept of ‘art-as-a-proper-name’”: 
 
                                                 
147 Henry Staten takes issue with de Duve’s treatment of the question of the medium as well as his 
rehearsal of Greenbergian modernism in Kant after Duchamp. Staten, quite rightly I think, argues that, 
while De Duve “pays lip service” to the question, he effectively “sublates the materiality of the medium 
into the idea of convention” (79). Conversely, we might add, de Duve’s argument in Clement Greenberg 
Between the Lines, which suggests that the medium must be understood as fundamentally “other,” again 
absolves the medium of its materiality, by turning it into the absolute opposite of convention, the 
unknowable. This is to say that rather than thinking through the relationship between the particular and the 
generic, de Duve concentrates on the generic. While I shall follow de Duve’s practice for a short while in 
order to outline the logic of his argument, I shall argue shortly that this leaves him with a problem as 
regards the readymade for it undercuts the necessity of the relation between Duchamp’s gesture and the 
medium of painting. 
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The latter operates on the level of theory. It expresses the conceptual 
knowledge acquired through the theorem that defines the word “art” by the 
…concept of the proper name or rigid designator. But the idea of art as 
proper name, on the contrary, operates at the level of practice, that is of 
judgement, of the aesthetic usage of the word “art.” The concept is either 
true or false, the idea is either just or unjust. (Kant 74) 
 
At the very core of pictorial nominalism, then, aesthetic judgement plays a pivotal 
role.148 While to use “art” as a concept is to match the work against a set of pre-
determined criteria, to use it as a name is to make a judgement without such criteria and 
thus to respond to the work in its singularity. De Duve’s baptismal rite is not performed 
with the emphasis on the term art, but rather on the judgement: “this is art” (in which art 
is subject to change with each judgement) rather than “this is art” (in which a pre-
conceived concept “art” determines the judgement).149 Art cannot exist, de Duve 
stresses, as a concept removed from the actual work of art, but is rather a performative 
judgement that turns a specific object into an artwork.  
It is in the light of this practice that de Duve re-conceptualises the avant-garde in 
his 1996 essay “Silences in the Doctrine” as a pact between artists and viewers. The 
avant-garde must break with artistic convention but only on the basis of an 
understanding that the break occurs in order to enable new conventions to be founded. In 
other words, for de Duve, the relationship of the avant-garde to tradition is not one of 
negation as it is for Bürger. Nor, however, is it one of continuation, as it is in 
                                                 
148 By aesthetic judgement, I mean a judgement that is not governed by extrinsic or pre-determined criteria 
but is made according to intrinsic criteria which emerge from the experience of engaging with the 
work/object itself. In the Critique of Judgement Kant describes this kind of judgement as “disinterested” 
or free, indicating that the judgement is properly aesthetic when it is not based upon my relation to the 
object being represented or any such criteria extrinsic to the event of the experience. The judgement 
cannot therefore be measured against logic, cannot be “true” or “false”. The emphasis, as de Duve 
suggests, moves from the question of whether the judgement is correct to whether it is right or just. This 
aspect of aesthetic judgement is developed by Lyotard in order to describe the ethical/political task of the 
avant-garde, as I shall try to show in Chapter Four.  
149 In fact, de Duve argues that to be precise we should conceive of art as having been a proper name: the 
event of baptism is an aesthetic judgement and so, operating outside rationalised time-space, by the time it 
enters the discourse of art history it is necessarily past. This temporal model is clearly comparable to the 
“future anterior” model used by Lyotard to describe the post-modern which is likewise predicted on the 
idea of aesthetic judgement (see “Answering the Question: What is Postmodernism?”). De Duve’s notion 
of the idea of art as a proper name, moreover, bears some likeness to, and might profitably be considered 
in relation to, Lyotard’s work on the idea of the “tensor” in Libidinal Economy (see Libidinal 42-93). 
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Greenberg’s formulation. Rather, as it is in Foster’s model, the avant-garde work is an 
address to the history of art: the medium representing not only the conventions as they 
currently stand but as they have been developed in the past. “In modernism” de Duve 
writes, “art has value for the artists of the future and is addressed to the artists of the 
past” (“Silences” 84). In other words, art addresses tradition and it is in its 
reconfiguration of tradition that is meaningful for artists of the future who will address it 
in turn. In contrast, and here de Duve borrows Greenberg’s vocabulary, “avant-gardism 
is precisely the reverse: to say that art stands for the artist of the past but addresses the 
artists of the future” (“Silences” 85). Avant-gardism, in other words, is art that seeks to 
erase past art, to stand in place of it rather than to address it; it claims to abolish the old 
order in the name of the new. It is at this juncture that the connection between the 
readymade and painting becomes vital to de Duve’s argument: Fountain must be 
positioned as a painting/not painting, for in order to claim Duchamp as avant-garde de 
Duve must show that rather than an outright rejection of convention, his work is 
primarily a response to an identifiable artistic convention. 
The historical significance of Duchamp’s work, de Duve tells us, is that it reveals 
the practice of nominalism at the very heart of modern art: Fountain performs the 
performative judgement by which the pact around the name “art” is re-configured. In 
other words, by suspending his own aesthetic judgement Duchamp produces a work that 
is about aesthetic judgement. The specificity of painting and the generality of the 
readymade must be understood in relation to one another. While the “regulative idea” of 
abstraction “was the specifically pictorial; [Duchamp’s gesture] was about the 
specifically pictorial. Theirs was geared to establish their craft’s name, Malerei; his was 
a philosophy about that name” (Kant 165). At stake in the readymade, de Duve thus 
claims, is the name of painting; Duchamp demands that the “the proper name of art—or 
of arrhe—be given to a practice that no longer was painting, but that was apropos of 
painting. … the readymade is art about painting even before it is art about art” (Kant 
166). De Duve goes on to demonstrate, by means of an elaborate and lengthy argument 
connecting Duchamp to painting, that this is more than a negative dependency, and that 
the readymade can be seen to actively engage with the stakes of painting. Like 
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Dulcinea—a work that, as I have suggested, can be read as commenting on the canvas as 
a site of projection—what the readymade reveals, as de Duve sees it, is the instability of 
the name in relation to the object, an instability that applies to the name “painting” as 
much as it applies to the name “art.” Fountain is not a rejection of painting, de Duve 
argues, but—surprisingly enough—precisely the opposite, a continuation of the stakes of 
painting under conditions in which painting has become impossible. For this reason, it 
should be considered a sort of “abnormal” painting.150 
It is through breaking the pact of “painting” that the readymade opens out the 
question of “art at large”, de Duve argues. It is thus only through its relation to painting, 
as a consequence, that the readymade can be understood. Yet at the same time, de Duve 
is keen that the emphasis be shifted away from the idea of the medium and onto the 
process of naming: it was Greenberg’s fixation on the medium of painting, his argument 
implies, that prevented him from seeing the workings of modernist art as inclusive of 
gestures such as the readymade, a gesture which proves that the medium is in fact a 
secondary concern. This indicates, however, a point of tension in de Duve’s own work. 
For while it may well be the case that the question of “purity” or specificity recedes after 
Duchamp, what de Duve’s own argument suggests is that the material conventions of the 
art object that play a crucial role in the breaking and reforming of the pact “art.” For if 
the readymade can only be understood as “art” by means of its status in relation to 
painting, this is because it is only in relation to conventions (of which media are the 
physical embodiments according to de Duve) that the pact can be agreed. De Duve’s 
attempt to deny the importance of the materials of art seems doubly strange when we 
consider the role he ascribes to aesthetic judgement. It is on the basis of aesthetic 
judgement, he argues, that the baptism of “art” is performed but such judgement 
necessarily requires an engagement with an object. Without the materiality of the 
medium there is nothing to prevent “art at large” from becoming a concept rather than a 
name. It is his reluctance to acknowledge the importance that the medium plays in his 
                                                 




own argument that leads to the ambiguity between the idea of art and the concept of art, 
an ambiguity which de Duve finds himself repeatedly attempting to clarify.  
Refusing to address the problem of the medium, de Duve fails to explain why it 
is painting in particular to which the readymade responds, rather than say literature or 
sculpture, art forms with which it can also be seen to be in dialogue. De Duve thus 
imports the status ascribed to painting in Greenberg’s work without examining it. At no 
point does he speculate on what this particular status might mean for art and the arts 
more broadly. As a result, when he declares that what is at stake in the readymade is the 
name art (which seems in his argument regarding Fountain to be equivalent to the name 
painting), we are left to guess precisely what is at stake in that name. Clarifying this is 
the task which philosopher Jay Bernstein sets himself. In an essay that argues that the 
readymade inherits “the stakes of art, not its name but what is at stake in that name” 
(Against 205), Bernstein, as I shall now attempt to show, puts the importance of the 
medium right back at the centre of the debate.  
 
6. Fugitive Experience and the Conventions of Art  
 
In Against Voluptuous Bodies: Late Modernism and the Meaning of Painting (2006), 
Bernstein credits Duchamp with drawing attention to the contingency of the physical 
conventions of the media of the arts. He builds upon de Duve’s reading, situating 
Fountain as a nominalist gesture and, reiterating the claim that it must be understood in 
relation to painting, argues that in fact what makes the readymade significant is its 
failure to distinguish between two types of nominalism: sceptical and integral. The 
former emphasises the gesture as pivoting upon the idea that any object may be art, the 
latter emphasises the idea that nominalism is a process of purposively turning an object 
into art. The failure to distinguish between these different modes, Bernstein suggests, 
turns Fountain into a gesture whose meaning is permanently irresolvable: Fountain is, 
he writes, “a truly indeterminate case” (214). Duchamp’s insight, Bernstein goes on to 
argue, was not about the practice of nominalism but rather about the practice of painting. 
What he grasped was, in Bernstein’s dense but precise formulation, that “painting is the 
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wholly conventional and in principle exhaustible reduction and preservation of the claim 
of sensuous particularity to the two-dimensional world of the stretched canvas to which 
pigment is applied” (214). In order to set out exactly what this insight entails, it will be 
necessary to rehearse some of the arguments by which Bernstein reaches these terms, 
arguments which take us back to the stakes of art as outlined by Adorno. Before 
returning to Bernstein’s reading of Duchamp, then, I will outline what “the claim of 
sensuous particularity” is, why painting in particular is implicated in this claim, why it 
necessarily “reduces” and “preserves” this claim, and what it means to say that painting 
is “exhaustible.” 
 Against Voluptuous Bodies is in large measure a defence of Adorno’s Aesthetic 
Theory. For Adorno, as Bernstein reminds us, “the arts owe their very existence to a 
historical calamity, the diremption of the symbol into sign and image or concept and 
intuition” (206). Art is generated, as I tried to show in Chapter One, by the tension in 
which, over the course of history, “substance [increasingly] finds itself stretched out 
between two poles: the one unifies and is rational, the other is diffuse and mimetic” 
(Adorno “Art” 383). For Adorno, it is within the tension between these two poles that art 
objectifies itself; the autonomy of art is therefore, as Bernstein writes, “a consequence 
and so an expression of the fragmentation and reification of modern life” (3). In this 
Adornian model, the possibility of art as such is opened out, just as it was for Greenberg, 
at the moment in which the forces of rationalisation divide concept from intuition, 
rational ideas from aesthetic ideas.  
This same argument grounds Bernstein’s earlier monograph The Fate of Art 
(1992) which also argued that autonomous art is born of the rationalisation of society 
and social practices, a process which has increasingly meant that the embodied, 
sensuous experience of the individual—intuition and the practice of intuiting, aesthetic 
experience—is disregarded and repressed in the name of conceptual, rational experience. 
In the wake of Kantian thought, Bernstein argues, and in particular in the wake of the 
categorical imperative, intuition and sensual experience are held to be neither valid 
foundations for knowledge nor grounds for action, instead rationality and logic, and the 
kind of knowledge that they generate, are privileged. As a result, Bernstein writes, “the 
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experience of art as aesthetical is the experience of art as having lost or been deprived of 
its power to speak the truth” (Fate 4). 
The consequence of this process of rationalisation is that knowledge comes to be 
understood as independent of sensory perception and embodiment. Thus what is cast out 
with art in the process of its becoming autonomous is the capacity of sensory, embodied 
experience to be meaningful. “What hibernates, what lives on in an afterlife in the 
modern arts,” Bernstein argues in Against Voluptuous Bodies, 
 
is our sensory experience of the world, and of the world as composed of 
objects, things, whose integral character is apprehensible only through 
sensory encounter, where sensory encounter is not the simple filling out 
of an antecedent structure but formative. (3)  
 
For Bernstein, as for Adorno, modernist art bears witness to the repression in modernity 
of an alternative experience to the dominant practices of rationalisation and to the 
potential of that alternative experience to be cognitively significant, to be formative. Art 
does not express something that can be otherwise expressed, it cannot be mapped on to 
another antecedent structure but rather the meaning of art is in our experience of it, our 
encounter forms the work and the meaning of the work is the form of our encounter, its 
binding eloquence.151 What is at stake in art, then, is the possibility of non-instrumental, 
non-rationalised cognition; what Bernstein calls “emphatic experience” which he 
describes as “our now delegitimated capacity for significant sensory encounter” (7). 
This entails that there is, as Bernstein writes, a  
 
potentiality for objects unidentified by standard, reified concepts to mean 
something other than their empirical meaning. They reveal this meaning 
otherwise by standing in relation to one another in works in ways that are 
both compelling and not capable of being captured by conceptual or causal 
                                                 
151 Bernstein’s account of modernism is, as we might expect given that it is derived from Adorno’s 
thought, a formalist one. Equally however, the influence of Adorno means that this formalism is quite 
specific and—importantly—unlike the rather less complex and more prevalent sense of formalist 
aesthetics that was discussed earlier in this chapter. While the latter understands form as in opposition to 
content, the organisation or structure of the work and thus something that is present in the absence of a 
spectator, for Bernstein/Adorno form is a dynamic process that takes place when we encounter the work, a 
process in which the elements of the work are held together in a coherence that does not unify, the 
“binding force” of Aesthetic Theory. 
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means … Adorno will go so far as to say that artworks “move toward the 
idea of a language of things…through the organisation of their disparate 
elements.” (198) 
 
The claim of art, then, is the claim of sensuous particularity addressing us in its own 
language. What is at stake in art is our capacity to read and interpret this language, to 
acknowledge the existence of a sense other than the reified concepts of instrumental 
reason and thus to create the possibility of an alternative to instrumental reason: “in the 
semblance of what is other,” to recall again Adorno’s phrase, “its possibility also 
unfolds” (Aesthetic 23). 
It is only through the practices of art, Bernstein goes on to argue, that non-
rationalised, non-instrumental emphatic experience is rationally accessible. Emphatic 
experience is rationally accessible in art because art is a product of the system of 
rationalisation against which it protests. It is the space within this system in which 
sensory experience hibernates; art’s becoming the repository of this experience, 
however, is a consequence of sensory experience having already been rationalised. This 
is why art is the consequence and expression of instrumental logic, even though such 
logic is what it rebels against: art opposes, as Adorno puts it, “not rationality, but 
rationality’s rigid opposition to the particular” (Aesthetic 128). Being a result of what it 
protests against, Bernstein argues, art is a priori late: 
  
since the claim of modernism emerges as what has been disclaimed, 
repudiated, and delegitimated generally, then lateness is inscribed in 
modernism’s emergence. From the outset, the works of modernism are 
fugitives; or better, what they provide is fugitive experience. (8)  
 
Modern art is thus not a repository of sensuous embodied experience but its ghost. In the 
terms of Aesthetic Theory it is semblance, an after-image or a reminder. The claim of 
art—its claim for the potential of sensory, embodied experience to be emphatic or 
significant—is, Bernstein argues, already a claim defeated: media are “stand-ins for the 
lost authority of nature” (my emphasis 11). Art is not an advance warning of the force of 
rationalisation but rather a consequence of its already having delegitimated the claims to 
“truth” of sensory experience. 
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 In Against Voluptuous Bodies this “lateness” is figured in the sense of a temporal 
delay but also in the sense of an “a priori deadness” (212). It is for this reason that 
painting can only act as a preservation of the necessarily reduced claim of sensuous 
particularity, which can appear only as an effigy. Art, Bernstein writes,  
 
does not save or redeem or enliven its material conditions of possibility or 
what those conditions refer to; that is exactly what art cannot do, what it 
remains impotent before. Rather, at best, art preserves and transmits its 
material in its destitute state. … Autonomous art enlivens its materials the 
way embalming fluid enlivens a corpse. (210-211)  
 
This lateness or deadness belongs to the very material and substance of modern art. It is, 
Bernstein claims, the aporia at the core of the modernist work, for “painting (or 
sculpture, or music, et. al) secures its appearing fullness upon its existential emptiness: it 
is without actual content, its claim to fullness made possible by its being without 
empirical significance, its being semblance” (9). Art can become significant for society, 
in other words, only as something disconnected from empirical reality but, as such, this 
significance is limited: the claim of art—what Bernstein calls its material motive—is 
made only on the condition that it cannot be satisfied. For art, this failure, which returns 
us to the paradox of autonomy that Bürger’s argument turns upon, is “the only form of 
success now available” (10).  
 It is painting, for Bernstein, which best articulates the material motive of art: the 
art form is, he claims, at “the crux of the claim of modernism” (11). For painting, 
Bernstein argues, is the medium most able to transmit its material in its destitute state. 
Painting “can rid itself of representation and remain painting: the paint-stuff can stand in 
for objects by being one of them; the forming of the paint-stuff into intensive patterns 
does for it what representation did for the objects represented” (211). In other words, 
abstract painting can subside into its own materiality and become nothing other than 
paint on canvas, without ceasing to be art. It thus openly stages the conflict between art 
and empirical reality by being representative of “art” and highlighting at the same time 
its status as material, as an object. Painting is the art, Bernstein thus suggests, which 
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most clearly announces the stakes of art in modernity, not because it is the most “pure” 
art, but because it is the art which most risks its own collapse. 
 As this description of painting indicates, Bernstein’s notion of modernist art is 
one in which art is continually under threat of dissolution into empirical reality. As for 
Adorno, then, for Bernstein art achieves a precarious autonomy through the force of 
dissonance: its autonomy is precarious because non-art, in the form of the medium itself, 
is held within art. The anti-art impulse, in other words, is at the very core of modernist 
art. It inheres, in Bernstein’s account, in the materiality of the medium. Bernstein thus 
provides the grounding for de Duve’s prioritising of painting but at the same time 
counters his claim that the importance of the medium recedes in modern art. As 
Bernstein puts this,  
  
in art the medium is not a neutral vehicle for the expression of an otherwise 
immaterial meaning, but rather the very condition for sense-making. The 
specificity of (modern) art-meanings is that their mediums are not regarded 
as contingent with respect to the meanings communicated. (74) 
 
As the opposition between a generalised aesthetics and specific media is broken down, 
the medium is revealed not as a secondary but as a primary consideration: there can be 
no generalised “‘art’ and nothing but ‘art’.”152 It is this very insight, I will suggest in the 
following chapter, that Duchamp in fact develops.  
                                                 
152 Art, according to this definition and playing for these stakes, is—just as Duchamp demanded that it 
should be—“at the service of the mind” (Writings 125). It is important however to distinguish between an 
understanding of art as cognition and the idea of “conceptual” art; for while the latter also seeks to place 
emphasis on the cognitive potential of art, it is against such work that Bernstein locates his argument. 
Conceptual art—which is precisely the kind of “literary,” “avant-gardist” art that Greenberg so 
detested—in fact responds directly to Duchamp’s demand that art become “intellectual:” indeed, Joseph 
Kosuth, eschewing the “retinal titillation” of sensory experience declared that “all art (after Duchamp) is 
conceptual (in nature) because art only exists conceptually” (“Art After Philosophy” 18). Kosuth’s 
contemporary Sol le Witt explains: “When an artist uses a conceptual form of art, it means that all of the 
planning and decisions are made beforehand and the execution is a perfunctory affair. The idea becomes a 
machine that makes the art” (846). In other words, the artwork does not develop in conjunction with its 
materiality or medium: the “idea” of the work exists fully formed prior to its embodiment. In conceptual 
art, then, the sensual experience of an encounter with the art object is considered unimportant: the primary 
concern is the “message” or concept that the work communicates. This means that conceptual art in fact 
represses the capacity of our material encounter with the work to provide orientational significance. The 
medium is unimportant in conceptual art, for the cognitive potential of embodied, sensual experience is 
denied. Of course, conceptual art is governed by the contradiction between its aim, to present fully formed 
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According to Bernstein, what Duchamp’s Fountain reveals is that painting is 
conventional. With Fountain, by offering a “minimum of conventionality to signal ‘art’: 
the urinal’s being turned 90 degrees onto its back and placed on a black pedestal” (215), 
the artist shows that the conventions in which the material motive of art is articulated are 
arbitrary.153 Reiterating de Duve’s argument, Bernstein claims this as a sign that painting 
is exhausted, that it has gone as far as it can in presenting the destitution of its material 
by reducing itself to the monochrome. The next step, as Duve argues, would be to 
renounce convention entirely, to be not-painting. Duchamp’s nominalism is thus, 
Bernstein claims, “another name for modernism’s idea of progress through negativity” 
(213). Indeed, it is by negating painting, by being emphatically not painting, that the 
readymade reveals art’s material motive and thus the importance of the medium. Still, 
because Duchamp lays emphasis not on the material motive of art but rather on the 
arbitrariness of convention, Bernstein argues, Fountain appears to suggest that any 
object can be “art:” this is to grasp the work as a gesture of sceptical nominalism. “The 
wrong thought that anything can be art through nominal insistence or attitude, however, 
sequesters the better one,” Bernstein writes, which, to quote Adorno, is that “art is a 
second world ‘composed out of elements that have been transposed out of the empirical 
world …[art is an] order just like the habitual order but changed in the slightest degree’” 
(215). In other words, Fountain can also be understood as integral nominalism, a 
generative gesture that transforms what is at first an arbitrary object into art. Art, 
Bernstein thus argues, is not a label that can be given to any object as if the difference 
between art and empirical reality depend upon a simple decision. Rather, following the 
Adornian argument that I attempted to sketch out in Chapter One, empirical reality 
becomes art through a process of objectification. The lesson that the readymade provides 
in this light, Bernstein claims, is “that the ‘slightest degree’ is an arbitrary convention 
                                                                                                                                                
“extrinsic” ideas, and its reality which in fact demonstrates the impossibility of this practice. Kosuth’s 
reading of Duchamp, moreover, is highly problematic (see 86n33).  
153 Bernstein’s argument is slightly complicated by historical fact here, as, given the history set out in 
Chapter One of this thesis (see 59n56), it seems most probable that photographer Alfred Stieglitz made 
these changes rather than Duchamp. Nevertheless, Bernstein’s basic point that these “alterations” are 
necessary for us to see it as art is still plausible. 
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that recapitulates the historical calamity that makes art necessary” (215).154 The 
readymade makes as its subject the actual process of dividing art from non-art, the 
aesthetic from the rational: the gesture of integral nominalism is the performance of this 
“historical calamity.” As such, it recognises that while the conventions of the medium 
are arbitrary, art cannot exist without a sensuous foundation: the gesture of integral 
nominalism is that gesture by which the conventions of the medium are created.155  
It is not enough, Bernstein suggests, to show that art requires a medium nor to 
show that the conventions of media are contingent. Indeed, he concludes that 
 
By equating the claims of artistic modernism with the claims of modernist 
painting, the securing of flatness and the delimitation of flatness, Greenberg 
issued a red herring that disoriented artists and critics alike. And by failing 
to distinguish with the readymade between integral and sceptical 
nominalism, Duchamp unintentionally suppressed the stakes and motives 
of modernism, generating a red herring of his own. Greenberg’s 
essentialism and Duchamp’s sceptical nominalism are the precise 
antithetical ideas of modernism, the logical extremes, which need to be 
avoided if the logic and paradox of modernism are to be understood. (212)  
 
The essentialism which motivates Greenberg’s avant-garde and the negative gesture of 
the readymade, Bernstein thus argues, belong to the opposing poles between which the 
tension that art requires for its objectification is generated: neither is a sufficient 
response to the stakes of modern art. The real challenge in the face of the exhaustion of 
painting, Bernstein goes on to argue, is not to unmask the medium as a set of 
conventions but rather to produce a new medium that will take up its mantel: “the 
inaugurating convention must be generative; that is, it must be capable of supplying 
conditions and limits that enable an alternative material logic to appear” (215). In the 
face of the total reification of painting, the task of the artist is to generate a set of 
conventions or medium with a comparably binding eloquence, to find alternative ways 
                                                 
154 It is precisely this Adornian “messianic conception” (45) of art that de Duve is opposed to, as he states 
in “Silences in the Doctrine”. His description of the difference between art and life as symbolic and the 
values of art and life as flowing through one another is his attempt to counter the idea.  
155 Although he does not make the distinction, then, it is clearly as operating in the mode of integral rather 
than sceptical nominalism that de Duve understands Duchamp’s “pictorial nominalism.” 
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of inscribing the language of things.156 It should be no surprise, then, that Bernstein 
finishes by judging Fountain as at best “meretricious” (215) with regard to the challenge 
that art faces.157 Like Greenberg, Bernstein thus concludes, Duchamp fails to grasp that 
at stake in modern art is the possibility of an alternative language to that of reified 
conceptual rationality: it is this conclusion that, returning to the question of literature, 
Chapter Three will set out to dispute. I will argue that Duchamp’s engagement with 
literature is precisely an attempt to invent an alternative mode of inscription with which 
to counter the “café and studio platitudes” that he found so restrictive. His work thus 
opens out a site by which to re-evaluate one of Warhol’s least discussed but most 
interesting projects, the novel a; a novel. 
Bernstein’s case for modern art as a search for alternative forms to those of 
rational, conceptual language is persuasive. However, his Adornian narrative of history 
as the progressive domination of “nature” seems to foreclose on the possibility of art’s 
success in this endeavour. In Chapter Four, I will argue that it is this narrative that leads 
to the idea of painting as apparently closer to lost “nature” than the other arts. Unlike 
Bernstein, I will attempt to show, Lyotard questions the grounds upon which “nature” is 
                                                 
156 Krauss comes to a similar conclusion in her short 2000 book on Marcel Broodthalers, entitled “A 
Voyage on the North Sea”: Art in the Age of the Post-Medium Condition. While the proximity between 
her conclusion and Bernstein’s is obvious, Krauss’s essay is considerably more problematic as she makes 
the unargued assertion that “inter-media” experimentation and the “dissolving of categories” articulates 
art’s complicity with the homogenizing drive of capital. At no point does she entertain the possibility that 
this refusal of disciplinary identity might be an attempt to counter the forces of rationalisation and 
specialisation upon which capitalism depends. 
157 It is important to note that, in the quotation cited above, Bernstein performs a little sleight of hand: 
Duchamp’s readymade, which Bernstein had earlier interpreted as failing to distinguish between integral 
and sceptical nominalism, is unambiguously labelled as sceptical. The indeterminacy of the gesture is 
collapsed into anti-art once more. Given this assessment of Duchamp, there is some irony in that fact that 
Bernstein turns immediately to the work of Joseph Cornell and Louise Bourgeois, asking whether “for the 
purposes of producing a new medium … a box with a glass front or a cell of wire mesh” (Against 215) 
might do,  for both Cornell and Bourgeois are of course heavily influenced by Duchamp, whose own 
master work The Bride Stripped Bare by Her Bachelors, Even, is nothing more than a “box with a glass 
front,”157 the “cell” or, as he puts it “transparent cage” (see Writings 30) in which his bride and bachelors 
were separated and imprisoned. Bernstein—apparently unwittingly—suggests that Cornell’s work reveals 
Duchamp’s readymade as a dead end, when in fact Cornell himself was highly influenced and inspired by 
precisely this idea. Throughout the 1930s and 1940s Cornell even helped Duchamp create his boxes, 
following his precise instructions and undertaking the exacting and time-consuming labour of creating 
editions of The Green Box and the Boîte-en-Valise. Cornell consciously and directly explores the 
problematic that Duchamp set up: in this sense the readymade is not meretricious but highly generative, 
leading directly to the works that Bernstein values more highly. For more on the relationship between 
Duchamp and Cornell, see P. Koch. 
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given such authority and what that assumption entails. While Bernstein’s work 
represents Adorno’s aesthetics pushed in the direction of mournfulness and pessimism (a 
direction in which they were admittedly already well underway) and once again reduces 
the avant-garde to a purely negative anti-art gesture, Lyotard’s work, I will try to show, 
opens out an alternative reading of Adorno that opens out possibilities for thinking about 







































The Matter of Words: Literature and the Book 
  
Duchamp’s early illustrative sketches and paintings such as Nude Descending a 
Staircase, Sad Young Man and Dulcinea, all demonstrate ways in which the artist 
actively brings literature into dialogue with the visual arts. Warhol’s work, as I 
suggested in the previous chapter, echoes this media-scrambling and, at the same time, 
knowingly parodies the apparent “silence” of abstract painting. The literary experiments 
of both artists, however, remain under-examined.158 My aim in this chapter, therefore, is 
to take account of the impact of literature on the work of Duchamp and Warhol. Doing 
so, I hope to show, not only opens out a fresh perspective on their art but also 
demonstrates that the work of both artists can be grasped as challenging reified language 
and literary forms, and attempting to find alternative conventions by which to inscribe 
sensory experience. Both artists, in other words, were attempting to create new and 
generative conventions for art through an exploration of how literature and the visual 
arts impact on one another.  
Like Duchamp, Warhol evidently felt a strong and constant pull towards writers 
from the very beginning of his career. As he reflects in his 1980 memoir POPism, 
 
In the fifties, in my pre-Pop days, I wanted to illustrate [Truman Capote’s] 
short stories so badly I used to pester him with phone calls all the time. ... 
It’s hard to say now what made me want to connect my drawings with 
those short stories … I could almost picture Truman tilting his head and 
arranging his words around the pages, making them go together in a 
magical way. (193) 
 
                                                 
158 Even Reva Wolf’s otherwise ground-breaking study of Warhol’s involvement with the New York 
poetry scene in the 1960s barely touches upon the pop artist’s own experimental texts. As Wolf shows, 
Warhol emerged into a social context dominated by abstract expressionist painters, whose close 
relationship to New York School poets such as Frank O’Hara is well-documented (see for example, 
Perloff’s Frank O’Hara: Poet among Painters). The Pop artist wanted both to be involved in the scene 
and at the same time to differentiate himself and his circle from it: the dynamics of his involvement, which 
Wolf focuses on, are thus significant. 
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In these “pre-Pop” years Warhol had been primarily employed as an illustrator in the 
advertising trade: he was also writing and illustrating numerous picture books of his 
own.159 A business interest in the commercial prospects of this type of activity, then, 
might go some way to explaining his desire to work with Capote. The image of the 
writer conjured up here, however, not only betrays Warhol’s admiration but also 
suggests that one reason for his attraction was a feeling of identification.160 Capote 
appears more as artist than writer, the process of writing imagined as a gift of vision. In 
imagining the writer at work, in fact, the artist seems to imply a kind of kinship between 
their working methods: Warhol imagines a direct and physical relationship between 
author and page, akin to that between painter and canvas, the writer engaged in a process 
of arrangement and composition rather than invention.161  
This kinship with writers was something that Warhol would continue to seek 
throughout the following decades, surrounding himself with writers at all stages of his 
career,162 and working with his literary protégés to produce numerous books:163 “the Pop 
idea, after all, was that anybody could do anything so we were all trying to do it all. 
Nobody wanted to stay in one category; we all wanted to branch out into every creative 
thing we could” (POPism 134).164 The most ambitious book project that Warhol set 
                                                 
159 Private prints include Holy Cats by Andy Warhol’s Mother (early 50s), 25 Cats Name [Sic] Sam and 
One Blue Pussy (1954) and numerous others. Privately published works include Wild Strawberries (1959) 
andAmy Vanderbilt’s Complete Cookbook (1961). For information on these little known works and other 
rarely discussed Warhol projects see O’Connor and Liu, Unseen Warhol. 
160 In the end, Warhol seems to have established the close working relationship that he aspired to have 
with Capote with the poet Gerard Malanga. While Malanga helped Warhol to produce his paintings, the 
artist provided illustrations for the poet’s collection of poetry, Chic Death (1971), and frequently designed 
“sets” or visual back-drops for his readings. 
161 Warhol also discusses Capote’s compositional skills in artistic terms in THE Philosophy of Andy 
Warhol. What he really admired about Capote, he claims, was that he “filled up space with words so 
well.” (148) 
162 In the 1960s, Warhol’s circle consisted of young poets such as Malanga and Billy Name (Linich), while 
in the 1970s and 80s he worked particularly closely with the novelist Pat Hackett.  
163 The most notable of which are as follows: the magazine in a box, Aspen (1965), the play Pork (1971), 
the pop up book The Andy Warhol Index Book (1967), the books, a; a novel (1968), THE Philosophy of 
Andy Warhol (1975), Andy Warhol’s Exposures (1979), POPism (1980), Andy Warhol Diaries (1982), the 
picture book America (1985), and Interview magazine which began in 1969 and continues to be published 
today. As the dates indicate, then, Warhol was almost continuously producing work in text and book 
formats as well as painting, photography, film and video throughout his career. 
164 Warhol wasn’t the only person to try out the Pop principles in literature. In 1968 Ronald Gross 
published a collection of what he called “Pop Poems.” They consisted of titled texts, which had been 
sections of longer texts from various “non-literary” sources; primarily advertising, of course, with one 
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himself was his 1968 experimental tape-recorded work a; a novel. The plans began in 
1965: “I wanted to do a ‘bad book,’” he later claimed, “just the way I’d done ‘bad 
movies’ and ‘bad art’” (POPism 287). In order to produce the text Warhol adopted 
precisely the same strategy that he used in painting and turned, as usual, to technology: 
a, which purports to document a day in the life of Ondine (one of Warhol’s associates at 
the Factory), consists not of measured and artful prose, but rather of unaltered transcripts 
of tape-recordings. Twenty four tapes were made, each side apparently recording a 
period of thirty minutes. The artist claimed that no editing was done: the tapes were 
transcribed by some local high school girls; they typed what they heard (or thought they 
heard) with all their own personal idiosyncrasies. When the transcripts were given to 
Warhol he was reportedly so pleased with the result that he arranged for them to be 
typeset almost exactly as they stood.165 The result is a text that has neither chapters nor 
story, that switches unpredictably from left justified to centred to right justified text, 
from a conventional page layout to a newspaper-like double column, from attributing 
comments to various speakers to running one monologue into another.  
When a was finally published, it was almost unanimously savaged:166 the few 
critical responses that the work has since provoked have read it through the lens of 
Warhol’s paintings and films, and as a mere curiosity. Slipping through the gaps 
between the disciplines of art and literary history, a, like Warhol’s other texts, has been 
almost completely overlooked. Examining Warhol’s interest in literature, however, 
                                                                                                                                                
consisting of a section of the police report on the assassination of J.F. Kennedy. As the subject matter 
indicates, they are entirely derivative of Warhol. However they benefit neither from his humour, nor from 
his ability to accurately predict what non-art material will work as “pop” and what will not.  
165 This report is slightly misleading for in fact some parts were changed quite a bit as we shall see in later 
sections of this chapter. It is difficult to know, however, what was done by Warhol and what was done by 
his assistants. Poet Billy Name appears to have had responsibility for typesetting the book and chose the 
titles that appear as headers to each page, so he may well have made some of the other changes too. For 
more on the production of a; a novel see Bockris, “glossary.” 
166 Reviews described it variously as “tedious,” “vulgar,” “absurdly vapid and unreadable”, even 
“pornography” (qtd. in Kara 270). If one reason for such outbursts was the content of the novel (the 
protagonists are involved in drug-taking, homosexuality and prostitution), another was the challenge that a 
posed to conventional ideas about literature. Since its publication, the novel has received little critical 
attention. Even Wolf, who discusses Warhol’s engagement with literature at length, has little to say about 
it. She dedicates only four pages to the work, placing it alongside Jack Kerouac’s Visions of Cody which 
she suggests is its model. It is the connection rather than the book itself which interests her (see 141-145). 
By far the best and most lengthy response to a; a novel is the 2005 article “Whereof One Cannot Speak” 
by Craig Dworkin.  
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provides a means to set his work in dialogue with Duchamp’s in a manner that moves 
beyond questions of influence, originality and repetition.167  
The relationship between the arts also underpins the central conceit of 
Duchamp’s masterpiece The Bride Stripped Bare by Her Bachelors, Even, namely the 
work’s status as “unfinished.”168 In 1949, Duchamp wrote to his friend the artist Jean 
Suquet that the Large Glass 
 
is not meant to be looked at (with “aesthetic” eyes). It should be 
accompanied by a “literary” text, as amorphous as possible, which never 
took shape. And the two elements, glass for the eyes, text for the ears and 
understanding, should complement each another, and above all prevent 
one or the other from taking on an aesthetico-plastic or literary form. 
(Correspondence 283-284) 
 
These remarks describe a kind of inversion of the Wagnerian Gesamtkunstwerk, as 
Duchamp envisages bringing together different arts not to create a unified work but 
rather to prevent such an outcome: the combination of the visual and the literary is not a 
resolution of their differences but is conceived as a means to prevent the work from 
cohering. The letter also suggests that these plans never came to fruition. Indeed, 
curiously enough, it appears that at exactly the moment that Duchamp abandoned 
painting in order to devote his time to experimenting on the Glass, he also abruptly 
stopped referencing literature and illustrating literary works.169 As his ideas for the Glass 
took shape, this seems to indicate, Duchamp’s interest in literature as such began to 
wane.  
                                                 
167 To connect the two via their interest in literature is not to say that Warhol was aware of and mimicking 
Duchamp’s preoccupation with literary language in the same manner that he may have mimicked the 
readymade: Warhol is unlikely to have been aware of Duchamp’s interest in language, in fact, as little 
attention had been paid to this aspect of the latter’s work before the 1970s. What the idea of cross-
disciplinarity seems to offer then is less a sign of influence than a shared concern, arrived at 
independently. 
168 Duchamp began work on The Bride Stripped Bare in 1915, after four years of developing ideas, and 
stopped working on it in 1923 at which point he declared the work unfinished. See Cabanne Dialogues 18 
and Duchamp Writing 127. For sustained readings of the Large Glass see Golding and Steefel. 
169 The 1942 installation The Green Ray is an exception here, adopting the title of a novel by Jules Verne 
and depicting the natural phenomenon around which the story is constructed. For more on this work see 
Molderling “Objects of Modern Scepticism.”  
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 In fact, however, an “amorphous” textual accompaniment to the Glass was 
produced. Duchamp considered numerous formats: one idea, as Juan Antonio Ramírez 
writes, “was ‘to produce a round book, with no beginning and no end,’ with a spine 
made up of ‘rings around which the pages gyrate’” (74). Another was to construct 
something akin to a commercial catalogue, a set of instruction manuals or an advertising 
pamphlet.170 The idea of a “poem” as accompaniment to the Glass also seems to have 
been considered, although the artist’s notes suggest that such a text must “not express in 
the manner of a poem” (qtd. in Ramírez 270). The shape that the text finally took (it was 
produced some 11 years after Duchamp had ceased to work on the Glass) was that of a 
loose-leaf collection of working notes and sketches, contained in a green case. These 
objects were reproductions of the working notes and sketches that Duchamp had made 
between 1911 and 1915. Although Duchamp inscribed the work with the same title as 
the Glass itself, The Bride Stripped Bare by her Bachelors, Even, it would be as The 
Green Box that the work would subsequently be known.171 
 Despite the implication of their shared title—which deliberately situates both 
objects as The Bride Stripped Bare172—there has been a tendency in critical discussions 
to assume that The Green Box is a secondary object, little more than an explication of 
the Large Glass.173 This is an approach, it should be noted, that Duchamp himself seems 
to have encouraged, referring to The Green Box as the “manuscript” for the Glass 
                                                 
170 See Perloff, 21st Century 79. 
171 There were two editions of the Green Box, a normal edition which was unlimited in number and a 
deluxe edition of just 20. These were compiled to order by the artist over the course of the decades that 
followed. Both versions contained photographically reproduced copies of the 93 working notes for the 
project, collected between 1911, when the ideas for the project began to surface, and 1915 when Duchamp 
began to implement them. The boxes of the deluxe edition were distinguished by the fact that each 
contained one original. All description of the Green Box in this thesis is based on the one that Duchamp 
produced for George Hugnet, which is currently held in the archives at the Dean Gallery, National 
Galleries of Scotland, Edinburgh. It is number 13 of 20 in a limited edition, dating to the first year of 
production, 1934.  
172 I use The Bride Stripped Bare, when I mean to indicate the work as a composite of the two pieces. I 
will therefore refer to the Large Glass and the Green Box when I discuss one of the other of these pieces. 
173 Of the two major monographs on the Glass, Steefel’s work is interested precisely in the iconographic 
and stylistic development of the work and so not in the Box, while Golding does little more than read the 
notes as explanatory texts despite acknowledging that “they fail, and indeed were not intended to explain 
the Large Glass rationally” (12). Linda Henderson sees his notes operating as “a guide book” (74) to the 
glass and compares them to the notebooks of Leonardo da Vinci which were published in France at the 
turn of the century. Judovitz also connects Duchamp’s Green Box to Leonardo’s notebooks (79-81). 
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(Correspondence 214). It has also been prevalent from the outset thanks to Andre 
Breton’s 1934 essay “Lighthouse of the Bride,” an immediate response to the 
appearance of the box. Although there have been some attempts to counter this tendency 
to approach the work as a visual work supplemented by documents, the attitude is still 
powerful.174 Ramírez, for example, goes as far as to assert that the Green Box should not 
be confused with the “literary” text planned but never executed: the box, he claims 
instead, provides “primordial material for interpreting the significance of The Bride 
Stripped Bare by her Bachelors, Even” (74). Clearly, Ramírez sees the box not as a part 
of the work but rather, despite its appearance after the Glass, as an artefact that is 
somehow prior to the “main” work: that this is the case is confirmed when he speaks of 
the notes as “the artist’s raw material” (75). The Green Box is thus positioned as an 
object which clarifies rather than contributes to the project of the Glass.  
 Ramírez is not alone in adopting this stance; in fact it is standard practice to refer 
to the content of the notes as evidence with which to corroborate interpretations of 
Duchamp’s work and to present readings of the notes as a demonstration of having 
uncovered the artist’s intentions.175 While the Box does indeed shed light on the 
hermetic symbols and mechanics of the Glass, to approach the relationship in this one-
sided way is nevertheless to ignore several important facts. Firstly, there is the fact that 
the meaning or content of Duchamp’s writings is far from clear: not only are the textual 
fragments full of symbols and drawings, with parts scored out or scribbled over, but 
even those parts in which fully formed sentences can be found are, as we shall see 
shortly, extremely ambiguous. In other words, to suggest that the notes are explanatory 
is to turn a blind eye to the fact it is in no way easier to comprehend them than the Glass 
                                                 
174 See Bloch, “Green Box.” 
175 The assumption that the Green Box is a set of notes about the Glass rather than a work in itself also 
grounds the attempts by George Heard Hamilton and Richard Hamilton to typo-translate the work, 
rendering the hand-written notes into print. The complex typographical rendering of the Green Box 
implies that the notes are primarily communicative, and thus translatable into another form and indeed 
another language. These translations position the Green Box not as an enigmatic work of art, the meaning 
of which is bound up with its material form, but rather as a set of “meanings” and ideas that can be 
extricated from their presentation. However, the diagram of the Large Glass produced in this process—
despite significantly reducing the work, of course—may be a useful tool for those less familiar with the 
piece, as the complexity of the Glass is notorious: I have therefore attached it as an appendix to this thesis. 
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itself.176 Secondly, this desire to find intention and explanation in the notes ignores the 
warning articulated in the work which, as I will try to show shortly, is, like a; a novel in 
fact, an elaborate meditation on failures of communication and the impossibility of 
perfect understanding.177 Situating the notes as “raw material,” moreover, provides no 
means to take account of the considerable work that Duchamp put into creating the 
boxes: for it is hardly the case, as Ramírez claims, that Duchamp “simply selected 93 old 
working notes published facsimile copies of them and put them into a box, unnumbered 
and unbound” (74). In reality the production of the Green Box was an arduous affair; it 
was a laboured procedure, done by hand and which took an enormous amount of 
planning and meticulous execution over the course of several years.178 Working some 
twenty years after the original notes had been made, Duchamp sourced the exact papers, 
tore them into fragments of exactly the same measurements, and copied the drawings 
and scribbles precisely.179 Such levels of dedication suggest that the Green Box must be 
considered no less significant than the Glass itself.  
 The box, moreover, appears not to replace the idea of the literary text, as 
Ramírez suggests, but rather to emerge from it; in the artist’s letters, interviews and 
statements the two ideas fuse together. In October 1934, for example, Duchamp wrote to 
one exhibition organiser that he would send a book but that “this book is more like a box 
containing photographs and reproductions of handwritten notes and photos of paintings” 
                                                 
176 Although Cabanne acknowledges this, he does so only to immediately reassert the primacy of the notes 
and their status as artist’s intention: “many of the phrases that are found in the box” he writes “are 
enigmatic, because they are an attempt to capture [Duchamp’s] thought processes on paper as they 
happened” (Duchamp & Co. 94).  
177 If I acknowledge the problem of translation here, it is not to pick holes in Hamilton’s translation of the 
Green Box specifically. It rather to introduce the idea that in any attempt at translation, be it from one 
language to another or one genre to another or one media to another, the text or idea or image changes. 
Translation is a necessary task but one doomed to at least a degree of failure from the outset. Sentiments 
about the unreliability of language are rife in Duchamp’s remarks and correspondence. See also Tomkins 
31. 
178 For discussion and description of the process of making the Green Box see Perloff, 21st Century 79-81, 
and Cabanne, Dialogues 77-79. 
179 Jonathan Bass Rieck suggests that Duchamp in fact made tiny alterations in each copy (see Rieck 281). 
He cites an electronic article that I have been unable to access by Rhonda Roland Shearer and Stephen Jay 
Gould (“The Green Box Stripped Bare: Marcel Duchamp’s 1934 ‘Facsimilies’ Yield Surprises” Toutfait 
1.1 (1991)). Such a practice would be entirely in keeping with the fact that in making his reproduction by 











Fig. 3.1 Marcel Duchamp Green Box 
(exterior) (1934) 
 




(Correspondence 191). In 1959, Duchamp told an interviewer that “the description of 
the visual part is the literary part. That is why I say welding; the welding of the two 
sources is very important” (Hamilton “Radio” 77). In the late 1960s, finally, he echoes 
his earlier comments to Suquet, telling Cabanne that when looking at the Glass “one 
must consult the book, and see the two together. The conjunction of the two things 
entirely removes the retinal aspect that I don’t like” (Dialogues 43). It is on the level of 
the work itself, however, that the connection between the Green Box and the form of the 
book is played out most strikingly: for the final product bears the marks of the work’s 
“literary” inception, appearing as a kind of inverted tome which opens to reveal the title 
and publication details imprinted down the interior spine. (Fig. 3.1 & Fig. 3.2) The 
artist’s description of the box as “manuscript” (rather than sketch, blueprint, or diagram) 
and its apparent “publication” (by “Editions Rrose Selavy, Paris”) foregrounds the 
object’s textuality and its relations to the process of bookmaking and, as it turns out, 
these relations pervade not only the Box but also the Glass. The Bride Stripped Bare, as 
Sarat Maharaj notes, carries us “to the scene of writing and its mechanized modes.” In 
the Glass 
 
script/print references abound: a moving inscription scrolls the screen; 
there are encoding and decoding contraptions, ciphers and molds, an 
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alphabet box of letters, … [it] not only reflects on Gutenberg techniques, 
but with its collotypes, facsimiles, prints, photographs, reproductions and 
serial runs, is itself a product of them. (61)  
 
In other words, if the readymade is a kind of abnormal painting, then the Green Box, and 
perhaps even The Bride Stripped Bare as a whole, is a kind of abnormal book.180 While 
Duchamp may abandon both illustration and the idea of the poem as an accompaniment 
to the Glass, it is not because his interest in literature and its relation to the visual arts 
wanes: indeed, as he would later tell Cabanne, it was during this period in which the 
Glass was developed that he considered himself to have finally become a “literary man” 
(Duchamp & Co. 76).  
 It is Duchamp’s abnormal book that this chapter will begin by examining, before 
moving on to a discussion of Warhol’s a. What I want to argue is that in these book 
projects both Duchamp and Warhol clearly demonstrate their awareness of the stakes of 
art: they reveal the material motive of art as it operates in literature. Each artist, I will try 
to show, in different ways articulates a fantasy of perfect “unmediated” communication 
at the same time as making its impossibility apparent. They thus articulate the 
constraints put upon expression by the material conventions of media, and at the same 
moment, the necessity of such mediation, thereby revealing a productive conflict 
between freedom and constraint at the heart of these works. In this sense, they articulate 
precisely the dynamic that, as I tried to show in Chapter One, Adorno locates within the 
form of the artwork.  In the final section of this chapter, I will examine how each work 





                                                 
180 Given the number of print references, the paradox of the work is that the notes are handwritten: “as 
they speak against the hand-mark’s aura, the potent spell of script, signature and manual trace closes in” 
(Maharaj 61). This, along with the term “manuscript,” indicates that the Box’s status as text is part of the 
complex of questions about authenticity and reproduction that the Glass raises. For more on this see 





Fig. 3.3 Marcel Duchamp The Bride Stripped Bare by Her Bachelors, Even (1915-1923) 





1. “Illumanistic Scribism”: Duchamp, Mallarmé and the Book 
 
The Bride Stripped Bare takes the dual form, as I have indicated, of the Large Glass and 
the Green Box. The Large Glass (Fig. 3.3) is a vertical construction, split into two panes. 
These spaces are separated by “the bride’s clothes” which consist of three, barely visible 
horizontal panes of glass. Each space depicts a sequence of images of machines: in the 
bottom pane, the space of the bachelors or “malic molds,” these machines are 
mechanistic and industrial, like the machines that we might encounter in everyday life. 
This space is governed by the conventional laws of classical perspective and, as the 
molds are also referred to as “the cemetery of uniforms or liveries,” the bachelors are 
identified by various professions (cuirassier, busboy, etc.). In short, the bachelor space is 
governed by convention and represents a “realistic” space in which the figures have 
recognisable roles that correspond to social positions beyond the imaginative space of 
the work. In direct contrast, the top pane, where the Bride is depicted, is envisaged as 
representing an imaginary four dimensional space. It is dominated by the “natural” 
forms of the opaque “Milky Way” and an insect-like machine, the Bride-motor. What 
links the machines in these different spaces, however, is their malfunctioning: although 
the notes describe their workings in some detail, the mechanisms that the Glass depicts 
in each pane are imagined as intrinsically faulty.  
 Despite their separation and differences, both of the areas which compose the 
Glass are imagined as spaces regulated by language: it is language which drives the 
operations of the machines in the Glass. The commands of the Bride in the four-
dimensional upper section resonate down to the nine bachelors (or molds) in the three 
dimensional space below and inspire their movement: their rhythmic operations in turn 
are synchronized by the verbal litanies chanted by the Glider as it moves back and 
forth.181 The bachelors, whose emissions power the lower section of the Glass (while the  
                                                 
181 Thus in The Bride Stripped Bare the visual arts, literature and music (in the form of the songs of the 
work) are brought together, just as in Musical Erratum (1913), a song about visual images and titled with 
a “literary” concept (an erratum is the publisher’s correction of mistakes in a printed work). Both suggest a 





Fig. 3.4 Marcel Duchamp Three Standard Stops (1913-1914) 
 
 
Bride’s “love gasoline” keeps her motor running in the top section), are “castings” 
generated by “the illuminating gas” (Writings 51). This is to say that the illuminating 
gas, one of the “givens” with which Duchamp’s work is constantly pre-occupied, 
appears here as the material by which the bachelors are generated. Provoked to respond 
to the Bride’s commands, the bachelors belch out the illuminating gas from their 
“heads”: this is then processed and rationalised through the pataphysical “logic” devices 
of the “capillary tubes.” These are formed by reproductions of an earlier experiment, the 
3 Standard Stops (3 Stoppages Étalon 1913-14) (Fig. 3.4): Duchamp took a meter-length 
piece of string, held it precisely one meter above ground, dropped it and fixed the 
                                                                                                                                                
a harmonious unity (a “musical erratum” suggests that music is used to correct a text or the words to 
correct the music) Again, then, as in the letter to Suquet, while the notion of the Gesamtkunstwerk is 
brought into play it is only, as always, to ‘slightly distend” the concept. On the aural aspects of 
Duchamp’s work, see Carol James’ “Duchamp’s Silent Noise/Music for the Deaf”; Adcock “Marcel 
Duchamp’s Gap Music”; Landy, “Duchamp, Dada Composer.” 
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resulting shape. This operation to “can” chance was done three times in order to create a 
distorted measure, a meter/not meter.182 As a result of its movement through these tubes, 
and its further processing in the “sieves” or “parasols” which arc over the grinder, the 
illuminating gas is provoked into various states and ultimately reduced to a lonely 
“splash.” In the end, then, the bachelors are unable to make themselves heard; their 
attempt at communication (having gone quite literally through the “mill”) is fruitless: 
“they will never be able to pass beyond the Mask = They would have been as if 
enveloped, alongside their regrets, by a mirror reflecting back to them their own 
complexity to the point of their being hallucinated rather onanistically” (Writings 51). 
The illuminating gas, the notes thus suggest, is a substance at once explosive, generative, 
enlightening and deadening. It serves to produce subjective identity and social 
positioning and at the same time, increasingly rationalised and reified, it is unable to 
actually facilitate, even prevents, real communication. The illuminating gas, in short, is a 
kind of abnormal language.   
 In two intriguing notes in the Green Box, Duchamp appears to plan to attach 
texts directly to the bachelor part of the glass. On the drainage slopes (the parasols or 
sieves) where the gas/language goes through the process of becoming abstracted and 
regulated, a photograph of To Have the Apprentice in the Sun was to be placed. This 
illustration of Laforgue’s poetry would act as a “commentary” or an “improvement of 
the [illuminating] gas to the slopes” (Writings 51). On the chocolate grinder, there was 
to be a “commercial formula, trade mark, commercial slogan inscribed like an 
advertisement on a bit of glossy and colored paper (have it made by a printer)” 
(Writings 68). While poetry is invoked in order to comment on or improve the reification 
of the language/gas, the onanistic movement of the chocolate grinder is matched by a 
use of language that is the opposite of poetic, the language of pure capital, associated 
with the technologies of reproduction: the language of advertising reflects the bachelors 
                                                 
182 For Duchamp “the number three [was] important […] one is unity, two is double, duality, and three is 




back at themselves.183 The bachelor section of the Glass, then, as it emerges in 
conjunction with the Green Box, represents a complex and ambiguous statement about 
the power and failures of language and about how communicative language and poetic 
language engage with and impact upon one another.  
 Untouched by the illuminating gas, the realm of the Bride is nevertheless equally 
concerned with language and in particular with its inscription. While the bachelors are 
empty castings formed by the gas/language, the bride herself is “blank desire” (Writings 
39). The commands that she issues pass through the three “draft pistons,” scrolling out 
as “the top inscription” within the flesh-coloured “Milky Way” and filling the upper 
section of the Glass. Like the standard stops, these forms were obtained through 
recording the way in which a regular form, here a rectangle, is made irregular by natural 
forces: the artist hung squares of netting material in a window and photographed the 
shapes they made as wind blew through them. Another example of “canned chance”, 




 obtained with the draft pistons. (indicate the way to “prepare” these  
pistons.). Then “place” them for a certain time. (2 to 3 months) and let 
them leave their imprint as 3 nets through which pass the commands of the 
pendu femelle (commands having their alphabet and terms governed by the 
orientation of the 3 nets [a sort of triple “cipher” through which the milky 
way supports and guides the said commands] 
Next remove them so that nothing remains but their firm imprint i.e. the 
form permitting all combinations of letters sent across this said triple form, 
commands, orders, authorizations, etc. which must join the shots and the 
splash. (Writings 36) 
 
Like the mechanics of the lower section, then, the draft pistons encode the bride’s 
instructions. They create an “alphabet and terms” through a sequence of prints and 
imprints. Just as they are recordings of nature in the form of wind, so they record and 
                                                 
183 Thus the mechanics of the bachelor realm may be understood as foreshadowing Warhol’s soup cans, 
which use the imagery of advertising to short-circuit meaning. For more on Duchamp’s work in relation to 
the processes of consumerism and capitalism see Joselit Infinite Regress. 
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encode the desire of the bride within the “organic” matter of the Milky Way. Fixed in 
this language, these commands are intended to join the emissions of the bachelors.  
This process of the inscription of “blank desire” is also called “Blossoming” and 
like the “splash,” represents a sexual climax. It is the pleasure of the bride—“the sum 
total of her splendid vibrations” (Writings 42)—and the “happy goal” towards which the 
erotic machinery of the Glass works. Again, the Blossoming appears as a form of 
writing: 
 
[Blossoming] ABC..  
To make an inscription of it 
   (title,). 
Moving inscription. i.e. in which the group of alphabetic units. should no 
longer have a strict order from left to right.-each alphabetic unit will be 
present only once in the group ABC. and will be displaced from A to C and 
back again.—Since, from A towards C, the inscription should, according to 
the need for equilibrium of the plate D, displace a [stabilizer] (a ball or 
anything) On this plate D. At A. there will be [a sort of letter box] 
(alphabet) which will go towards B and C. (to develop and study) 
Representation of this inscription: Photographic method 
 Determine the alphabetic units. (their number, form, significance..).  
 represent sculpturally this inscription in movement. and take a snap shot.  
(Writings 38) 
 
The blossoming of the bride is a moving inscription, complete with its own unique 
alphabet and grammar. It mimics the circulation of information in society, letters being 
“posted,” photographs being taken. The Bride’s language, however, is untranslatable; as 
Duchamp notes of the top inscription, “this alphabet very probably is only suitable for the 
description of this picture” (Writings 32). Yet, this is “the most important part” of the 
Glass (Writings 42). Indeed, the notes suggest that the work itself, The Bride Stripped 
Bare, is in fact the result of the blossoming:  
 
graphically, there is no question of symbolising by a grandiose painting this 
happy goal—the bride’s desire; only more clearly, in all this blossoming, 
the painting will be an inventory of the elements of this blossoming, 
elements of the sexual life imagined by her the bride-desiring. In this 
blossoming, The bride reveals herself nude in 2 appearances: the first, that 
of the stripping by the bachelors. the second appearance that voluntary-
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imaginative one of the bride. On the coupling of these 2 appearances of 
pure virginity—on their collision, depends the whole blossoming, the upper 
part and the crown of the picture. (Writings 42) 
 
The work is an “inventory” of the sexual life of the bride, a means to cataloguing the 
elements of her blossoming. It is a projection that is generated at the moment in which 
the bride’s own imaginative vision collides with that of the bachelors: the two 
imaginations clash in order to produce the blossoming, in order to produce the 
inscription. If, on one hand, then, The Bride Stripped Bare appears as a warning of the 
unreliability of language, on the other, it is also the dream of an erotic epiphany 
embodied in a unique and untranslatable writing. At the heart of the work is a vision of a 
moment of perfect clarity, a kind of orgasmic coupling of imaginations by which the 
bride and bachelors can communicate.184  
The fantasy of The Bride Stripped Bare is a kind of perfect match between the 
written language of the bride and the spoken language of the bachelors, a moment in 
which the commands encoded in the blossoming meet with the processed splash. Yet, as 
we have seen, the bachelors’ emissions do not reach the bride. As malfunctioning 
machines, the bachelors remain celibate and the Bride remains the apotheosis of “pure 
virginity”: their desired union is a virginal coupling, a paradoxical impossibility, as they 
remain separated from one another by “the bride’s clothes,” isolated at the very moment 
of their coupling in the Glass. It is in this mode of frustrated coupling/non coupling, a 
connection between unconnected things, that, I will argue shortly, we might also 
understand the relationship between the visual Large Glass and the literary Green Box. 
At this juncture, however, I want to turn to one of the literary sources for the Glass, 
Mallarmé.  
 Mallarmé’s poetics, as I indicated in the last chapter, were a source of inspiration 
for both Duchamp and Greenberg.185 For Greenberg the key notion that Mallarmé 
                                                 
184 On the relation of the Glass to the work of Joyce and the Joycean epiphany, see Maharaj 70. 
185 This is discussed briefly by Rabaté who identifies Duchamp’s Given  as a visual literalisation of the 
second verse of Mallarmé’s poem “The Tomb of Charles Baudelaire” (See Rabaté, Given 71). 
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provides is that of purity, a state to be obtained through processes of negation.186 In 
painting, Greenberg tells us, purity means that the sensuous plastic values appeal to 
eyesight alone, pure painting is the negation of subject matter. In terms of poetry, the 
aim is “to deliver poetry from the subject and to give full play to its true affective 
power” and, we may recall, the content is what the poem “does to the reader, not what it 
communicates” (“Laocoon” 33-34). As Greenberg rightly suggests, for Mallarmé poetry 
is not pure sensuous materiality—“the sound of words is a part of their meaning, not the 
vessel of it” (33)—but rather the “pure notion” (Mallarmé Selected 75). “I say: a 
flower!” Mallarmé proclaims “and there arises musically, as the very idea and delicate, 
the one absent from every bouquet” (76).187 Pure poetry is not the sensuous physicality 
of the word—the sound or graphic appearance—but rather the power of words to invoke 
ideal forms. In other words, pure poetry is a poetry which transcends the difference 
between the particular object and the general concept to articulate a “pure notion,” pure 
sense independent of materiality: like the epiphany of the Large Glass, Mallarmé’s pure 
poetry is not “mediated” at all but rather appears as sense itself. 
 What Mallarmé presents us with is the idea of pure poetry as fully autonomous, 
language as freed from ordinary reference, no longer a sign of something else but sense 
itself. This is a similar point to that made more recently by literary critic Paul de Man 
who writes that the phenomenal understandings of “literariness” of the kind proposed by 
Lessing are naïve.188 Literariness is not a property of the material of the medium he 
suggests, in fact 
 
the convergence of sound and meaning … [is] a mere effect which language 
can perfectly well achieve, but which bears no substantial relationship, by 
analogy or by ontologically grounded imitation, to anything beyond that 
                                                 
186 For an interesting discussion of the political ramifications of this negativity in the cold war context, see 
Caroline Jones Eyesight Alone 83. 
187 In the original : “Je dis : une fleur! Et, hors de l’oubli où ma voix relègue aucun contour, en tant que 
quelque chose d’autre que les calices sus, musicalement se lève, idée même et suave, l’absente de tous 
bouquets” (Oeuvres 213). 
188The major concern of the article “The Resistance to Theory” is why post-structuralist literary theory has 
been received with such skepticism and why it should be considered important. Although I will not be 
drawing upon de Man again, this problem will be explored in some detail in the following chapter in the 
context of Lyotard’s work.  
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particular effect. … [The] relationship between word and thing is not 
phenomenal but conventional. (10) 
 
In other words, there is a difference between the phenomenal experience of language—
here sound but equally its graphic appearance—and the experience of it as sense: these 
two are not necessarily, but contingently, connected. Like paint on canvas they are a 
matter of convention. Literariness, de Man goes onto argue, is a result of the potential 
autonomy of language, the capacity of language to not refer (a capacity born of the 
recognition that its reference is purely conventional rather than something inherent in the 
word). In this sense literary language does not “mean” but is: the literariness of a text 
comes from its “freedom from referential restraint” (10). Importantly, this makes 
literature a space in which “negative knowledge about the reliability of linguistic 
utterance is made available” (10). The lesson of literary language, then, according to de 
Man, is precisely the lesson that The Bride Stripped Bare meditates upon: the 
unreliability of language, its opacity and its ambiguity.  
 An immediate consequence of thinking about the poetic in this way is that it has 
to be distinguished from aesthetics. Indeed, de Man argues, literary language, as 
language that demonstrates that there is no necessary connection between sense and 
phenomenal experience, “involves the voiding, rather than the affirmation, of aesthetic 
categories” (10). The literary or poetic is, as he envisions it, a kind of negation or 
opposite of the aesthetic, language cleansed of the illusion of a direct or necessary 
connection with matter. Yet this results in a paradox, for, as de Man acknowledges, it is 
at the moment in which language becomes literary, freed of reference, that the 
materiality of the word itself becomes the focus of attention. “The ensuing 
foregrounding of material, phenomenal aspects of the signifier” de Man writes, “creates 
a strong illusion of aesthetic seduction at the very moment when the actual aesthetic 
function has been, at the very least, suspended” (10). In other words, at the same time as 
language approaches “literature”, as it achieves a freedom or autonomy from 
referentiality, it appears as material and phenomenal, as aesthetic.  
 Greenberg judges poetry on aesthetic rather than poetic terms, an approach 
legitimated, as I suggested in the last chapter, by his reading of Laocoon. In that text, 
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Lessing argued that painting and poetry shared a common goal: each attempted to 
capture nature in representation. The skilled poet is able to capitalise on the 
sophisticated conceptual meanings of words and at the same time to make language 
appear as a “natural” sign by mimicking natural sounds, rhythm and pacing. Poetry thus 
overcomes the arbitrariness of its signs by appealing to sensory experience: the poet 
attempts to render language sensually evocative of the phenomenon that it represents. 
For Lessing, in other words, the telos of the visual arts and the literary arts are one and 
the same: like visual aesthetics, literariness is held to operate through and be judged 
upon its sensuous, perceptual values. The plastic values of painting are understood as 
comparative to the phonic and rhythmic values of poetry. Lessing, in other words, sets 
up a notion of poetics as aesthetics.189 Unlike Lessing, Greenberg does not view painting 
as a “natural” sign. However, as he sees it, the task of art has changed; its goal is no 
longer to represent either nature or concepts but rather to present art itself in the form of 
the medium. While he refuses the semiological distinction that Lessing sets up, 
Greenberg maintains the basic premise that the arts are motivated by the same goals and 
measured by the same criteria.190 Eliding poetics with aesthetics, Greenberg views 
literature as compromised by the fact that it cannot remove itself from representation 
(pure poetry is a fantasy, after all) and, viewing the relationship between the arts through 
the prism of Laocoon, deems painting to be the superior art.  
 Yet, as I suggested in the last chapter, it is possible to interpret Mallarmé’s ideas 
differently. Indeed, his work makes available an important insight, namely that poetry 
like all the arts is dependent upon the clash between materiality and sense. Art is not 
defined solely by its material support but nor can it exist without it: there is a linguistic 
moment in even the most abstract painting, as there is a material moment in even the 
                                                 
189 Wellbery describes the “central core” of Lessing’s aesthetics as follows: “The aesthetic is a general 
form of representation, sensate intuition, which is realised in different semiotic media. Phrased in another 
way, the different types of sign are used aesthetically when they yield the sensate intuition or illusionary 
presentation that characterises the aesthetic in general” (200). 
190 The way that Greenberg reduces art (most famously painting) to its material support in fact, as I hope 
my discussion of Bernstein showed, is one of the most problematic aspects of his work. 
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most autonomous language.191 The transcendence that Mallarmé’s dream of pure poetry 
seeks is impossible: strikingly, this realisation lies at the heart of Mallarmé’s work, as 
his writing on the Book demonstrates. “One does not write luminously on a dark field;” 
Mallarmé admits, “the alphabet of stars alone, is thus indicated, sketched out or 
interrupted; man pursues black on white” (Selected 77). In practice, in other words, 
poetry takes place in the materiality of ink on the page: poetry is born of the dissonance 
between poetry and the non-poetry of the material word. It is this insight, I think, that 
Duchamp takes. 
In “The Book: A Spiritual Instrument” Mallarmé describes his vision of the ideal 
physical form of literature. Mallarmé’s Book (the word is always capitalised in 
Mallarmé’s writing in order to distinguish it from the banal, commonplace object) is 
neither merely the product of a writer, nor simply the material means for distributing 
ideas but rather the space in which “all earthly existence must ultimately be contained” 
(80). It is “a hymn, all harmony and joy, an immaculate grouping of universal 
relationships come together for some miraculous and glittering occasion” (80), or, as 
Paul Valéry describes it, “a mental instrument designed to express the things of the 
intellect and the abstract imagination” (312). All of these descriptions might equally 
apply to The Bride Stripped Bare, a work which, as I have tried to show, might itself be 
considered an experiment with the book form.  
Mallarmé’s Book is the physical form in which the ideal forms of poetry may be 
adequately expressed: it is an experiment with the aesthetic experience of engaging with 
the book, the page, the word, aimed at developing the physical form of literature into 
“the divine and intricate organism required by literature” (“Book” 83). It is thus, as 
Johanna Drucker puts it, an attempt at a synthesis “between a philosophical vision of the 
book as an expansive instrument of the spirit and the capacity of its physical form to 
reflect and embody thought in new visual arrangements” (36). The Book, in other words, 
                                                 
191 We are returned, in fact, to the very point that Adorno made in “Commitment”. However, this is not to 
say that the consequences of Adorno and de Man’s positions are the same. I draw this comparison without 
wishing to conflate their thought. I simply want to suggest that on this single point their thinking is 
comparable. I have brought de Man’s work into the discussion because in this essay he articulates the 
precise idea in which I am interested in here, I will not attend to his work more broadly in this thesis 
because it is removed from the debates on avant-gardism which are my main focus. 
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represents the physical embodiment of pure poetry, the aesthetic form of the poetic, a 
creation as arising from the materiality of language, text and print itself. It is 
 
the total expansion of the letter, [and] must find its mobility in the letter; 
and in its spaciousness must establish some nameless system of 
relationships which will embrace and strengthen fiction. … [We] will 
misunderstand the true meaning of this book and the miracle inherent in its 
structure, if we do not knowingly imagine that a given motif has been 
properly placed at a certain height on the page, according to its own or to 
the book’s distribution of light. (“Book” 82) 
 
Mallarmé’s work thus insists upon recognition of the meaning of form and the material 
embodiment of sense. It is a work in which typography, layout, binding and even the 
foldings of the pages develop significance and are experienced as meaningful. 
It is, of course, with the posthumously published Un Coup de Dés (1896) that 
Mallarmé came closest to creating a work that might be thought of in these terms. The 
poem experiments with the properties of the form; its sense manifests itself in the 
relationship between the page and the words. Valéry describes his reaction to first being 
shown the work as follows:  
 
It seemed to me that I was looking at the form and pattern of a thought, 
placed for the first time in finite space. Here space itself truly spoke, 
dreamed, and gave birth to temporal forms. Expectancy, doubt, 
concentration all were visible things. With my own eye I could see silences 
that had assumed bodily shapes. (309) 
 
As Valéry’s words make plain, Un Coup de Dés is a work that combines the concerns of 
poetry with those of the visual arts. It spatialises the temporal form of literature, creating 
“a sort of material intuition … [which] should make us anticipate what is about to be 
presented to the intelligence” (Valéry 312). Mallarmé does not collapse aesthetics and 
poetics into one as Greenberg does, then, but rather attempts to hold them in an 
illuminating tension in the form of the book. Un Coup de Dés illustrates the key lesson 
of Mallarmé’s thought: literariness and aesthetics are neither opposed nor separable, 
they are rather constituted in and through one another. In the process of becoming 
autonomous, the work of literature is always in the process of becoming aesthetic, yet it 
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is in this process that it becomes aesthetic and takes on significance that overflows the 
meanings of reference: it is a dynamic conflict between sense and matter which creates 
the force of the work. As Lyotard writes,  
 
[what] the Coup de dés says is that language does not abolish its other, that 
the work itself participates in the sensible, that the choice is not between 
choosing the written word or renouncing it … that language and its other 
are inseparable. (qtd. in Carroll Paraesthetics 35)192  
 
The real lesson of Mallarmé’s work, then, is that to counter the language of the 
bourgeoisie—to move beyond “café and studio platitudes”—it is sufficient neither to 
retreat into the materiality of the medium like abstract painting, nor to attempt to ignore 
the medium in a quest to find “art” or “poetry.” Rather what is required is an 
acknowledgement of the role that the material properties and conventions of language 
play in generating meaning: there is a literary moment in painting as there is an aesthetic 
moment in literature.193 
It is precisely this lesson that Duchamp’s work takes up, as he investigates 
language, how it is presented, how it operates, how it changes and—as I will try to show 
shortly—the possibilities its material forms open out. It is as a consequence of this 
lesson that he insists that poetic words are not “essential concept[s] which [do not] exist 
at all in reality” but rather “words distorted by their sense” (Cabanne Dialogues 90). In 
Duchamp’s work, as in Mallarmé’s, the poetic is brought into contact with the aesthetic, 
not in order that their differences be resolved but in order that they challenge one 
another and trouble one another: this difference is mobilised, as I tried to show in 
                                                 
192 This quotation is taken from Discours Figure (1971) and translated by Carroll. 
193 While Mallarmé’s work envisages the virtual ideal form of poetry and the harmonious integration of 
the aesthetic and the poetic in the material form of the Book, at the same time he recognises that poetry is, 
like the other arts, the result of and compensation for the failure of language and the fragmentation of 
experience: purity is impossible and even undesirable. As Eric Gans explains Mallarmé recognised in the 
Gesamtkunstwerk “the dangerous illusion that the imaginary reality [art] designates is contiguous with, 
and therefore accessible to, the world of the spectator” (17). Recognizing “pure” transparency as a 
potentially threatening chimera, therefore, Mallarmé sought to “opacify [poetic form] by dissolving its 
clearly perceptible contours into a maze of half-finished gestures and allusive associations. The forgetting 
of form becomes impossible because naive illusion is never allowed to arise in the first place” (Gans 17). 
In other words, according to Gans’ reading, just as The Bride Stripped Bare does, Mallarmé’s work 




Chapter One in the case of Fountain, in order to keep works unfinished, incomplete, 
dynamic. This, indeed, is how we can best grasp The Bride Stripped Bare, I think, as a 
coupling/non-coupling of the aesthetic and the literary. Just as the Green Box cannot 
explain the Glass, the Glass is not the visual translation of the “ideas” encoded in 
language in the notes. Rather the notes project the picture, as the picture projects the 
inventory (or “catalogue” or “description”) of its components in the Box: the work itself 
is produced through this fantastic collision. Its spatial forms moreover are bound up with 
its temporal forms: the notes apparently precede the Glass, being written as ideas took 
shape, but the Glass in turn precedes the appearance of the notes, which appear as an 
after-thought to the work. In this way, meaning, in the form of subject matter or 
intention, cannot be pinned down and fixed: the work remains definitively unfinished: 
the “illuminatistic Scribism” (Writings 78)194 of the Bride Stripped Bare by Her 
Bachelors, Even is a “delay”, which is “poetic, in the most Mallarméan sense” (Cabanne 
Dialogues 40).195 
 
2. The Mechanical Scribe: Automatism, Realism and a; a novel 
 
In contrast to the elaborate machinations of the Bride Stripped Bare, a; a novel appears 
as a more simply conceived work. It was created by recording and presenting the events, 
conversations and sounds of Warhol’s immediate environment. Warhol’s approach to 
literature, this suggests, begins from the idea that literature can be defined purely in 
terms of its material form or what it is.196 His assumption leads to a sequence of 
                                                 
194 We might note that, contra to what Bernstein calls for, Duchamp does not produce a new medium, but 
reconfigures an old one, an observation the importance of which will become clear in the next chapter. 
This aspect of Duchamp’s work (its return to pre-modernist ideas and concerns) is paid particular attention 
by Judovitz whe draws a series of fascinating connections between his work and that of Leonardo da Vinci 
and Giuseppe Archimboldo (see 75-87).  
195 The delay is also a pun, it is worth noting, as the pun is delay. As Cabanne notes “the expression 
“retard en verre” is a homophone of several others, notably “retard d’envers” [delayed reversal], “retard 
envers” [delay in relation to/delay towards].” (Duchamp & Co. 76) As a pun, unstable and shifting, it 
prevents a single fixed meaning from emerging and ties the untranslatable ambiguity of the phrase to the 
opaque matter of the word.  
196 Warhol thus begins from what literary theorist Gerard Genette, in his 1999 essay “From Text to Work”, 
terms the idea of literature as “constitutional” rather than “conditional” literature. The former, Genette 
suggests, is attended by the question of what literature is, the latter by the question of when literature is. I 
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“logical” equations: a novel is a book; a book is printed text on bound pages; a printed 
text on bound pages, therefore, is a novel. Warhol creates a novel by creating an artefact 
in the material form of a novel and baptising it a; a novel.197 Combining a nominalist 
gesture with the presentation of a work that superficially conforms to the material 
requirements of literature, the work appears to suggest that what differentiates literature 
and non-literature is simply formal presentation.  
It is no surprise, then, that what a represents in the context of Warhol’s broader 
catalogue is simply the transferral of tried and tested techniques from painting and film 
into a new medium. For all of Warhol’s work, across different media, was produced 
through processes that were as mechanized as possible. Throughout his career Warhol 
experimented with many forms of technology and technological reproduction from the 
rubber stamp through silkscreen printing and photography to the video camera.198 The 
refusal to edit was also a key strategy in his film-making: the artist simply turned on the 
camera and left it running,199 collating material collected into almost unbearably long 
and repetitive movies.200 a; a novel, then, is created through precisely the same 
techniques as Warhol’s paintings and films, presenting the unedited transcriptions 
spliced together like the reels of his films or the canvases of his serial works and, in so 
doing, attempting to capture in the physical form of the book the temporal form of the 
day. Just as with the electric chair paintings, then, with a; a novel Warhol pivots 
between mimicking and mocking formalist aesthetics. For, on one hand, it asserts that 
                                                                                                                                                
hope to show in this chapter that these questions, as Warhol’s work meditates upon them, are not as 
discrete as Genette’s essay suggests. 
197 Reading a as a gesture of sceptical nominalism of course dovetails neatly with the “anti-art” 
interpretation of Warhol’s other work, an interpretation which has been dominant from the outset and 
remains so today. On the predominance of this reading see Foster “Death in America” and Walker. 
198 For a discussion of the techniques Warhol used see Crone. His most radical “mechanization” was of 
course the technique of producing paintings by silkscreen printing, little more than a kind of stenciling 
process, which Warhol adopted in the 1960s. The majority of his paintings were subsequently produced in 
this way. He even claimed on a number of occasions that his paintings were actually produced by his 
assistants. Although he later retracted this saying “I really do all the paintings. We were just being funny.” 
See Buchloh, “One” 45. 
199 Jane Holzer recalls “Andy would just turn on the camera and walk away. And he’d tell you ‘Don’t 
blink.’ That was his only direction” (Unseen Warhol 47). For more on Warhol’s films see O’Pray. 
200 Probably the most famous example of such technique is Empire (1964), an eight-hour unmoving single 
shot of the Empire State Building. The 1963 films Kiss and Sleep, however, also experiment with repeated 
footage and serial structure. See O’Pray and S. Koch for more on Warhol’s films. 
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the arts are a set of purely formal devices but, on the other, it implies that all media are 
alike, that the same strategies and techniques can be used to create art in any form thus 
directly contradicting the principles of formalist aesthetics associated with Greenberg.  
 Warhol’s novel, like The Bride Stripped Bare, is on one level a fantasy of perfect 
immediacy. The aim of absenting himself from the process of production, the artist often 
claimed, was in fact to capture reality without mediation. “I never liked the idea of 
picking out certain scenes and pieces of time and putting them together,” he claimed 
“because then it ends up being different from what really happened – it’s just not like 
life” (POPism 110). Just as Warhol aimed to capture “life” on film, so too he aimed to 
capture “life” on tape: a was conceived and marketed as presenting a day in the life of 
the Factory. It is in this manner that the most vocal champion of Warhol’s writing, his 
biographer Victor Bockris, understands the work. His reading of a, presented in the short 
essay “Andy Warhol the Writer,” builds on the relation between Warhol’s book and his 
visual art by drawing an analogy between the tape-recorder and the camera and 
suggesting that the novel can be best understood as a snapshot or “voice portrait” of 
Ondine and the Factory. He explains that “the most accurate and revealing image of the 
subject via the topics he or she chooses to discuss, as well as the grammar, syntax and 
vocabulary used” can be obtained by faithfully transcribing recordings as they sound: “if 
a tape is transcribed very accurately, with each “uhm”, “err” and “but” included, what is 
redacted is a voice portrait.” (17) Conceived of as presenting a direct image of the 
subject, the voice portrait is grasped by Bockris as a means to presenting first-hand, 
bypassing the need for second-hand description: in this sense, like the visual portrait 
which traditionally is held to capture not just a photographic likeness of its subject but 
something of their character or presence, the technique seems to offer an enhanced 
immediacy. The more automatic the inscription process, Bockris further suggests, the 
more immediate the presence within the text.201 The material of the work itself, in other 
                                                 
201 Bockris’ reading, like all readings of a; a novel that I have come across in fact, completely ignores the 
role of the typists, a pool composed of local high school girls and one or two female members of the 
artist’s set. Indeed, in Bockris’ reading of the novel as voice portrait, the typists are reduced to mere 
recording technologies. This gendered omission, in which the male Warhol and Ondine are hailed as the 
producers of the work while the female typists are forgotten, is entirely keeping with the masculine logic 
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words, is not what is important here; it is the reflection of the Factory that it seems to 
provide on which Bockris focuses. Indeed, in this account the work is judged not as 
literature or art but rather according to its documentary value. For Bockris, the book 
represents a kind of ultimate readymade, transparently mirroring events by capturing 
speech in writing. It is a kind of snapshot of the Factory scene, a rendezvous between 
artist/scene and reader with as little mediation as possible. 
The problem with Bockris’s reading is immediately apparent to anyone who has 
even glanced at the book. Due to its lack of editing, the text preserves traces of its 
production processes and the various stages of remediation it went through. (See Fig. 
3.5) Veering across the pages, and following neither convention nor logic, this is a text 
in which words and sounds break down into letters and marks as the typists try to 
capture the sound of the tapes: the repetitions, stutters and ruptures of the first sentences 
establish the tone which remains until the book’s close some 400 pages later. Faced with 
such text, readers do not find themselves transported to the world of the Factory but 
instead confronted with an opaque and material page that seems to offer up little in the 
way of sense. What a; a novel does not do, then, is present an image of the speakers, nor 
does it evoke a sense of having been at the Factory: in fact, as one reviewer complained, 
“most of the time, you can’t tell who is talking to whom about what; … and at least a 
third of the sentences simply make no sense whatsoever” (Carroll “Warhol?” 45).  
In his brief discussion of the work Wayne Koestenbaum makes precisely this 
point. He reiterates the idea of a; a novel as portrait—this time an indirect self-portrait 
by Warhol—and, like Bockris, he too suggests spoken language is more authentic than 
written language. In contrast however, he understands the transcription process not as 
preserving the sense of the event or the image of the speaker but as destroying this 
immediacy. a, he argues, “[highlights] how the act of conversion, from one galaxy to 
another, disembodies and alienates the material—embalms it, expunging the soul,” 
continuing a few lines later to suggest that “the novel communicates the tragic gap … 
between a living act and its transcription on the dead page” (117). For Koestenbaum, in  
                                                                                                                                                
of the Factory. For more on Warhol’s work in relation to gender and sexuality see Caroline Jones, 





Fig. 3.5 Andy Warhol a; a novel (1968) 
New York: Grove Press, 1968.  
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fact, the book mimics Warhol’s paintings, which he reads as a critique of mass media 
and celebrity culture. Like the images of the Coca Cola bottles and the car crashes, the 
novel evokes the deadening effects of a modern existence increasingly dominated by 
capitalism and techno-scientific rationality. a; a novel is not a successful “voice portrait” 
but an example of the deadening effect of reification.  
On one level, Bockris and Koestenbaum represent two opposed responses to 
Warhol’s book. For Bockris the novel is a success, important evidence of the Factory 
scene; for Kostenbaum it is a failure which demonstrates the power and the threat of 
technological reproduction and mediation. On another level, their responses operate 
from the same assumption, as both critics approach the work as a form of documentary, 
aiming to capture unmediated reality and thus, in a manner that recalls the treatment of 
Duchamp’s notes, understand it in terms of recording rather than art-making. Neither 
commentator makes anything of the fact that Warhol titled the work a; a novel, thereby 
placing it in relation not to documentary but to literature. 
 It was in terms of Surrealist automatism in fact that the novel was conceived of 
among the Factory crowd: at the time of its production, a was held to be a case of 
“automatic talking.”202 Automatic writing is practiced by setting pen to paper while 
keeping the conscious mind “switched off”. For the Surrealists, its aim was to free the 
writer from the habitual conventions of language and logic.203 Such conventions were 
considered by Surrealists such as André Breton to be “rusting barriers to life” which 
suppressed “the reality of the human condition” (Breton “Automatic” 12), a reality 
which automatism could reveal. The practice, Breton claimed, provided a means of 
allowing what was repressed by those structures to emerge. It was “a true photography 
of thought” (qtd. in Clinton 12), the practitioners themselves becoming, like Warhol’s 
tape-recorder, “modest recording instruments” (qtd. in Clinton 13). The automatic text, 
then, was held to be an articulation of the subconscious which, once externalized, could 
                                                 
202 This is how Warhol’s assistant Billy Name continues to understand the work. See Bockris, “a” 453. 
203 For more on the history of automatic writing see Clinton. This technique was also frequently used by 
psychologists in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century (see Barkworth, and Downey and 
Anderson), among whose number was the young Gertrude Stein who would later use automatism in her 
own writing (see Hoffman; Stafford). 
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be read and analyzed by the conscious subject. In this manner, the attempt to detach the 
conscious mind from the writing body was aimed not to dissociate the personality of the 
producer from the work, but rather, as Breton claimed, “to unify that personality” 
(“Automatic” 25). In other words, by allowing the subconscious to express itself 
unedited through the body and present itself to the conscious mind, a unity of the subject 
was established.  
In fact, the idea of automatism as a means to liberate oneself from convention 
had already made a significant impact in the artistic circles of New York in terms of the 
visual arts: it was one of the key painterly techniques of Abstract Expressionism which 
was perhaps the most dominant force in the contemporary American art scene of the 
time and the backdrop against which Warhol’s art is often read.204 Heavily influenced by 
Jungian psychology, Jackson Pollock, the group’s leading light, had begun in the late 
1940s to lay canvases horizontally on the ground, sloshing and dripping paint over them 
with “automatic movements.”205 Approaching the canvas as a field to move within rather 
than an object to be created, Pollock felt he could detach mind from body to the extent 
that he could claim “when I am in the painting, I’m not aware of what I’m doing. It’s 
only after a sort of ‘get acquainted’ period that I see what I have been about” (Spring 54-
57). Action painting was a cathartic process, a release from consciousness and intention. 
Crucially, for Pollock as for the Surrealists, this detachment aimed not to dissociate the 
personality of the producer from the work, but rather, to allow access to the 
subconscious, essential “deep self” which resided within. The practice, by reducing the 
body to the level of machine, attempted to provide a connection to what is most essential 
in the human: “my concern” as Pollock put it, “is with the rhythm of nature” (Spring 
57).206  
                                                 
204 See in particular Buchloh “One” and Krauss “Carnal Knowledge” which discusses Warhol’s work of 
the 1970’s as a specific response to Pollock. Krauss writes that Pollock’s work and its “supposed 
invention of a kind of drawing that, in enclosing nothing but ‘eyesight itself,’ leaves the viewers body 
behind as a kind of discarded skin” (112) is countered with the use of the body in Warhol’s Oxidation 
series, in which the canvases were urinated upon. 
205 For a detailed look at Pollock’s automatism and its relationship to Surrealism see Rubin. 
206 Pollock’s own hand written notes, dating from about 1950 clearly demonstrate that Pollock’s concern is 
with humanism rather than technology, see Karmel 24. 
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 Surrealist automatism, then, positions the conventions of literary genres and 
writing more broadly as impositions that frustrate real significance: automatism is a 
strategic denial of subjective or authorial autonomy in an attempt to achieve a freedom 
from these constraints, a greater autonomy. In this sense, the Surrealists approach the 
practices and conventions of writing or painting as something external, imposed on the 
“reality” of the subject: without these conventions a more profound meaning might be 
discovered. However, as is well known, while in theory Surrealist automatism evades 
the conventions of language in practice it was a different story: as Breton himself 
admitted, not controlling the text during the writing practice was extremely difficult.207 
“Switching off” the mind, the “unconscious” automatic writer did not slip out of writerly 
convention but rather slipped into the habits and conventions of writing: such 
conventions, the practice demonstrated, were internalized to the degree that evading 
them was all but impossible. In other words, what the results of the Surrealist 
experiments showed was that the conventions of writing and grammar were not 
externally imposed upon the subject, but that the subject generated itself through those 
conventions: the “rusting barriers” are necessary and intrinsically bound up with 
subjectivity. This is to say that in the practice of automatic writing, what speaks is not 
the pre-linguistic subconscious of the individual author, but rather language itself.  
It is this practical lesson that Warhol draws upon. a; a novel is clearly not a work 
which seeks to unify the personality: there is no pretence here that the aim is to present 
Ondine’s subconscious thoughts for reflection. Indeed, what the work seems to question 
is the extent to which the individuals involved are independent speaking subjects, or 
whether they appear as such because they allow themselves to be used by language. This 
idea of subjectivity and meaning as created by mediation in fact motivated Warhol’s 
attitude to subjectivity more broadly.208 Certainly he applied it to the people that 
surrounded him: 
                                                 
207 Indeed, in “The Automatic Message” his essay on the technique, Breton describes how as the Surrealist 
writers began to get competitive as regards whose automatic writing was better and began to produce 
increasingly more nuanced and poetic “automatic” texts, the idea that the mode was driven by the 
subconscious or the body alone seemed increasingly implausible. 
208 For many years, the artist referred to his ever present tape-recorder as his “wife”: “So in the later 50s I 




“Good performers,” I think, are all-inclusive recorders, because they can 
mimic emotions as well as speech and looks and atmosphere …Good 
performers can somehow record complete experiences and people and 
situations and then pull out these recordings when they need them. 
(Philosophy 82) 
 
The Warholian subject presented here is not simply the master of language or its slave, 
but rather a figure which allows itself to be used like a recording machine, allows 
language to speak through it in order to harness it for its needs. As Lynne Tillman writes 
in her reflections on a, 
  
Ondine, the protagonist, sometimes fought against the chains of the tape 
recorder, a new master, asking Warhol many times to stop it. But Ondine 
continued to let himself be recorded, as did all the others who questioned 
Drella’s demands in making this novel-book. … They used and were used, 
perhaps, in every possible sense. (39-40)  
 
Unlike Surrealist automatism, then, a is not an attempt to bypass the conventions of 
writing and mediation: more radically, Warhol’s work questions whether there is 
anything “behind” these conventions. It figures mediation as a means to generate 
subjectivity. Thus, while on one level, a; a novel appears as another example of 
Warhol’s borrowing established techniques for the purposes of subverting them—just as 
he did with the grid and the monochrome—his concern with automatism and his 
persistent blurring of the lines between the human and the machine is more than a mere 
mockery of artists like Pollock. In fact, his work operates to challenge the key 
assumption of Surrealist automatism, the priority of the subject to expression.  
Certainly what the novel reveals is that unified presence, whether in the form of 
the unification of the subject that the Surrealism sought, or in the form of the pure 
unmediated “notion” of Mallarmé’s poetics, or in the form of the perfect communicative 
coupling of Bride and Bachelors, is an impossibility. Like the bachelor section of the 
Glass, what the novel illustrates above all is, as Craig Dworkin writes, “the degree to 
                                                                                                                                                
with as many as four at a time. But I didn’t get married until 1964 when I got my first tape recorder. My 
wife. My tape recorder and I have been married for ten years now” (Philosophy 26). 
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which medial networks frustrate the very communication they permit, and to which 
noise is the very precondition of any message” (“Whereof” 49). Take for example the 
following section of text: 
 
T-Yeah, yeah, it’s true. 
  The schlitzmongers really get the 
  right to bet. It’s true. 
Now the next one after that.    M- I think the penny piggers do pretty well. 
T- Well yeah, they do but y’know 
like they’ve mixed, they’re mixed 
they’re mixed to the point of 
 . . . They’re not quite as these 
People are the ones that get the  
most …     M- Schlitzmonger 
  Schlitz is is spit and shit. 
O- Penny pigger, schlitzmonger …. 
T – And what can you get, and also, 
  Ondine do you realize what it is? 
O- Even better, penny pigge r 
T – Spit, shit, and split.   M- Penny pigger    
(a 128) 
 
The first point to note here is the repetition of the nonsense words and sounds: the “s” 
and the “it” sounds provokes one sequence of repetitions schiltz, spit, shit, split; the “i” 
echoes through the words penny and pigger, themselves alliterative; the explosive force 
of the hard consonants “t” and “p.” Such language content is not governed by semantic 
codes, but rather by the process of vocalizing sounds, moving the mouth, its emergence 
owing more to the enjoyment of making such noises than an attempt at communication. 
The automatic bodily movements of speech then are highlighted. That these words, if 
they can be considered referential at all, have a vaguely sexualised character and call to 
mind bodily process or perhaps obscene insults, is not insignificant: such semantics 
highlight suppression of the “noise” of the bodily and the libidinal in conventional 
“rational” language. The pulsions of the speaking body are articulated in the sequences 
of words, their rhythms and repetitions, which get in the way of logic and effective 
communication. This language, although freed from reference, is constrained by the 
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bodily drives and impulses of the speaking body. The tension between these and the 
requirements of conventional language and writing—a tension which recalls the 
distinction between the cacographic and the calligraphic that, as I suggested in Chapter 
One, Duchamp’s puns articulate—is in fact, as I shall argue shortly, the driving force of 
a; a novel.  
A second important feature of this extract is the page layout. The dialogue 
spoken by M (Moxanne)209 appears in smaller type on the right hand side of the page, in 
contrast to the larger type of the majority conversation on the left side. This layout 
forces the reader to consider the materiality of the text and how that imposes on our 
interpretation. Firstly, what does this layout signify with respect to the speaker: should it 
indicate volume or distance for example? It would then be a choice made by the typist. 
On further reflection, however, we recall the fact that typewriters only have one size of 
print. The difference between these two parts of the conversation could not, therefore, be 
the work of the typist. This indicates that a reasonable amount of editing was in fact 
done: is this a composite of two pages, pasted together? Or has the type been resized in 
the type-setting process? If so, why?210 Does it indicate not volume or distance perhaps 
but status? The novel, despite the apparent claim to record the day transparently, is 
revealed as a heavily mediated object: the sudden and inexplicable appearance of an 
image of Mercury (Fig. 3.6), the messenger of the gods and thus a symbol of 
communication and mediation, confirms this, for how does an image appear in a tape-
recorded and type-written book?211 
                                                 
209 Moxanne is the nickname of Genevieve Charbon, a French actress who had befriended Edie 
Sedgewick, also known as “Lady in Waiting” (Bockris, “a” 455). For more on the individual figures that 
appear in the novel, see Bockris, “a; a glossary”. 
210 There is in fact plenty of evidence that the text of a is not quite as untouched as Warhol would have us 
believe: indeed there are clues that the recordings were, to some degree, directed. One example here is the 
final tape of Ondine’s ‘Soliloquy’ (which is of course a nod to another one-day novel, namely Joyce’s 
Ulysses) in which Ondine remarks that this is “supposedly” a “long m-o-n-o-logue about whatever it is 
that I talk about” and claims, in clichéd director-speak, to be “makin g love t o th e tape record er” (445). 
There are also reports that Warhol altered comments that he disliked and changed the cast’s real names to 
their nicknames. See Dworkin and Bockris “a; a glossary”. 
211 As Dworkin argues, the book abounds with the theme of media too: from the telephone call which 
opens the book to the ongoing discussion about video-recording. Dworkin also suggests numerous 
thematic links between the picture and the text: it “prefigures those signs (both advertising and zodiacal) 
that will fascinate Ondine’s companions several hours later, and will be recalled by one of the legendary 





Fig. 3.6 Andy Warhol a; a novel (1968)  
New York: Grove Press, 1968.  
 
a; a novel ruptures the codes of reading, insisting on the material presence of the 
text. It shows that the physicality of the medium (be that the body of the performer or 
the body of the text) asserts itself in the process of making meaning and reminds us that, 
in the words of N. Katherine Hayles, “even when the interface is rendered as transparent 
as possible, this very immediacy is itself an act of meaning-making that positions the 
reader [and text] in a specific material relationship” (Writing Machines 107). The 
implication of this, as Lynne Tillman puts it, is that the work makes visible “realism as a 
                                                                                                                                                
potentially lethal.” (49) Mercury was also the god of speed” (49) and given the amount of amphetamine 
that fuels the action of this novel, entirely appropriate as its figurehead.  
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form of writing, a type of fiction, a genre, not an unmediated, exact replica of life, not a 
mirror image” (40). a raises questions about the relationship between fiction (or “art”) 
and reality, suggesting the division between them might not be quite as clear cut as it 
might sometimes appear. The work can thus be grasped as an exploration of autonomy, 
the autonomy of both the subject and language, playing with a tension between “I 
speak”, the freedom of the author to create meaning and the idea that meaning is prior to 
expression, and “it speaks” the idea that language itself rather than the subject shapes 
expression and thought. a can in fact be understood, therefore, as a consideration not just 
of what constitutes literature, what literature is, but under what conditions language 
becomes literary, when it is. It raises, then, the same temporal problem as Duchamp’s 
Bride Stripped Bare.  
 
3. Calligraful Writing: Nonsense and the Generative Potential of Word Play 
 
Both Duchamp’s Mallarméan exploration of the book and Warhol’s automatist 
experiment can be read as expressing the exhaustion of conventional writing, the 
frustrations of reified language which makes true communication impossible. Yet both 
works also acknowledge that it is not possible to cast off the material conventions of 
mediation: that all art, literature included, takes form through the process of its 
objectification. In other words, each work can be seen to recognize that the conventions 
of media are necessary but contingent. The lesson that they both articulate is that, in the 
face of this realisation, the task is not to refuse or destroy convention but to transform it.  
 In Duchamp’s case, an important source for his experiments in this regard was 
Raymond Roussel. It was Roussel’s Impressions of Africa (1910) that the artist 
repeatedly claimed as the inspiration for The Bride Stripped Bare by Her Bachelors, 
Even.212 The fantastic story, originally a novel, was turned into a play which Duchamp 
                                                 
212 See the artist’s letter to Robert Lebel, where, recalling his excitement and that of his friends Apollinaire 
and Picabia, he calls Impressions of Africa “a revelation” (Correspondence 283). The editors of the 
collected letters date the performance to June 1912. In her discussion of the staging of the play Abba 
Cherniack-Tzuriel suggests it would have been May that Duchamp attended. For a different account of the 
Rousselian influence, see Seigel. By means of Roussel, Seigel suggests, Duchamp entered a “private and 
symbolic world,” which was to be “the last stage and most developed stage of the separation and 
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saw performed in 1912.213 It describes the activities of The Incomparables Club, a 
strange association formed by a group of Europeans shipwrecked in Africa. On the 
occasion of the coronation of the local Emperor, the club members undertake to 
distinguish themselves through sensational and entirely original performances such as 
training an earthworm to play a zither, being electrocuted by lightening and building a 
statue light enough to be balanced upon inflated calf lungs. While this might suggest a 
drama of “bizarre attractions,” the 1912 audience was in fact presented with “two long 
acts of nearly unintelligible and detailed exposition” (Cherniack-Tzuriel 123). The 
reaction was less than positive: it was, in Roussel’s words, “a veritable hue and cry. 
They described me as a madman, barracked the actors, pelted the stage with coins, and 
sent protesting letters to the manager” (qtd. in Cherniack-Tzuriel 123). Duchamp, 
however, experienced the piece as a revelation: the artist was delighted by the spectacle 
on stage and revelled in its “madness of the unexpected” (Cabanne Dialogues 33). 
Afterwards he sought out Roussel’s novel and, he told Cabanne, began to associate the 
text with the visual experience (Cabanne Dialogues 34). 
Impressions of Africa, like all of Roussel’s writing, was generated through 
language games and word play. His unprecedented “method,” outlined in the 
posthumously published How I Wrote Certain of My Books (1935), consisted of 
generating random sentences and phrases by homonymic word play and then using these 
linguistic constructions as the foundations upon which to build his narrative. Roussel 
would create phrases that were identical except for a single letter or word and embed 
them in the text itself. One favoured technique, for example, was to place one such 
sentence at the beginning of the text and one at the end, the challenge thus being how to 
get from one to other via the narrative. Another was to play with the phonetics of 
popular expressions and song refrains in order to create new phrases with different 
associations: words and phrases were broken apart and reformed in surprising 
                                                                                                                                                
detachment that had long been a theme in his work and a condition fostered through it.” (74-75) His work 
is thus situated neatly in the entirely conservative category of individual genius, the artist apparently 
wrapped “in the freedom of his isolation, where the self that is purified of the residues of ordinary life 
achieves a radical wholeness.” (233).  




combinations to produce puns and double entendres and so on. In other words, as in 
Mallarmé’s Book, although in a completely different fashion, in Roussel’s texts the 
materiality of the signifier as much as its sense was at play: the graphic and phonic 
aspects of the word were manipulated in order to generate new contexts for their later 
reappearance in a process of textual recycling. As Bruce Morissette writes, Roussel 
insisted on “the purely linguistic status of his fictional inventions”: despite the exotic 
titles, nothing in Roussel’s works “came from outside reality; everything came from 
inside the text, from the words, their relationships, their interplay” (256). Indeed, for 
Roussel the seamless incorporation into his text of the words, phrases and sentences 
generated through this method was the only criterion for success, his only real aim in 
writing.  
Roussel’s word play explores the generative capacity of the material of literature; 
words, phrases, sentences. It is an attempt to allow language to generate itself, its own 
material and rules, with only minimal interference from the author. In this sense, it 
operates in a manner apparently free from the limitations of convention, independent of 
the formal conventions of drama and fiction. Yet, paradoxically, it achieves this freedom 
only through the creation of alternative and often mysterious constraints of Roussel’s 
own devising. For each of his works stems from a system unique to the text, planted or 
hidden within it. In other words, using his method, Roussel created texts that were to 
function as self-contained spaces operating according to their own set of codes.214 We 
are obliged to read such works, as the poet John Ashbery writes, “with the understanding 
that we are not being told at all; that behind their polished surface an encrypted secret 
probably exists” (16). This, in fact, is precisely what is thematized in Impressions of 
Africa: the strange feats, objects and performances are each governed by their own 
peculiar intrinsic logic and what makes them “incomparable” is that the extrinsic, 
                                                 
214 Michel Holoquist in fact reads this as the defining characteristic of literary nonsense, which, he writes 
“is ‘a collection of words of events which in their arrangement do not fit into some recognized system’ but 
which constitute a new system of their own” (104). This is a rather reductive caricature, however, which 
ignores the diversity of the genre as well as completely dislocating the texts from their historical contexts. 
For another viewpoint on nonsense in relation to modernist literature, see Wendy Steiner 91-145. 
Interestingly, Steiner also points out that the disjunction between image and language is frequently 
capitalised upon by nonsense, which is very often illustrated.  
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overarching logic in which they are held is not apparent, the means of comparison are 
denied the reader. In this manner, Roussel’s texts operate in the same manner as the 
Duchampian pun discussed in Chapter One, Lits et Ratures, simultaneously impelling 
the search for an overarching logic or structure in which the composition makes some 
kind of sense, but at the same time denying the reader precisely that.215 Another example 
of this type of hidden system can be found in one of the Green Box notes, which reads 
“buy a dictionary and cross out the words to be crossed out. Sign: revised and corrected” 
(Writings 77).216 But what are “the words to be crossed out”? Corrected according to 
what system? Such word play, as a result, seems at once a promise of the generative 
potential of language to create new meanings and, at the same time, evokes the threat of 
meaninglessness.  
In his 1994 book Philosophy of Nonsense, literary theorist Jean-Jacques Lecercle 
examines how Victorian nonsense literature intuitively prefigured some of the most 
important debates in twentieth-century philosophy and claims that this particular double-
bind is in fact characteristic of the genre. In a discussion of Lewis Carroll’s Alice’s 
Adventures in Wonderland, he suggests that what is at the very core of such nonsense 
works is  
 
a theory of the relationship between meaning and saying, the general 
moral of which … is that meaning logically and chronologically, precedes, 
or ought to precede, saying. And at the same time [such works] deeply 
subvert this conception, impelling readers to work out another for 
themselves. (124) 
 
                                                 
215 It is unclear whether the artist had heard of Roussel’s system before 1935 but, judging by texts such as 
Written Wrotten and the puns of the 1920s, Duchamp, as David Joselit says, “certainly seemed either to 
know of or intuit it” (“Monte Carlo” 18). 
216 In this context, the 1916 readymade With Hidden Noise appears apposite: the work contains a ball of 
yarn in which Duchamp had Walter Arensberg implant an object (the identity of which is unknown to the 
artist and to art history). The piece is also inscribed with bilingual acrostics that make little sense in either 
language, despite inviting the viewer to “uncode” them. The work’s French title is A Bruit Secret: is the 
perceptible but meaningless noise a “brute” or sensory “secret” to the artist who wanted to put art back at 
the service of the intellect? The two texts cannot be viewed at the same time and the secret sense of the 
work—apparently held somewhere between the inscriptions—is, like the identity of the sound-making 
object, impossible to discover. For detailed readings of With Hidden Noise see Perloff, “Conceptual 




In other words, as Lecercle positions it, Carroll’s nonsense prefigures precisely the way 
that Roussel and Duchamp’s texts operate. It asks us to believe that there is necessarily 
an intentional meaning implanted in language, that we are the masters of language as 
Humpty Dumpty would put it, but at the same moment it opens out towards the 
possibility that language generates its own meaning, that language might be the master 
of us. In this way, Carroll’s texts can be seen to engage with the same problem as 
Warhol’s automatist experiment, which, as the extract examined above demonstrates and 
as many of its critics have complained, itself veers towards nonsense. Such work is 
governed by the same paradox or textual double-bind:  
 
It is both free and constrained. It tells the reader to abide, and not to abide, 
by the rules of language. …[this is the paradox of] I speak language, in 
other words I am the master of the instrument which allows me to 
communicate with others, and yet it is language that speaks: I am 
constrained by the language I inhabit to such an extent that I am inhabited, 
or possessed by it. (Lecercle 25) 
 
This dichotomy of freedom and constraint, the tension between “I speak” and “it 
speaks”, drives Warhol’s novel as well as Duchamp’s punning word play, and even the 
thematics of the Glass. The bachelors, as the castings made by the illuminating gas, are 
perfect examples of figures inhabited and generated by language. The illuminating gas 
moves through them and in their space it is controlled, reigned in and rationalised. In the 
bachelor realm, language speaks but is brought under control by social subjects in a 
manner that deadens it. In the upper section of the Glass, the Bride herself is the source 
of language, as her commands are scripted into a unique alphabet capable of precisely 
expressing the Blossoming. Yet if the Bride is the mistress of her language, this is not to 
say that she can communicate her desire, for her unique “pure” language, we might 
recall, is probably “only suitable for the description of this picture” (Writings 32). The 
“it speaks” of the bride’s desire, finding its perfect expression in the writing of the draft 
pistons, is ultimately as useless as the rationalised babble of the bachelors. What writing 
(by which I include the writing of art, as the inscription of a language of things) depends 
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upon, the Glass suggests, is the shaping of convention, the dialectical movement 
between freedom and constraint.  
It is through this movement, in fact, that Duchamp attempts to transform the 
conventions of writing, to find an alternative inscription, as one of the Green Box notes 
demonstrates:  
 
Take a Larousse dict. and copy all the so called “abstract” words i.e. those 
which have no concrete reference. Compose a schematic sign designating 
each of these words. (this sign can be composed with the standard stops) 
These signs must be thought of as the letters of the new alphabet.  
(Writings 31) 
 
Here, Duchamp envisages changing the material form of words which have no material 
referent, abstract words independent of objects, in order to generate different letters by 
which to create a new alphabet, to generate a whole new language. This will be 
governed by “a sort of grammar, no longer requiring a pedagogical sentence 
construction” which renders the language “inexpressible by the concrete alphabetic 
forms of languages living now and to come” (Writings 32). He envisages, in other 
words, a writing that arises out of established languages but expresses an alternative 
sense, capable of expressing something other than any sense imaginable in the structures 
of experience as they currently exist.  
That these ideas began to develop at the time Duchamp was learning English and 
supporting himself in New York by teaching French is perhaps not coincidental.217 The 
difficulties of translating between one language and another, the different expressions 
that each language enables and the various restrictions that they place upon expression 
were very much on his mind, as the following note shows.  
 
Dictionary 
-of a language in which each word would be translated into French (or 
other) by several words, when necessary by a whole sentence. 
                                                 
217 In a recent reading of Duchamp’s textual works, T. J. Demos has read the instability of meaning in 
Duchamp’s work in relation to his status as émigré and his repudiation of nationalist ideas during the 
world wars (“The Language of Expatriation”). The use of foreign words obviously adds to this argument 
which Demos has developed at length in his recent monograph The Exiles of Marcel Duchamp (2007).  
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-of a language which one could translate in its elements into known 
languages but which would not reciprocally express the translation of 
French words (or other), or of French or other sentences. 
-Make this dictionary by means of cards. 
-find how to classify these cards (alphabetical order, but which alphabet)  
(Writings 77) 
 
The dictionary, of course, on one level seems to represent language as a complete and 
containable system: it is a guidebook and inventory for the speaker, suggesting that 
language is a tool that can be mastered. However, what the bilingual dictionary reveals, 
as Duchamp realised and as this note tells us, is the fissures between such systems: the 
incomparability of words across language, the arbitrariness of the sign. The bilingual 
dictionary seeks to impose the same order on different systems and, in so doing, it 
reveals the extent to which expression is limited by language: things that can be 
expressed in one language remain inconceivable in another. A new form of inscription, a 
new language, then opens out new possibilities of expression.  
 It is at this juncture that we might return, with the notion of translation in mind, 
to a; a novel.  For perhaps the central lesson of Warhol’s work is that meaning is a 
constant process of negotiation. Strikingly this process is enacted on the pages of a, as 
the speakers misunderstand, correct and challenge one another. 
 
O – What’s this? 
R – It’s the first line, right here.  
It’s called Not So Funny, the poem. 
O – Oh Not—, your writing is strange. 
R – I knew I had 
O – You’re writing is calligraful.  
Calligraful? Is that a word? Yeah. 
R – Calligraphic. 
O – Calligraphic, but no no, calligraful  
is, must be a 
R – Something like colorful. 
O – No c- (pause). A poem by  




In this discussion, two words, calligraphy and colourful, are confused by the speaker 
who questions his own language usage.  His interlocutor, Rotten Rita,218 supplies a 
correction which is rebutted in favour of the multiple implications of the mistake: for 
“calligraphful”, because it recalls colourful, is apparently preferable in this context. The 
repeated sounds here set the conversation in motion, and prompt Ondine to attribute the 
poem to Cristine Rosetti (rather than Christina Rossetti), although Rotten is the author. 
The conversation leads on the next page, as so many in the novel do, to Maria Callas, 
whose records Ondine plays throughout the recordings.219 Indeed, Callas’ name 
performs a similar operation on page 265 of the novel (Fig. 3.5, p. 25): 
 
 O – I’m not going to part with it. 
(Mumble mumble.) Oh Ooh, 
 my callas, oh ho. 
R – Your calls. He’s worried about  
his callas; it can’t even sing. 
O – My callas is hurting me.      (265) 
 
In both instances, the conversation is pushed along through chains of associations, the 
materiality of the words driving the subjects rather than, as logic would dictate, the other 
way around.220 As Dworkin explains, “[regardless] of their registers or denotations, 
words evoke other words. And in a in particular, the proximity of individual words 
along the metonymic axis is in fact one of the strongest structuring elements of the 
otherwise unstructured text.”  (51)221 In other words, without the imposition of grammar, 
language is shown, in Warhol’s novel, to find a means of structuring itself.  
                                                 
218 “Rotten Rita” was the nickname for another member of the Factory crowd Kenneth Rapp, also known 
as the Mayor (Bockris, “a” 455) 
219 Dworkin examines the implications of the Callas’ music in the context of the novel and the Factory 
seen more broadly throughout his essay. 
220 Indeed, the title of the work might well be read in this way as not only a nominalist gesture but also the 
result of a stutter or hesitation, a; a novel.  
221 This tension between “I speak” and “it speaks” was something that evidently impacted on Warhol more 
broadly, and of which he was very much aware. In his book of philosophy, he claimed that  
 
“sometimes in the middle of a sentence I feel like a foreigner trying to talk it because I 
have word spasms where the parts of some words begin to sound peculiar to me and in the 
middle of saying the word I’ll think, ‘Oh, this can’t be right—this sounds very peculiar, 
[…] and so in the middle of words that are over one syllable, I sometimes get confused 
and try to graft other words on top of them. Sometimes this makes good journalism and 
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 The materiality of language thus generates what Derek Attridge, in a discussion 
of literary nonsense, has termed “contextual circles” (202). Attridge describes these 
circles as generated by one of the key discoveries of literary nonsense, the portmanteau. 
In the introduction to The Hunting of the Snark, Lewis Carroll describes how the 
portmanteau operates: 
 
take the two words “fuming” and “furious.” Make up your mind that you 
will say both words, but leave it unsettled which you will say first. Now 
open your mouth and speak. If your thoughts incline ever so little towards 
“fuming” you will say “fuming-furious”; if they turn, by even a hair’s 
breadth, towards “furious,” you will say “furious-fuming”; but if you have 
that rarest of gifts, a perfectly balanced mind, you will say “frumious.” (7) 
 
The portmanteau word is a collision between “I speak” and “it speaks.” As in 
Duchamp’s “canned chance”, the components of the operation are selected by the 
speaker but the product is created through passively allowing these components to be 
altered by their impact on one another. The portmanteau thus operates as a “contextual 
circle” in which the plurality of meanings that the different parts of the word mobilise 
rebound off one another: “plurality of meaning in one item increases the available 
meanings of other items, which in turn increases the possibilities of meaning in the 
original item” (Attridge 202). Meanings ricochet off one another, echoing through each 
other and layering more and more meaning on top of one another. “The longer and 
denser the text, the more often the circle will revolve, and the greater will be the 
proliferation of meanings” (202).222 This is precisely the operation of a; a novel as 
                                                                                                                                                
when they quote me it looks good in print, and other times it’s very embarrassing. 
(Philosophy 147-148)221 
 
What is described here is of course precisely the anxiety over mastery that literary nonsense plays upon. 
Warhol’s writing, which survives in only a few examples of correspondence, shows similar “patching.” 
Indeed, he was almost certainly dyslexic, a fact which sheds light on both why his books were always 
created with the help of writers and why he was not interested in editing a. Indeed, in this sense of all his 
works a as Dworkin writes “most directly reveals Warhol’s own personal signature.” (57)  
222 In Peculiar Language, Derek Attridge contrasts the portmanteau with the pun. He argues that while the 
pun evokes the potential of language to generate meaning, the capacity of language to speak independently 
of the intention of the author, it does so only in order to undercut this potential; for what the pun really 
articulates is the author’s mastery of language, their ability to bend it to their will, to make it mean more 
than one thing but to remain in control of meaning. In contrast, Attridge suggests, the “portmanteau has 
the effect of a failed pun—the patterns of language have been shown to be partially appropriate but with a 
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meanings and “misunderstandings” multiply over the course of the pages and sections in 
a process the generative potential of which Warhol recognised as moving beyond the 
boundaries of the novel: 
 
Something that I look for in an associate is a certain amount of 
misunderstanding of what I’m trying to do. Not a fundamental 
misunderstanding; just minor misunderstandings here and there.  … If 
people never misunderstand you and they do everything exactly the way 
you tell them to, they’re just transmitters of your ideas, and you get bored 
with that.  But when you work with people who misunderstand you, 
instead of getting transmissions you get transmutations, and that’s much 
more interesting in the long run. (Philosophy 99) 
 
a is an experiment in tracking such transmutations, which can be seen to occur not only 
between different people and media in the course of the novel’s production, but also on 
the page, in the course of the conversation. 
 If a; a novel can be said to let language speak, then the same can be said of the 
two textual experiments that Duchamp conducted in 1915 and 1916, at the point when 
work on the Glass had just begun. These seem, in fact, to be Duchamp’s attempts at 
generating nonsense of his own. Both The (or, to give the work the full title under which 
it first appeared THE, Eye Test, Not “Nude Descending a Staircase”) (Fig 3.7) and 
Rendezvous of Sunday, February 6, 1916. (Rendez-vous du Dimanche 6 Févier 1916 
1916) (Fig 3.8)223 were systematically composed to be grammatically correct yet to 
make no logical sense. The is a short text, the main body of which is in English: there is 
a brief instruction in French below that reads “remplacer chaque * par le mot: the” 
(“replace every * by the word: the”) Rendezvous consists of four postcards upon which 
Duchamp has typed French text, again taking every care to make no sense at all. For 
David Joselit, these works attempt to create a completely abstract language, but in effect 
                                                                                                                                                
residue of difference where the pun found only happy similarity” (201-202). In other words, the 
portmanteau refuses to confirm the mastery of language in the manner that the pun does—it does not insist 
upon meaning being prior to saying—and instead allows language to speak, to proliferate on its own and 
to create meaning in contextual circles.  
223 See Schwarz, Vol. 2 642. The former work was written as Duchamp began to learn English and was 






Fig. 3.7 Marcel Duchamp The (1915) 
The Louise and Walter Arensberg Collection, 
Philadelphia Museum of Art. 
 
Fig. 3.8 Marcel Duchamp Rendezvous of 
Sunday 6th of February 1916 (Rendez-
vous du Dimanche 6 Févier 1916) (1916) 
The Louise and Walter Arensberg Collection, 
Philadelphia Museum of Art. 
  
reduce their material to gibberish: “words are drained of their significance, falling back 
into a sensuous medium of sound” (77). Even leaving aside the problem of turning 
Duchamp into a sensualist, which goes against the artist’s often repeated and always 
emphatic insistence that the sensual was precisely what his work operated against,224 
Joselit’s conclusion seems shaky. For, as Marjorie Perloff points out in a discussion of 
Rendezvous, the work does “not prompt oral recitation, and hence the appeal of sound; 
on the contrary, Duchamp has made it difficult to decipher the visual text, with its odd 
word division at line ends” (“Conceptual” 97).225 The words may fall into a kind of 
                                                 
224His distain for the olfactory masturbation and retinal shudder of the painter is well-known and sound 
did not fare any better in his opinion: what he termed “the cat gut” effect of music was dismissed outright 
“I’m not anti-music. But I don’t get on with the ‘cat gut’ side of it. You see, music is gut against gut: the 
intestines respond to the cat gut of the violin” (Hahn 67). 
225 For Perloff, Duchamp’s work prefigures “the radical difference at the core of the most interesting 




materiality, in other words, but they are closer to graphic rather than phonic matter: 
indeed they recall the grids of painterly abstraction. Curiously, however, despite the 
artist’s proclamation that Rendezvous 1916 is without meaning, Perloff finds in the text 
what appear to be several references to numerous other works by Duchamp. “The 
language of Rendezvous 1916” she thus argues is “as allusive as [T.S.] Eliot’s language 
but the allusions are all internal; they point, along a number of metonymic paths, to 
Duchamp’s own visual/verbal universe” (98). Making a similar move in Appearance 
Stripped Bare, Octavio Paz has taken the phrase “water writes always in * plural” which 
appears in The as the spur for an exploration of the relationship between feminine and 
masculine in the Large Glass, making the “meaningless” phrase resound with gendered 
implications that in their turn bear on numerous other works.226 These texts represent an 
                                                                                                                                                
Duchamp understood what the function of poetry would be in the “age of reproduction” 
and its seeming loss of aura. From the smallest linguistic difference (p ? b), to the key 
deviation from a given meter or rhyme, to the synonymity that is never complete and the 
homynymity that produces puns, poetic language is the language that focuses on delay – a 
delay ordinary discourse is bent on erasing. (119)  
 
While I agree that it is the “delay” of Duchamp’s work (which I have argued develops from his 
understanding of Mallarmé’s poetics) that is the key which enables him to escape from the reified “café 
and studio platitudes” that he so detested, I would hesitate to call this, as she does, a “conceptual 
aesthetic” (101). Indeed, I think to do so is to come dangerously close to doing precisely what, as I tried to 
show in Chapter Two, de Duve was so careful to guard against, namely turning nominalism into 
conceptualism. Perloff’s concern here is not with the theoretical intricacies however, her primary concern 
is as ever with building a historical narrative that legitimates more recent experimental poetics by 
establishing their roots in the work of the historical avant-gardes. 
226 See “Water Writes Always in * Plural” in Marcel Duchamp: Appearance Stripped Bare 91-178. In 
Duchamp’s case the key work as regards the idea of the contextual circle, of course, and one that appears 
entirely self-conscious of the operations of the portmanteau, would of course be the last of Duchamp’s 
boxes, the Boîte-En-Valise. According to the artist, the Boîte En Valise is “ready-made talk of what goes 
on in the Glass” (qtd. in Judovitz 71), indicating that the various positions of the works comment upon 
The Bride Stripped Bare. The Boîte positions one readymade next to each part of the photographic 
reproduction of the Glass. Next to the top section, is the sealed ampoule Paris Air (1919): this work, a 
comically literal attempt to use art as a means to capture nature, is also a punning play with the idea of the 
musical air. Music as “pure form” is presented here not as something to hear, but rather as “nothing to 
see,” for the ampoule is empty. Music might therefore be understood as a parallel to the Bride’s voice, the 
inscription of which occurs in the blank spaces of the draft pistons set out in the “natural” space of the 
Blossoming in the Milky Way. The clothes of the bride are accompanied by Travellers Folding Item 
(1916) which is the cover of a typewriter, hung to look like a skirt: the bride’s clothes, which separate the 
two realms and which prevent the communication in the Glass, are thus somehow associated with writing 
and the reproductive technologies of print. Next to the Bachelor’s section hangs Fountain, a work that, as I 
tried to show in Chapter One, can be understood as gaming with discourses, as playing different types of 
language off against different contexts. The Boîte then positions the readymades as another layer of 
commentary on the Glass and in so doing, infuses them retrospectively with meaning. For more on this 
constellation see Judowitz 71–73. 
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attempt to reduce language to its bare material but what they demonstrate is that through 
this material, with authorial intention erased, meaning proliferates from language itself: 
it speaks and we are driven to make sense of it. As Lecercle reminds us, “writing outside 
sense proves to be surprisingly difficult, for meaning puts up a fight” (115). 
Duchamp, I have tried to show in this chapter, abandons conventional painting 
and conventional literature, in order to experiment with the possibilities afforded by 
language, attempts to find new linguistic conventions from within the old. Likewise, his 
Bride Stripped Bare represents an attempt to transform the book into a form that defies 
the recuperative power of conceptual categorisation.  His abnormal book attempts to use 
the visual arts to open out language and its modes of presentation, as he uses language to 
open out visual art: poetics and aesthetics “mirrorically return” into one another. 
Warhol, through reducing the novel to its medium, shows that the art-form is more than 
simply a material form. a, in its apparent “freedom” from convention in reality operates 
to reveal the impossibility of working without conventions: by not editing, what appears 
as a gesture of sceptical nominalism or “anti-literature”, operates to reveal the process 
and importance of integral nominalism. Warhol’s stuttering “nonsense” novel shows 
that the sensory, aesthetic experience of engaging with the medium is at the heart of 
meaning. Moreover, by passively allowing language to speak, what he reveals is that 
language itself is always already in the process of transformation: the negotiation of 
meaning is an ongoing process. As if to confirm this point, these works both reformulate 
the question of what art is through the question of when art is, inscribing a temporal 
problem by examining how meaning is “delayed” in the materiality of language. The 
reiterative contextual circles that they thus inscribe—which the next and final chapter of 
this thesis will trace into the theory of the avant-garde—echo the mirrorical returns and 
re-workings of both artists’ broader catalogues. Their individual works take on new 
meaning by reworking ideas and elements of previous works, projecting forwards as 
well as back, in a mode of recycling that lifts the destitute material of everyday life, as 
the apparently coincidental last line of a; a novel suggests, “Out of the garbage and into 






The Figuration of a Possible: Rewriting the Critical Relation 
 
How, if one writes, is it possible not to say yes to the sea of language?  
 – Lyotard 
 
In 1974 Jean-François Lyotard published his second monograph, the vitriolic tract 
Libidinal Economy. “It was my evil book,” he later remarked, “the book of evilness that 
everyone writing and thinking is tempted to do” (Peregrinations 13). Deliberately 
provocative, Libidinal Economy represents an important moment in Lyotard’s thought: it 
is one of a number of experimental texts which mark the philosopher’s disengagement 
from the direct political activism that had informed his previous work, and his re-
engagement with the political as it emerges through art and aesthetics.227 These texts 
constitute an assault on critical theory, indicating Lyotard’s recognition of the 
complicity of criticism in the structures of power and the role of discourse as an agent of 
recuperation. They also mark his attempt to reconfigure that role, to invent a mode of 
practice that is able to take account of the movement of recuperation while 
acknowledging its own position within the very system that it seeks to interrogate. These 
texts, then, are a response to the same theoretical problem which, as I tried to show in 
Chapter One, underwrites the activities of the avant-gardes.228  
Lyotard does not simply take up the theoretical problem of the avant-gardes, 
however, he also responds directly to their works; the flowers of his “evil” period are a 
succession of essays exploring the works of diverse artists and writers, among whose 
ranks we find both Duchamp and Warhol. Indeed, Duchamp is one of the key figures of 
this “evil” period: between 1974 and 1977, Lyotard produced no less than five critical 
                                                 
227 For Lyotard’s own account of his involvement with direct activism in Socialisme ou Barbarie and his 
subsequent rejection of Marxism, see Peregrinations and the 1972 interview “On Theory”. Lyotard’s 
engagement with art and aesthetics in fact slightly precedes the break with Marxism, emerging in 1971’s 
Discours Figure. However this work was still felt by its author to be too negative and too reliant on the 
Marxist model (see Carroll, Paraesthetics 23-30). 
228 This problem is most clearly stated by Paul Mann, as I indicated in Chapter One (26-28). 
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essays on the an-artist, collected in Duchamp’s TRANS/formers (1977). Duchamp’s 
work not only impacted on Lyotard’s thought, but also on his writing: Lyotard, as I will 
try to show shortly, responds to Duchamp by borrowing the artist’s own tactics, 
experimenting with form, genre and convention. A similar relationship, although less 
immediately obvious, can be traced between Lyotard and Warhol, whose work, I will 
argue in the later sections of this chapter, also had a significant impact upon Lyotard’s 
thought. In the 1973 essay “Painting as a Libidinal Set-Up (Genre: Improvised Speech)” 
the philosopher identifies within Warholian Pop “a critique of representation, but one 
that is inverted, and that does not signify that representation is a commodity, but rather 
that the commodity is always representation, always fetishism” (327). It is as precisely 
this kind of inverted critique, I hope to show, that Lyotard’s early work can be 
understood. This is to say that the philosopher’s “evil” writing attempts to subvert the 
recuperative function of criticism by knowingly adopting strategies made available by 
avant-garde art, by inverting the relationship between criticism and its objects in order to 
question and challenge its function and role. 
As his remarks on Libidinal Economy indicate, Lyotard would later distance 
himself from the writing produced during this period. This change of position can be 
understood, as Lawrence Schehr writes, as paralleling  
 
a more general shift over time: moving from the waywardness or drift of 
earlier work to a perception that such a drift may itself have been wilful or 
evil; a move from a relativism buoyed by Marx toward a concept of 
judgement and justice sustained by Kant and Augustine. (66) 
 
It is for his later Kantian work that Lyotard is probably best known; his most famous 
contributions to philosophy are his writings on postmodernism and the idea of the 
differend. It is from the perspective of this later position, moreover, that Lyotard set 
about reworking the concept and task of the avant-garde, one of the central projects of 
the 1988 essay collection The Inhuman: Reflections on Time. However, clear though this 
shift may be, it would be a mistake to underestimate the importance of the earlier 
experimental texts. The philosopher himself may have retrospectively come to regard 
some aspects of his own writing as excessive, but that by no means indicates his 
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rejection of what it articulates.229 Indeed, what I want to argue here is that an 
understanding of what is at stake in this constellation of early ideas and texts, and in 
particular in their excesses, is crucial to any attempt to grasp Lyotard’s later work on the 
avant-garde. Indeed, without a sense of what is at stake in his early writing, Lyotard’s 
avant-garde might seem indistinguishable from the aesthetic modernism against which, I 
will argue, he is in fact positioning himself.230 It is thus only in the light of his earlier 
work that Lyotard’s understanding of the avant-garde reveals its full potential.  
In this chapter, then, I will trace the connections between Lyotard’s “evil” 
writing, directly influenced by the work of the avant-gardes, and his later, more 
conventionally philosophical work on aesthetics and the avant-garde. Perhaps the single 
most important thread of connection between these two periods, as far as this thesis is 
concerned, is Lyotard’s critical engagement with Adorno. It is an engagement that 
motivates Lyotard’s critique of Marxism and provides a vital impetus for the arguments 
put forth in The Inhuman. Lyotard’s interrogation of Adorno’s thought thus provides a 
space in which to locate both his early response to the works of the avant-garde and his 
later re-conceptualisation of the task and responsibilities of the avant-garde, and to 
explore how these aspects of his work are linked. Having taken a fuller account of the 
character of Lyotard’s writing in Duchamp’s TRANS/formers, therefore, I will proceed 
to examine Lyotard’s critique of Marxism through a reading of the experimental essay 
“Adorno as the Devil” (1974). As I will try to show, while he appears to challenge 
Adorno, Lyotard’s real target is not the German philosopher himself but rather the crude 
distillation of Adorno’s ideas into a formulaic and reductive theoretical framework: in 
fact, Lyotard’s work owes a profound debt to Adorno’s writing and in particular to his 
Aesthetic Theory. I will sketch out how Lyotard responds to what he sees as the 
strengths and weaknesses of Adorno’s thought, and how his readings of Duchamp and 
                                                 
229 Lyotard recalls the reception of Libidinal Economy, reporting that “its rare readers disliked the book, 
which passed for a piece of shameless immodesty and provocation” (Peregrinations 14). Yet, despite his 
apparent rejection of the work, as Geoffrey Bennington reports, Lyotard views it as one of his most 
important (see Bennington 2). For more on the book’s reception see Lyotard, Peregrinations 13-14, 
Carroll, Paraesthetics 44, and Schehr 69. 
230 It is possible, as Diarmuid Costello has shown, to read Lyotard as espousing a variation of 




Warhol impact on this response, before turning to his formulation of role of the avant-
garde in The Inhuman. I will then address the question of how Lyotard’s thought impacts 
on the debates on avant-garde and modernist art that have been sketched out in previous 
chapters and how his work, as a response to Adorno, provides an important  alternative 
model to both the dominant theorisations of the avant-garde and to the Adornian 
aesthetic modernism defended by Jay Bernstein. 
 
1. Paraesthetics and Post-aesthetics 
 
Given the standing of Lyotard’s work on postmodernism and given the prominent role 
that Duchamp has played in theorisations of this concept, one might be forgiven for 
assuming that Duchamp’s TRANS/formers is a well-known work. Quite the opposite is 
the case: it is one of Lyotard’s least discussed works and has received only the briefest 
of mentions in the vast amounts of work devoted to Duchamp.231 One reason for this 
absence of engagement may well be the sheer opacity of the writing: it is more or less 
impossible to reduce the book to a coherent interpretation of Duchamp’s art. Instead of 
explaining the artist’s work, in fact, Lyotard adopts the kind of strategies associated with 
the “theatrical” art under discussion, staging conflicting ideas and consciously 
attempting to manipulate the reading experience.232 The five essays do not make up a 
univocal reading but rather together produce the effect of a debate in which different 
voices confirm, challenge and transform the various arguments under discussion. They 
thus make problematic the very notion of a single “correct” response by interjecting 
difference into the very structure of the text. The book’s introduction makes this strategy 
explicit as it stages a conversation between several (often antagonistic) speakers, some 
                                                 
231 A sustained discussion of Duchamp’s TRANS/formers (the only one I have found) appears in A. Jones, 
Postmodernism (195–200). What Jones takes from the book is Lyotard’s denunciation of systems of 
thought which seek to repress difference (sexual difference primarily) and the reading of the relationship 
between The Large Glass and Given, set out in Lyotard’s final chapter “Hinges”.  
232 I use the term “theatrical” here for two reasons. Firstly, it recalls the formalist assessment of cross-
disciplinary art discussed in Chapter Two (see 92-94); “theatrical” is the term adopted by Fried to describe 
what Greenberg termed “literary”. Secondly, the metaphor of the theatre points forward to some of the 
figures and tactics that will emerge later in this chapter; the idea of representation as a mode of “staging” 
is important here, as I shall try to show shortly. 
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of whom adopt arguments that Lyotard makes in other books, others of whom attack 
these positions. Lyotard thus prevents his work being collapsed into a single argument 
and, using these voices in a manner that recalls Duchamp’s use of pseudonyms, avoids 
constructing a coherent “authorial” position.  
These techniques, which generate a writing poised somewhere between art and 
interpretation, are what Lyotard calls paraesthetic strategies.233 That his philosophy is 
thereby part of a broader current has been shown by David Carroll, who uses the term to 
analyse the work not only of Lyotard but also of his contemporaries Jacques Derrida and 
Michel Foucault. Paraesthetics, Carroll writes, is “something like an aesthetics turned 
against itself or pushed beyond or beside itself, a faulty, irregular, disordered, improper 
aesthetics—one not content to remain within the area defined by the aesthetic” (xiv). 
Such writing, infiltrated by this improper aesthetic, is no longer “purely” philosophical 
but takes on the mode of literary or poetic language: it is absolved of the necessity to 
transparently refer and instead questions the relationship between signifier and signified, 
representation and “reality”. 
It has been Derrida rather than Lyotard who has generated the most discussion in 
these terms. In her essay “Poststructuralism and the ‘Paraliterary’” (1980), for example, 
Rosalind Krauss recalls the philosopher giving a lecture that made use of exactly such 
devices. In a performance that clearly recalls the plural voices of Duchamp’s 
TRANS/formers, Derrida delivered his speech in two voices, one his usual voice, the 
other high and feminine. This second voice functioned, Krauss writes, “to open and 
theatricalize the space of [his] writing, alerting us to the dramatic interplay of levels and 
styles and speakers that had formerly been the prerogative of literature but not of critical 
or philosophical discourse” (37). Krauss describes such work not as paraesthetic, but 
“paraliterary.” Gregory Ulmer, too, has explored this aspect of Derrida’s work, arguing 
that the philosopher adopts collage and montage strategies from the visual arts.234 While 
Ulmer employs different terminology, designating the practice “post-criticism,” both he 
and Krauss agree that what such work signifies is a change in the relationship between 
                                                 
233 See Lyotard, “Philosophy and Painting in the Age of their Experimentation” 191. 
234 See Ulmer, “The Object of Post-Criticism”.  
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criticism and its objects, a change in what we might call the critical relation. Refusing 
the division between criticism and art, the post-critic or paraesthetic philosopher no 
longer comments on art and literature from an external position but inhabits them in 
order to dramatize the significance of the critical work. 
As I have suggested, like Derrida, Lyotard adopts tactics from artistic practice in 
order to explore and transform the critical relation. As Sadie Plant has recently argued, 
there is evidence to suggest that the activities of the Situationist International, an avant-
garde group led by filmmaker and polemicist Guy Debord, were a key source of 
inspiration for Lyotard.235 In his Situationist manifesto The Society of the Spectacle 
(1967) Debord rails against the reification of social relations and the homogenous time-
space of a society governed by exchange value: “the world we see,” he writes, “is the 
world of the commodity” (21).236 As Plant quite rightly suggests, such arguments 
resonate with Lyotard’s thought, the goal of which is often stated as “making visible” 
that which is repressed by such social structures. Lyotard, moreover, quite explicitly 
draws upon the Situationist practices of dérive and détournement. Dérive, “drifting”, 
describes an aimless movement in which spaces are occupied and used in manners other 
than those for which they were designed, a form of passive resistance to how space is 
controlled and demarcated by the spectacle.237 Détournement, “derailment”, designates 
the practice of using language and objects in manners for which they were not designed: 
rather than seeking an outside position from which to attack the spectacle, it suggests, a 
                                                 
235 Debord was, like Lyotard, a member of Socialisme ou Barbarie and also an active participant in the 
occupation of the Sorbonne in 1968. This occupation was accomplished as a result of the activities of Le 
Mouvement du 22 Mars with whom Lyotard was involved at the University of Nanterre. The direct 
political activism of the Situationist International has tended to make the movement seem quite distinct to 
other more artistically oriented avant-gardes. However, whether the SI appears as an artistic or political 
movement depends very much on the selection of texts examined/presented: Ken Knabb, for example, in 
his Situationist International Anthology, chooses texts with a strong political emphasis that obscure the 
cultural activities of the artists involved. Sadie Plant takes a similar approach, regarding the Situationist as 
theorists more than artists. A recent attempt to redress this balance can be found in a special issue of 
October (Vol. 79) dedicated to Situationism which includes a good synopsis of the different approaches to 
the SI in the form of Thomas F. McDonough’s “Rereading Debord, Rereading the Situationists”.  
236 The spectacle, in Debord’s text, is itself the time/space generated by the reified relations of bourgeois 
society.  
237 While texts such as Drifting from Marx and Freud (1973) and “Adrift” (1972) self-consciously 
announce their allegiance to this practice, Lyotard’s description in Peregrinations (1988) of thinking as a 
process of wandering through clouds also owes a less obvious debt to dérive.  
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better goal is to set its own products against it. “Détournement reradicalises previous 
critical conclusions,” Debord writes, “plagiarism is necessary…it sticks close to an 
author’s phrasing, exploits his expressions … [but it is] the opposite of quotation, of 
appealing to a theoretical authority” (113-114). As we shall see shortly, this could easily 
be a description of aspects of Lyotard’s work and it is therefore easy to see why Plant 
feels able to declare that 
 
the breadth of situationist theory and its magpie tactics of appropriation and 
détournement find their expression in the deconstructive eclecticism of 
poststructuralist writing, which similarly has no scruples about taking 
ideas, examples, and forms of expression from anywhere. (112)238 
 
Just as Krauss and Ulmer draw out Derrida’s use of artistic and literary strategies, so too 
Plant suggests that Lyotard’s philosophy no longer simply comments on art but mimics 
it, appropriates its tactics. While Derrida is concerned with the play of signification 
across these different techniques and strategies however, Lyotard, in contrast, as I will 
try to show, draws upon the different arts in order to open out the non-linguistic within 
language, in an attempt to respond to the question which he formulates as how to write 
without saying “yes to the sea of language” (Lyotard “Return” 145).  
While some critics have seen in such practice a kind of liberation from the 
constraints of theoretical reason, paraesthetic philosophy has not met with unanimous 
approval.239 Indeed, it is precisely such tactics that Lyotard’s translator Ian Hamilton 
Grant refers to when he reports that Libidinal Economy has been described as “naïve 
anti-philosophical expressionism, an aestheticizing trend hung over from a renewed 
                                                 
238 This is not entirely accurate for, contrary to what Plant suggests, Lyotard is highly selective in his 
choice of strategies and forms of expression. While the Situationist practice of détournement can be seen 
as an influence, for example, Lyotard is careful to distance himself from the idea that détournement, as 
Debord claims, operates to “[delete] a false idea, [and replace] it with the right one” (Spectacle 113). For a 
comparison of the paraesthetics of Derrida and Lyotard, see Carroll Paraesthetics. 
239 The apparent invasion of the aesthetic into the realm of theory generated a great deal of debate during 
the early 1980s. See Shattuch, Donoghue, Bruss, de Man, and Cain. Krauss and Ulmer see paraesthetics as 
sign of a certain degree of freedom. Plant, in contrast, recognises in Lyotard’s practice the rejection of the 
distinction maintained by the SI between the real and the spectacle and, completely ignoring his later 
work, argues that, losing “any sense of purpose or meaning,” he eventually drifted into a postmodernity 
which escaped the dilemma of how we can have truth in the face of mediation “at the price of a political 
despondency and celebration of meaninglessness” (Plant 109). As we shall see, this is simply not the case. 
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interest in Nietzsche in the late 1960s” (Libidinal xix). This accusation is also levelled 
by Diarmuid Costello, who argues that Lyotard’s work repeats Greenberg’s mistakes by 
presuming aesthetic values to be higher than those of the rational spheres of everyday 
life or philosophical discourse. Terry Eagleton has gone further, dismissing Lyotard’s 
work as “amoral” and accusing him of aestheticizing politics through his articulation of 
a misguided and dogmatic “intuitionism” (397).240 Approaching from a different angle, 
Paul Crowther claims Lyotard is a “sceptical” post-structuralist who regards any attempt 
to demarcate boundaries between disciplines as an attempt at domination and who, in 
Crowther’s view, “drastically overemphasizes both the fluidity of modes of knowledge 
and experience, and their status as social ‘constructs’” (Critical Aesthetics ix). Finally, 
the most famous critique of Lyotard’s early work can be found in the writings of Jürgen 
Habermas who claims that paraesthetic work denies aesthetic autonomy and, by 
levelling the distinction between philosophy and literature, “[jumbles] the constellations 
in which the rhetorical elements of language assume entirely different roles” (209).241 
Literature and philosophy may bear a family resemblance, Habermas argues, but their 
modes are completely distinct and “the false assimilation of one enterprise to the other 
robs both of their substance” (210). While these charges will be dealt with individually 
as this chapter progresses, at this juncture it suffices to note that although they differ in 
their subtleties, all of these criticisms share a reliance on a particular mode of thinking: 
each accusation positions the aesthetic as other to reason, art and literature as other to 
philosophy. From this perspective, the danger posed by paraesthetic writing is that it 
threatens to reduce philosophy to a “mere” art, to annul its claim to reason and to truth 
by positioning it as rhetoric.  
If the paraesthetic work does pose a threat to philosophy, the claims of Lyotard’s 
1978 essay “Theory as Art: A Pragmatic Point of View” might seem particularly 
worrisome. In this short text, Lyotard argues that critical theory should in fact be 
                                                 
240 Eagleton’s main target here is not so much Libidinal Economy as The Postmodern Condition (1979). 
However, the earlier work is perhaps even more vulnerable to this accusation than that text. 
241 This essay is directed at Derrida rather than Lyotard. However, as is well known, Habermas targeted 
not just Derrida but French post-Nietzschean philosophy more generally provoking a debate with Lyotard. 




considered not as commentary on the arts, but rather as one of the arts: theory is, he 
writes, “a particular case of those genres we usually term literary” (71).242 This claim 
opens out the discursive space in which Lyotard works. To grasp what is at stake here, 
however, it must be approached not as a call for the aestheticisation of philosophy but 
rather as operating within the context of what Bernstein has termed “post-aesthetic” 
thought.  
In The Fate of Art, Bernstein develops the idea of “post-aesthetic” philosophy as 
a counter to “aesthetics”. Aesthetics, he argues, understands art as separated from other 
spheres of experience, figuring it as autonomous and thus “cut off and separated from 
truth, as silenced, as dirempted from all that would give it significance” (4). In a society 
that privileges rational, conceptual (“scientific”) cognition, art is seen to be “autonomous 
from (rationalized) truth and morality” (4). As a result, as “subjective” and “aesthetic” 
rather than “objective” and “scientific,” art comes to be perceived as not just separate 
from “reason” and “truth” but as their very opposite. It is within this framework that the 
objections to Lyotard’s paraesthetic practice are positioned.243 In such a structure, 
Bernstein goes on to argue, a double bind emerges which opens out an aporia at the heart 
of aesthetics: 
 
If art is taken as lying outside truth and reason then if art speaks in its own 
voice it does not speak truthfully or rationally; while if one defends art 
from within the confines of the language of truth-only cognition, one belies 
the claim that art is more truthful than truth-only cognition. (2)  
 
Either art is not truthful/rational or, if it can be comprehended in these terms, it is less 
truthful, less rational than the philosophy which acts as its interpreter. In both cases art 
                                                 
242 This idea is not new, as Lyotard hastens to add, philosophy has always dealt in rhetoric: from Platonic 
dialogue through to Descartes, philosophy generates its space within the discursive terrain by 
simultaneously distinguishing itself from and borrowing rhetorical strategies from literature.  
243 It is also immediately clear, I hope, that the theories of art set out by Bürger and Greenberg must be 
considered as within this “aesthetic” framework (which also grounds the narratives of the “death” of art). 
For Bürger, it is against this silencing that the avant-garde protests: attempting to restore art’s significance, 
the avant-garde seek to reconnect art and wider social systems. For Greenberg, this separation and 
silencing is in fact the key to art’s importance: released from the burden of significance, art preserves the 
highest values which are incompatible with those that motivate the spheres of politics and morality. See 
Chapters One and Two. 
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loses its direct relation to truth and becomes “mere” art: its critical potential is 
effectively silenced. Here, then, we are returned to the contradiction of aesthetic 
autonomy that lies at the heart of the theories of the avant-garde explored in Chapter 
One. 
“Post-aesthetic” philosophy, Bernstein suggests, is that thinking which responds 
to this problem, to the silencing at the centre of aesthetics, and recognises the double-
bind or contradiction of art’s autonomy. If art is a critique of (but also a product of and 
by no means opposite to) the rationalised, conceptual, “scientific” cognition which 
modernity privileges, then post-aesthetic theory attempts to maximise and highlight this 
critical potential. It accepts that art relies on some degree of autonomy (thus it is not 
institutional critique) but denies that art is severed from truth, from politics, from 
morality. Instead of bemoaning or celebrating aesthetic alienation, such work attempts to 
understand art in “non-aesthetic terms because the very idea of aesthetics is based upon 
a series of exclusions which themselves assume a conception of truth in terms of its 
isolation from normative and ‘aesthetic’ values” (3-4). In other words, post-aesthetic 
philosophy attempts to approach art from a direction other than that set up by the 
conventional framework of “aesthetics”.244 It is the work of Adorno above all others, for 
Bernstein, which exemplifies post-aesthetic philosophy,245 and it is in relation to this 
aspect of Adorno’s project that Lyotard’s proposal to consider theory as an art can be 
situated. His work can thus be understood as operating against the oppositions by means 
of which, as we have just seen, it has been critiqued.  
Lyotard’s paraesthetic writing is an attempt to alter the critical relation set up by 
“aesthetics”, a relation in which philosophy or theory acts as art’s interpreter. It is 
important, therefore, that this aspect of his writing is not dismissed as stylistics or as 
indicative of a lack of rigour. It is, rather, an attempt to invent a practice in which an 
                                                 
244 It is this refusal of the opposition between the aesthetic and the rational or conceptual that enables 
Lyotard to respond to a wide variety artists and artworks. Lyotard not only writes about the “modernist” 
abstract paintings of Barnett Newman, but also about “post-modernist” figures such as Duchamp, Warhol 
and Kosuth. Indeed, it is highly significant, I think, that Lyotard’s thought takes account of impulses that 
in “aesthetic” frameworks appear, as we have seen, to be antithetical. 
245 Adorno’s formulation of aesthetic autonomy, as I attempted to show in Chapter One, operates to break 




alternative relation between art and criticism can emerge. Instead of attempting to grasp 
art under a conceptual formula (or set of formulae), Lyotard’s aim, as Duchamp’s 
TRANS/formers declares, is “to try not to understand and to show that you haven’t 
understood … [to accept] nonsense as the most precious treasure” (12). The paraesthetic 
“nonsense” of Lyotard’s work is not secondary to its conceptual meaning, then, but is 
the attempt to inscribe what rational discourse suppresses or forgets. As such, it is a 
crucial part of his critique of Adorno and Marxist theory to which I now turn.  
 
2. The Magical Square  
 
If one was looking for confirmation of Adorno’s influence on Lyotard’s “evil” work, 
then the title “Adorno as the Devil” seems to offer it. Before examining this influence, 
however, it is worth taking some time to outline the form that this 1974 essay takes. For, 
written while Duchamp’s TRANS/formers was taking shape and clearly influenced by 
this work, “Adorno as the Devil” is particularly remarkable for the manner in which its 
structure and composition self-consciously operate to reinforce its argument. Full of 
disjunctions and random contiguities, it is one of Lyotard’s most experimental and least 
“logical” works.246 Around half way though the essay, the following declaration appears: 
 
I have determined six ideas (dialectics, criticism, indifference, position, 
theology and expression, affirmation) under which I have distributed all my 
reflexions in the form of items. A first drawing has assigned to each of 
these items the face of a dice. A second drawing (another throw of the dice) 
has permitted me to establish the diachronic series of the ideas’ appearance. 
Next a drawing (little papers carrying the numbers 1 to 20) has determined 
which item, number 5 or number 14, for example, belonging to which idea 
(for example, indifference) would occupy place n in the series. Several 
dimensions are left undetermined: the duration of each item, the duration of 
the blanks-silences which separate them, the chromatism (one would have 
been able to conceive of several writing types), etc. The artist has become 
the mere executor of his own intentions, plus: intensities which do not 
belong to him. “We are getting rid of ownership,” “our poetry is the 
realization that we possess nothing:” Cage. The artist no longer composes, 
he lets his deployment’s desire go its way. That is affirmation. The quotes 
                                                 
246 James Williams also discusses this essay in Lyotard and the Political (64-65). 
 
180 
from Adorno are noted in italics, those of other writers are between 
quotation marks. The designation of this item is: affirmation 13. (131-132) 
 
The text, this passage reveals, is the product of Duchampian “canned chance” (filtered 
through the I Ching practices of John Cage, whose own artistic debt to Duchamp is well 
documented)247 combined with a Warholian passive affirmation. Lyotard includes 
Adorno’s words as if they were his own, inhabiting the phrases, setting them in a new 
context in order to give them a new thought (just as Duchamp did with the urinal). These 
reflections are assembled in random order according to the throws of the dice: there is an 
indirect reference to Mallarmé here, amplified by the direct reference to poetry. Indeed, 
like Mallarmé’s Un Coup de Dés, this essay draws the different arts together: we should 
note that the language draws upon the terminology of the visual arts (the repetition of 
“drawing”, the idea of chromatics and blank space) and music (duration, silences, the 
mention of the composer Cage) in order to describe the process of writing. Openly 
transferring the experiments of different arts into the realm of philosophy, Lyotard uses 
them to problematize and to disrupt the linear logic of established reasoning.  
The final paragraph of the essay, perhaps the strangest, provides an insight into 
what Lyotard is attempting. It centres on the description of what he calls (borrowing a 
phrase from the novelist Thomas Mann) “the magical square” (137). The description of 
this figure—which is not mentioned at all in the previous paragraphs—is built up 
through a sequence of examples: the magical square is to be found in the work of 
Albrecht Dürer, inventor of the classical perspectival grid, as well as in the music of 
Arnold Schönberg, in which the differences between harmony and melody are 
suppressed. The magical square, Lyotard writes, “is the end of the narrative, the 
emergence of the structure. The neutralization of intensive differences. A narrative will 
still be possible but only as one realization among others of a structure, the performance 
of a competence” (137). Synthesising difference, making vertical identical to horizontal, 
the magical square is like a chessboard, permitting certain moves and disallowing others  
                                                 
247 The I Ching is an ancient Chinese system of divining order in chance events, such as the throwing of 
dice. For the relationship between Duchamp and Cage see “John Cage on Marcel Duchamp” by Moira 





Fig. 4.1 Richard Baquié. Untitled: Reconstruction of Marcel Duchamp’s Given: 1. The 
Waterfall, 2. The Illuminating Gas (1991). This shows how the installation, normally only 
visible through the peepholes of the door (which is set into a wall) is constructed. The 
Collection of the Museé d’Art Contemporain de Lyon. 
 
according to a set of rules. In Given, as Duchamp’s TRANS/formers reminds us, 
Duchamp, an accomplished chess player himself, covers the floor-space behind the door 
with black and white squared linoleum.248 (Fig 4.1) For the viewer this space is, Lyotard 
explains, “entirely invisible, as the squaring must be that serves to set up the perspective 
in Alberti and others” (176). Hidden from sight, it is the ground of the installation, the 
condition upon which the apparition itself can appear: invisible, it is that upon which 
visibility is predicated. The emergence of the magical square—which, as it turns out, is 
                                                 
248 Duchamp was an internationally recognised chess master and author, along with Vitaly Halberstadt, of 
a book on endgames entitled Opposition and Sister Squares are Reconciled, which was published in 1932. 
“Even the chess champions don’t read the book”, he told Cabanne, “since the problem it poses really only 
comes up once in a lifetime” (Dialogues 77-78). For more on the relationship between Duchamp’s chess 
playing and his art see Damisch. 
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not magical at all—is the materialization of the conditions of visibility, the revealing of 
the laws that govern what takes place within their frame. The square is the site in which 
the manner that narratives and works are “put into perspective” is exposed, the site in 
which they are revealed as the reproduction of laws.249 Crucially, what is also made 
manifest in the emergence of the magical square is that while such a structure generates 
certain narratives, or certain visibilities, it disallows others: “putting into perspective” is 
also means of concealing or preventing possible alternatives from becoming visible. 
Narratives are possible—language games, like games of chess—but the idea of the 
narrative, the one “true” representation, is invalidated.250  
The key task that Duchamp set himself as an artist, Lyotard argues in Duchamp’s 
TRANS/formers, was to “detect everywhere in ‘realities’ the putting into perspective that 
forms them, a putting into perspective that is both necessary and contingent” (198). The 
task was, in other words, to reveal the magical square. This is another way of saying that 
Duchamp’s work is engaged in a process of revealing conventions as such. In this sense, 
Lyotard’s work prefigures the more recent arguments of de Duve and Bernstein, for the 
gesture of “putting into perspective” is the very same gesture as that of integral 
nominalism, the gesture that Duchamp reveals as at the heart of art-making. In “Adorno 
as the Devil” Lyotard takes on this avant-gardist mantle and, critiquing philosophy as a 
form of representation, locates the same problematic at the heart of philosophy: it is the 
necessary but contingent “putting into perspective” of his own work that he reveals in 
“affirmation 13,” the paragraph quoted above. Strikingly, his essay is organised in a 
manner that echoes a; a novel; both texts organise their narrative spatially, in a random 
                                                 
249 Clearly the magical square can be thought of in very similar terms to the grid of abstraction which, as I 
suggested in Chapter Two, can also be conceived of as the end of the narrative and which, as the re-
presentation of the frame or canvas itself, can be understood as the emergence or becoming visible of the 
structure of painting. Lyotard’s argument here might then also be taken to be inspired by the reductive 
procedures of abstraction. Indeed, in this essay Lyotard might be seen as reflecting on key ideas of both 
abstraction (in the form of the grid) and “theatrical” art (in the form of Duchamp) and, in so doing, 
refusing their apparent opposition. This ability to take account of both impulses is one way in which his 
work differs from modernist aesthetics and one way in which it can be seen as performing in a Warholian 
manner, for, as I tried to show throughout Chapters Two and Three, Pop should be understood as setting 
abstraction into a dialogue with “literary” art rather than rejecting it.  
250 Thus, just as Warhol inverts modernist abstraction, so too does Lyotard reconfigure its silence: this grid 
is not the end of narrative full stop but the end of the narrative, and so it is a site in which other narratives 
are made possible. 
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series of blocks, rather then temporally (with a beginning, middle and end) and thus 
break down Lessing’s distinction between narrative time and visual space. While 
Warhol transfers the model of the visual arts onto literature, Lyotard develops the idea of 
the square as figure that applies to the different arts of music, painting and writing. His 
essay reveals the affinity between narrative and perspective and in so doing it reveals the 
possibility of multiple narratives, like multiple perspectives.  
What Lyotard’s essay adopts, then, is the avant-garde strategy of breaking down 
aesthetic theories of the arts, of medium scrambling, allowing the effects and concerns 
of different media to impact upon one another. It is “the refutation of the distinguo 
introduced by Lessing’s Laocoon,” he writes, that has “been the central concern of 
avant-garde research since, say, Delauney or Malevitch” (“Newman” 81). This 
refutation is the central concern of the avant-garde because it is by means of this process 
that the avant-garde reveals “realities” as constructions.  
The avant-gardist critique of representation is precisely what Lyotard sees as 
missing in Adorno’s thought. The task he sets himself in “Adorno as the Devil” is to 
transfer this critique to philosophy, to reveal Adorno’s thought, by contaminating 
philosophy with art, as one way of “putting into perspective” and thereby to challenge its 
claim to truth. Yet while Lyotard thus appears to be arguing against Adorno in this 
essay, it is important to realise that he is also developing ideas that he sees as emerging 
in the Frankfurt-School thinker’s work. In fact, Lyotard turns Adorno’s own thought 
against the narratives associated with his work. Adorno’s work itself, he suggests in this 
essay, makes visible the contingency of the “reality” that it articulates. It is the site in 
which the magical square that grounds the Marxist narrative emerges. It is thus Adorno 
that shows Lyotard the necessary contingency at the heart of philosophy and that leads 
him to see “Adornian Marxism” as not the theoretical position but one position among 
many possible positions in a given framework.  
For Lyotard the key structure upon which the Marxist narrative is founded, and 
thus the structure which it cannot properly take account of, is the critical relation. It is 
this relationship which grounds the belief in the opposition between art and life, self and 
other, subject and object, critic and work/text. Under such a model, Lyotard argues, both 
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the category of the subject and that of representation remain uncriticized. It is at this 
juncture that a grasp of Lyotard’s paraesthetic practice of staging different positions 
becomes particularly important. Indeed, it is vital here to grasp the split between 
Adorno’s thought and the way that Lyotard is staging it for, as I hope the previous 
chapters have shown, this is clearly not the framework that grounds texts such as 
Aesthetic Theory, “Art and the Arts,” and “Commitment.” What Lyotard associates with 
the name Adorno in this essay is in fact a much cruder Marxism than that made available 
in the German philosopher’s writing. Yet while Lyotard stages and attacks a certain 
version of the critical relation under the name “Adorno” this is not to say that this 
version can be separated from a “true” or “correct” Adorno. This is necessarily so 
because what Lyotard’s argument operates against is the claim of any single reading or 
narrative to be the truth. To aim to separate out a “true” reading of Adorno’s work would 
be to submit to the criteria of the framework that Lyotard seeks to challenge. In what 
follows, then, it is important to bear in mind this blurring of different versions of 
Adorno: Lyotard’s practice of responding to some aspects of Adorno’s thought in its 
sophistication and over-simplifying and deliberately “misreading” other aspects is 
entirely strategic.251 
For Adorno under capitalism the human subject is “riven” or “alienated”, 
dominated by the inhuman system of techno-scientific rationality. Yet, Lyotard tells us, 
Adorno holds onto the idea of reconciliation, albeit in the negative:  
 
the reconciliation of the subject and object has been perverted into a 
satanic parody, into a liquidation of the subject in the objective order. 
Totality is missing = there is no god to reconcile = all reconciliation can 
only be represented in its impossibility, parodied = it is a satanic work. You 
[Adorno] wasted your time replacing God with the devil, the prefix super—
with the old sub—terranean mole, you remain in the same theological 
deployment. (132-133) 
 
Adorno’s apparent refusal to affirm existence in its rivenness, his belief that 
                                                 
251 What Lyotard does with Adorno in “Adorno as the Devil” is thus comparable to what he does more 
explicitly with Marx in Libidinal Economy. In that text, Marx is famously staged variously as “Marx,” 
“old man Marx,” and “little girl Marx.” See Chapter Three, “The Desire Named Marx” 94-155.  
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reconciliation is desirable (even if impossible) forces him to preserve the idea of the 
unified subject. For Lyotard this leads, as the passage above indicates, to something akin 
to a negative theology.  
 
The dissipation of subjectivity in and by capitalism; Adorno like Marx, sees 
there a defeat; he will only be able to surmount this pessimism by making 
of this defeat a negative moment in a dialectics of emancipation and of the 
conquest of creativity. But this dialectics is no less theological than the 
nihilism of the loss of the creative subject; it is its therapeutic resolution in 
the framework of a religion, here the religion of history. (127) 
 
Dialectics institutes a progressive temporal model—history—in which “development” is 
achieved through negation, a movement driven by the utopian promise of reconciliation 
as an ultimate goal. It thus takes the same shape as Christianity: dependant upon a 
primordial unified past, from which the present—a time of absence and alienation—is 
experienced as fallen or degraded; it sustains itself on the promise of a messianic end to 
these struggles. Acknowledging modernity as a fragmented and rationalised space, 
Adorno mourns for a lost state of unified presence and posits a utopian hope for a future 
in which alienation and domination will end, in which reconciliation will take place. The 
hope of redemption and reconciliation merges with the idea of a prelapsarian state of 
grace, and becomes a return to a lost unity: the end of history, this future is a return to 
the past. Adorno’s vision of modernity, Lyotard thus claims, is nostalgic.  
It is against this nostalgia that Lyotard’s work protests, against a desire for “the 
whole and the one, for the reconciliation of the concept and the sensible, [for] the 
transparent communicable experience” (“Answering” 81-82). For all that such nostalgia 
serves to do, as he sees it, is to reinforce the very structures against which it protests; 
dialectical narratives of progress are implicated in the techno-scientific system. 
Adorno’s Marxism, as anti-capitalism and as a result of his refusal to give up the utopian 
impulse, unwittingly conspires with the operations of capital. “One sees that such an 
analysis, made by Marx-Adorno, is constrained to produce its antibody, the natural, as 
that which capitalism comes to lack. Capitalism is thought nihilistically, relative to a 
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natural subject” (“Adorno” 131).252 Lack of presence, in other words, can only be 
thought of in terms of an absence. Likewise, insisting on its possibility, Adorno is only 
able to figure reconciliation in its absence or impossibility, in the negative. Such 
thought, as Lyotard puts it in “Adorno as the Devil,” remains “inside faith” (130).253 
Negating, as he declares elsewhere, is “deeply rational, deeply consistent with the 
system. … [T]he critic remains in the sphere of the criticized, he belongs to it, he goes 
beyond one term of the position but doesn’t alter the position of the terms” (“Adrift” 
13).254 The dialectical historicism of the Frankfurt School, in other words, is unable to 
alter the critical relation: rather than revealing and changing the conditions of its 
particular “reality” it operates to conceal them. It is the omnipotence of this narrative 
which goes by the name “Marx-Adorno” that Lyotard, by revealing its structure, seeks to 
challenge.  
Stepping aside from this critique for one moment, it is worth noting once again 
the schism in Lyotard’s reading of Adorno. For although it is posed as an attack on 
Adorno’s thought, the discussion of the magical square and Lyotard’s claim that 
negating is a movement that is consistent with the dominant structures of rationality, 
directly recalls Adorno’s claim (outlined in Chapter One) that decisions instigated at the 
level of the artwork are interchangeable, that anti-art does not challenge art but rather 
reconfirms it. The potential Adorno assigns to art, the potential to challenge the 
omnipotence of such structures, is what Lyotard transfers to philosophical thought. 
Thus, it begins to seem that Lyotard’s attack on “Adorno” is in fact generated by 
                                                 
252 Here, of course, we are returned to Bernstein’s argument, set out in Chapter Two, which is also based 
on a nostalgic conception of contemporary experience becoming increasingly “unnatural”: indeed, in this 
chapter, it is as a counter to this specific aspect of Bernstein’s reading of Adorno that I am attempting to 
set Lyotard up. 
253 This is a sentiment that Duchamp also formulated: “I am against the word ‘anti’,” the artist told Arturo 
Schwarz, “because it’s a bit like atheist, as compared to believer. And an atheist is just as much of a 
religious man as the believer is, and an anti-artist is just as much of an artist as the other artist” (Schwarz 
1:33). 
254 Lyotard can thus be understood as echoing Paul Mann’s declaration that “discourse has no negative 
force that is not reduced to dialectical systems-maintenance” (88). Yet, unlike Mann, Lyotard refuses to 
fall silent in the face of this apparently totalising force. Instead, for Lyotard the scenario that Mann 
describes is the emergence of the magical square, and thus the emergence of possible alternatives.  
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radicalising Adorno’s thought on aesthetics and art and turning it against what Lyotard 
presents as his conceptions of history and subjectivity.255  
Adorno, Lyotard argues, can see neither the consequences nor the contingency of 
the magical square, the critical relation of Marxist thought, which puts his thought into 
perspective. In a phrase that suggests the Christian notion of the passion—the suffering 
of martyrdom and the pain that must be endured in order to achieve reconciliation—
Lyotard describes Adorno as caught in “the passion of meaning”, as suffering for his 
belief in a unified truth and unified subject. He is caught in the seductive illusion of 
dialectics which, in its claim to reveal the truth, binds itself to falseness and negation. 
“Dialectics has not degenerated into a State religion” as Adorno claims, Lyotard writes, 
in fact “the modern State can only have for its religion dialectics, this catchall for 
skepticisms and nihilisms, this ready-to-wear for melancholy” (133). Adorno’s thought 
is not simply on the consequences and expressions of the dominance of techno-scientific 
capitalism but reveals itself as a consequence and expression of this very system.  
 
The Aesthetische Theorie is not constructed like a Phenomenologie or a 
Dialectics, like a discourse proceeding to its proper conclusion, it is 
fragmented, full of silences and full of silence …. It carries the loss of 
totality in its form: the sweeping of a field, a fragmentation never reclosed. 
But why say loss of totality? This discourse of rhetoric and classical and 
romantic philosophy is a deployment (implying representation of the 
totality by its very construction), this deployment is disinvested. (136) 
 
In other words, Adorno’s nostalgia is the result of the framework in which his narrative 
is constructed. It is this structure that generates the idea of a lost unity or totality (which 
it names as Eden or nature, depending on religious preference). Once this framework is 
revealed as such, as a framework, it loses its claim to be the truth and the idea of a lost 
totality relinquishes its grip.256 That Adorno himself could not recognise this 
                                                 
255 This is to say that Lyotard develops the idea of internal discordance that Adorno associates with art as a 
way of thinking about history (which, he claims, Adorno has a unified vision of) and the subject (which is, 
in Adorno’s thought, unlike art, potentially unified).  
256 It is at this point that Bernstein’s argument that the medium is a stand-in for the lost authority of nature 
begins to sound questionable, appearing as the articulation of precisely this kind of nostalgia. Just as 
Lyotard asks why we say “loss of totality” we might ask why Bernstein /Adorno mourn “nature.”  I will 
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disinvestment, that he continued to think in terms of a loss, is why, for Lyotard, “Adorno 
is criticism’s finale, its bouquet, its revelation as fireworks” (130).  
Lyotard’s attempt to transform theory by means of art is of course his attempt to 
work through and critique the critical relation that he considers “Adornian” Marxism to 
have left unexamined. In both Duchamp’s TRANS/formers and The Inhuman he also 
explicitly reworks the categories that he perceives as uncriticized in the framework of 
Adorno’s thought; the subject and representation. Before moving on to examine these 
critiques, however, I want to briefly take note of the fact that in Lyotard’s verdict on 
Adorno there is the resounding echo of the criticism levelled at Adorno by Peter Bürger. 
Both suggest that Adorno’s key failure is his inability to see his work as contingent 
rather than necessary. “Adorno as the Devil” argues that Aesthetic Theory is the finale of 
a particular critical movement, while Theory of the Avant-Garde, which was published 
in the same year as Lyotard’s essay, argues that Adorno’s “theoretical position is itself 
part and parcel of the epoch of the historical avant-garde movements” (63). Yet while 
these two claims may sound alike, they must be carefully distinguished. Bürger locates 
Adorno in this manner because of the latter’s refusal to give up the idea of art as a 
critical space. However, without recognising it, Bürger remains within the framework of 
Adorno’s thought, no more able to go beyond Frankfurt-School Marxism than Adorno 
whose work he sees as becoming “historical” with the death of the avant-garde. Bürger 
moves one step in the same framework; rather than a utopian vision, his is a dystopian 
vision of the increasing dominance of the recuperative techno-scientific system. What 
Bürger provides, then, is the antithesis to Adorno’s thesis: “he goes beyond one term of 
the position but doesn’t alter the position of terms” (Lyotard “Adrift” 13). While Bürger 
is able to critique what he terms the “sub-system” of art he is unable to critique the 
critical relation. He can be accused, as a result, of precisely the system-immanent type of 
criticism of which he accuses Adorno, the system here being extended beyond “art” to 
indicate the Marxist theoretical framework which positions “art” and “life praxis” as 
separate from one another.  
                                                                                                                                                
return to this later in this chapter, when I draw a comparison between Lyotard and Bernstein’s notions of 
the task of art.  
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For Lyotard on the other hand, Adorno’s thought (which, as we have seen, 
articulates a considerably more dynamic and complex relationship between art and “life” 
than that assumed by Bürger) is vital because it reveals itself as a product of the system 
which it seeks to oppose. Aesthetic Theory is, for Lyotard, the site in which the magical 
square emerges—“it carries the loss of totality in its form”—a finale, but also a 
revelation. The moment of Adorno’s magnum opus is, for Lyotard, at once an ending 
and a beginning. It is the site in which the necessary contingency of the Marxist 
narrative as one “putting into perspective” among others is made visible. As a result, it is 
Adorno’s work that opens out the possibility of different relations, a space from which 
criticism and the critical relation can be re-written. As we shall see shortly it is this 
possibility that generates Lyotard’s reformulation of the term “avant-garde.” In fact, the 
polemics of “Adorno as the Devil” distract from the fact that Lyotard takes as much 
from the Marxist theorist as he rejects: it is this relationship that I want now to sketch 
out, as I explore how Lyotard’s philosophy develops Adorno’s aesthetics and expands 
his complex concept of “art” beyond the realm of “aesthetics”. 
 
3. The Hinge  
 
The central concern of all of the essays in Duchamp’s TRANS/formers, Lyotard remarks 
in Peregrinations, is the idea of the “paradoxical hinge.” This is part of a broader 
pattern, he goes on to confess, which develops out of his “obsessive concern with open 
‘space-time’ in which there are no more identities but only transformations” (31). The 
notion of an “open ‘space-time’” takes on particular significance in Lyotard’s phrasing 
of the avant-garde, as we shall see shortly. For the moment, however, I want to 
concentrate on the idea of the paradoxical hinge. 
The hinge joins two distinct things; it links them and holds them in relation to 
one another. This simple device fascinated Duchamp throughout his career: in his last 
work Given, for example, the hole in the door operates with a hinge-function between 
the gallery space in which the viewer is standing and the imaginary space of the bride 
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into which he/she looks. That this interest was also evident earlier in Duchamp’s career 
is demonstrated by one of the notes in the Green Box, which reads 
 
Perhaps make a hinge picture (folding yardstick, book…) develop the 
principle of the hinge in the displacements 1st in the plane 2nd in space. 
Find an automatic description of the hinge. 
Perhaps introduce it in the Pendu femelle.  
(Writing 27)  
 
Like so many of Duchamp’s notes, this one alludes to a number of vague ideas without 
clarifying them and suggests a number of strange connections without developing them. 
The unfolding yardstick may relate to the 3 Standard Stops which form the capillary 
tubes of the bachelor section in the Large Glass. The mention of a book might be taken 
as prefiguring the geometry book, Unhappy Readymade (1919), which Duchamp asked 
his sister to hang on her balcony until its pages were destroyed and scattered by the 
weather, though it might also be a simple reference to the physical form of the book as 
pages hinged by a spine. The sentence goes on to associate the hinge principle with non-
Euclidean geometry and Duchamp’s attempt to imagine the 4th dimension: 
displacements in the 2-D plane (which create three dimensions) and in 3-D space (which 
create four) are imagined as helping to develop an independent “principle.” The notion 
of an “automatic description” alludes to both Duchamp’s concern with machines and 
mechanical processes and to the indifference to taste and subjective values which he 
famously attempted to harness by way of chance mechanisms. Finally, there is the 
reference to the “pendu femelle,” the bride of the Large Glass. This once again suggests 
an interest in the fourth dimension although the phrase can also be associated with 
Fountain: the urinal was hung in Duchamp’s studio and is referred to as female in the 
notes.257 Thus the early note on the hinge principle seems also to hint at the connection 
between the readymades and the Bride Stripped Bare by Her Bachelors, Even that would 
later be drawn in the Boîtes-En-Valise.258  
                                                 
257 The note in question is from The 1914 Box and reads “-one only has: for female the public urinal and 
one lives by it” (Writings 23). 
258 See Chapter Three, 166n68. 
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 These allusions, then, draw a large number of Duchamp’s works into a single 
constellation and these works, disparate though they may seem, have one thing in 
common: a concern with the relation between the measurable or calculable and the 
immensurable or incalculable.259 It is perhaps in terms of how geometry and the weather 
are brought together in the Unhappy Readymade that this is most immediately obvious. 
The interest in the fourth dimension, however, also involves a similar relationship: non-
Euclidean geometry is a system of measurement which predicts the existence of a 
dimension which it cannot know, which it can only postulate. In one sense, then, the 
fourth dimension can be understood as marking the connection between the proof of 
reason and the power of the imagination. In terms of the Large Glass, the connection is 
between the “rational” space of the Bachelor machines in the lower part, a mechanical 
realm organised according to the laws of classical perspective, and the “non-rational” 
space of the four dimensional bride and her resplendent “blossoming” taking form in 
“the milky way.” If, furthermore, the hinge connects the readymades to the Large Glass, 
then it connects a process which Duchamp described as using mechanical “canned 
chance” (at a pre-selected moment, to select from a range of “readymade” objects) with 
a process of elaborately working out a highly personal and unique “masterpiece”. Again, 
then, we have the measured and the rational brought into connection with the 
immensurable and non-rational. Finally, the two objects that Duchamp imagines as 
“hinge pictures” fit the same pattern: a scale of measurement that—ironically—can 
become smaller than it is and yet remain that measure, the folding yardstick is like the 
standard stops, a measure “diminished” (Writing 22); the book is an object which 
presents language (rational, commonsensical, man-made) as non-rational matter, marks 
on a page. In Duchamp’s note, we may conclude, the hinge appears to be a figure for 
connecting incomparables, a figure for the point of contact between spaces and systems 
that operate according to different laws. It is not a space like the magical square in which 
differences are annulled, but rather a figure in which different orders are held together 
but distinctly: like the door of Given, the hinge separates as it joins. This is the paradox 
                                                 
259 Lanier Graham reads this interest in bringing the rational and intuitive together in terms of a 
male/female balance and Duchamp’s persistent interest in androgyny (see Duchamp & Androgyny). 
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to which Lyotard refers: the hinge “designates the connection between unconnected 
elements” (Duchamp’s 80).  
It is precisely Duchamp’s attempt to think the hinge as a figure of connection 
between the rational and the non-rational, sense and nonsense, which interests Lyotard. 
For the Duchampian hinge is an alternative to the magical square: a figure of 
heterogeneity and incommensurability, it does not maintain itself by the logic of 
homogenisation and assimilation. It is a figure in which difference is held, a figure for 
the opening out of possibility and alterity, not as entirely remote or disconnected from 
that which is already known/mapped but rather as something in relation. In fact this 
problematic notion of the connection between unconnected spaces or systems—or, as he 
prefers, incommensurables—is also central to Lyotard’s thought and operates far beyond 
the confines of Duchamp’s TRANS/formers, motivating his various enquiries from 
Discours Figure (1971) through The Postmodern Condition (1979) to The Differend 
(1981). It pertains directly to his rephrasing of the sublime—itself a paradigmatic figure 
of incommensurability—by means of which, in The Inhuman, Lyotard re-conceptualises 
the task of the avant-garde. 
As a figure of internal difference, characterised by its ability to differ from itself, 
and its ability to hold difference in tension, the hinge recalls Adorno’s complex concept 
of art. As I attempted to show in Chapter One, Adorno conceives of art as composed of 
internal heterogeneity, a constellation of different orders. Art is the dynamic 
crystallisation of heterogeneous materials, marked by what Adorno calls its “empirical 
incommensurability,” its differing from itself. The artwork, then, is a hinge figure: it 
cannot be reduced to the rational or the material, to sense or nonsense but, Adorno 
claims, emerges through a process of separating itself from the material out of which it 
takes shape and to which it remains tied. Its relationship to empirical reality, in other 
words, is precisely the connection/separation of the hinge. Operating within and as a 
product of reason, the artwork does not conform to the rules of rationality: it does not 
arise from a framework, cannot be reduced to a set of concepts. Objectified in the 
tension between the pole of unified rationality and the pole of the diffuse and mimetic, 
art, as Adorno thinks it, is a hinge, a binding force, which holds the rational and the non-
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rational together. What the “paradoxical hinge” can be taken to represent, therefore, is 
firstly, Lyotard’s extension of the structure of Adorno’s artwork beyond the realm of 
“art” (as defined by the framework Bernstein labels “aesthetics”) and secondly, a shift of 
emphasis from the question of autonomy as separation to the question of relation or 
connection. Lyotard adopts the complex structure by which Adorno thinks art as a figure 
by which to think structures more broadly; he does not accept, in other words, the border 
between art and life put in place by “aesthetics”.  
Libidinal Economy is also concerned to elaborate this kind of hinge, which takes 
the shape of what Lyotard calls the “energetic dispositif” (3). In this figure structure 
collides with the immensurable intensities of what Lyotard calls the “great ephemeral 
skin” or “libidinal band.” The opening section of Libidinal Economy is dedicated to 
describing this band, which depends upon a deliberately provocative and graphically 
described process of cutting open and dissecting the “so-called body” of the humanist 
subject.260 It is a movement which recalls and intensifies Duchamp’s obsession with the 
violence of “stripping bare.” Indeed, in Duchamp’s TRANS/formers, Lyotard makes this 
connection, suggesting that the artist’s protest against the “retinal stupidity” of the 
painter should be understood as a protest against “the stupidity that gives credence to the 
‘body,’ to the organic machine of reproductive centralism” (76). The only move by 
which this “body” can be discredited, Lyotard argues in Libidinal Economy, is if we 
construct a new figure, if we  
 
go immediately to the very limits of cruelty, perform the dissection of 
polymorphous perversion, spread out the immense membrane of the 
libidinal “body” which is quite different to a frame. It is made from the 
most heterogeneous textures, bone, epithelium, sheets to write on, charged 
atmospheres, swords, glass cases, peoples, grasses, canvases to paint. All 
these zones are joined end to end in a band which has no back to it, a 
Moebius band which interests us not because it is closed, but because it is 
one-sided, a Moebian skin which …[has]… therefore neither exterior nor 
interior. (2-3) 
 
                                                 
260 Interestingly Lawrence Schehr argues that the libidinal band is a problematic figure because, as figure 
for the non-individual, it should thus be non-sex but is in fact masculine: a tumescent space which throws 
up or erects dispositions through desire (see “Lyotard’s Codpiece”). 
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This band or skin, is composed not only of bodily material and material charged with 
intensities (among which, we might note, Lyotard includes artistic media: sheets to write 
on, canvases to paint) but intensity itself; heterogeneous and immensurable affects, 
sensualities and desires. It is important to note, however, that the libidinal band is 
emphatically not some kind of primordial “flesh” of the world: it does not displace the 
individual body in order to return back to more authentic experience but rather is a 
figure for that which is held and repressed within the experience of embodied 
subjectivity. In this sense, the libidinal band can be associated with the way that 
aesthetic experience is set up in Adornian modernism: not as something removed from 
or detached from rational “life praxis”, but rather as an aspect of experience which is 
repressed within the structures of rationality.  
The band of libidinal intensities is contrasted with the “theatre of 
representations” (3), a figure of structure or disposition. The metaphor of the theatre 
recalls the practice of staging that, I have suggested, Lyotard’s work is engaged in. 
Although we can and should think the entities that Libidinal Economy describes—
intensities and structures or representations—as in conflict, it is of course a mistake to 
consider them antithetical. Intensities are not external to the structures of representation 
but rather inherent to them, necessarily present but repressed within them. For, Lyotard 
claims, representations themselves result from a type of labour or event on the libidinal 
band. It is precisely such labour that generates the “energetic dispositif,” or “chamber of 
representation” (3). Lyotard describes this as a “box closed upon itself, filtering 
impulses and allowing only those to appear on the stage which come from what will 
come to be known as the exterior, satisfying the conditions of interiority” (3). In other 
words, the dispositions that are generated by the energies of the libidinal band operate to 
internalise and contain those energies, to turn them into players on their stages or to send 
them off-stage, to exclude and repress them.261 This domination is, however, a 
                                                 
261 Lyotard warns against confusing his notion of the chamber of representations with the idea that “there 
is no outside...—don’t go confusing this crestfallen message and this representation of an entirely closed 
theatre with our Moebian-labyrinthine skin, single-sided patchwork of all the organs (inorganic and 
disorganized) which the libido can transverse: for however well it is closed upon itself, it too, like a good 
Moebius band, is not at all closed in the sense of a volume, it is infinite and contrary to the representative 
cube, intensities run in it without meeting a terminus, without ever crashing into the wall of absence” 
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paradoxical task: just as the intensities of the libidinal band are unknowable and 
unthinkable except through structures, so structures are driven by the band.262 The 
energetic dispositif is a hinge, holding the rational form of structures and the 
immensurable intensities of the libidinal band in tension: it is a figure through which 
Lyotard attempts to think the non-unified and riven without either nostalgia or hope of 
reconciliation. In this figure structure and intensity coexist in a constant state of 
movement: the chamber is never able to finally close upon itself, but remains (perhaps 
unwittingly) an open structure, constantly being changed by the flow of intensities. The 
space of possibility opened out by an event such as the emergence of the magical square, 
then, is not a space “next to” the structure which is revealed but rather within that 
structure: difference and possibilities are held within structures, not simply excluded by 
them. The challenge is to find ways to release these possibilities, to generate 
transformations. The name that Lyotard gives to this process, the generation of 
transformations in structure by intensity, is dissimulation. 
 Before moving on to discuss how Lyotard uses the notions of the energetic 
disposition and dissimulation to critique the subject and the critical relation, it is 
important to note once again the proximity between this hinge figure and the figure of 
the artwork developed in Adorno’s aesthetics. The libidinal band and the theatre of 
representations can be grasped as corresponding to the two poles between which, as I 
tried to show in Chapter One, Adorno understands art to emerge. The libidinal band is 
diffuse and mimetic; the theatre of representations is rational and unifying. Yet, just as 
Adorno disputed the “omnipotence” of these poles, Lyotard’s work suggests that they 
cannot be grasped independently of one another as “pure” or unified forms: it is the 
clash between them that generates structures, as we know them. Structures are born of 
and hold within them the intensities of the libidinal band, it is these intensities that give a 
transformative force to structures. In this, the relationship between the energetic 
disposition and the band mirrors that of the relationship between the Adornian artwork 
                                                                                                                                                
(Libidinal Economy 4).  Here, Lyotard can be read as arguing against the nihilism which Plant reads into 
his work (see 175n13). 
262 Lyotard is of course consciously working within and against the theatre of representations, hence his 
“staging” of Adorno. 
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and empirical reality, and just as the Adornian artwork is a force that reconfigures the 
different elements that it holds in its constellation so too is the energetic disposition a 
dynamic collision. The key difference here, again, is that while Adorno reserves the 
potentially transformative power of this force to art, to the sphere of “aesthetics”, in his 
early philosophy Lyotard envisages this energetic and transformative power as at the 
basis of all structures.263 This leads, as Lyotard argues it, to quite different 
understandings of history and subjectivity than those set forth by Adorno: strikingly, it is 
on these grounds, as I will now try to show, that Lyotard’s project begins to appear 
comparable to that of Warhol.  
 
4. A Mechanical Asceticism: Automatism, Bachelor Machines and the 
Critique of Subjectivity  
 
It is, as the title Duchamp’s TRANS/formers suggests, as a mechanics of dissimulation 
that Lyotard positions Duchamp’s work: of particular significance here are the bachelor 
machines, a kind of energetic disposition that brings the human and the mechanical into 
conflict. The machine, in its more familiar guise, is a tool by which humans dominate 
nature; here, however, Lyotard resists the idea of the machine as “anti-natural.” Instead 
he describes the machine as “a combination of resisting bodies, assembled in such a way 
that, by means of them and certain determinant motions, the mechanical forces of nature 
are obliged to do the work” (41).264 Following Duchamp’s lead, in Lyotard’s book the 
machine becomes not an inhuman opposite of the subject, but an analogy for the subject: 
bodies which resist, which do not work but rather “oblige” something else (nature, 
which is here described as mechanical) to do the work. Such a pairing should be 
understood not as anthropomorphic, an attempt to figure the machine in human terms, 
but rather as a mechanisation of the human, an attempt to figure the human in machinic 
                                                 
263 In the later work, Lyotard seems to take a more Adornian line, discussing this force as something that 
belongs peculiarly to art (although not necessarily exclusively).  This shift is no doubt part of the broader 
shift away from the earlier work that was outlined at the beginning of this chapter. 
264 Here Lyotard is in fact adopting the definition of machines given by kinetics pioneer Franz Reuleaux, 
director of the Technische Hochschule in Berlin in the mid nineteenth century and author of the 
Kinematics of Machinery: Outlines of a Theory of Machines (1875). 
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terms. In this sense, the bachelor machines recall the way in which Warhol positions the 
subject: as I tried to show in the last chapter, the technologisation of the subject is a 
favourite trope in the Pop artist’s work, one which a; a novel in particular plays upon. In 
Duchamp’s TRANS/formers, the analogy is compounded by Lyotard’s description of the 
mechanical operation as a “coupling” with nature, a phrase that deliberately hints at an 
erotic or sexual relation between the mechanical and the natural.265 Not a tool for the 
domination of nature, Lyotard’s machine is  
 
an apparatus that lets us overturn relations of force…neither an instrument 
nor a weapon, but an artifice, which is and which is not coupled with 
nature: it is so coupled in that it does not work without capturing and 
exploiting natural forces; it is not so coupled in that it plays a trick on these 
forces, being itself less strong than they are, and making real this 
monstrosity: that the less strong should be stronger than what is stronger. 
(41-42)266 
 
The machine connects the immensurable forces of nature with the “rational” artifice of 
the mechanical structure: it is a space (like the Glass) in which nature and artifice are 
held together but not unified, a hinge space that is characterised by what appears as an 
almost revolutionary potential to generate transformative energy. The bachelor machines 
do not seek to dominate nature but rather to outwit it. Like the Warholian subject who 
brings out their “recordings” when needed, they are “cunning machines,” traps set, 
waiting for the energies of nature to move through them. This idea of waiting, which in 
fact points forward to the temporality of Lyotard’s later description of the avant-garde, is 
                                                 
265 This echoes Warhol’s comments about the televisions and his “wife” (the tape-recorder) which were 
cited in Chapter Three 151n51. Given Warhol’s homosexuality, however, the idea of technology as his 
“wife” perhaps sets in motion not so much an erotic relation than the idea of adhering to social norms 
responsibility, duty and the cliché of marriage as a limitation on male freedom.  In this light, the tape-
recorder might be seen as a “ball and chain” and thus technology appears as something that enslaves the 
human subject as much as it enables it.  For references for more on the queer and masculine sexual politics 
of the Factory see Chapter Three, 146n44). 
266 This last formulation—that the less strong should be stronger than what is stronger—provides, I think,  
a good way of thinking about how Warhol’s work engaged with an art scene that was dominated by 
Abstract Expressionism.  Next to the macho and spiritual art of someone like Pollock, the light-
heartedness of “swish” Pop appears transient and ephemeral, yet, as I have tried to show at various points 
in this thesis, it is precisely by harnessing the energies of abstraction and allowing the clash between high 
and low, serious and humorous etc. to happen, that Warhol’s brand of Pop is generated.  In other words, 
rather than attempting to overthrow Abstract Expressionism, Warhol uses it to shape his art.   
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a waiting-in-vain. For the revolutionary promise will never be fulfilled: the bachelor 
machines are destined to remain celibate for the machine/nature coupling/not coupling is 
like that of the bride and bachelors, neither pairing can form a unity. Indeed, it is at the 
very moment of consummation that the disparity between the two is confirmed. 
 
It’s always when there is contact between two bodies in movement 
…[nature and artifice,] the suitors and their lovely objects, and when from 
one side a claim arises to unite them, to unify them in one body animated 
by the same movement, hence when the aim of coupling or of composing 
forces appears, it’s then that retortion comes along to foil this claim, 
erecting the dissimilating partition between the partners. (Duchamp’s 45) 
 
The coupling of disparate forces does not result in the stronger being finally overthrown; 
the order of the machine or structure does not replace that of nature. To substitute one 
order for another is to work within the magical square, to simply repeat the laws upon 
which domination is based: the cunning machine, in contrast, will allow itself to be 
dominated by nature and in so doing will use the power of nature, in the same way that 
the structure is built on and transformed by the energy of the libidinal band.  
This description of the bachelor machines and their coupling resonates with the 
controversial description in Libidinal Economy of the relationship between the 
proletarian worker and the machine and thus should be understood as being not just a 
response to Duchamp but also a development of Lyotard’s critique of the Marxist 
subject. Discussing the industrial revolution—and in deliberately incendiary language—
Lyotard writes that the worker becomes “the slave of the machine, the machine of the 
machine, fucker fucked by it” and, again eroticising the relationship, claims that “there 
is a jouissance in it, … they [the workers]—hang on tight and spit on me—enjoyed the 
mad destruction of their organic body which was indeed imposed upon them, they 
enjoyed the decomposition of their personal identity” (109). The idea that the proletariat 
take pleasure in their oppression is designed to be offensive, of course, but the key point 
is that the worker to some extent allows himself to be used and thus participates in his 
own oppression. This clearly recalls the production processes of a; a novel discusses in 
the previous chapter and Ondine’s role as cultural “worker,” using as much as being 
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used.267 Warhol’s work again can be seen as the deliberate performance of the structures 
of domination, mirroring the processes of capitalism.  
In Duchamp’s TRANS/formers, staging a dialogue with a hostile interlocutor, 
Lyotard returns to his provocative statement and writes  
 
I’m talking about a mechanical asceticism. The proletariat, in being 
subjected to it, contributed to modernity. It is inaccurate and foolish to see 
them as cattle who couldn’t enter the future except backwards and under a 
hail of blows … “Jouissance.” The French think it means the euphoria that 
follows a meal washed down with Beaujolais. Proletarianization as 
prostitution, they don’t believe that’s in Marx; it’s only a literary metaphor. 
(17– 18) 
 
This is not to say that the worker “gets what he deserves” nor to say that the system is 
either just or defensible, it is to say that the Marxist proletarian subject is a figure that 
can exist only by means of its position within the frameworks that repress it: if 
capitalism is a structure generated by the repression of the worker, the worker is a 
structure generated by capitalism. Just as the worker provides the raw material for 
industry, industry creates the worker, generates a position in which the subject can locate 
him or herself. The subject, then, is an energetic disposition, created by the structures by 
which it is also oppressed.268 
It is at this point that we might briefly respond to some of the charges set out at 
the beginning of this chapter. The first of these is that, according to Crowther, Lyotard 
regards any attempt to demarcate boundaries between disciplines as an attempt at 
domination and therefore as undesirable. It is certainly the case that domination, in 
Lyotard’s early work as in Adorno’s, is the imposition of structure by the forces of 
                                                 
267 Here we might also think of the typists.  Warhol recalled that they took 18 months to finish what 
should have been a relatively short project. “I would glance over at them sometimes with admiration 
because they had me convinced that typing was one of the slowest, most painstaking jobs in the world. 
Now I realize […that] they just liked being around all the people who hung around at the studio” 
(Philosophy 95). 
268 Later, in The Inhuman, Lyotard will claim that the condition of subjectivity is always riven and that it 
is this rivenness that prevents us from becoming fully inhuman. See “Introduction: About the Human” 1-7. 
For another version of this argument see Lyotard’s essay “The Other’s Rights”: “What makes human 
beings alike is the fact that every human being carries within him the figure of the other. The likeness that 
they have in common follows from the difference of each from each” (136). 
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rationalisation and so it is true that the attempt to demarcate boundaries is in some sense 
a form of domination. Yet, it is important to note that for Lyotard such domination is 
necessary: without it structures cannot exist. Lyotard is not a utopian thinker; he does 
not see the end of domination as a possibility. However, he does see strength and force 
as something that can be used in the way that the machine uses nature. In other words, 
domination is not a purely negative power and, most importantly, the form it takes is 
contingent. Crucially, this means that the lines of demarcation, the structures of 
domination, are open to transformation. Lyotard does not, then, protest against all 
domination but rather attempts to think through how domination works and how its 
structures can be transformed.  
As I have already suggested, Lyotard does this by adopting Adorno’s model of 
the artwork: the model of the libidinal band as the ground and substance of the structure, 
is the same model as that sketched out by Adorno when he writes of the “collective 
unconscious” as the ground and substance of the artwork.269 For Lyotard, structure and 
intensity are as mutually dependent upon one another as art and non-art are for Adorno. 
It is this movement of aesthetics beyond the sphere of art, of course, that is seen as 
problematic by Eagleton, who critiques Lyotard’s work as aestheticism or anti-
philosophical intuitionism. Again, what this critique fails to take account of is the place 
of structure in Lyotard’s thought. Lyotard’s work does not reject structure, it is not anti-
reason or anti-theory: it simply reveals these forms as dependent upon the differences 
that they seek to repress in the name of “truth.” Such structures are necessary but they 
are also contingent: they do not constitute the truth. Lyotard does not value art, intuition 
or intensity over and above philosophy, reason and structure; he reveals them as 
mutually dependent.  
Marxist revolution as a resolution of inequality, a vision of the absence of 
domination, can do nothing to challenge the “magical square” of capitalism: attempting 
                                                 
269 As I mentioned in chapter one, Adorno’s notion of the collective unconscious can be approached in 
terms of Heidegger’s discussion of the relation between Being and beings. That Lyotard’s thinking of the 
event can also be approached this way is suggested by his use in The Inhuman of the term Ereignis: see 
Malpas’s “Sublime Ascesis” for an exploration of the relation between Ereignis and the Lyotardian event. 
For an alternative Heiddeggerian model of the avant-garde as event see also Ziareck, Force. 
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to exchange one totalising system for another (even if this attempt is carried out in the 
name of redistribution and equality) it repeats the laws upon which domination is based. 
It is a negative reflection of capitalism. To really alter this structure, Lyotard argues, we 
have to be able to see our own complicity with it, how structure generates the subject as 
well as represses it, and crucially we need to be aware of its necessary contingency.270 
The structure of the Marxist narrative of history and subjectivity is one way of putting 
into perspective, not the way: the moment of integral nominalism at the heart of all 
structures (political as well as theoretical and artistic) should be grasped. This is what is 
at stake, for Lyotard, in both art and politics, “to make seen what makes one see, and not 
what is visible” (“Sublime” 102). For, once the magical square emerges, then the 
possibility of other structures which operate to different, more just laws unfolds.  
These stakes call not for the active resistance of rebellion against the system but 
rather for a kind of passivity in which the necessary contingency of the structure is 
allowed to expose itself as such and can thus be transformed. It calls, in other words, for 
a kind of automatism that suspends conscious will and instead allows the operations of 
structures to be revealed, an automatism that (like the automatic talking of a; a novel) 
reveals the dependency of human thought on these structures at the same time as it 
reveals their contingency. Thus it is that thought proceeds by means of a mechanical 
ascesis, an ascesis of the conscious will: “the artist no longer composes, he lets his 
deployment’s desire go its way” (“Adorno” 132). Rather than predetermining the 
meaning of events, it is the duty of thought, as Lyotard puts it, to “[scan] the situation 
sincerely (as in the case of the painter)” (Peregrinations 26), to allow change to happen 
and to judge what happens on a case by case basis, without forcing events to conform to 
predetermined criteria. Thinking moves, in Lyotard’s work, through a kind of aesthetic 
judgment, a judgment which takes place without determinate criteria. Its duty is to resist 
the movement of synthesis, of unification and instead to bear witness to what Lyotard 
has “always tried, under diverse headings –work, figural, heterogeneity, dissensus, 
event, thing – to reserve: the unharmonizable” (Inhuman 4). This term clearly gestures 
                                                 
270 Lyotard has also formulated the same idea in directly political terms a discussion of his time and 
activities in Algeria in Peregrinations (see 26). 
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towards the categories and arguments of aesthetic theory and in particular the notion of 
the sublime. It is the task of bearing witness to the unharmonizable, moreover, which 
emerges in Lyotard’s writing as the task of the avant-garde. Before examining this 
connection, however, it is necessary to briefly outline how Lyotard’s critiques of 
subjectivity and representation re-configure the critical relation, for this reconfiguration 
not only illuminates Lyotard’s thinking more generally but also opens out a site in which 
to compare his work with the theories of the avant-garde discussed in previous chapters. 
 
5. I’ll be Your Mirror: Dissimulating the Critical Relation  
  
The world is a multiplicity of apparatuses that transform units of energy 
into one another. Duchamp the transformer does not want to repeat the 
same effects. That is why he must be many of these apparatuses, and must 
metamorphose himself continually. He wants to win first prize every time, 
in all the competitions, for new patents. 
 
Duchamp as several transformers. (36-37)271 
 
Duchamp attempts, in other words, to dissimilate the intensities within himself and his 
own work. Through repetition, indifference, canned chance and “mirrorical returns” he 
avoids replication—of ideas, of social structures, of works, of his own “authorial” 
identity—and instead generates difference. This process of transformation through 
repetition, dissimilation, becomes in Lyotard’s thought an alterative to the critical 
relation set up by Frankfurt-School Marxism.  
In Duchamp’s TRANS/formers, Lyotard sets up a distinction between two 
different types of relation or response, namely the “mirrorish” and the “specular”. The 
latter, which returns us to the idea of the spectacle as a set of reified relations, describes 
a relation of simulation or replication. The specular mode homogenises, generates 
copies. It is this specular relation that grounds the idea of representation as a “true” 
reflection, and thus grounds the assumption that criticism can reproduce in language the 
meanings and propositions of art works. The specular relation is that of capitalism, but 
                                                 
271 This final sentence is italicised and in English in the French original thus, like Duchamp, Lyotard uses 
foreign languages and italicisation to draw attention to the materiality of his text. See Chapter Three 161-
162 for a fuller discussion of this strategy in Duchamp’s work. 
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equally that of the “Adorno/Marx” narrative which Lyotard attacks in “Adorno as the 
Devil”. In contrast the mirrorish relation that Lyotard associates with Duchamp is a 
dissimilating relation. For a mirror, although it may seem to present a true reflection of 
what stands before it, in fact what it presents us with, as Duchamp’s occasional practice 
of mirror-writing reminds us, is an inversion:272 “a duplicating machine” Lyotard writes 
“the mirror can be taken as a duplex/duplicitous machine… its fidelity and its infidelity 
are produced together” (91). The “mirrorish” relation, which clearly owes something to 
Duchamp’s “mirrorical return”, is thus a relation that, while appearing to copy, actually 
transforms.273   
 “Similitude,” Lyotard writes, “like causality and implication, comes from the 
stupidity of the eye, out of which its power is engendered. Dissimilation foils this power: 
it puts it in check” (Duchamp’s 76). In this formulation we get not only the attack on the 
stupidity of the eye of Duchamp’s project, of course, but also that of Lyotard’s early 
work. In fact, what Duchamp’s TRANS/formers represents is the coupling/non-coupling 
of artist and philosopher, the mirrorish transformation of Duchamp’s work in Lyotard’s 
response. Lyotard’s text takes on the character of Duchamp’s nonsensical notes and 
from the givens of his work dissimulates a mirrorishly faithful/unfaithful reproduction. 
274 Suppressing the question of original and copy, author and imitator, Duchamp and 
Lyotard allow for transformation, not identity, to be given priority. This is a useful way 
                                                 
272 By inscribing words backwards, mirror-writing is only able to be read when a mirror it held to it, 
reflecting its inversion into “proper” writing. See Correspondence 135, for example, where Duchamp 
signs a letter (dated 26th July 1923) to Ettie Steheimer in this script.  
273 Lyotard’s distinction between the specular and the mirrorish clearly recalls Debord: the specular return 
is a return that reproduces the reified relations of the spectacle, while mirrorish activity, like 
détournement, bears a resemblance but is in fact different. These, however, are not true echoes but 
themselves mirrorish dissimilations for, as we have seen, Lyotard’s work refuses the opposition between 
the spectacular and the authentic.  
274 In this respect, the immense care that has gone into the presentation of the English translation of 
Duchamp’s TRANS/formers should be applauded. Not only has the book been bound in the same green 
baize-like material as Duchamp’s Green Box, but the text is preceded by a sequence of pages whose 
contents work as a kind of prefiguration of the work that follows. Firstly, there is a quotation from 
Duchamp, one that is now familiar; “I was thinking of a book, but I didn’t like that idea.” On the 
following page, introducing both the trope of sexual difference and the possibility of a slippage between 
identities, the famous Man Ray photograph of Duchamp’s feminine alter-ego appears, signed “lovingly 
Rrose Sélavy, alias Marcel Duchamp.” Finally, in a phrasing that clearly indicates the possibility of such 
slippage between Duchamp and Lyotard, the title page reads “Duchamp’s TRANS/formers: A book by 
Jean-François Lyotard,” the typography of the title indicating graphically both the coupling of dissimilars 
and the partitioning of unities.  
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of thinking about Lyotard’s project during this period more broadly in fact and, in 
particular, his Libidinal Economy, which can be understood as the mirrorish reflection or 
“evil twin” of capitalism. The libidinal economy as Lyotard imagines it operates not 
through exchange value (it does not offer a better or even a different system) but rather 
through the investments of immensurable intensities. While the economy of capitalism is 
based on the specular mode of reproduction, assimilating different values to the 
commensurable value of money, the libidinal economy works to the mirrorish mode, 
dissimulating the same into difference. Lyotard’s work is not only a mirrorish reflection 
of capitalism, of course, but also, as I have attempted to show, of Marxism and a 
mirrorish transformation of Adorno’s aesthetics, both faithful and unfaithful to his 
thought.275 Recognising the implication of the idea of revolution in oppression, Lyotard 
does not attempt to overthrow the nostalgic modernism against which his early work 
protests; rather than replace it, he attempts to hold a dissimulating mirror to it.276 It is 
this same tactic, I will suggest shortly, that he uses in his later work when approaching 
aesthetic modernism.  
“To raise doubts about representation,” Lyotard writes in “Adorno as the Devil”, 
“is to manifest the theatrical relation (in music, in painting, in politics, in the theatre, in 
literature, in film) as being directed by an arbitrary libidinal deployment [disposif 
libidinal]” (“Adorno” 128). In other words, it is to understand representation, history and 
politics, as we know them, to be not logical necessities but rather contingent 
                                                 
275 For more on the relationship between Marxism and Lyotard’s Libidinal Economy, see David Carroll’s 
chapter “Aesthetic Antagonisms” 44-52. As this chapter should make clear, however, I would refute 
Carroll’s claim that Lyotard is unaware of the proximity of his work to Frankfurt School Marxism and 
that, in positing the “libidinal as the negation of all theorization” (49) he simply mirrors “Adorno’s” 
negative theology. I am arguing that Lyotard is more than aware of the proximity between his thought and 
Adorno’s and that at various points he deliberately “mirrors” his work in order to speak to and about it, 
without negating or opposing it.  
276 As I have tried to show at various points in this thesis, is the very strategy that lies at the heart of 
Warhol’s work. The pop artist’s paintings mimic advertising and mass media as well as abstract painting 
and aesthetic formalism, holding each up as the mirror image of the other and revealing their mutual 
complicity in the structures of domination.  Warhol’s work shows that abstract painting does not exist 
outside society but is as much a consequence and expression of it as “literary” art. With a; a novel he 
postures as though the work directly and faithfully reflects/records reality, like a mirror, and in fact reveals 
the fact that realism is a set of conventions, a magical square. The moment of this revelation, the moment 
in which these conventions become available, is the moment in which the possibility of their 
transformation opens out.  
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manifestations of libidinal energies. The critical relation is “theatrical”, a manipulative 
process of staging. Representations are modes of “putting into perspective.” It is 
capitalism itself, Lyotard goes on to suggest, that, by continually extending its 
rationalising, homogenising structure over all social spheres and domains, exposes its 
own reliance on such intensities. There is no sense in attempting to negate such a 
system, he argues, for (as Paul Mann also argued) it can recuperate and neutralise all 
critiques. Yet such recuperation (thought mirrorishly, as an “inverted” critique) 
becomes, in Lyotard’s thought, a productive event.  
 
[Capitalism] places everything inside representation, representation doubles 
itself (as in Brecht), therefore presents itself. The tragic gives way to the 
parodic, the libido retracts its investment from the stage, and invests the 
ensemble stage/hall, the whole interior of the theatre, including the wings 
and underneath the stage. (“Adorno” 128) 
 
It is the totalising drive of capitalism, in other words, that reveals the presence of 
libidinal intensities in structures. Representation doubles itself, thus reveals itself as 
something that is internally riven, a structure differing from itself: the process of 
recuperation, then, dissimulates the intensities within representation. While it is Brecht 
that Lyotard mentions, this could very well be a description of the operation of 
Fountain, disinvesting the object of art and reinvesting the gallery space, or of Warhol’s 
Campbells’ Soup Cans, disinvesting the conventional subject matter of painting and 
reinvesting the banal objects of everyday life. Indeed, it is as this mirrorish reflection of 
capitalism, that Lyotard recognises Pop’s drive to reveal the libidinal basis of the art 
economy and consumerism more broadly. In Warhol’s art, he writes, 
 
not only is the libidinally charged character of [consumer/art] objects 
shown, but also their obsolescent, exchangeable character, and the fact 
that they will disappear, be consumed, that they have no importance. And 
in showing that, it is indicated (but only negatively) that what is important 
is energy, fluidity, desire in its displaceability, and that these object are 
concretions destined to disappear, just as what is important in a 
commodity for capital is not what it is, but what it can be transformed 
into; it is the metamorphosis that counts, and not the object itself. 




In other words, dissimulation as transformation is an exchange of intensities that mirrors 
the monetary exchange of the capitalist economy.  Rather than exposing capitalism as at 
the basis of all structures (forms of domination), then, Lyotard positions capitalism as a 
form of structure or representation. He dissimulates Adorno’s thought to reveal “the 
entire society as an economy (in the Freudian sense), as the expense and metamorphosis 
of libidinal energy” (“Adorno” 130).  
This is a revelation with consequences for all forms and structures, including the 
“rational” discourses of philosophy and theory. The essay, with its serial structure and 
paraesthetic experimentation, exposes the necessity/contingency of the conventions by 
which a philosophical text differs from a literary text. It implies thereby that 
philosophical texts do not have greater “truth claim” than literary texts, which is to say 
that it questions the autonomy of art, its separation from “rational” discourse. Lyotard’s 
thought posits a mirrorish relation in which forms or structures (artworks, genres, 
subjects etc.) are generated through the internalisation of difference, by holding 
themselves in relation to alterity. It reminds us that not just art but dispositions such as 
theory and philosophy are shot through with intensities and so also provide fertile 
pastures for the activity of dissimulation. His work stages a conflict between art and 
philosophy in the attempt to think through and generate difference. Lyotard’s tactics of 
dissimulation are designed, like Duchamp’s “hilarious picture” (the Large Glass), not to 
oppose rationality and the discourse of philosophy but rather to open up “hilarious 
perspectives… in matters of theoretical discourse” (Libidinal 53).  
 More importantly still, this revelation is a serious challenge to the notion of 
autonomy upon which the theories of the avant-garde put forward by Bürger and 
Greenberg depend. If all structures are generated through the conflict of alterity, 
objectified like Adorno’s artwork by their being in relation to what they are not, then 
autonomy can no longer be conceived of as separation, independence or self-
determination. Such a phrasing would only reinforce the Marxist critical relation that is 
generated on the nostalgic promise of reconciliation. The oppositional structures upon 
which thinkers like Greenberg and Bürger build their notions of the avant-garde—avant-
garde and kitsch, art and life, the visual and the literary—are precisely those that 
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Lyotard rejects. Lyotard’s thought, therefore, can be understood as pre-empting the idea 
(discussed in Chapter Two) that the formulations of the avant-garde set forth by Bürger 
and Greenberg are not in fact oppositional but rather manifestations of the same impulse. 
Both Bürger and Greenberg are trapped in a cycle of nostalgia and negation: “modernity, 
in whatever age it appears,” Lyotard writes, “cannot exist without a shattering of belief 
and without discovery of the “lack of reality” of reality, together with the invention of 
other realities” (“Answering” 77). The project of Bürger’s avant-garde is the shattering 
of belief, it “unmasks” art, reveals it as just as corrupted as the society from which it 
emerges. Greenberg’s avant-garde sees society as lacking and posits an art that is truer, 
more authentic. Each formulation is based on the same structures and epistemologies as 
Lyotard ascribes to Adorno: autonomy is the central question. Here the very framework 
upon which this idea is predicated is revealed as modernist nostalgia. The magical 
square which grounds both theories of the avant-garde emerges and the possibility of an 
alternative post-aesthetic avant-garde unfolds.  
Both Greenbergian formalism and the dialectics that underpin Bürger’s work are 
reactions towards the period of the individual subject. Lyotard’s thought, on the other 
hand, is an attempt to “act toward the time of the circulation of energy liberated from the 
law of value” (“Adorno” 133). In the realm of capital and under the law of value, time 
and space become history (“now” and “then”) and representation (“on stage” and “off 
stage”). The critical relation seeks to contain difference, neutralise intensities, and 
reduce heterogeneity to a system of commensurability. Lyotard, in contrast, attempts to 
think incommensurability and difference: this is what is at stake in his self-declared 
obsession with “an open space-time”. Moving on to discuss Lyotard’s later work now, I 
want to argue that it is as a philosophy of the event, of the open space-time, that 
Lyotard’s thought recasts the material motive of art as a material moment. He thereby 
echoes the gestures of Duchamp and Warhol who, as I tried to show in the last chapter, 






6. The Sublime as Material Moment 
 
In The Inhuman there are two key statements on the avant-garde, “Newman: the Instant” 
and “The Sublime and the Avant-garde.” Both focus upon delineating what Lyotard sees 
as the peculiar temporality of the avant-garde art work which he describes as a now. This 
now is, he writes, 
 
a stranger to consciousness and cannot be constituted by it. Rather it is 
what dismantles consciousness, what deposes consciousness, it is what 
consciousness cannot formulate, and even what consciousness forgets in 
order to constitute itself… [it is the] it happens…Just an occurrence. (90)  
 
Like the intensity of the libidinal band, unknowable unless congealed into structures but 
nevertheless the condition of their emergence, the event is that which makes history and 
representation possible yet evades their attempts to represent it. It is a moment of 
transformation, “the fact or case that something happens,” as Bill Reading puts it, “after 
which nothing will ever be the same again” (xxxi). For Lyotard, as I have tried to show, 
it is the presence of this “putting into perspective” of the event, that both art and 
philosophy must attempt to make visible. The avant-garde is the mode of art which bears 
witness to the now of the event.  
This is not to say, however, that the avant-garde artwork represents the event or 
stands in for it. Rather, as Lyotard writes in “Newman: The Instant,” the task of the 
avant-garde artwork is “ontological” and “chronological” in that “it accomplishes it 
without completing it. It must constantly begin to testify anew to the occurrence by 
letting the occurrence be” (88). The art work, Lyotard thus claims, manages to maintain 
something of the event within itself and in so doing operates as event. It is this capacity 
to operate as event that Lyotard understands as giving art its power, because it is as an 
event that the artwork demands a response without providing in advance the laws under 
which that response must be formulated.277 “It isn’t a matter of sense or reality bearing 
                                                 
277 If the artwork is conceived of as anything other than an event (i.e. as a commodity, as an example of a 
particular genre, as the articulation of a prior conceptual idea etc.) then the response it provokes takes 
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upon what happens or what this might mean,” Lyotard writes.  
 
Before asking questions about what it is and about its significance, before 
the quid, it must “first” so to speak “happen,” quod … [thus] the event 
happens as a question mark “before” happening as a question. It happens is 
rather “in the first place” is it happening, is this it, is it possible? 
(“Sublime” 90)  
  
It is as this questioning, as an ascesis of narrative or a privation of consciousness, that 
Lyotard thinks the avant-garde: its task is to disarm “that which we call thought” and to 
open out towards what eludes or escapes consciousness (“Sublime” 90). In Lyotard’s 
thought, therefore, the avant-garde does not seek to capture and represent the event, nor 
to create it, but rather, by questioning and listening, waiting like the cunning machine, to 
allow it to be felt. Disarming consciousness, its task is “that of undoing the presumption 
of the mind with respect to time” (“Sublime” 107) and allowing that which is forgotten 
by consciousness, repressed in the narrative of “rational” mind, to make its presence 
apparent. The avant-garde is a mechanism of dissimulation, a privation or waiting in 
which that which is other to representation makes itself felt.278 
 It is as a privation of thought, an ascesis which allows the incommensurable to 
manifest itself as such, that Lyotard locates the avant-garde within the aesthetic mode of 
the sublime. Indeed, rather than seeing the avant-garde as a specifically twentieth-
century phenomenon, made possible by the full historical unfolding of aestheticism, 
Lyotard traces the roots of what he sees as avant-gardism further back, claiming that it is 
“present in germ in the Kantian aesthetics of the sublime” (98). According to Kant, 
Lyotard writes, the sublime is a “failure of expression [which] gives rise to a pain, a kind 
of cleavage within the subject between what can be conceived and what can be imagined 
or presented” (98). This cleavage is at the same time pleasurable because it demonstrates 
the inability to represent Ideas and is thus “a negative sign of the immense power of 
Ideas” (98). The sublime, as a failure of synthesis, is a mode in which the rational mind 
                                                                                                                                                
place within a pre-determined framework (i.e. according to its economic value, according to the laws of 
genre, according to how it measures against the idea).  
278 Such a description resonates with Ziareck’s recent claim that it is “this ability to let go of power, to 
transform relations and enable their alternative configurations, [that] constitutes the paradoxical force of 
contemporary art” (Force 4). 
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is made aware of its limitations, made aware that there is something which exceeds its 
grasp.279 The sublime can thus be understood as a kind of hinge figure, a sign of the 
connection between unconnected or incommensurable forces.   
In “The Sublime and the Avant-garde,” however, Lyotard attempts to distinguish 
his notion of a modern sublime from the Romantic sublime of Kantian aesthetics. This 
distinction operates on three levels. Firstly, Lyotard claims, while the art of the 
Romantic sublime is concerned with representing sublime objects, creating an 
expression worthy of the sublime, modern art is concerned with expressing the failure of 
expression itself: “The art object no longer bends itself to models,” Lyotard writes, “but 
tries to present the fact that there is an unpresentable; it no longer imitates nature, but is 
… the actualisation of a figure potentially there in language” (“Sublime” 101). 
Significantly, then, as Lyotard sees it, there is a break between art and nature, art no 
longer tries to imitate nature. With this phrase the key difference between his position 
and the Adornian position set out by Bernstein begin to appear: unlike Bernstein’s 
modernism, Lyotard’s avant-garde does not mourn “lost nature” but rather attempts to 
inscribe the failure of expression, to inscribe the now that evades the structures of 
presentation or expression. In this sense the avant-garde work (including the literary 
work) inscribes that which language cannot express: it writes without “saying yes to the 
sea of language”.  
This difference is important in the context of the second mode of differentiating 
between the Romantic and the contemporary sublime: unlike the Romantic sublime, 
Lyotard’s sublime does not promise transcendence nor does it offer reconciliation. 
Rather what it reveals is immanent presence: it is the “occurrence of a sensory now 
[that] cannot be presented and which remains to be presented” (103). As Simon Malpas 
explains, “what flashes up is the quod of the quotidian: the occurrence, the isolated ‘it 
happens’ that has always been immanent in what happens but has remained occluded by 
                                                 
279 Kant describes the sublime as that “which is absolutely great” (§25, 64) and which cannot be attained 
by an Idea. (See Critique of Judgement §23-29, 60-90) For discussion of the Kantian sublime see 





realist representations” (205).280 Thus, in painting, Lyotard suggests, “the indeterminate, 
the ‘it happens’ is the paint, the picture. The paint, the picture as occurrence or event is 
not expressible, and it is to this that it has to bear witness” (93). The art-event, in other 
words, is the “putting into perspective” of art; the inscription of the inexpressible is the 
materiality of the medium itself.281 The material motive of art is reconfigured as a 
material moment, the now, in which the medium does not stand in for the lost authority 
of nature but presents itself as a doubling of presence, as the it happens of the event. 
This a key difference between Bernstein’s material motive and Lyotard’s material 
moment, a difference upon which the argument that follows will depend. For the 
moment though, it suffices to say that the unpresentable is not an absence, not a “lost” 
state of grace; “the inexpressible does not reside in an over there, in another world, or 
another time, but in this: in that (something) happens” (“Sublime” 93). This flashing up 
of the immanent unpresentable within presentation is the sublime now: “it’s this 
painting. Here and now there is this painting, rather than nothing, and that’s what is 
sublime” (93). The “nonsense” of the occurrence is “the most precious treasure” to 
which art and philosophy must bear witness. 
The immanent now marks the final mode by which Lyotard distinguishes his 
thought from Romantic aesthetics: temporality. The pain of the sublime, Lyotard 
suggests, can be thought as the pain of waiting, the fear that nothing will happen that 
marks the questioning of the avant-garde is it happening? In other words, the sublime is 
marked by the fear that the failure of expression, the failure of synthesis, might not be 
overcome. At the same time, however, this sublime waiting holds within itself the 
pleasure of anticipation, the sense that “something will happen, despite everything, 
within this threatening void, that something will take ‘place’ and will announce that 
everything is not over” (“Newman” 84). The sublime holds out the possibility of joy as 
                                                 
280 Lyotard’s insistence on the quod of our encounter with art, on its material presence, is a mirrorish 
dissimilation of formalism. It may seem to align his thought with Greenberg’s because both thinkers locate 
art’s power in the affective capacity of this encounter, but, as I will suggest shortly, this is deceptive. See 
Costello for an in depth reading of Lyotard’s sublime in relation to Kant’s aesthetics and a comparison to 
Greenberg’s modernism.  
281 This is not to say that all events are artworks, of course, nor that all artworks are events. What I am 
describing here is specifically the art-event of the avant-garde work as Lyotard thinks it. 
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the it happens, the realisation of the event or now as a moment of freedom which is 
intrinsically open to the future without pre-determining what that future will be. 
It is the temporal drive of consciousness—“the presumption of the mind with 
respect to time”—Lyotard suggests in “The Sublime and the Avant-garde,” that leads to 
a confusion between the now and the new, modes which must, he argues, be carefully 
differentiated. Like avant-garde art, capitalism has something of the sublime about it: “it 
is, in a sense, an economy regulated by an Idea – infinite wealth or power” (“Sublime” 
105). In highly developed capitalist societies, economies are no longer driven by the 
production of products, but by the circulation of information. But information, as soon 
as it is accessible, becomes redundant:  
 
We ‘know’. It is put into the machine memory. The length of time it 
occupies is, so to speak, instantaneous. Between two pieces of information, 
‘nothing happens’, by definition. A confusion thereby becomes possible, 
between what is of interest to information and the director, and what is the 
question of the avant-gardes, between what happens – the new – and the Is 
it happening?, the now. (105-106) 
 
 
Information operates according to the logic of innovation and the new, Lyotard suggests, 
and is defined by constant streaming: information accounts for all time and operates 
through the logic of consumption. It constructs a sequence with no gaps, a narrative in 
which one piece of information links seamlessly onto another. Because information 
operates with the temporality of the instant it may appear to operate like the event, but, 
Lyotard argues, this is to mistake the occurrence for mere innovation. To innovate, one 
does not invent but rather one simply “re-uses formulae confirmed by previous success, 
one throws them off-balance by combining them with other, in principle incompatible, 
formulae, by amalgamations, quotations ornamentations, pastiche” (106).282 Innovation, 
                                                 
282 This formulation clearly recalls Greenberg’s notion of avant-gardism, as a magpie tactic of medium 
scrambling. Indeed, in his differentiation between the new and the now Lyotard’s thought seems almost 
equivalent to aesthetic modernism (hence Costello’s accusation, mentioned at the outset of this chapter): 
innovation, driven by capitalist consumption, can be easily aligned with kitsch and, as Lyotard figures the 
avant-garde by means of Barnett Newman’s work, his claim for the now as an alternative temporality to 
the new appears very close indeed to Fried’s notion of the “presentness” of abstract painting. The choice 
of Newman’s paintings as the key examples in the essays on the avant-garde has in fact been read as 
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then, is a process of repetition, the performance of a competence: it is a programmed 
synthesis, the rules of which are pre-determined by the demands of consumption and 
capitalism. To innovate is “to behave as though lots of things happened, and to make 
them happen. Through innovation, the will affirms its hegemony over time. It thus 
conforms to the metaphysics of capital, which is a technology of time. The innovation 
‘works’” (107) and, in its powerful efficiency, it prevents the questioning and waiting of 
the avant-garde. A product of the will to make sense, information is that which shores up 
and arms “that which we call thought.” 
It is this demand for efficiency and desire for innovation that leads, in The 
Differend, we might note, to a vision of the future of writing that brings to mind 
Warhol’s project in a; a novel. “In the next century,” Lyotard writes,  
 
there will be no more books. It takes too long to read, when success comes 
from gaining time. What will be called a book will be a printed object 
whose ‘message’ (its information content) and name and title will first have 
been broadcast by the media, a film, a newspaper interview, a television 
programme, and a cassette recording. (Differend xv) 
 
In other words, the drive of information/capital will erase the materiality of writing, the 
matter of words. Capital operates to erase the medium, to make us forget matter and to 
replace it with information: “where there is a message,” Lyotard writes in Libidinal 
Economy, “there is no material” (43).283 In contrast, the event (which, as I have tried to 
show, is material in Lyotard’s thought) works to destabilise the structures of 
representation: it attacks the representations of historical and narrative time, for “with 
the occurrence the will is defeated” (107). The avant-gardist task is to resist the will that 
drives capital, to resist the demand to save time by making consumption easier through 
the seamless production of the new, to resist its reduction of everything to a unit of 
                                                                                                                                                
Lyotard claiming painting as the paradigmatic form of modern art, as Greenberg and Bernstein did. I will 
argue, however, that this is not the case: as I hope the discussion so far has shown and as I will continue to 
argue in what follows, in fact Lyotard’s thought resists the frameworks of such modernist aesthetic theory 
and should not be read as privileging painting. 
283 Of course, what a; a novel actually shows, as I argued in the last chapter, is that this erasure of matter is 




information. As a process of anamnesis, art and philosophy must attempt to bear witness 
to what consciousness forgets: as a privation of consciousness, the failure of 
programmed synthesis, it is an opening in which a kind of passive synthesis may (or 
may not) occur, during which the unpresentable event may (or may not) make itself felt. 
 There is an obvious debt to Adorno in Lyotard’s formulation of avant-garde art 
as a process of bearing witness to that which is suppressed within techno-scientific 
rationality and as driven by something other than the forces of innovation which power 
capitalism. For both, the avant-garde work bears witness to that which is repressed or 
forgotten in consciousness, that which the forces of rationalisation seek to erase. It thus 
holds open the possibility of alterity and difference in the face of a system which moves 
towards homogenisation and totalising domination. Certainly, Lyotard’s distinction 
between the now and the new echoes Adorno’s attempts to distance art from the idea of 
the new (which Adorno too considers one of the driving forces of capitalism).284 Yet, 
Lyotard’s distinction is also meant to be set in contrast to the progressive historical 
narrative which, if we are to believe “Adorno as the Devil”, underwrites the German 
philosopher’s thought: Lyotard does not position the avant-garde as future-oriented in 
the manner of Bürger, nor as nostalgic in the manner of Adorno and Bernstein but rather 
as operating recursively. Like Foster, he adopts a psychoanalytic model of repetition and 
working through to characterise the temporal mode of the avant-garde.  
 
Thought works over what is received, it seeks to reflect on it and overcome 
it. It seeks to determine what has already been thought, written, painted or 
socialized in order to determine what hasn’t … this agitation (agitation is 
the word Kant gives to the activity of the mind that has judgement and 
exercises it), this agitation is only possible if something remains to be 
determined, something that hasn’t yet been determined. One can strive to 
determine this something by setting up a system, a theory, a programme or 
a project – and indeed one has to, all the while anticipating that something. 
                                                 
284 For an interesting discussion of Adorno’s position on the new see Cunningham, “A Time for 
Dissonance and Noise”. Interestingly, as Cunningham shows in another essay, “The Futures of 
Surrealism”, this now temporality in fact might be understood as developing from the work of another 
Marxist thinker, Walter Benjamin, whose Arcades project describes the notion of Jetztzeit (see 
Cunningham 54 – 55). This would provide an interesting point of reconnection between Lyotard’s work 
and Frankfurt School Marxist thought. 
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One can also enquire about the remainder, and allow the indeterminate to 
appear as a question-mark. (“Sublime” 90-91) 
 
As this passage indicates, the task of the avant-garde, as Lyotard presents it, is, like the 
task of thought in general, to work over and dissimulate what is given, to transform 
tradition, convention and received ideas. The avant-garde, as the question-mark, resists 
programmes, projects and theories: it attempts to reveal that there is something that 
remains to be thought, something that resists the structures of reason, without 
anticipating (and so pre-determining) what that is. The avant-garde operates within and 
on the structures of tradition and convention. While consciousness, or the will, operates 
by imposing structure and imposing meaning (through dominating and reigning in the 
event) the avant-garde is an ascesis, an opening that allows the indeterminate, the un-
thought, to be given. 
 It is at this juncture, through his use of this recursive model, that Lyotard can be 
seen to open himself to the same charge that, as I suggested in Chapter Two, could be 
levelled against Foster. Lyotard may be understood as replacing the utopian nostalgia for 
nature, or the original and authentic, which characterises both Adorno and Bürger’s 
work, with a negative origin in the form of an absence or traumatic event, a gap in 
history. As I indicated in Chapter Two, the avant-garde conceived as a working through 
of the traumatic event (as absence or gap) might therefore appear as a compulsive return 
to the scene of trauma, repeatedly attempting to recall and rewrite the missing event. The 
event as a lost origin, that which is forgotten and repressed in discourse and which 
haunts it, thus appears to set the parameters of future action and so to deny agency, 
closing down possibilities rather than opening them up. Such a model, as Jacques 
Rancière has recently argued, comes dangerously close to falling into the same negative 
theology that Lyotard critiques under the name Adorno: it is at risk of turning art into 
“the mourning of politics” which is a move, Rancière argues, that substitutes 
“repentance and memory for any will to political transformation” (22). Drawing out the 




For Lyotard, as for Adorno, the avant-garde must indefinitely draw the line 
severing modern art from commodity culture. But Lyotard pushes this 
“task” to its point of reversion. In Adorno’s construction, the external 
separation and the inner contradictions of the artwork still kept the 
Schillerian promise of emancipation, the promise of an unalienated life. In 
Lyotard’s version, they have to witness to just the contrary: the drawing of 
the dividing line testifies to an immemorial dependency of human thought 
on the power of the Other, that makes any promise of emancipation a 
deception. (22)285 
 
In other words, Rancière reads Lyotard’s refusal of autonomy as articulating a 
dependency which forecloses on the possibility of freedom that art, according to 
Adorno, is a reminder of. The trauma model thus appears to replace autonomy with 
subservience, agency with passivity, and hope with despondency.286 The artwork, rather 
than standing in for the lost authority of nature, as we saw it do in Bernstein’s Adornian 
account, stands in (equally mournfully) for the event as a past disaster, the historical 
calamity after which nothing will ever be the same again. 
It is at this point that connecting Lyotard’s notion of the art-work as event (rather 
than as response to or reminder of a past event, for this is what differentiates his model 
from the trauma theory put forth by Foster) to the idea of the energetic disposition that 
his earlier work outlines becomes particularly important. For while it is certainly the 
                                                 
285 Rancière, in fact argues that Lyotard replaces Adorno’s messianic vision, with a past disaster for 
which mourning never ends, an alternative form of nostalgia. In both cases, Rancière writes,  
 
it is the same theology of Time which is overturned, namely the vision of the historical 
event which breaks through History, separating a time before and a time after. For a long 
time, that event had been the forthcoming revolution. In the ethical turn, that orientation of 
times was reversed. History is no more cut by the promise of revolution ahead of us; it is 
cut by the event of Extermination that lies behind us, an event which stands for the endless 
disaster, debarring any process of emancipation. (23)  
 
Rancière’s reading of Lyotard, as I think this passage makes plain, is a response to The Differend’s 
setting up of “Auschwitz” as the Unpresentable, a move that once again draws an obvious parallel 
between Lyotard’s work and Adorno’s. Rancière’s critique is undoubtedly important: Lyotard’s choice of 
the theological term “evil” for his earlier work, moreover, suggests that he himself may have come to see 
it as falling into this trap. Yet, as I hope to show in what remains of this chapter, in terms of the avant-
garde as it presented in The Inhuman, the event cannot be considered as either past or disastrous in this 
way but rather is figured as present and emancipatory. In this sense, I will try to suggest, Lyotard’s work 
on aesthetics and art in fact offers a model of progression and a sense of hopefulness for the future that 
Rancière overlooks.  
286 The application of the psychoanalytic model of trauma to cultural production became an established 
critical manoeuvre in the 1990s. It has received a good deal of critique; see Kansteiner, Ball and Seltzer. 
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case that Lyotard does not see emancipation (thought of as the end of domination) as a 
possibility, this is not to say that his position is one of resignation and despair. Indeed, as 
I hope my reading of his early work showed, Lyotard views aesthetic experience as 
opening up possibilities, as a force of transformation. Thus, as he acknowledges in the 
late lectures gathered under the title Peregrinations (1988), his work on art and 
aesthetics can be understood as articulating an alternative model of progress to the 
techno-scientific narrative of the new, a model of progress driven by the hope of 
transformation rather than what he considers (as we saw in the earlier discussion of the 
machine) to be the illusion of complete emancipation.  In this sense, I want now to 
suggest, Lyotard’s avant-garde, by pushing Adorno’s aesthetics beyond the boundaries 
of art, provides an alternative model to the modernism that Bernstein describes in 
Against Voluptuous Bodies. In Lyotard’s work, the avant-garde’s attack on aesthetic 
theory—waged through its refusal of the rational categories imposed upon it—emerges 
as something considerably more profound and important than a simple negation or “anti-
art” gesture.  
 
 7. The Post-Aesthetic Avant-Garde: Freedom, Invention and Obligation  
 
One key difference between Lyotard’s avant-garde and Bernstein’s modernism lies, as I 
have already indicated, in how they lay emphasis on the significance of art’s materiality.  
Both describe the importance of a particular event, the collapse of form, the flashing up 
of the materiality of the medium. In Bernstein’s account, this event reminds us that 
sensory experience was once orientational and capable of formative significance: the 
material motive of art is the mourning of the lost authority of nature.  In other words, art 
is an effigy; the material motive of art is a reminder of a type of knowledge that is no 
longer possible. By this account, as I tried to explain in Chapter Two, painting, as the art 
form most able to collapse into its own materiality, is the paradigmatic form of modern 
art. In the well-known essay “Answering the Question: What is Postmodernism?” 
Lyotard acknowledges this idea of failure as central to modern art. Yet, he points out, 
this failure need not be thought negatively: “The emphasis can be placed on the 
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powerlessness of the faculty of presentation, on the nostalgia for presence felt by the 
human subject” (79) or it “can be placed on the increase of being and the jubilation 
which result from the invention of new rules of the game, be it pictorial, artistic or any 
other” (80).  For Lyotard, then, the sublime failure to synthesise does not signify absence 
but rather is a material moment in which presence is doubled (held, hinge-like, in its 
difference, rather than collapsed into one). Instead of the tension between art and its 
materiality revealing the loss of the authority of nature, for Lyotard it reveals the power 
of sensory experience in the present. Working out the possibilities of Adorno’s thought, 
Bernstein presents an account of modernist art which appears as a form of nostalgia, a 
form disinvested of energy and intensity; engaged in the same project, Lyotard 
emphasises the force of art as a transformative conflict.  
 It should come as no surprise, then, that although the abstract paintings of 
Barnett Newman play a pivotal role in the essays of The Inhuman, Lyotard is not 
engaged in a defence of painting. Indeed, his writing on the avant-garde is as concerned 
with cross-disciplinarity as his early work, as his readings of Newman and Duchamp 
show. In “Newman: the Instant” Lyotard suggests that there are two key differences 
between the works of Newman and Duchamp, the first thematic and the second poetic. 
Thematically, Duchamp’s work is a Vanitas, a meditation on the vanity of human 
aspirations and a reminder of human limits. “Duchamp’s great pieces are a plastic 
gamble,” Lyotard writes “an attempt to outwit the gaze (and the mind) because he is 
trying to give an analogical representation of how time outwits consciousness” (79). 
Poetically speaking Duchamp’s work is a story, or many stories:  
 
the time it takes to “consume” (experience, comment upon) these works is, 
so to speak infinite: it is taken up by a search for the apparition itself (the 
term is Duchamp’s), and “stripping bare” is the sacrilegious and sacred 
analgon of apparition. Apparition means that something other occurs. … 
Duchamp organised the space of the Bride according to the principle of 
“not yet” and that of Etant donnés according to the principle of “no 
longer.” Any one who looks at the Glass is waiting for Godot; the voyeur 
pursues a fugitive Albertine behind the door of Etant donnés. These two 
works by Duchamp act as a hinge between Proust’s impassioned anamnesis 




The mentions of Proust and Beckett here are not coincidental for Duchamp’s work is a 
plastic work that speaks to literature, as I have tried to show. It takes the temporality of 
literature into the visual arts in order to reveal that the unpresentable event which eludes 
consciousness can no more be seen by the eye than can be captured in narration. 
Duchamp works on the structures of modernism “notably by researching multi-
dimensional space and all sorts of ‘hinges.’ His work as a whole is inscribed in the great 
temporal hinge between too early/too late” (80).287 In this reading Duchamp’s work 
represents that there is an unpresentable, it holds back the event in a sequence of delays. 
A painting by Newman, in contrast, belongs to the thematic of annunciation: “Newman 
is not representing a non-representable annunciation: he allows it to present itself” (79). 
Newman neither tells nor demands a story: his work is an announcement that renders us 
speechless. “It is a feeling of ‘there’ (Voilà). There is almost nothing to ‘consume,’ or if 
there is, I do not know what it is. One cannot consume an occurrence but merely its 
meaning” (80). This comparison, however, should not be seen to reduce Newman’s 
work to pure form or pure materiality, to suggest it appeals to eyesight alone. In fact for 
Lyotard, Newman’s work is not addressed to the eye, but rather—like Duchamp’s work 
and in “literary” fashion—to the ear. Lyotard explains: 
 
Newman is concerned with giving colour, line or rhythm the force of an 
obligation within a face-to-face relationship, in the second person, and his 
model cannot be Look at this (over there); it must be Look at me, or, to be 
more accurate Listen to me. For an obligation is the modality of time rather 
than space and its organ the ear rather than the eye. Newman thus takes to 
extremes the refutation of the distinguo introduced by Lessing’s Laocoon 
…. (81)288  
                                                 
287 Interestingly, this reading differs somewhat from the reading in Duchamp’s TRANS/formers where 
Lyotard writes that the attempt to “represent unpresentable space is the point (which is not a point) [on 
which] all the work of Duchamp oscillates” (90).  Given that Lyotard consistently argues against univocal 
interpretation, such a shift does not indicate a problematic inconsistency in his thought but rather simply 
indicates that the philosopher has a deep and ongoing engagement with Duchamp’s work.  
288 Lyotard’s attack on the “so-called” body of the human subject should thus also be understood as an 
attack on the way that body is refined and constructed in Romantic aesthetic theory.  To recap, if art is a 
product and expression of the fragmentation of the subject in modernity, then the diversity of the arts 
mirrors that fragmentation; each art, as we have seen both Adorno and Lessing declare in earlier chapters, 
is assigned to a different sense. The great romantic dream of the harmonious unification of the sister arts 
in the Gesamtkunstwerk is, of course, a version of the utopian hope of reconciliation: it is born of 




Duchamp and Newman, in different ways but both by refuting the aesthetic theory of the 
arts, interrogate the relation between presentation and the unpresentable and reveal the 
conditions of visibility as the unpresentable sensory now. Their work bears witness to 
the immanent unpresentable within presentation by appearing as a failure of expression, 
a failure of synthesis. They are energetic dispositions in which heterogeneous materials, 
ideas, times and spaces are held in dynamic conflict: in both cases, the constellations of 
difference which the works constitute draw on an aesthetic or “visual” moment and a 
“literary” moment. Their works differ in how they respond to and articulate the failure of 
expression which underwrites the sublime feeling, but they share the drive to cross-
disciplinarity and the resistance to aesthetic theory which characterises the avant-
garde.289  
The material moment of art or of thought, conceived of as an increase of 
presence rather than as the mourning of an absence, is not the hibernation of the 
formative significance of sensory experience in the material of the medium, but rather 
the announcement of the quod of matter immanent in the quid of meaning. This 
announcement, as paraesthetic works such as “Adorno as the Devil” and Duchamp’s 
TRANS/formers attempt to show, is as much a concern of writing as it is of painting.  
 
A text differs from painting by its medium. The distinctive medium of a text 
is made not of colour but of words. In inscribing these words in perceptible 
time-space, it is only a question of giving them the thickness that is theirs 
                                                                                                                                                
finds its purity and achieves a unified presence, articulates a similar longing. All of these theories attempt 
to institute a hierarchy of the arts, to claim that one or another is dominant, more important, or closer to a 
purity of presence. It is in opposition to such aesthetic theory, as interrogating the unharmonizable, that 
Lyotard situates his work.  
289 In “Answering the Question: What is Postmodernism?” Lyotard suggests that the nostalgic mode of 
presenting the unpresentable as an absence, melancholia, and the mode of novatio, the euphoria of 
invention, are difficult to distinguish from one another. “The nuance which distinguishes these two 
modes may be infinitesimal; they often coexist in the same piece, are almost indistinguishable; and yet 
they testify to a difference (a differend) on which the fate of thought depends and will depend for a long 
time, between regret and assay” (80).  This coexistence of different modes in a single work again recalls 
the energetic disposition, formed through internal conflict, a differend. It also helps to explain how 
Lyotard’s reading of Duchamp changes between the early work, in which he appears very much on the 
side of novatio and “Newman: The Instant” in which he appears as verging on the melancholic. In these 
different pieces Lyotard stages different aspect of his work: the mode of operation is dissimulation again, 
the same mode that Lyotard adopts in response to Adorno.  
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and that is forgotten in the reading of the printed word, the immaterial 
thickness of the forgotten language. (“Foreword” xviii)290 
 
This is what it means to inscribe the inexpressible; to draw and paint with words, to give 
them their materiality and their opacity. In a formulation which invokes the idea of the 
mirrorish dissimulation at work in art and in his own philosophy, Lyotard writes that 
“the obvious meaning of the writing hides other meanings. The written sentence is never 
transparent like a windowpane or faithful like a mirror” (Foreword xvi). This is to say 
that writing, like painting, is a constellation of heterogeneous materials and intensities: it 
is not that informational message, pre-recorded (captured on tape), of pre-digested kitsch 
regurgitated on command. In another of the essays in The Inhuman, Lyotard, once again 
using the arts to read one another and drawing an analogy between painting, music and 
writing, describes words as the material moment of thought: 
 
Words themselves in the most secret place of thought are its matter, its 
timbre, its nuance, i.e. what it cannot manage to think. Words “say”, sound, 
touch, always “before” thought. And they always “say” something other 
than what thought signifies, and what it wants to signify by putting them 
into form.  Words want nothing they are the “un-will”, the “non-sense” of 
thought, its mass. They are innumerable like the nuance of a colour- or 
sound- continuum. They are always older than thought. They can be 
semiologized, philologized, just as nuances are chromatized and timbres 
gradualized. But like timbres and nuances they are always being born. 
Thought tries to tidy them up, arrange them, control them and manipulate 
them. But as they are old people and children, words are not obedient. As 
Gertrude Stein thought, to write is to respect their candour and their age, as 
Cézanne or Karel Appel respect colours.  (“After the Sublime” 142-143) 
 
Words are material—just as paint on canvas and the vibrations of a musical note are 
material—but they exceed this materiality. Writing cannot be reduced to mere matter, 
marks on a page, but at the same time cannot be removed from its material occurrence. 
In this light, theory, rational discourse, appears as the attempt to erase matter, “the 
attempt by which the mind tries to rid itself of words, of the matter that they are, and 
                                                 
290 Lyotard’s “Foreword” introduces a collection of essays by the conceptual artist Joseph Kosuth. In his 
essay, Lyotard reads conceptual art—held by both Greenberg and Bernstein to be the antithesis of abstract 
painting—as equally concerned with material moment as Newman’s work.    
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finally of matter itself” (“After the Sublime” 143).291 Here we arrive at the same 
apocalyptic projection of the complete domination of nature by rationality that both 
Adorno and Bernstein envisage. Lyotard, however, is not as pessimistic: “happily, this 
attempt has no chance of success. One cannot get rid of the Thing. Always forgotten it is 
unforgettable” (“After the Sublime” 143). To put this slightly differently, in practice all 
writing, literary or philosophical, takes place, as Mallarmé put it, in black on white. 
The sublime feeling which accompanies the avant-garde in Lyotard’s thought 
marks the failure of expression, the failure of synthesis (which is also the failure of 
synthesis between the different arts, the “unharmonizable”). In the aesthetics of the 
beautiful, the faculties of reason and imagination are considered to be engaged in a 
pleasurable and harmonious free play;292 the form of the beautiful object is the synthesis 
of sensory and cognitive experience. In the aesthetics of the sublime, art must testify to 
the failure of expression; “form is no longer the point of esthetic feeling” 
(Peregrinations 41). It is by locating the avant-garde within the “formlessness” of the 
aesthetics of the sublime, however, that Lyotard is able to connect it with a sense of 
progress, a progress driven not by the forces of innovation and efficiency but by 
responsibility and obligation.293 This provides a second and equally important means by 
which to compare his formulation of the avant-garde to Bernstein’s modernism.  
                                                 
291 In “Theory as Art” Lyotard argues that critical theory must be considered as one of the arts: throughout 
the paper he talks as though theory and philosophy were exchangeable terms. In later essays, however, the 
term “theory” takes on negative associations, coming to be aligned with the notion of a rigid “structure” or 
set of determining criteria which absolve the thinker of a truly critical engagement. The writing of The 
Differend marks this change, taking place in a context that Lyotard describes as “the weariness with regard 
to ‘theory,’ and the miserable slackening that goes along with it (new this, new that, post-this, post-that, 
etc.) The time has come to philosophize” (xiii). It is for this reason that I claim that it is “philosophy” and 
not “theory” that Lyotard considers art. 
292 See Kant, Critique of Judgement §9, 38-40. 
293 It is crucial to make this connection with a sense of progress, of course, for otherwise there would be 
little sense in insisting on the term avant-garde for, as Cunningham writes, “before any apparent 
locatability of something called the avant-garde within the disputed limits of a socio-historical or art-
historical periodization, the concept of an avant-garde inscribes a particular mode of temporalizing history 
in its own right” (Cunningham, “Making an Example” 256). Lyotard as we have seen challenges “history” 
as representation; yet, without some notion of progress or development (the words are imbued with 
connotations which make them less than ideal) his thought would indeed slip into the despondency of 
which he is sometimes accused. For Lyotard, it is the idea of the avant-garde which opens up this 
alternative mode of progress, which is why the idea is so important throughout his thought. Adorno’s 
notion of autonomy, as Cunningham argues, opens up the importance of progress (for it is though a 
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For Bernstein, as I tried to show in Chapter Two, developments in art are driven 
by the need to find generative conventions by which the material motive may express 
itself. Art depends on its materiality as the site in which a lost sensory significance is 
preserved. The more that art is encroached upon and dominated by techno-scientific 
rationality, the more pressing the need to separate out and conserve the (autonomous) 
space of art that the medium represents. In other words, the development of media is 
envisaged as the negative reflection of the progress of techno-scientific domination, a 
result and expression of that progress.  Lyotard, in contrast, sees the sublime, with its 
combination of pain and pleasure, as opening out the possibility of a different mode of 
progress. “The entrance of suffering into esthetic feeling” Lyotard writes “must be 
understood as a shadow cast over imaginative work by an Idea of reason” 
(Peregrinations 40).  The idea of reason casts a shadow, it mediates the experience of 
the sublime but it does not grasp it: the sublime feeling, like the hinge, reveals the 
connection between unconnected and incommensurable things, the connection between 
the aesthetic and the rational. It reveals that there is something for which existing 
expressions, existing ideas are inadequate; something that exceeds their grasp, remains 
incommensurable. In other words, the aesthetics of the sublime challenges thought, asks 
it to move beyond itself, to develop.  Thus, Lyotard argues, “there is no sublime without 
the development of the speculative and ethical capacities of the mind” (Peregrinations 
41).  In other words, the pain of the inability of thought to synthesise imagination and 
reason is accompanied by the pleasure of the development of these capacities. The open 
space-time of the sublime thus allows an alternative force to that of the will to be felt. 
“The impotency of the empirical will can be felt as a pleasure” writes Lyotard “to the 
extent that it reveals the presence of an independent causality which is incommensurable 
with any natural force: it is the causality of freedom” (Peregrinations 41).294  
                                                                                                                                                
continual process of renewal that art maintains itself), an importance which Adorno, because of his social 
theory, is reluctant to acknowledge: it is this latent possibility that Lyotard develops.   
294 It is at this juncture that some of the other Kantian ideas that Lyotard is reworking as a part of his 
discussion of the sublime come into play. For example, the obligations that come with freedom are part of 
his thinking through Kant’s categorical imperative and, as Crowther has suggested, Lyotard’s work in the 
avant-garde owes something to the Kantian idea of genius (see Critical Aesthetics 157-160, and, for more 
on genius, this thesis Chapter Two 81n23). For artistic creation as the touch of the independent causality 
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To put this point slightly differently, we might say that Bernstein’s notion of 
artistic development takes place as an inversion of the progress of rationalisation. It is a 
programmed synthesis, its goals are fixed, its outcomes predetermined. In contrast, 
Lyotard’s notion of progress through the sublime feeling operates without such 
restrictions; it is driven not by techno-scientific rationality, but by freedom, the freedom 
to invent expressions and formation which do not yet exist, to bring into existence 
different modes of thinking, different modes of expression. The sublime event opens 
towards the future, but as an open space-time not governed by the logic of 
representation, it does not determine in advance what that future will be. In other words, 
invention is not the product of a pre-programmed synthesis, but rather holds the 
potential to open out infinite possibilities. Driven by the development of the ethical and 
speculative capacities of mind, it is a progress, Lyotard writes, “of the responsibility to 
the Ideas of reason as they are negatively ‘presented’ in the formlessness of such and 
such a situation which could occur” (41), which is to say that alternatives to the 
structures of rationality (which are not anti-rational, but rather oppose the opposition 
between rational and aesthetic) are presented in the sublime feeling by means of the 
formlessness of possibility.  
Lyotard’s avant-garde is the response to an obligation, to the Listen to me of 
Newman’s painting. It is a response to the obligation pressed by freedom to 
acknowledge the inadequacy and injustices of existing expressions and structures, the 
failings of what has been thought.295 It attempts so to find new idioms, new ways of 
“putting into perspective” new modes of bearing witness to the fact that there is an 
                                                                                                                                                
of freedom suggests that the truly inventive artist is one that allows that force to flow thought him/her, in 
much the way that the Kantian genius allows nature to move through him/her.  Moreover, as Crowther 
writes, the primary quality of the art of genius is originality, but since there can also be original nonsense 
(Kant admits) it must also be “‘exemplary’ that is it must involve not just a breaking with the old rules but 
also the invention of new ones” (160).  Lyotard’s work is not a straight-forward adoption of Kant’s notion 
of genius as Crowther seems to suggest, however, and should be understood as being modified by his 
critique of subjectivity.  
295 In its mode of working over what is given, Lyotard’s avant-garde might be compared to the model set 
out by de Duve. For de Duve, as I tried to show in Chapter Two, the avant-garde addresses the past but has 
significance for the future. This is also the case with Lyotard’s model. However, in de Duve’s argument 
the avant-garde was located as engaged in a process of addressing art history while for Lyotard art (the 
autonomy of which is no longer considered as a separation from society) is important precisely because it 
addresses a wider, socio-political context. 
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unpresentable: its task is to experiment with material (or media) in order to allow what 
cannot be phrased, what cannot be thought to present itself within presentation. It is this 
obligation that underpins the avant-garde’s mechanical ascesis, the waiting, questioning 
and listening: indeed, as a mode of listening, Lyotard writes, the avant-garde “is closer 
to an ethics than any aesthetics or poetics” (Newman 81).  Through experimentation, 
through a willingness to open itself out towards the unpresentable of difference, the 
avant-garde dissimulates what is given without pre-determining what is possible. 
For both Lyotard and Bernstein, the avant-garde artwork is a gesture of integral 
nominalism, a moment in which established expressions fail and a new expression is 
demanded and/or given. Yet for Bernstein, what art expresses will always be the lost 
authority of nature: for art is an effigy of nature, the consequence and expression of its 
domination through the forces of rationalisation. For Lyotard, in contrast, the moment of 
integral nominalism is a more radically transformative moment: the avant-garde artwork 
must be understood as not simply a set of conventions (however generative) in which to 
express something, but also as a now, an event in itself, a site of transformation. The 
avant-garde experiments with media in an attempt to give voice to what has been 
silenced, and to call new and more just forms into being for the avant-garde work, if 
powerful enough, “will wind up producing its own readers, its own viewers, its own 
listeners” (Just Gaming 10). In other words, the artwork figures alternative realities and 
transforms existing realties by reconfiguring relations, critiquing representations and 
changing the constellations in which thought and expression move. It disperses the 
intensities congealed in reified relations and in so doing, Lyotard argues, “today’s art is 
the equal of being as the power of things possible” (190). The political task of the avant-
garde, then, is not to engage in socio-historical “reality” but to transform the structures 
upon which that reality is based, to reveal “realisms” as constructions and to figure 
alternative realities. While Bernstein’s material motive is the preservation of a corpse, 
the reminder of nature, Lyotard’s material moment is birth of the new, the touch of 
freedom. 
It is as a striving towards such freedom, towards new clouds of thought, that 
Lyotard’s philosophy should also be understood, which returns us to his claim that 
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philosophy should be considered an art. It is a claim which operates with the same 
movement as Duchamp’s Fountain or Warhol’s a; a novel. While such works constitute 
a threat to art, only if taken as sceptical nominalism and thus as operating in the 
framework of art/anti-art, Lyotard’s claim is threatening only if it is taken as sceptical, if 
it is framed in the context of an opposition between art and philosophy/truth. But just as 
the avant-garde work, understood as integral nominalism, promises a certain freedom, so 
too does Lyotard’s proposal. The philosopher, like the artist, he argues, should not be 
guided by theories or pre-determined criteria: instead he or she seeks to reveal the 
hidden conditions of the visible, the “putting into perspective” of thought. The task is 
not to perform a competence in the field of the magical square, but rather to reveal the 
square as such and to dissimulate the intensities which it attempts to annul. To do so, 
philosophy must give up its claim to speak the truth. Artists make no such claim, 
Lyotard reminds us, they respond only to the question “what is art?” They do not create 
treatises but “instead they essay. And so through them we glimpse the importance that 
must be given to the Essay” (191). It thus becomes clear here why Lyotard himself also 
works primarily in the essay form and why his paraesthetic essay experiments are so 
vital to grasping what is at stake in his thought.   
Rather than an articulation of nostalgic modernism, Lyotard’s avant-garde 
writing on the avant-garde extends the importance of the material moment to which it 
bears witness far beyond the realm of the canvas and the conventions of painting. The 
avant-garde artwork creates new idioms; it reconfigures the critical relation and thus it 
offers the possibility of different relations. It is precisely this task that Lyotard’s 
response to Adorno performs, responding to the latter’s aesthetic theory and 
reinvigorating the idea of art’s social responsibility. What is significant about Lyotard’s 
work on the avant-garde, then, is not what it says about art and literature but what it 
allows them to do: Lyotard displaces art and philosophy as an art in order to infect, 
complicate and open out critical discourse, history, aesthetics and politics. He responds 
to Adorno not by reflecting his pessimism and adopting his conclusions, but by 
mirrorishly transforming his thought into a more optimistic model, releasing the power 
of things possible from within it. The avant-garde, as it emerges in Lyotard’s work, as 
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one of Duchamp’s notes puts it, is “the figuration of a possible (not as the opposite of 
impossible nor as related to probable nor as subordinated to likely) The possible is a 











































Conclusion: Interfering with the Avant-Garde 
 
“The construction of mass utopia, was the dream of the twentieth century,” writes Susan 
Buck Morss, a dream which was “the driving ideological force of industrial 
modernization in both its capitalist and socialist forms” (ix).  As Buck Morss reminds us 
however, the century was characterised not just by this dream but also by crimes against 
humanity wrought in its name. It is as an intrinsic part of this twentieth-century 
ideological pattern that the avant-garde has been understood. Its project of social 
engineering through art has been grasped, on one hand, as a protest against the 
conditions of modern experience and an attempt to create a better life from a basis in art 
and, on the other, as an attempt to aestheticize life.296 The avant-garde artist has been 
both heralded as the idealistic engineer of the future and declaimed as a dictator seeking 
a power that reduces everything in his or her path to mere material for construction. The 
avant-garde is seen to partake not only in the utopian dream, but also in its inverse, the 
nightmarish project of totalitarianism. From either perspective, though, the avant-garde 
thus appears as a, if not the, key cultural manifestation of the twentieth century, an idea 
which articulates the most important and vital contradictions and complexities of its 
time.  
The twentieth century is over, however. We stand at the beginning of a new 
century in which new ideological constellations are being formed, new dreams created. 
Indeed, we might argue that it is only on the condition of the emergence of this new 
century that we are able to recognise the ideological patterns of the last as such: the 
magical square that structures the twentieth century emerges as the possibilities of the 
new century begin to unfold. Given its close connection to the dreams and 
disappointments of the twentieth century, then, does the idea of an avant-garde have a 
part to play in the twenty-first century?   This thesis has attempted to show that, thought 
somewhat differently, it does. Through an examination of how it has been put into 
perspective or constructed, I have attempted to suggest that it is possible to think about 
                                                 
296 This argument was developed at length by Boris Groys in The Total Art of Stalinism (See Chapter One 
29n22). See Buck Morss’ “Afterward” (214-278) for a discussion of this text, the circumstances of its 
production and its reception.   Her book is an attempt to counter this reading. 
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the avant-garde in different terms, terms which move beyond negation. By way of a 
conclusion, then, I want to reflect very briefly on the implications of my argument for 
contemporary aesthetics. 
One theorist who would argue that the avant-garde has a key role to play in the 
future is media theorist Lev Manovich. In his influential essay “Avant-garde as 
Software” (1999),297 Manovich argues that it has been technology rather than any critical 
impulse that has been the driving force behind developments in modern art. The avant-
garde is a force of progress and innovation: it does not oppose the logic of capitalism but 
rather, in the form of the industrial arts such as graphic design and advertising, connives 
with the dominant ideology of the late twentieth century in the dream of a techno-utopia. 
Computer software, Manovich announces, is the form in which the avant-garde vision 
has been realised and the form in which it lives on into the twenty-first century. “This 
statement should be understood in two ways,” he writes. “On the one hand, software 
codifies and naturalizes the techniques of the old avant-garde. On the other hand, 
software’s new techniques of working with media represent the new avant-garde of the 
meta-media society” (11). Manovich’s digital avant-garde, then, is purely affirmative: 
the strategies of the twentieth-century avant-gardes are seen as motors in the engine of 
capitalism. Not concerned with changing the structures of society, nor with challenging 
aesthetic and social theory, Manovich’s avant-garde is a form of product development, a 
mode of innovation in which old media are recycled for the sake of recycling alone.  
“The new avant-garde is no longer concerned with seeing or representing the world in 
new ways,” writes Manovich, “but rather with accessing and using previously 
accumulated media in new ways” (8). Works and media are reduced to bits and codes as 
the avant-garde adapts itself to the logic of information: the materiality of works (and 
indeed the world) is no longer considered to be of importance. In this sense, Manovich 
concludes, “new media is post-media” (8). 
It is against such a vision, of course, that Bernstein’s recent defence of 
modernism is directed. Indeed, the urgency of Against Voluptuous Bodies stems from its 
                                                 
297 Manovich is not alone in seeing avant-garde potential in digital technology: for alternative positions in 
the debate see Block and Wohlfarht. 
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author’s sense that the kind of sensuous, formative encounter that art represents is in 
immanent danger of being subsumed into the rationalising force of techno-scientific 
capitalism. The last critical space of late modernity is in danger of recuperation. As I 
tried to show in Chapter Two, Bernstein claims that the sense-making potential of an 
artwork depends upon its materiality and thus that the question of autonomous art “has 
been from the outset the question of mediums, and the fate of the claim of art bound up 
with the possibility of there being artistic mediums” (Against 17). In the twenty-first 
century, Bernstein goes on to acknowledge, technological development threatens to 
make the medium redundant. Referring to the potential of digitalization to replace and 
erase the differences between media, the potential that Manovich celebrates, Bernstein 
argues that in its reduction of matter to bits and codes,  
 
digitalization does for media what the Cartesian reduction […] did for 
nature in general: it reduces material form into abstract numbers. Once this 
occurs then in principle any medium can be translated into any other. […] 
Digitalization thus represents the apotheosis of concepts without intuitions. 
(17) 
 
The materiality of the medium is erased as art is reduced to information: in other words, 
digitalization represents the triumph of techno-scientific rationality over the lost 
authority of nature that the medium, according to Bernstein, stands in for.  For 
Bernstein, this signals the end of art and the realisation of the danger to which it bears 
witness.  In the face of this threat, modernist painting appears as the retreat from 
“information”, hibernation appears as the only option. As I attempted to demonstrate, in 
this framework the avant-garde appears as secondary to modernism, a mode that fails to 
grasp the real stakes of art.  
 These oppositional positions adopted by Manovich and Bernstein are generated 
by the same ideological pattern identified by Buck Morss. They are performances of the 
same structure: Manovich’s avant-garde articulates the dream of a techno-utopia, 
Bernstein’s apprehension about the digital is a dystopian nightmare of total 
rationalization. That this structure can be disinvested and transformed has been the 
central line of argument of this thesis. In Chapters One and Two, I attempted to show the 
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crucial move of recent work on the cross-disciplinary avant-garde has been to think it in 
relation to the medium specificity of modernism: to show that these impulses constitute 
a false opposition. This insight was developed through Adorno’s aesthetic theory, as I 
tried to show the importance of his commitment to thinking through the relation between 
the abstract/general and the concrete/particular. As I set it out in Chapters One and 
Three, the real challenge presented by the avant-gardes is in fact to think through the 
relationship between conceptual thought and the materiality of art. Allowing materiality 
and sense to interfere with one another, the avant-gardes operate against any easy 
opposition between the aesthetic and the conceptual and, despite Manovich’s hopes and 
Bernstein’s fears, show that erasing one in the name of the other is an unachievable 
fantasy: the signal is a noise. The avant-garde work, as I argued in Chapter Three, reveal 
this by highlighting the way in which the interference of matter impacts on thought.  
 In Chapter Four, I tried to show how these insights ground Lyotard’s important 
but seldom discussed response to the avant-garde. Lyotard’s philosophy develops the 
implications of “avant-garde” media hybridity in order to critique Adorno’s work and to 
drive it beyond the limitations its sets for itself and the pessimism that marks Bernstein’s 
position. Lyotard, while acknowledging the precariousness of art, shows how this 
impulse to cross-disciplinarity is as important and as critical as “modernist” medium 
specificity.  Importantly, while distinguishing the logic of the avant-garde from the logic 
of innovation that drives Manovich’s vision—while arguing that its development does 
not conform to the logic of efficiency and innovation that drives capital—his work also 
offers a way in which to think about how the avant-garde impulse might develop. 
Lyotard presents the avant-garde as a mode or moment of transformation, a questioning 
that raises the challenge of how to respond to that which evades categorisation and 
rational or conceptual understanding. The avant-garde as it emerges from his work is a 
response to the question of how we might read beyond conceptual “meanings” and how 
we might inscribe what is inexpressible in established and conventional idioms. The 
post-aesthetic avant-garde that I have attempted to present in this thesis thus challenges 
not just aesthetic theory but also continually reconfigures its critical links with 
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experience. In this sense, as I have tried to show, the avant-garde is a transformative 
force rather than a specific, historical field.  
The contemporary debate on digital art is the product of the kind of nostalgia 
against which Lyotard’s avant-garde operates. Once the positions of Manovich and 
Bernstein are recognised as belonging within this structure, they immediately appear less 
compelling. What becomes clear is that digital media do not necessarily represent either 
the advance or the fall of the avant-garde. In other words, digital media should be 
viewed as another set of material conventions: conventions which may or may not be 
generative of new possibilities and which need to be investigated for both the 
opportunities which they open out, as well as for those that they disallow, the 
expressions that they suppress. All of which is to say that digital media are no more or 
less generative of avant-garde activity than any other media: the avant-garde operates 
against the hierarchical structuring of media/arts that such aesthetic theory inscribes. 
If the avant-garde is to have relevance for the twenty-first century, then, it needs 
to be thought beyond the models of utopianism and negativity in which it is currently 
mired.  The ideological structure which Buck Morss sees as underwriting the twentieth 
century, as I hope my reading of Lyotard shows, can be disinvested. Moreover, this 
disinvestment, as I have presented it, develops out of the work and theorizations of the 
avant-gardes. What is at stake in theorising the avant-garde is not the labelling of 
specific phenomenon or specific fields, but rather the reconfiguration of relations upon 
which society is grounded, the possibility of art as having an intrinsic political and social 
task.  This is why it is important to recognise that the avant-garde, by questioning the 
relationships between the arts as well as between art and non-art, does not resolve but 
rather opens and holds open the question of art’s relation to society. It is as an opening, a 
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